WikiLeaks is at it again-this time, State Department in "contigency" mode.

LOL. WOW, so civilized, What ever happened to humanity, standards of decent behavior etc etc

Hypocrite.

http://bbs.clutchfans.net/showpost.php?p=5740281&postcount=45

http://bbs.clutchfans.net/showpost.php?p=5740153&postcount=40

http://bbs.clutchfans.net/showpost.php?p=5740029&postcount=34


Double standards much? Get out of here with your inane posts.

 

Execution is the appropriate sentence for treason.

 

Rereading the original article I had in mind I think it is my recollection that is off.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wor...hanistan-Taliban-hunting-down-informants.html

In the article Adm. Mike Mullen says that "Mr Assange can say whatever he likes about the greater good he thinks he and his source are doing, but the truth is they might already have on their hands the blood of some young soldier or that of an Afghan family," So it is speculation on Adm. Mullen's part and not a fact.

What is a fact though is that the prior Wikileaks leak did include the names and in some cases the addresses of Afghans that had cooperated with NATO forces.

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20011886-503543.html

[rquoter]
Hundreds of Afghan civilians who worked as informants for the U.S. military have been put at risk by WikiLeaks' publication of more than 90,000 classified intelligence reports which name and in many cases locate the individuals, The Times newspaper reported Wednesday.

The article says, in spite of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange's claim that sensitive information had been removed from the leaked documents, that reporters scanning the reports for just a couple hours found hundreds of Afghan names mentioned as aiding the U.S.-led war effort. One specific example cited by the paper is a report on an interview conducted by military officers of a potential Taliban defector. The militant is named, along with his father and the village in which they live.
[/rquoter]

 

From what I have been hearing about this current batch of wikileaks is that there is little there that is exposing some great conspiracy, criminal activity or really things that are extremely unethical on the part of the US State Dept.. What these leaks do mostly expose is a lot of embarrassing comments by diplomats and foreign leaders. This seems to have done as much damage to other countries as to the US State Dept. At the moment I don't see these things on par with The Pentagon Papers but more along the lines of the Climategate emails which embarrassed the scientist involved but didn't seriously challenge the scientific basis of man made global warming.

Like Climategate though these emails will make it more difficult for those involved to do their jobs. They damage US credibility in regard to confidentiality in diplomatic discussions and make it that much harder for the US to conduct diplomacy. Ironically Assange, rather than reducing the prospects of war might have made it more difficult to seek diplomatic solutions to conflicts.

 

It does reveal glaring weaknesses on who should and who shouldn't have access to this info.

 

I don't think they have vetted it at all, other than picking which documents go into which releases. There are no top-secret documents because his source didn't have enough clearance to get those. That's all.

I'm down with keeping the government honest and exposing the lies when they try to deceive the electorate. I see some merit in the evidence of known war atrocities we've committed, for example, even though those might be the most damaging. In those cases, the public has a legitimate right to know and perps should be prosecuted.

But, these diplomatic leaks don't fall in that category at all. As a citizen, I vote these guys in to represent me and do my governing for me. By releasing information haphazardly, wikileaks makes their work more difficult and hurts my own self-interest. Because this information isn't only being released to the 'stockholders' but to the whole world. And that's going to mess up a lot of delicate negotiations that we could have gained from. If China takes a harder stance to save face because people think they'll give up on North Korea, that hurts a lot. If Rafsanjani doesn't succeed Khamenei because of this leak and cannot therefore remove Ahmadinejad, that's going to hurt too.

This little diplomatic nuggets were not being kept secret in an attempt to deceive the voting public. They're secret to deceive foreign powers and to preserve advantages our country has in an international competition. Wikileaks isn't fighting despotism here, just taking a dump in the punch-bowl.

As for knowing we're dealing with crooks, that we fund murders and torture, and all that -- I think we knew that before the leaks.

 

I think we'd be better off if every major power had their **** leaked, but damaging the US alone won't do us any benefit in the long run.

Maybe if this happened before the 70s when people cared and were willing to march and possibly get beat up.

Today, people seem to be focusing on a different set of problems.

