Where are the WMD? US changes its strategy

Yes.

 

Your the one saying this?!
The only section in which you post is the D&D!And that's basicly to prove one point: US/Bush is good,the rest is bad!
You have no right to accuse as you are the most biased poster on the entire BBS,all other forums included!


ALA

 

I am incapable of processing ionformation due to my bias? Yeah...you're right, jh...but one day, with hard work and a few bricks to the head, I aspire to be as open minded as you.

Your classic example was and is wrong...we were talking about this war, and i dealt with your response in another thread. The fact that you see it as another 'fact' of you being right is not a surprise, but just a little sad.


1) Point one was agreed upon by a body you call irrelevant, dismiss as corrupt and incompetent, and by the way, you are really stretching the inerpretation. Hardly a fact, and, as the popular saying goes...where are the WMD?

2) Point 2 was proven, was it? You really, really don't get the point of my comments, do you? You claim everything you say is proven, despite the ad nauseam arguments people have had with you regarding the Czech source...it's the same old song.


3) At least here you admit it's subject to debate, as opposed to your usual, and earlier demonstrated tendancy to claim all of your sides in an issue are fact..or usually FACT.

4) I agree that no determination can be made at this point...so how do you explain the 15 times you claimed it was a FACT in the posts I cited, not to mention the hundreds of others not quoted? So whrn the search had begun...before the admin was admitting 'overemphasis' and the search was coming up empty, you were calling it a done deal, a FACT, and laughing at everyone who disagreed...now that even the admin and generals in charge of the hunt are backing off, now you say it's too close to call. Hmmmm...coming from anyone else, jh, that might sound a tad like a 2 step.

5) Again, this FACT, the whole Iraq supported Al Queda thing, which cannot be argued...you do know that even the admin has backed off that, right? That no one...and I mean no one is still barking up this particular tree. This is a classic example of your version of facts.

6) You stand by that statement? Ok...a little advice...just don't stand too close by it, the smell's enough to make you pass out. So those are FACTS, are they? Please tell the White House, the chief military leaders, etc. as they have yet to bring forth any evidence of these facts, and are in fact backing off these positions as we speak. Man, you just don't get it.

7) You genuinely believe that Iraq has been proven to be behind Al Qaueda, and had an active WMD program up to our invasion, don't you. I know you do...No wonder you've been so quiet about this lately, you must be sooo confused what with all these people questioning the government's lying, the government admitting thewy haven't found what they said, 'overemphasis', etc. You poor, poor boy.

8) You still believe, but nobody will stand by their original charge? jh..wake up...why do you think that is? Why do you think that you are the only one 'standing by' these allegations, especially when those who made them aren't? And you say I'm blinded by bias...

9) The story of us finding Iraq's nuclear programme is still unraveling? Man, are you serious with this stuff? I think even tree has said No Mas on this one...

10) I cited that you questioned one aspect of one report, and credited you with it, but you have yet to question the articles veracity or confirmation...the article in question never said it was weapons grade..YOU speculated, and I gave you credit for admitting it was speculation..the article, and it's contents, you left unquestioned, as usual. Nice try, though.

11) Ahhh...here we have it. You admit the article you cited was wrong...and you posted the article ( WITHOUT THE NON-CONFIRMED ASPECT THAT YOU CLAIMED IN THIS THREAD YOU ALWAYS INCLUDED)...and you ask why you are responsible for admitting that it was wrong? Because you posted the article...get it? It's called credibility, jh.

jh...Batman is among the most credible posters in here, and you ignore him at your loss. I have given you credit in the past where due, and was suprised and impressed at your responses in the Worst Moments in American History thread, and your occassional sense of humor, but you calling Batman insulting and lacking in credibility and perspective is truly the really really black pot calling the shiney new kettle black.

 

You know, I know this is in the other thread but it deserves a mention here:

Chalk him up with all the rest of us conspiracy theorists I guess.

 

There was a mention of it on this page, i'm sure we will be hearing more of the apparent cover-up in the coming months.

