Where was the world uproar in ....

This was us not doing anything to Hitler?

 

Our people were far and away opposed to getting into the war...and were selling arms to the Germans to use against the British...and we agreed to overlook the British inability to pay for arms given their at the time unfortunate situation ( being attacked by the greatest military power on the planet) only in exchange for naval bases worht far more, and only under the writen guarentee that the debts would be payed in the future...this for our sworn allies....yeah...great stuff...By saying we did nothing to him I was addressing the contention that we attacked him before he was a threat to us, and wanting nothing to do with us, which was sort of refuted by the whole him declaring war and attacking us thing...

If you feel that Lend Lease was the motivation for Hitler declaration of war, you have an interesting point to make to history, albeit you are in for some stiff competition on the guise of the notes of Albert Speer and the German High Command, who largely were relieved by Lend Lease as they ( accurately ) saw it as the US throwing Britain a bone in compensation for ignoring thier treaty obligations and because FDR was so adamantly in favour of US involvment...

 

There were protests in Germany in both cases. However, they were much smaller than the current ones and I agree that you do have a point. It strikes me that the current anti-war protesters actually make the mistake that one could almost think they side with Saddam. There always seems to be more protest against something the USA do than when others do it.

 

The USSR did more of a job in saving Europe from Hitler then America.

 

OK, while we're going down the list:
1.) South Africa, where we supported apartheid because those folks were anticommunists
2.) South Vietnam where we supported right wing dictators because those folks were anticommunists
3.) Nicaragua where we supported right wing terrorists because those folks were anticommunists
4.) Columbia where our military support enables the government to fund right wing terrorists because they aren't left wing terrorists
5.) Several countries in the central america where we deposed democratically elected officials and supported revolutions for right wing dictatorships. Domincan Republic, Chile, Guatemala, and this does included the attempt on democratic Costa Rica.

We have a long and sometimes sorry history of intervention.

RE: former Soviet Union and US in WW2, the Soviets suffered somewhere between 15-30 million dead. The United States had less than 500,000. The start of the end of the war for Germany was Operation Barbarossa.

 

The Summer Games of the XXII Olympiad, although boycotted by the United States and other countries, were held in Moscow, U.S.S.R. from July 19th to August 3rd. Almost 6,000 competitors from 81 countries arrived to compete in 22 sports. An estimated 10,000 athletes were expected to be a part of the 1980 Summer Games.

The boycott, a result of the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, was announced by President Jimmy Carter on January 20th, 1980. A February 20th deadline was given to the Soviets to pull out of the country or else the United States would refuse to participate in the Summer Games and would request that other countries do the same.

Needless to say, a huge controversy erupted. The Soviet Union justified its invasion as being "the correct response to a neighbor's call for help." U.S. athletes opposed the boycott (big shock, eh?) because they felt that the boycott was only hurting them and believed it would have little to no effect on Soviet policies.

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) said that the Games should not be concerned with politics and looked down upon the United States' actions. Nevertheless, the U.S. stood firmly by its decision and did not participate. Canada, Japan, China and West Germany also joined in boycotting the Summer Games.

 

Let's look at a list of vetos of the US...
Vetoes from the USA 1972-2002

Year - Resolution Vetoed by the USA

1972 Condemns Israel for killing hundreds of people in Syria and Lebanon in air raids.

1973 Afirms the rights of the Palestinians and calls on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories.

1976 Condemns Israel for attacking Lebanese civilians.
1976 Condemns Israel for building settlements in the occupied territories.
1976 Calls for self determination for the Palestinians.
1976 Afirms the rights of the Palestinians.

1978 Urges the permanent members (USA, USSR, UK, France, China) to insure United Nations decisions on the maintenance of international peace and security.
1978 Criticises the living conditions of the Palestinians.
1978 Condemns the Israeli human rights record in occupied territories.
1978 Calls for developed countries to increase the quantity and quality of development assistance to underdeveloped countries.

1979 Calls for an end to all military and nuclear collaboration with the apartheid South Africa.
1979 Strengthens the arms embargo against South Africa.
1979 Offers assistance to all the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movement.
1979 Concerns negotiations on disarmament and cessation of the nuclear arms race.
1979 Calls for the return of all inhabitants expelled by Israel.
1979 Demands that Israel desist from human rights violations.
1979 Requests a report on the living conditions of Palestinians in occupied Arab countries.
1979 Offers assistance to the Palestinian people.
1979 Discusses sovereignty over national resources in occupied Arab territories.
1979 Calls for protection of developing counties' exports.
1979 Calls for alternative approaches within the United Nations system for improving the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
1979 Opposes support for intervention in the internal or external affairs of states.
1979 For a United Nations Conference on Women.
1979 To include Palestinian women in the United Nations Conference on Women.
1979 Safeguards rights of developing countries in multinational trade negotiations.