 

For international relations, this dump seems to be a whole lot of meh, other than the North Korean missiles to Iran thing. The rest of it:

- The Arabs still hate the Persians.
- State Department officials spy.
- World leaders that general public thinks are corrupt are also considered corrupt by US administration officials.
- Kim Jung-Il is too crazy for China.

Honestly, it's like international relations gossip. I like the idea of Wikileaks, but it can be dangerous to some of the people on the ground. Assange should only leak stuff where the information is important enough to be worth the risk.

 

They haven't released them all, but I've skimmed through everything, and read through everything Israeli/Arab/Iran/Europe.

Sarkozy the authoritarian. WHO KNEW? lol

edit: .. through everything AVAILABLE..

 

One of the most damning things released by WikiLeaks is the direct connection between Iran's pursuit of long range missiles that could carry atomic warheads, North Korea, who supplied Iran missile components, and China, which was the conduit between Iran and North Korea. China has a great deal of explaining to do. North Korea shipped the components by air, fearing an American interdiction by sea, and flew them to Iran via Beijing. By doing so, China has had a hand in arming a rogue state and giving them advanced technology. We attempted to prevent this by insuring that China was aware of what was happening (how could they not be?). It appears that our efforts were ignored by the PRC's oligarchy. This is part of a leaked cable from 2007, during the Bush Administration. What is clear is that the United States made those efforts behind the scenes, when they could have gone public with this. That discretion was not rewarded by Beijing taking action to halt and prevent these technology tranfers, and the transfer of actual long range missile components.

Saturday, 03 November 2007, 05:03
S E C R E T STATE 152317
EO 12958 DECL: 10/31/2027
TAGS PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: POST REQUESTED TO FOLLOW UP ON ONGOING MATTERS OF
PROLIFERATION CONCERN RAISED AT APEC BY PRESIDENT BUSH
REF: (A)STATE 071143, (B)STATE 073601, (C)STATE 72896, (D)BEIJING 5361, (E) STATE 148514
CLASSIFIED BY EAP DAS THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1. (S) URGENT ACTION REQUEST: IN SEPTEMBER DURING THEIR MEETING AT THE APEC SUMMIT IN SYDNEY AUSTRALIA, PRESIDENT BUSH DISCUSSED WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT HU STRONG CONCERNS RELATING TO THE ONGOING TRANSSHIPMENT VIA BEIJING OF KEY BALLISTIC MISSILE PARTS FROM NORTH KOREA TO IRAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM. PRESIDENT BUSH PLEDGED TO RESPOND TO PRESIDENT HU'S REQUESTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION. EMBASSY SHOULD ON NOVEMBER 3 AT THE MOST EFFECTIVE LEVEL POSSIBLE, DELIVER THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 8 WHICH RELATES TO SPECIFIC, TIME- SENSITIVE INFORMATION ABOUT AN IMMINENT TRANSSHIPMENT. IN ADDITION, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY POST SHOULD DELIVER THE NON-PAPER IN PARA 9 TO MFA AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL POSSIBLE, PREFERABLY BY THE AMBASSADOR SINCE THIS IS IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS.

----------

OBJECTIVES

----------

2. (S/REL CHINA) Post should:

--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Request China to stop an imminent shipment to Iran's ballistic missile program. This is the same cargo that the Ambassador shared about on October 25 (ref E). It is now scheduled to leave Beijing airport on November 4.

--(This point for November 3 Delivery) Note the importance of this demarche since it relates to a topic discussed by Presidents Bush and Hu in Sydney. Embassy should further note that the Embassy will be seeking an appointment at the highest level possible to convey a more extensive presentation on this topic of ballistic missile parts from North Korea to Iran.

--Remind Chinese officials that President Bush has been personally engaged on the issue of the transshipment of ballistic missile parts between North Korea and Iran via Beijing and that he raised this issue with President Hu at the APEC Summit.

-- Seek information on the steps China has taken since the APEC discussion to address this issue and impress on them the necessity for China to take immediate strong action.

-- Stress that the credibility of UN Security Council actions must be maintained by vigorous implementation by UN Member States of UNSC resolutions calling for Chapter VII sanctions, particularly 1718, 1737, and 1747.

--Indicate that the U.S. believes that the proliferation of missile technology between North Korea and Iran will increase and that these two countries will attempt to conduct these transfers through Chinese territory.