 

That kind of talk is why the defense department had Newt out calling the State department failures.

 

Heck, we have places they want to give us evidence and we don't want it.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8337-2003Jun3.html

U.S. Won't Probe Secret Iraqi Documents
By DAFNA LINZER
The Associated Press
Tuesday, June 3, 2003; 2:29 PM


BAGHDAD, Iraq - More than a decade of suspicions about Iraq's missile industry and its capabilities for delivering weapons of mass destruction could be investigated quickly now that American forces control the country.

But no U.S. weapons hunters or intelligence officials have visited the heart of Iraq's missile programs - the state-owned al-Fatah company in Baghdad, which designed all the rockets Saddam Hussein's troops fired in 1991 and again this year. Not only that, it's not even on their agenda.

"We have the most sensitive documents here," said Marouf al-Chalabi, director-general of al-Fatah. "We were sure the Americans would target us but they haven't even dropped by."

Looters, however, have ransacked the place. The three-building complex has been stripped of everything from drafting tables to light switches.

Among the few things left behind, though, are what U.N. inspectors long believed existed but never obtained: design plans and test results for every missile system and warhead the Iraqis developed.

Plans for rocket engines, guidance systems and even missile warheads are strewn across the dusty office floors and swirl in the parking lot outside. Some have been blown into nearby bushes. "They're scattered everywhere," al-Chalabi said, marveling at the mess.

American missile experts who have accompanied U.S. weapons teams in Iraq expressed astonishment this week when told that the design plans and engineers behind the Iraqi Scuds and other missile projects were available.

The experts, who couldn't be identified for security reasons, said the al-Fatah company wasn't on any target list they had seen.

But al-Fatah drew the attention of the United Nations long ago.

After reviewing a Dec. 8 weapons declaration submitted by the Iraqis, U.N. inspectors began inquiring about two newer missiles: the al-Samoud and the al-Fatah, which was under al-Chalabi's direct authority.

Test results for the al-Samoud showed that it could be fired beyond the 93-mile range limit set by the U.N. Security Council after Iraqi troops were forced from Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War.

Although the Iraqis claimed the results were flawed because the tests were done without the missile's heavy payload, a panel of experts determined otherwise, and chief weapons inspector Hans Blix ordered them destroyed March 1.

Less certain about the al-Fatah, inspectors asked for more information. It wasn't forthcoming.

"We still needed more test data from the Iraqis to make a final determination," said Ewen Buchanan, spokesman for Blix's U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission. "We never got it before we left."

U.S. weapons hunters have found a few al-Samouds and about a dozen other missiles. But searches for the kind of long-range Scud missiles the Iraqis fired at Saudi Arabia and Israel in 1991 have been unsuccessful.

On Monday, two search teams traveled 2 1/2 hours northwest of Baghdad to a suspected Scud storage site but found no evidence any missiles had been stored there recently.

U.N. inspectors were always suspicious of Iraq's aims in the missile field, so much so that they visited al-Fatah - located among large homes in Baghdad's Amariyah neighborhood - four times during the 3 1/2 months they were in Iraq before the war.

The facility also was inspected in the 1990s, and the visits paid off. Buchanan said U.N. inspectors repeatedly caught the Iraqis violating sanctions over the years when it came to rocket development.

"There were several projects which the Iraqis did ultimately disclose in the 90s, which had been aimed at producing missiles with ranges up to 3,000 kilometers (1,900 miles). Iraq always said those were only paper plans, but we had our doubts," Buchanan told The Associated Press.

Whatever plans the Iraqis did have could be found today scattered inside - and outside - the al-Fatah offices.

Raad Mahmoud, who created the al-Samoud's guidance system, said the missile was never designed to exceed U.N. specifications.

"I was really angry when the U.N. started destroying them," he said outside the offices of the National Monitoring Directorate, a Saddam regime bureaucracy stacked with former weapons chiefs and set up to deal with U.N. inspections.