1980 Requests Israel to return displaced persons.
1980 Condemns Israeli policy regarding the living conditions of the Palestinian people.
1980 Condemns Israeli human rights practices in occupied territories. 3 resolutions.
1980 Afirms the right of self determination for the Palestinians.
1980 Offers assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movement.
1980 Attempts to establish a New International Economic Order to promote the growth of underdeveloped countries and international economic co-operation.
1980 Endorses the Program of Action for Second Half of United Nations Decade for Women.
1980 Declaration of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
1980 Emphasises that the development of nations and individuals is a human right.
1980 Calls for the cessation of all nuclear test explosions.
1980 Calls for the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

1981 Promotes co-operative movements in developing countries.
1981 Affirms the right of every state to choose its economic and social system in accord with the will of its people, without outside interference in whatever form it takes.
1981 Condemns activities of foreign economic interests in colonial territories.
1981 Calls for the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons.
1981 Calls for action in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, curb the arms race and promote disarmament.
1981 Urges negotiations on prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.
1981 Declares that education, work, health care, proper nourishment, national development, etc are human rights.
1981 Condemns South Africa for attacks on neighbouring states, condemns apartheid and attempts to strengthen sanctions. 7 resolutions.
1981 Condemns an attempted coup by South Africa on the Seychelles.
1981 Condemns Israel's treatment of the Palestinians, human rights policies, and the bombing of Iraq. 18 resolutions.
1982 Condemns the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 6 resolutions (1982 to 1983).

1982 Condemns the shooting of 11 Muslims at a shrine in Jerusalem by an Israeli soldier.
1982 Calls on Israel to withdraw from the Golan Heights occupied in 1967.
1982 Condemns apartheid and calls for the cessation of economic aid to South Africa. 4 resolutions.
1982 Calls for the setting up of a World Charter for the protection of the ecology.
1982 Sets up a United Nations conference on succession of states in respect to state property, archives and debts.
1982 Nuclear test bans and negotiations and nuclear free outer space. 3 resolutions.
1982 Supports a new world information and communications order.
1982 Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.
1982 Development of international law.
1982 Protects against products harmful to health and the environment .
1982 Declares that education, work, health care, proper nourishment, national development are human rights.
1982 Protects against products harmful to health and the environment.
1982 Development of the energy resources of developing countries.

1983 Resolutions about apartheid, nuclear arms, economics, and international law. 15 resolutions.

1984 Condemns support of South Africa in its Namibian and other policies.
1984 International action to eliminate apartheid.
1984 Condemns Israel for occupying and attacking southern Lebanon.
1984 Resolutions about apartheid, nuclear arms, economics, and international law. 18 resolutions.

1985 Condemns Israel for occupying and attacking southern Lebanon.
1985 Condemns Israel for using excessive force in the occupied territories.
1985 Resolutions about cooperation, human rights, trade and development. 3 resolutions.
1985 Measures to be taken against Nazi, Fascist and neo-Fascist activities .

1986 Calls on all governments (including the USA) to observe international law.
1986 Imposes economic and military sanctions against South Africa.
1986 Condemns Israel for its actions against Lebanese civilians.
1986 Calls on Israel to respect Muslim holy places.
1986 Condemns Israel for sky-jacking a Libyan airliner.
1986 Resolutions about cooperation, security, human rights, trade, media bias, the environment and development.
8 resolutions.

1987 Calls on Israel to abide by the Geneva Conventions in its treatment of the Palestinians.
1987 Calls on Israel to stop deporting Palestinians.
1987 Condemns Israel for its actions in Lebanon. 2 resolutions.
1987 Calls on Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon.
1987 Cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States.
1987 Calls for compliance in the International Court of Justice concerning military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua and a call to end the trade embargo against Nicaragua. 2 resolutions.
1987 Measures to prevent international terrorism, study the underlying political and economic causes of terrorism, convene a conference to define terrorism and to differentiate it from the struggle of people from national liberation.
1987 Resolutions concerning journalism, international debt and trade. 3 resolutions.
1987 Opposition to the build up of weapons in space.
1987 Opposition to the development of new weapons of mass destruction.
1987 Opposition to nuclear testing. 2 resolutions.
1987 Proposal to set up South Atlantic "Zone of Peace".

1988 Condemns Israeli practices against Palestinians in the occupied territories. 5 resolutions (1988 and 1989).

1989 Condemns USA invasion of Panama.
1989 Condemns USA troops for ransacking the residence of the Nicaraguan ambassador in Panama.
1989 Condemns USA support for the Contra army in Nicaragua.
1989 Condemns illegal USA embargo of Nicaragua.
1989 Opposing the acquisition of territory by force.
1989 Calling for a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on earlier UN resoltions.