--Emphasize the need to inspect cargo and personal goods on regularly scheduled flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to Iran in order to detect and deter these shipments.

--Explain to Chinese officials that the U.S. carefully reviews the intelligence material that we have on shipments before we share it, and we ask that Chinese authorities respect this and act on our information accordingly and appropriately.

--Indicate that the United States believes that we can work together cooperatively and effectively on these issues.

--Express our willingness to continue to share as much information as possible to assist China's efforts to uphold these UN Security Council resolutions.

Background: Ballistic Missile Parts Shipped via Beijing Between North Korea and Iran.

--------------------------------------------- -------------

3. (S/Rel China) Iran and North Korea have continued their longstanding cooperation on ballistic missile technology, via air- shipments of ballistic-missile related items. We assess that some of these shipments consist of ballistic missile jet vanes that frequently transit Beijing on regularly scheduled flights on Air Koryo and Iran Air. We believe that the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG) is the probable end user for these parts. SBIG is listed in the annex to UNSCR 1737 and these jet vanes are controlled under Item 10.A.2 of the Missile Technology Control Regime and Item 6 of China's missile- related export control regulations. Moreover, UNSCRs 1718 and 1737 prohibit the transfer to or from North Korea or Iran, respectively, of jet vanes and any other item listed in UNSC document S/2006/815. These shipments therefore represent violations of UNSCRs 1718 and 1737.

4. (S/Rel China) The U.S. has raised this issue with China at the highest levels several times in the last few months. In May 2007, the United States informed China of imminent shipments on three separate occasions (Refs A,B and C). Though Chinese officials informed Embassy Beijing that China's investigations have found no evidence of these transfers, it appears that these shipments did occur and are continuing to transit via Beijing. In addition this issue was raised by ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney during bilateral nonproliferation talks in August 2007 (Ref D). The Deputy Secretary also raised this issue with Executive Vice Foreign Minister (EVFM) Dai Bingguo via during a telephone conversation in August. Finally, in September 2007, President Bush discussed this issue with Chinese President Hu at the APEC summit in Sydney. The two leaders agreed that the USG would provide the PRC with further information on these transfers.

5. (S/Rel China) On October 25 the U.S. provided PRC officials with detailed information, including the airway bill and flight number, of another imminent shipment of military related goods from North Korea to Iran via Beijing. This shipment was also assessed as destined for Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG). We now have information that the goods will be shipped on November 4 and insist on a substantive response from China to this information.

6. (S/Rel China) Our information indicates that at least 10 air shipments of jet vanes have transited Beijing thus far and that these shipments will not only continue but will also grow in volume. We have encouraged the Chinese to undertake frequent inspections of cargo on Air Koryo or Iran Air flights transiting Beijing from North Korea to both deter and detect these shipments.

7. (S/Rel China) The Department is seeking both immediate action on this new information and a strategic approach with regards to this critical issue. We assess that the best way to prevent these shipments in the future is for Chinese authorities to take action, such as those identified in para 9, that will make the Beijing airport a less hospitable transfer point.

--------------------------------------------- --------

NON-PAPER ON URGENT MATTER TO BE DELIVERED NOVEMBER 3

--------------------------------------------- --------

8. (S/Rel China) Begin points:

-- Last week we raised with you information regarding North Korean plans to send a shipment, probably for Iran's ballistic missile program, to Iran. We believe the cargo is intended for Iran's Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is responsible for Iran's solid-propellant ballistic missile program. You had requested additional information.

-- We now have reason to believe that the items above will be shipped to Iran via scheduled Iran Air flight on November 4.

--If these goods are missile-related, North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile-related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these concerns in mind we are asking that Chinese authorities investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.

------------------------------------------

BEGIN NON-PAPER FOR DELIVERY BY AMBASSADOR

------------------------------------------

9. (S/REL CHINA) Begin Points:

--Over the past several months we have raised with Chinese officials the problem of ballistic missile-related transfers between Iran and North Korea being transshipped through China. President Bush raised U.S. concerns on this matter with President Hu during the APEC summit in Sydney, demonstrating the importance of the issue to the United States. In response to President Hu's request for additional details, we are providing you further information regarding these activities. Specifically, we are urgently providing information regarding an imminent shipment of serious concern.