The directorate's top official, Hosam Amin, is in U.S. custody. Several of his deputies who worked on chemical and biological weapons have been questioned by intelligence agents but, according to al-Chalabi, no one from the missile programs has been approached.

By the time the war began March 20, about 75 percent of the deployable al-Samouds had been destroyed under U.N. supervision. During the first days of fighting, the Iraqis launched several missiles toward Kuwait and advancing coalition forces - far fewer than the dozens it fired in 1991.

The Bush administration said it went to war to destroy the banned weapons U.N. inspectors couldn't find and the Iraqis long claimed they didn't have.

Over the past 11 weeks, U.S. search teams have visited more than 230 suspected sites from a list drawn up U.S. intelligence but found no weapons.

Al-Chalabi, who studied engineering at the University of Colorado from 1964 to 1969, is convinced none will be found. He said he showed U.N. inspectors everything he had and was ordered by Saddam not to violate U.N. resolutions.

"We don't have those weapons. I think they must know this by now," al-Chalabi said. "I even signed a paper that said I would be executed if I violated the range fixed by the U.N. resolutions."

 

You would think the inspectors would stop there to at least say, "hi how ya doing, can we see your most advanced missile plant"

(ROLLEYES)

 

Oh, Christ...

MOBILE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION PLANTS!!!

How many times will I have to friggen say it??? You cannot deny this find forever. Or what it means. And you all know what it means.

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraqi_mobile_plants/index.html

(yes, I am going to keep referencing this item... until you all acknowledge what it means)

 

Uh huh. It wouldn't be easier to just move pharmaceuticals that have already been produced at a *stationary* (and far less expensive, and already existent) laboratory bu, oh, I dunno - truck???

Come on, man. Don't get stupid here. Mobile medlabs they ain't.

No, but there is no absolute proof that I am a homo sapiens sapiens either, and yet I believe myself to be one. There comes a point when you amass enough evidence about a thing to call it what it *almost certainly* is.

Well, let's put it this way: If you wanted to culture large amounts of biological organisms - I mean barrels full of them - then this is exactly what you would want to do it with. Oddly, it appears to be purpose designed exactly for that task...

Dude, this is not a hard question. It has only a few possible uses, and the only one that makes sense is a mobile biowarfare lab, especially since the trailers are constructed in military style (and colors) and were found around military sites (at least one was buried - hmm, why would someone bury it, I wonder?). A mobile fertilizer production plant? A mobile pharmaceutical plant? Please. Why on earth would you make mobile plants for either of those uses? Bullsh*t. They were made mobile to hide from our spysats and the inspectors.

The FBI has a suspect, but I don't see what this has to do with Saddam's trailers? Different case, dude.

You merely expose your own stupidity (yes - stupidity) when you try to make this into a partisan issue. This is not a fu*ing partisan issue. If you think it is then you really do not understand what is going on, and because of the partisan blinders you're wearing it is doubtful that you ever will.

I can tell by your questions that you did not read the CIA report I posted a link to... Please report back to me after you have finished reading it. If you don't want to read it, then we have nothing to discuss.

 

Dude Dude Dude thanks for the no-substance response. This thread is about Iraqi WMD, not the US anthrax case. You have been insinuating that either there were no WMD or the administration lied - jumping back and forth - and I posted something that is *very* relevant to both of those issues. You practically friggen ignored it.

Read the f*ing CIA report, and then come back to me with an issue. If you're smart you'll just drop it.

 

Well, I put the question to one of my roommates, who was a Chem. major, and currently works in the pharmaceutical industry, and while she says that she didn't find this as amusing as an earlier johnheath post about Staphycocolous as a bio weapon, she did get a chuckle out of it. She has only worked in a few mobile labs herself, but several of her colleagues have worked in many of them. Especially in 3rd world countries,mobile chem labs, of the R&D, developmental, and testing variety are used for many purposes. One is to test/develo different cultures, bacteria, etc. in different environments...for example to test why a certain bacteria is found in the water supply of a certain area more than standard, etc...two becuase many collected bacteria have limited lifespans or periods of certain activity, etc. and labs need to be on-site for immediate analysis, and three because that's the growing trend in lab work; mobility for higher efficiency.