1990 To send three UN Security Council observers to the occupied territories.

1995 Afirms that land in East Jerusalem annexed by Israel is occupied territory.

1997 Calls on Israel to cease building settlements in East Jerusalem and other occupied territories. 2 resolutions.

1999 Calls on the USA to end its trade embargo on Cuba. 8 resolutions (1992 to 1999).

2001 To send unarmed monitors to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
2001 To set up the International Criminal Court.

2002 To renew the peace keeping mission in Bosnia.

Note: During the eighties, the UN was concerned with Saddam Hussein's use of chemcal weapons. On 3/21/1986, the Security Council President, "speaking on behalf of the Security Council," stated that the Council members were "profoundly concerned by the unanimous conclusion of the specialists that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian troops...[and] the members of the Council strongly condemn this continued use of chemical weapons in clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons" (S/17911 and Add. 1, 21 March 1986).

The United States voted AGAINST the issuance of this statement.

 

The USSR was one of the key causes of things getting so bad in Europe in the first place...........to pat them on the head for taking the brunt of the heavy fighting with the Germans a few years later is amusing.

<a HREF="http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/nazsov/nonagres.htm">Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</a>

<i>The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desirous of strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R and proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April 1926 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached the following agreement:

ARTICLE I
Both High Contracting Parties obligate, themselves to desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other powers.

ARTICLE II
Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third power.

ARTICLE III
The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests.

ARTICLE IV
Neither of the two High Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of powers whatsoever that is directly or indirectly aimed at the other party.

ARTICLE V
Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties over problems of one kind or another, both parties shall settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary, through the establishment of arbitration commissions.

ARTICLE VI
The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with the provision that, in so far as one of the High Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this treaty shall automatically be extended for another five years.

ARTICLE VI
The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. The agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is signed.

Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.

MOSCOW, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

V. RIBBENTROP

With full power of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. MOLOTOV
</i>

<a HREF="http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/nazsov/addsepro.htm">Secret Additional Protocol</a>

<i>On the occasion of the signature of the Nonaggression Pact between the German Reich and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics the undersigned plenipotentiaries of each of the two parties discussed in strictly confidential conversations the question of the boundary of their respective spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. These conversations led to the following conclusions:

1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party.

2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San.

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.

In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.

3. With regard to Southeastern Europe attention is called by the Soviet side to its interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares; its complete political disinterestedness in these areas.

This protocol shall be treated by both parties as strictly secret.

Moscow, August 23, 1939.

For the Government of the German Reich:

V. RIBBENTROP

Plenipotentiary of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:

V. MOLOTOV
</i>

 

LOL! Hayes will be smiling/cringing in anticipation of what's coming....As he knows, but apparently Mango does not, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, and the factors leading up to it were not only the source of one of my more significant post-grad papers, but continue to be something I am supposed to refer to often, much to Hayes' annoyance...


The Soviets did indeed sign a pact of non-aggression with the Nazis...but only as a very last resort, and only after the powers of Western Europe had rebuffed all of Stalin's desperate attempts to formulate an alliance against what he presciently saw as the growing menace of Nazi Germany, and betrayed their lesser allies ( Czechezlovakia) in an effort ( later admitted, and bascially acknowledged at the time by Halifax and others) to turn the Nazi eye of expansion eastwards towards the U.S.S.R....


Stalin spent several years before the Munich agreement sending appeal after appeal to the French and British offering alliance against Germany, in an effort to present a unified front that would dissuade Hitler from becoming too bellicose, but the French and particularly British view was that Communism was a far greater threat than Fascism, and Stalin was repeatedly rebuffed. The growing Soviet sense that they were being shut out when, in 1938, the British and French agreed to the Nazi occupation of the Sudetenland, the most fortified region of Czechoslovakia while letting the Czech representative only find out his of his nation's betrayal after the meeting was convened...a meeting which the Soviets were noteable by their absence, due to not having evwn been informed of this meeting deciding the fate of Europe, let alone invited. And the conditions the French and British asked for in return? That Hitler would avow to no further ambitions for any land...in the West.

The implications were clear...rebuffed efforts at treaties with the USSR against Germany...treaty with Germany sacrificing land between Germany and the USSR, at whose discussions the Soviets weren't even invited. Stalin was shut out, and signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact as a last resort, having seen all other efforts denied, and being left alone to deal with Hitler's Germany...So to blame him for doing exactly what the West had done ie protecting himself from Hitler's growing abition by menas of treaty, would be a reach even if you didn't consider the other factors such as the West's obvious desire to isolate him, and clear diplomatic rejection of him in favour of Hitler would be beyond an oversimplification, it would be an hisorical injustice.

Note:While my paper dealt with these facts, it was not in an effort to prove the above...that is accepted historical fact.


Second Note: Hayes...I didn't bring it up...

 

MacBeth -

You are right, Russia was HUGE in WWII. They were the ones who took Berlin and outlasted the Germans in Stalingrad. The Russians were just as important as the US.