-- North Korea is prohibited under UNSCR 1718 from exporting missile- related items and UN Member States are prohibited from importing those items. In addition, North Korea would potentially be precluded under UNSCR 1737 from transferring these items to Iran if they are among the missile-related components included in S/2006/815 or if North Korea or China determines that they would contribute to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Moreover, SBIG is designated in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 and, as such, is subject to the mandatory asset freeze called for in the resolution. With these concerns in mind we are insisting that Chinese authorities urgently investigate this shipment and prohibit it from proceeding to Iran.

--We are very concerned that North Korean shipments of jet vanes occur on regularly scheduled commercial air flights transiting through Beijing. We believe this has been the case on about 10 flights.

--These items are likely intended for Iran's solid propellant missile development organization, the Shahid Bagheri Industries Group (SBIG).

--These cargo shipments probably include front companies.

--We have identified a large number of shipments beginning late last year of what are probably ballistic missile-related items that have transited Beijing, and we would like to share further information on these shipments.

--[DETAILS REMOVED] December 2006: A delegation from SBIG returned from Pyongyang probably via Beijing and transported what we assess to be jet vanes for a solid propellant medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) under development in Iran.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] January 2007: North Korea delivered what were probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or around [DETAILS REMOVED] January 2007: North Korea delivered what were probably jet vanes for Iran's developmental solid propellant MRBM to SBIG via Beijing on board regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] May 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] May 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of four what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

-- On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of five what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] June 2007: An air shipment composed of three what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] July 2007: An air shipment composed of ten what were probably jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] July 2007: An air shipment possibly composed of an unknown number of jet vanes from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--On or about [DETAILS REMOVED] August: An air shipment possibly composed of one jet vane from North Korea to Iran for SBIG was scheduled to depart North Korea and transit Beijing via regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--We believe that the number of jet vanes sent to Iran will increase dramatically in the future.

--To date we believe that about 40 probable jet vanes have been sent from North Korea to Iran.

--The contract for these components called for a total number of 500 and we assess that shipments of these may increase to a rate of 100- 160 per month.

--In addition, our information indicates that a second order of 1,500 components - possibly additional jet vanes - was agreed to in December of last year.

-- We believe that this trade will continue to utilize regularly- scheduled commercial passenger flights.

--As we have discussed on several occasions, Iran also has been seeking probable tungsten-copper alloy plates from China's Dalian Sunny Industries, also known as LIMMT. Dalian Sunny Industries shipped part of an order for this material in September. These plates are suitable for Iranian domestic production of jet vanes or as an insulator for ballistic missile components. Iran could be seeking these plates in case North Korea is unable to provide the quantity or quality of jet vanes required.

--We urge you to prevent such shipments via whatever action you deem appropriate, including frequent inspection of [NAMES REMOVED] flights. The use of regularly-scheduled commercial passenger flights indicates that frequent regular inspections of [NAMESREMOVED] flights are in order and would help deter these shipments in the future.

--We will continue to provide you with relevant information to help end this proliferation.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/128567

 

Coming soon from WikiLeaks: tens of thousands of documents from a major U.S. financial firm in early 2011.

Other interesting bit:

 

It's interesting to me that people get into these systems, see them for as corrupt and inherently immoral as they truly are, and then a sense of guilt and a need for justice compels them to leak documents.

I think it's absolutely great, and I can't wait to see the private-sector industry documents.

 

WOW.

And Assange is #3 right now for Time Person of the Year. Guess it's a great time to release all this stuff. JuanValdez kind of echoes my middle of the road, has no business spoken in D&D opinion on this (though he certainly was more eloquant than I could have been), but I have to admit........this is like a commuter train wreck............no matter how bad it is, you can't take your eyes away from it.

 

In this age of growing uncertainty, maybe people in their respective countries will retreat into a Stockholm Syndrome-like nationalism.

I wonder if something so explosive can shock us into action. I think there are certain degrees of shock and anger, like the guvmint socializing meddycare, but the old fart in me is doubtful. So that makes me think who else is reading this and how much can they use it to effect.

 

just an aside, I wonder who's got the rights to the movie

 

cnn? foxnews?

but they passed....