She qualifies the statement by saying she can't make any sort of conclusion about this particular mobile lab without specifics about set up, material found, etc. but she wonders how you are doing likewise under the same circumstances. But she says, in general, to assume that a lab mobile chem lab is most likely for the purpose of chemical weapons production is silly without much more incirimination.

tree...you say that after a while there is so much evidence that you reach a logical conclusion...ok, aside from the fact that we found mobile chem labs, which are pretty common theses days, especially in more remote or inaccessible/less developed countries, what is the evidence you speak of?

 

Ah yes, another one who didn't bother reading the report...

MacBeth - the report addresses that issue very specifically. Would you just friggen read it? Please?

Ah, hell... Since I know you guys are avoiding this like the plague:



Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Plants

Overview
Coalition forces have uncovered the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program.

Kurdish forces in late April 2003 took into custody a specialized tractor-trailer near Mosul and subsequently turned it over to US military control.

The US military discovered a second mobile facility equipped to produce BW agent in early May at the al-Kindi Research, Testing, Development, and Engineering facility in Mosul. Although this second trailer appears to have been looted, the remaining equipment, including the fermentor, is in a configuration similar to the first plant.

US forces in late April also discovered a mobile laboratory truck in Baghdad. The truck is a toxicology laboratory from the 1980s that could be used to support BW or legitimate research.
The design, equipment, and layout of the trailer found in late April is strikingly similar to descriptions provided by a source who was a chemical engineer that managed one of the mobile plants. Secretary of State Powell's description of the mobile plants in his speech in February 2003 to the United Nations (see inset below) was based primarily on reporting from this source.


Secretary Powell's Speech to the UN

Secretary Powell's speech to the UN in February 2003 detailed Iraq's mobile BW program, and was primarily based on information from a source who was a chemical engineer that managed one of the mobile plants.

Iraq's mobile BW program began in the mid-1990s—this is reportedly when the units were being designed.

Iraq manufactured mobile trailers and railcars to produce biological agents, which were designed to evade UN weapons inspectors. Agent production reportedly occurred Thursday night through Friday when the UN did not conduct inspections in observance of the Muslim holy day.

An accident occurred in 1998 during a production run, which killed 12 technicians—an indication that Iraq was producing a BW agent at that time.

Analysis of the trailers reveals that they probably are second- or possibly third-generation designs of the plants described by the source. The newer version includes system improvements, such as cooling units, apparently engineered to solve production problems described by the source that were encountered with the older design.

The manufacturer's plates on the fermentors list production dates of 2002 and 2003—suggesting Iraq continued to produce these units as late as this year.

Prewar Assessment

The source reported to us that Iraq in 1995 planned to construct seven sets of mobile production plants—six on semitrailers and one on railroad cars—to conceal BW agent production while appearing to cooperate with UN inspectors. Some of this information was corroborated by another source.

One of the semitrailer plants reportedly produced BW agents as early as July 1997.

The design for a more concealable and efficient two-trailer system was reportedly completed in May 1998 to compensate for difficulties in operating the original, three-trailer plant.

Iraq employed extensive denial and deception in this program, including disguising from its own workers the production process, equipment, and BW agents produced in the trailers.

Plants Consistent With Intelligence Reporting

Examination of the trailers reveals that all of the equipment is permanently installed and interconnected, creating an ingeniously simple, self-contained bioprocessing system. Although the equipment on the trailer found in April 2003 was partially damaged by looters, it includes a fermentor capable of producing biological agents and support equipment such as water supply tanks, an air compressor, a water chiller, and a system for collecting exhaust gases.

The trailers probably are part of a two- or possibly three-trailer unit. Both trailers we have found probably are designed to produce BW agent in unconcentrated liquid slurry. The missing trailer or trailers from one complete unit would be equipped for growth media preparation and postharvest processing and, we would expect, have equipment such as mixing tanks, centrifuges, and spray dryers.