But to say that they more important is a little overboard. The lend-lease act may have begun late, but it was huge to both England and Russia. Over 11 billion in aid was sent to Russia.

It's hard to argue the value of the American manpower and resources. The war in Europe was at a stalemate, maybe leaning in the German favor. The US entry opened up a real Western Front and forced Germany to split its forces, which allowed Russia to stop and repel the Germans. Also America opened up another front in Africa, yet another distraction for Germany thus weakening their abilities in Russia. Without US entry I think that Russia would have been able to stall Germany, but I am not sure that they would have been able to stop them.

Some other info:

Sept 3, 1940 - "Destroyers for Bases agreement with Britain." US gives Britain 50 old destroyers in exchange for bases in Caribbean. This is almost six months before the lend-lease act is approved (one year after WWII started) and over a full year before US entry into WWII. We were helping the Allies before the lend-lease act. I am curious though, I couldn't find anything about the US selling arms to Germany, or being the number one supplier like you said? I did find some stuff about profiteering and reinsurance selling which funneled info/money to Germany.

http://www.boston.com/globe/nation/packages/secret_history/index7.shtml

I do agree that we got into the war to protect ourselves, not to free Europe. But as a result of us entering the war, the tide of World War II turned in the Allies favor. Do you agree?

 

I know quite well that you did extensive research on von Ribbentrop.

It would have helped if Stalin would have been <b>prescient</b> quite a few years earlier than you give him credit for.

<a HREF="http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/R/RapalT1r2.asp">Treaty of Rapallo</a>
<i>1922, agreement signed by Germany and the USSR at Rapallo, Italy. It was reached by Walter Rathenau and G. V. Chicherin independently of the Conference of Genoa (see Genoa, Conference of ), which was then in session. Germany accorded the USSR de jure recognition (the first such recognition extended to the Soviet government), and the two signatories mutually canceled all prewar debts and renounced war claims. Particularly advantageous to Germany was the inclusion of a most-favored-nation clause and of extensive trade agreements. The treaty enabled the German army, through secret agreements, to produce and perfect in the USSR weapons forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. </i>

<a HREF="http://www.bartleby.com/67/1821.html">TREATY OF RAPALLO </a>

<i>The TREATY OF RAPALLO between Germany and Soviet Russia. The agreement provided for economic cooperation and established close political connections. Despite the indignation of the other powers, Russia and Germany, as outcast powers, held steadfastly to the pact, which was supplemented by a commercial treaty (Oct. 12, 1925) and a treaty of friendship and neutrality (Treaty of Berlin) of April 24, 1926, which remained technically in effect until Hitler's attack in 1941. <b>During the 1920s the German high command made secret agreements with its Russian counterpart that enabled Germany to manufacture munitions and carry out training in violation of the Treaty of Versailles.</b></i>


A nice read here:
<a HREF="http://worldatwar.net/chandelle/v3/v3n3/articles/lipetsk.html">Planting the Dragon's Teeth: the German Air Combat School
at Lipetsk (USSR) 1925-1930</a>

Another nice read:
<a HREF=http://www.achtungpanzer.com/neu.htm">Early Projects and Prototypes</a>

<i><b>Between 1926 and 1932, Rheinmetall-Borsig, MAN, Krupp and Daimler Benz were ordered by Reichswehr to build prototypes of light (10-12 tons) and medium tanks (to 23 tons) under the cover name of "tractor" in order to hide their military potential from the Treaty of Versailles. Prototypes were tested from 1926 to 1933 at Kama (Panzertruppenschule Kama), near Kazan in USSR under high security. Kama was the codename created by words Kazan and Malbrandt. Oberstleutenant Malbrandt was the one, who selected the location for artillery and tank testing. Kama was joined Red Army and Reichswehr training and testing ground of military technology.</b> ...........

In 1927, Germans designed two self-propelled guns based on fully tracked tractors. First was 3.7cm WD Schlepper 25PS, which was a lightly armored 25hp WD tractor with pedestal mounted 37mm PaK L/45 gun. Second was 7.7cm WD Schlepper 50PS, which was 50hp Hanomag tractor with pedestal mounted 77mm K light gun. Both self-propelled guns were accepted into service with the German Army in 1927.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Since 1926 till 1929, at least 146 officers finished the training school at Kama. The most famous "cadet" was Von Kleist. The person responsible for the training in Germany was Gen. Lutz and in USSR, the NKVD Komissar Unshlicht. All the German "tractor" prototypes were on trial at Kama Proving Grounds. The training program was quickly finished at the beginning of 1929.
A very interesting thing - the training was not under the control of the NKO (Ministry of Defence), but under the control of the NKVD ( Ministry of State Security).
The German pilots were at the same time on training in Lipetzk Military Air School and the officers of the Chemical defence in Astrachan Military School of the Chemical Warfare. At least 500 officers graduated succesfully from these two schools.
In 1939, USSR purchased samples of the all German AFVs. They were put on trials and the comission came up with the verdict that they had poor reliability. The opposite "verdict" was made concerning Me-109, which was purchased at the same time. The pilots said that it was better than Soviet fighters...............


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Rheinmetall-Borsig Leichte Traktor - Versuchskonstruktion (VK) 31

Development of light tanks was initiated in May of 1928 and in October of 1928, Krupp and Rheinmetall-Borsig were ordered to design light tanks. The vehicle was to be based on the chassis that could be also used as a base for a self-propelled mount for 37mm gun, armored supply carrier and tractor. Krupp in co-operation with Rheinmetall-Borsig began work on three prototypes. Krupp produced 4 men prototype powered by 6 cylinder 100hp Daimler-Benz M36 truck engine. Rheinmetall's 4 men prototype was powered also powered by Daimler-Benz M36 truck engine. Both designs had very similar specifications and were very similar in their design with the main difference being the suspension. Krupp used coil springs, while Rheinmetall used leaf springs suspension. Both vehicles known as Leichte Traktor (VK 31) were armed with 37mm KwK L/45 and light machine gun mounted in a turret (designed and produced by Swedish AB Landsverk and Bofors) mounted in the rear. Prototypes were ready in April and May of 1930 and two Krupp and two Rheinmetall vehicles were then tested in Kama in June of 1930. Rheinmetall-Borsig also produced third (mild steel) prototype, which was a 3 men self-propelled mount for 37mm Pak L/45 gun. This early Panzerjager was basically the same as the tank version with main difference being smaller turret and modified superstructure. Leichte Traktor vehicles proved to be successful during tests and were used for training purposes at Kama but were seen as not totally suited for combat. From 1931 to 1932, Rheinmetall worked on improving and modifying their prototypes (e.g. new track type and suspension). In 1931, 289 were ordered but in 1932, this project was cancelled in favour of other developments (such as Kleintraktor / La.S) and both Krupp and Rheinmetall produced only 3 prototypes. In 1933, co-operation with the Soviet Union ended and all four vehicles returned to Germany, where they were used for training at Panzer Gunnery School at Alt-Gaarz at Wustrow. Eventually, one of Rheinmetall's prototypes with modified suspension ended up as a monument at Putlos.


Daimler Benz's Grosstraktor I at Unterluss ready to be shipped to Kazan, Russia.

In 1925, Rheinmetall-Borsig, Daimler Benz and Krupp were ordered to design medium (heavy) tanks - codenamed Armeewagen 20 (Army Car 20). The following specifications were to be fulfilled: length of 6m, width of 2.4m, 75mm gun mounted in a rotating turret and weigth of 15tons. Each company was to produce two mild steel (6-14mm) prototypes disguised as commercial vehicles. Krupp designed their own turret, while Rheinmetall designed a turret to be mounted on their own design and that of Daimler-Benz. Work started in 1925 and tests were planned for 1929/30. Daimler Benz's Grosstraktor I was designed by Dr.Porsche and was armed with single 75mm KwK L/24 gun and three to four 7.92mm schwere MGs. It had amphibious capabilities and was powered by Daimler M182206, 6-cylinder gasoline engine with total power of 255(260)hp. It had a leaf springs sophisticated suspension and hull design. Only two mild steel prototypes were built in 1929 (nr.41) and 1930 (nr.42) and were secretly tested. It appears that one of the prototypes was rearmed with a longer version of 75mm gun. Both vehicles had problems with their transmissions and their testing was limited.


Rheinmetall-Borsig's Grosstraktor II

Rheinmetall-Borsig's Grosstraktor II was armed with single 75mm KwK L/24 gun and three to four 7.92mm schwere MGs. Its overall design was simpler from that of Grosstraktor I, it included side access doors and also had amphibious capabilities. Only two prototypes were produced, first in 1928 (nr.45) and the second one in 1929 (nr.46), while both were then modified in 1930, 1932 and 1933. Rheinmetall's design was powered by 6-cylinder BMW Va engine with total power of 250hp. Krupp's Grosstraktor III was also similar to other designs but differed with many detail differences. Also only two prototypes were produced, first in 1928 (nr.43) and the second one in 1929 (nr.44), while both were then modified in 1931. Both vehicles had coil springs suspension and their weight (16-16.4tons) and speed (40-44km/h) depended on the prototype. In general, all were similar in design to British Medium Tank Mark III and Medium Tank Mark C.


Krupp's Grosstraktor III as monument
at the barracks of Panzer Regiment 5 in Wunsdorf, 1937.