These other units that we have not yet found would be needed to prepare and sterilize the media and to concentrate and possibly dry the agent, before the agent is ready for introduction into a delivery system, such as bulk-filled munitions. Before the Gulf war, Iraq bulk filled missile and rocket warheads, aerial bombs, artillery shells, and spray tanks.

Prewar Iraqi Mobile Program Sources

The majority of our information on Iraq's mobile program was obtained from a chemical engineer that managed one of the plants. Three other sources, however, corroborated information related to the mobile BW project.

The second source was a civil engineer who reported on the existence of at least one truck-transportable facility in December 2000 at the Karbala ammunition depot.

The third source reported in 2002 that Iraq had manufactured mobile systems for the production of single-cell protein on trailers and railcars but admitted that they could be used for BW agent production.

The fourth source, a defector from the Iraq Intelligence Service, reported that Baghdad manufactured mobile facilities that we assess could be used for the research of BW agents, vice production.

Our analysis of the mobile production plant found in April indicates the layout and equipment are consistent with information provided by the chemical engineer, who has direct knowledge of Iraq's mobile BW program.

The source recognized pictures of this trailer, among photographs of unrelated equipment, as a mobile BW production plant similar to the one that he managed, even pointing out specific pieces of equipment that were installed on his unit.



(continued)

 

(continued)

Common elements between the source's description and the trailers include a control panel, fermentor, water tank, holding tank, and two sets of gas cylinders. One set of gas cylinders was reported to provide clean gases—oxygen and nitrogen—for production, and the other set captured exhaust gases, concealing signatures of BW agent production.

The discovered trailers also incorporate air-stirred fermentors, which the source reported were part of the second-generation plant design.

Externally, the trailers have a ribbed superstructure to support a canvas covering that matches the source's description.

Data plates on the fermentors indicate that they were manufactured at the same plant the source said manufactured equipment for the first generation of mobile plants. The plant also was involved in the production of equipment used in Iraq's pre-Gulf war BW program.

Employees of the facility that produced the mobile production plants' fermentor revealed that seven fermentors were produced in 1997, one in 2002 and one in 2003.



The seven fermentors appear to corroborate the source's reporting that Iraq in the mid-1990s planned to produce seven mobile production plants.

The two fermentors produced in 2002 and 2003 reportedly were sent to the al-Kindi Research, Testing, Development, and Engineering facility in Mosul—the site where the second trailer was found—and probably are the fermentors found on the trailers in US custody.

There are a few inconsistencies between the source's reporting and the trailers, which probably reflect design improvements.

The original plants were reported to be mounted on flatbed trailers reinforced by nickel-plate flooring and equipped with hydraulic support legs. The discovered plants are mounted on heavy equipment transporters intended to carry army tanks, obviating the need for reinforced floors and hydraulic legs.

The trailers have a cooling unit not included in the original plant design, probably to solve overheating problems during the summer months as described by the source.

The original design had 18 pumps, but the source mentioned an effort to reduce the number to four in the new design. The trailer discovered in late April has three pumps.

Legitimate Uses Unlikely

Coalition experts on fermentation and systems engineering examined the trailer found in late April and have been unable to identify any legitimate industrial use—such as water purification, mobile medical laboratory, vaccine or pharmaceutical production—that would justify the effort and expense of a mobile production capability. We have investigated what other industrial processes may require such equipment—a fermentor, refrigeration, and a gas capture system—and agree with the experts that BW agent production is the only consistent, logical purpose for these vehicles.

The capability of the system to capture and compress exhaust gases produced during fermentation is not required for legitimate biological processes and strongly indicates attempts to conceal production activity.

The presence of caustic in the fermentor combined with the recent painting of the plant may indicate an attempt to decontaminate and conceal the plant's purpose.

Finally, the data plate on the fermentor indicates that this system was manufactured in 2002 and yet it was not declared to the United Nations, as required by Security Council Resolutions.
Some coalition analysts assess that the trailer found in late April could be used for bioproduction but believe it may be a newer prototype because the layout is not entirely identical to what the source described.