None of those prototypes entered production due to numerous problems and defects encountered during tests. In 1933, after completed test and completed co-operation with the Soviet Union, four functional vehicles returned to Germany. Krupp and Rheinmetall-Borsig prototypes were used for training purposes in continuation with work started at Kama. Eventually, they were handed over to the 1st Panzer Division and took part in maneuvers in August of 1935. Both Daimler-Benz Grosstraktors ended up as monuments at 1st Panzer Regiment headquarters at Erfurt and 5th Panzer Regiment headquarters at Wundsdorf. After 1935, remaining four prototypes were used for training purposes at Panzer Gunnery School at Putlos. In 1937, one of Krupp and Rheinmetall Grosstraktors ended up as a monument at 5th Panzer Regiment headquarters at Wunsdorf. The remaining two were either scrapped or used for target practice. Grosstraktors were extensively tested and lessons learned from them provided the German designers with valuable experience, which was then used in the direct development of Neubaufahrzeug and eventually of other designs..........</i>



<a HREF="http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/germany/lectures/19versailles.html">The Legacy of Versailles</a>

<i>..........The idea for a security pact designed to allay French fears and guarantee Germany's western borders originated with the Germans. The Cuno government suggested it in December, 1922. The subject was broached again in May 1923, September 1924 and February 1925. That this persistent effort finally resulted in triumph was largely due to the courage and tenacity of Gustav Streseman, the Weimar Republic's most important foreign minister and Lord D'Abernon, the British Ambassador to Berlin.

Stresemann, the architect of Locarno, was motivated by fear of independent British action to provide the shaky French with security at Germany's expense. He sent a memorandum in January 1926 to test English policy. At this time London was unwilling to make an agreement that carried French evacuation of the Rhineland as a corollary. So Streseman moved in the other direction and opened negotiations with the French government in February. When the Geneva Protocol, which was to strengthen the League of Nations and give France greater security, was rejected by a new conservative British government, Stresemann saw an opportunity for a border agreement which the British were now willing to consider.

But Germany flatly refused to guarantee the Polish frontier as well, while French opinion was equally adamant on its absolute necessity. London leaned towards the German argument, being willing to underwrite a guarantee of Germany's western frontier but had little interest in the East. Stresemann was undoubtedly responding to prevailing German opinion, vociferously expressed by the rightwing parties, that refused to reconcile itself to the current boundaries with Poland. Stresemann's primary goals were


1) the protection of Germans abroad;
2) the readjustment of the eastern frontiers and
3) a union with German Austria.


The latter was specifically prohibited by the Versailles Treaty, but the idea refused to die in German minds. However, Stresemann was shrewd enough to realize that these goals would have to be achieved by using "finesse," as he put it, and by avoiding any "great decisions." This presumably meant that a piecemeal approach was more likely to succeed than the more typically German sledgehammer method. He seems to have entertained the notion that Danzig, under League of Nations supervision, could be fully recovered.

Other former German territories ceded to Poland could also be reincorporated, once Germany's diplomatic position was strong enough. To Stresemann's way of thinking the essential issue was not really compliance or non-compliance with the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty, but whether equality could be denied to Germany forever. He was intent upon raising Germany once more to full power status. It is probably wrong, therefore, to call Stresemann's diplomacy "fulfillment policy."

The French seemed to sense this basic orientation, when they insisted that peace in Europe could only be guaranteed if Germany made accords with her eastern neighbors, who would not be part of the proposed security pact. But the French were not the only ones who created problems for Stresemann.

At home the Nationalists and the Communists, on the the extreme poles of the political spectrum, violently opposed his policy-even threatened his life. Both parties-for different reasons-wanted a more definite eastern orientation. This combined opposition forced Stresemann to raise some reservations about article 16 in the League of Nations Covenant. This article implied that Germany might have to participate in a League action to defend Poland, if the latter were attacked by Russia. German entrance into the League was generally held to be part of a security package. But the French insisted on unconditional German entrance into the League if she wanted a security pact.

The problem engendered by article 16 was discussed at Locarno, among representatives from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The German government was very quixotic about this. While it accepted an Allied invitation to Locarno, the government at the same time unleashed a broadside on the issue of war guilt and the evacuation of the Cologne zone of occupation. This did not sabotage the conference, however, and a compromise was achieved, whereby members of the League would cooperate against aggressors, but each country would do what was compatible with its military and geographic situation. The upshot of this was that Germany signed arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia and agreed to maintain the territorial status quo determined by the Versailles Treaty. The French thus gained a renunciation of the claim to Alsace-Lorraine and the desired security guarantee from Britain. But the real gainer was Germany, since she made only a nominal sacrifice, a change in the territorial status quo being wholly unrealistic.

It was now incumbent on Germany to convince the Allies of her good will. The Rightist parties said it would mean the permanent acceptance of the Versailles Diktat. In fact the Nationalists left the Reichstag in protest. But Stresemann remained firm. He told his countrymen that Locarno meant the Versailles methods had finally been replaced by conciliation. The Allies made it easier for the Reichstag to approve the treaty by immediate evacuation of the Cologne zone. The vote was 271 to 174 and passage was assured mostly because the Social Democrats decided to back Stresemann.