A New York Times article on 13 May 2003 reported that an agricultural expert suggests the trailers might have been intended to produce biopesticides near agricultural areas in order to avoid degradation problems. The same article also reported that a former weapons inspector suggests that the trailers may be chemical-processing units intended to refurbish Iraq's antiaircraft missiles.

Biopesticide production requires the same equipment and technology used for BW agent production; however, the off-gas collection system and the size of the equipment are unnecessary for biopesticide production. There is no need to produce biopesticides near the point of use because biopesticides do not degrade as quickly as most BW agents and would be more economically produced at a large fixed facility. In addition, the color of the trailer found in mid-April is indicative of military rather than civilian use.

Our missile experts have no explanation for how such a trailer could function to refurbish antiaircraft missiles and judge that such a use is unlikely based on the scale, configuration, and assessed function of the equipment.

The experts cited in the editorial are not on the scene and probably do not have complete access to information about the trailers.

Hydrogen Production Cover Story

Senior Iraqi officials of the al-Kindi Research, Testing, Development, and Engineering facility in Mosul were shown pictures of the mobile production trailers, and they claimed that the trailers were used to chemically produce hydrogen for artillery weather balloons. Hydrogen production would be a plausible cover story for the mobile production units.

The Iraqis have used sophisticated denial and deception methods that include the use of cover stories that are designed to work. Some of the features of the trailer—a gas collection system and the presence of caustic—are consistent with both bioproduction and hydrogen production.

The plant's design possibly could be used to produce hydrogen using a chemical reaction, but it would be inefficient. The capacity of this trailer is larger than typical units for hydrogen production for weather balloons. Compact, transportable hydrogen generation systems are commercially available, safe, and reliable.

Sample Collection and Analysis

We continue to examine the trailer found in mid-April and are using advanced sample analysis techniques to determine whether BW agent is present, although we do not expect samples to show the presence of BW agent. We suspect that the Iraqis thoroughly decontaminated the vehicle to remove evidence of BW agent production. Despite the lack of confirmatory samples, we nevertheless are confident that this trailer is a mobile BW production plant because of the source's description, equipment, and design.

The initial set of samples, now in the United States, was taken from sludge from inside the fermentor, liquid that was in the system and wipes from the equipment. A sample set also was provided to a coalition partner for detailed laboratory analysis.

As we expected, preliminary sample analysis results are negative for five standard BW agents, including Bacillus anthracis, and for growth media for those agents. In addition, the preliminary results indicate the presence of sodium azide and urea, which do not support Iraqi claims that the trailer was for hydrogen production.

Additional sample analysis is being conducted to identify growth media, agent degradation products, and decontamination chemicals that could be specific for BW agents, as well as to identify a chemical associated with hydrogen production.

Mobile Production Plant Versus Mobile Laboratory?

Although individuals often interchangeably use the terms production plant and laboratory, they have distinct meanings. The mobile production plants are designed for batch production of biological material and not for laboratory analysis of samples. A truck-mounted mobile laboratory would be equipped for analysis and small-scale laboratory activities. US forces discovered one such laboratory in late April.

The mobile laboratory—installed in a box-bodied truck—is equipped with standard, dual-use laboratory equipment, including autoclaves, an incubator, centrifuges, and laboratory test tubes and glassware.

These laboratories could be used to support a mobile BW production plant but serve legitimate functions that are applicable to public heath and environmental monitoring, such as water-quality sampling.

 

I'm not trying to defend JohnHeath, but the report I heard from an NPR reporter said these particular mobile labs could possibly have been used for things other than bio weapons, but that they would have cost more to make and wouldn't have been near as efficient as legit pharm labs. The labs were investigated for that possibility, and the most likely purpose was bio weapons.

 

There. Now none of you has any excuse. Read it. Look at the pictures. It is not a mobile medlab. It is not a chemical analysis lab. If you still arrive at a different conclusion than the CIA did... Well, then you are quite an imaginative person.

 

interesting choice of words...