However, the "Locarno spirit" did not create an era of universal amity. In March 1926 complications arose over Germany's permanent seat on the Council of the League, since Poland, Czechoslovakia, Spain and Brazil also demanded permanent seats on the Council. Britain backed Spain and France supported the Poles. Sweden opposed Poland. Spain finally gave up, but Brazil stuck to her guns.

The reaction to these unseemly wranglings were violent in Germany, whose honor seemed to be aroused again. The Nationalists now accused Stresemann of treason, but the SPD once more saved the government. The Soviet Union now feared isolation and a reversal of the Rapallo policy, initiated by the famous treaty of 1922. The Reichswehr, so dependent on the secret military arrangement with Russia, was also worried. Stresemann quickly assured Russia that Germany would never be a party to an anti-Bolshevik crusade, and that article 16 was nothing to worry about. To confirm Rapallo, the Berlin Treaty with Russia was signed in April 1926. This treaty assured neutrality if either one of them were attacked by a third power. The same arrangement applied to a possible economic boycott. Germany even promised to oppose any anti-Bolshevik movement on be international scene.
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The Berlin Treaty created a sensation in Europe, since many felt that it had virtually converted German-Soviet friendship into an alliance.</b> France, Czechoslovakia and Poland, understandably enough, were particularly concerned. Poland and Rumania proceded to renew their alliance. France also made an alliance with Rumania to adumbrate what was known as the French alliance system...........<i>

 

i wonder if there's anything someone could bring up that MacBeth would take the U.S.'s side on?

 

Stalin's fear of Germany was due largely to Hitler, and Stalin's awareness of ( having read it ) Mein Kampf...and as Hitler didn't take power until '33, agreements which pre-date that are not really on point here, although it is true that for a while Stalin oscilated between maintaining any kind of relations with Germany while he was isolated, there is no historical doubt that he was actively and desperately trying to get the French and British to come treaty terms insofar as the German threat was concerned long before anyone else, even Churchill, had identified Hitler as the greatest threat to European peace, and the relationship which had earlier seemed to be growing between Germany and the USSR was openly chilled to the point where the Nazis were aware of the Soviet desire to ally against them...I am in no way a fan of Stalin, and disagree with most of his leadership decisions for practical as well as the obvious moral reasons, but in this case he was clearly in the right, and was screwed by the other European powers.

I have read most of what you posted here at length before, but I admire and respect your ability to find and bring these things to discussion on site, something I am completely incompetent doing..I still don't know how to take things from one site and post them in another as you are so profficient at doing with regularity. Want to teach me?

 

Why is everyone so focused on the US "saving" Europe during WWII? It can only be accurately be said that the US, Britian, and Russia formed a coalition that together defeated German and Italian fascism in Europe. No one power is solely responsible for that victory (although the Soviets probably could have, in the end, won on their own - but they did not).

I would argue that the US did, in fact, save Europe from tyranny - Soviet tyranny. There is little doubt at all that without the US stationing troops along the Iron Curtain, preopsitioning stocks and armaments with the intent to massively support Western Europe in the event of Soviet invasion, and prepared to commit to nuclear war with the Soviets - that without that, Western Europe would almost certainly have been gobbled up by a Soviet Union fresh from a massive victory against Nazi Germany, and the sole power in Europe still capable of conquest.

Had the US not stared them down for 46 years, eye to eye, ready to nuke the entire fu*king world and be nuked in return to save Western Europe, then Europe surely would have fallen, and it is doubtful whether the USSR would have imploded on its own weight as it did.

We most certainly saved Europe - both Western and Eastern Europe, although it took nearly 50 years to save the latter - from Soviet Communism. There is no doubt about that more recent victory, that the Western Europeans have so quickly forgotten. No, it was not as dramatic a conflict as WWII, but no less significant. The Frenchies still owe us.

 

There is some truth in what you are saying, but it isn't quite right. The Allies promised Stalin a Western Front for years before they delivered one, and in the meanwhile he was facing the vast majority of the Nazi war machine virtually single handedly...Of the roughly 295 German divisions in Europe, only about 45 were allocated to the West prior to the Allied landing in Sicily in July of '43...The rest were being used against the Russians. It should be noted that, even after the Western Front was opened, over 2/3 of the Nazi Divisions, including over 90% of it's elite Panzer and Wermacht forces were still fighting one enemy; the Soviets. Eben after the Soviets had destroyed the best part of the German war machine at Stalingrad and Kursk ( despite all the Normandy press, the two single greatest defeats the Nazis suffered ) on the eve of D-Day, even though Hiter was aware of it's inevitability, the German High Command had only committed 59 divisions, including most of it's green corps ( new troops ) and grey corps ( recalled previously retired older troops) to France, and had only 26 in Italy, as opposed to the 170 Divisions arrayed against the Soviets in the East. In other words, the two greatest Soviet victories, the battles that more than decimated the German infantry ( Stalingrad) and panzer ( Kursk) capability happened before the Americans were involved anywhere but Africa, and the African campaign was a very, very minor one, with the Germans comitting only a handfull of Divisions, and leaving those largely without supplies...because they were, as always, concentrating on the Eastern Front. Even after the Allies were in Europe, there was very little shift of Divisions towards the West...so it would be very hard indeed to back up the position that the American werw what allowed the Soviets to get off the mark...they were already off it before the Americans ever saw Europe, and they saw little lessening of opposition once the Allies landed in Europe.

It should be noted that well over 70% of the casualties in WWII occured along the Eastern Front...on both sides. That means that for every German casualty that the British, French, Americans, Canadians, Australians etc. caused, the Russians alone caused more than twice as many. When you then add to that the fact that the British, Canadians, and Australians accounted for well over 60% of the Western Front casualties, it puts the America won the war position on very tenous ground. Break it down, and for every German casualty the Americans accounted for, the Russians accounted for more then 7.

On that basis, the AMerica allowed the Russians to turn the tide doesn't hold that much water, but the providing supplies is a much better case, although incomplete. The three greatest factors that allowed the Soviets to face the lion's share of the Nazi war machine and come out on top were the following: 1)Stalin's early decision to shift all of his armament producing industry to the East, so that when it's ( unsurpassed ) war production got underway it was beyond danger for the war, and was churning out weaponry at an incredible rate...2) 2 key German miscalculations, involving the prioritization of Stalingrad and the failure to account for a winter campaign in '43...and 3) The incredible, almost inhuman willingness of Stalin to thrwo millions upon millions of young men against the Nazis, sacrificing more casualties than the rest of the allies combined by more than 2 to 1...and many of these often went in poorly aremed, if at all for the early part of the war. I doubt that any other Allied leader would have been so callous in his willingess to sacrifice the lives of his people...It worked, I suppose, but it's frightening when you look at the numbers.

Again, I say that ALL the major powers were essential to the outcome of the war...but a simple look at the numbers reveals where the greater responsibility for victory lies. Would the Russians have been able to win without the Allies? Doubtfull at best..would they have been able to win without the Americans? More plausible, but certainly unlikely...Would the Americans, or the Western Allies combined have been ever able to even land in Europe had they been facing the 290 odd Divisions of the German military might, including the elite forces they mostly never saw, as opposed to the 20 something they first saw in Italy, or the 59 they encountered in France? Virtually impossible.

 

Please don't try and reduce the otherwise mostly intelligent conversation to the level of playground marginalization. I have defended the US in many instances, and in fact supported the last war ( Gulf War )...but I am talking about historical facts here, not sides..If you take me citing facts as taking a side, then I would suggest that one of us doesn;t understand history.

 

1) Your first paragraph is probably the thing you have ever written with which I am most in agreement...in fact, I would say it is entirely accurate.

2) I also agree with your second paragraph...this is getting scary. I would point out that replacing Soviet Imperialism with the lately trumpeted Pax Americana could easily be seen to be choosing one imperialist power over another, but that's another argument.

3) With regards to the 3rd paragraph, here we start to differ. I agree that the Americans were a, no strike that, THE check to Soviet agression in Europe and elsewhere...but American activity since the fall of their own check in the Soviet Union shows that that role was also reversed. We currently have no Soviet Union to check our power, and not coincidentally we are currently telling the world things like they are with us or against us, that we will tolerate no military rival, and that when we find world opinion irrlelvent regarding our military actions abroad, we will ignre it and proceed as we wish.

4) And here we have our biggest disgreement...the fact about the kind of bloodthirst tyrants we were willing to support, even set up, merely because they were our bloodthirst tyrants shgows that our battle with the Soviets was nothing but self-serving; the fact that we sought to prevent our enemy from gaining the upper hand with regards to Europe was a by-product of our seeking to not let them get the upper hand anywhere, and the Europeans could easily resent BOTH sides in the Cold War for largely working out their differences with each other at European expense, mostly on European soil. We were not seeking to keep in the hands of it's people, we were seeking to keep it oit of the hands of our enemies.

 

In other words, we had selfish and self-serving motives for saving Europe from Soviet tyranny? So what? Why should that matter to the Europeans? We still saved their asses.

Just because our motives were not 100% altruistic does not render the action either meaningless or soured. And I would say that while our motives were not 100% selfless, they were also not 100% selfish. We made sacrifices along the way that we did not have to make.

 

I'm watching the anti-war protest in NYC and I can't believe what I'm seeing. I saw an officer try to apprehend one protestor, he had the guy by the arm when two protestors grabbed the other other arm and pulled the protestor free from the officer and then the protestors took off running. It's like the Running of the Bulls in midtown Manhattan. I have a simple solution. Tear gas.