No, this is what Powell said in this report which is current: The Iraqis' did say the reports were nonsense from beginning to end. What the administration stated in the months preceding the war has changed quite a bit in the past five months. The Iraqis' said nothing but the US does not know what it is talking about concerning WMD, your point is lost when you look at all the high ranking officials who have stepped forward to say there are no WMD and intelligence reports were manipulated.
http://slate.msn.com/id/2084988/ Was Bush Lying About WMD? Maybe not. Here's how they could've misread the evidence. By Fred Kaplan We may never know if Saddam Hussein really had weapons of mass destruction during the final months or years before his ouster, but it is worth asking why the Bush administration claimed he did with a degree of certainty far exceeding that of U.S. intelligence reports. Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and the other Pentagon officials who made these claims so fiercely probably weren't lying. Clearly, they had formed their conclusions first, then went scrounging for the evidence. Clearly, they stretched the evidence they found right up to, and in some cases beyond, the logical limits. However, it's a fair bet that they genuinely believed that Saddam had these weapons. They probably also believed that the analysts in the CIA and DIA, who were uncertain or skeptical about the matter, just didn't, or didn't want to, look hard enough. In this sense, Rumsfeld and company saw themselves as something like a district attorney who twists the facts a bit to "frame a guilty man"—or like Dean Acheson, Harry Truman's secretary of state, who admitted in his memoirs that, while pushing for a massive U.S. arms buildup against what he saw as a grave Soviet threat, he made his points "clearer than truth." In fact, the history of the Cold War offers many parallels to this pattern, few more enlightening or pertinent than the controversy over the "missile gap"—another case of a threat that everyone perceived as real and immediate (it even helped elect a president) but that, in this case, turned out to be completely false. ... In this past year's Achesonian campaign to make points "clearer than truth"—the much-reported pressure on the CIA to stiffen its stance and drop its caveats on the question of Iraqi WMD—there are similar patterns. In the beginning, as Rumsfeld has correctly noted, there was little disagreement within official circles over whether Saddam possessed at least the ingredients for biological or chemical weapons and had at least the desire to develop nuclear weapons. Paul Wolfowitz said in an oft-quoted Vanity Fair interview that he saw many reasons for going to war with Iraq, and that he settled on WMD for "bureaucratic" reasons because it was the one rationale that everyone could agree on. The point worth emphasizing here is that, at least for a while, everyone (or nearly everyone) agreed on it. The debates mainly concerned the degree to which Saddam had converted his wishes into real weapons—and, to the extent he had, whether he could be deterred from using them or whether he had to be overthrown. However, as doubts grew, both before and especially after the war, Rumsfeld and his team felt compelled—as the Air Force felt compelled when dealing with the CIA's slight dissent during the 1958 National Intelligence Estimate, and as Acheson felt compelled when dealing with anti-hawk sentiment in 1950—to turn up the heat, to make their points "clearer than truth." Rumsfeld even set up his own intelligence outfit, within the office of the secretary of defense, to search for evidence—about WMD and about Saddam's alleged links to al-Qaida—that he just knew existed. At his Cabinet Room meeting in December 1962, Kennedy said of the officials who created the missile-gap myth, "There are still people of that kind in the Pentagon. I wouldn't give them any foundation for creating another myth." It is extremely doubtful that George W. Bush is currently saying anything like this about his own Pentagon officials—likewise "emotionally guided but nonetheless patriotic individuals"—who, at the very least, exaggerated claims about Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear programs. But Congress might consider following Kennedy's example by doing its own study. Call it, "But Where Did the WMD Go?"
http://www.bayarea.com/mld/mercurynews/news/special_packages/iraq/6227824.htm Roberts: news will break on Saddam's weapons program LIBBY QUAID Associated Press WASHINGTON - The Bush administration and the U.S. intelligence community have had some success in finding Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, Sen. Pat Roberts said Thursday. Roberts, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, told reporters on a telephone conference call that he couldn't go into detail because the news is classified. "It's classified information now - I am urging the administration and the intelligence community to make at least portions of that public," Roberts said. "We've had some success; I'm sorry I can't go into detail about that." Roberts, R-Kan., traveled this week to Iraq and the Middle East with members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. When Congress returns from the July Fourth holiday next week, Roberts will continue Intelligence Committee hearings into prewar intelligence on Iraq's weapons program and whether the Bush administration manipulated the information. At issue is the administration's failure, so far, to find the Iraqi weapons. Roberts, already a staunch defender of the U.S. intelligence community, defended the White House. "It's going to take some time to uncover Saddam Hussein's weapons programs, and let me emphasize the term `programs,'" Roberts said. "This was a program designed to be hidden, hidden by people who knew what their fate would be if they revealed it. "You can't dig up every rosebush in Iraq," he added. "We need people who are familiar with the program to show us where they are hidden." Roberts said an aggressive effort is under way to piece together documents and find people with knowledge of the program. He also defended President Bush's warning on Wednesday that he would find and punish "anybody who wants to harm American troops." "There are some who feel like that the conditions are such that they can attack us there. My answer is bring them on," Bush said. "We've got the force necessary to deal with the security situation." Roberts said he took the comments as a message to U.S. troops, not potential attackers. "In talking with representatives of the Pentagon, I think that message was delivered to our troops saying we know we have the ability to take the fight to the enemy," Roberts said. "Perhaps he could have said it another way, but I think the message was not to the enemy so much, but it was to our troops."
A summary of articles and quotes through June 1 -- enjoy the spin. CAMP DOHA, Kuwait, April 22 — With little to show after 30 days, the Bush administration is losing confidence in its prewar belief that it had strong clues pointing to the whereabouts of weapons of mass destruction concealed in Iraq, according to planners and participants in the hunt. Bush launched and justified the war with a flat declaration of knowledge “that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction.” Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who took the lead public role in defending that proposition, said, among other particulars, that “our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent.” Can we trust the intelligence services? By Paul Reynolds BBC News Online world affairs correspondent The accusation by the chief United Nations weapons inspector Hans Blix that the case against Iraq was "shaky" raises the question as to whether the US and British intelligence services can be trusted over one of the major issues of our day - the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Both the United States and UK issued dossiers last autumn making a series of accusations against Iraq. Alex Standish Jane's Intelligence Digest There has also been the non-appearance of 1.4 tons of VX nerve agent, 20,000 chemical capable artillery shells, 25,000 liters of anthrax, 12-20 Scud missiles, mobile biological warfare laboratories and chemical and biological weapons "deployable within 45 minutes", all of which Iraq was alleged to have had. And perhaps more fundamentally there are allegations that the impetus for publishing the dossiers and interpreting the evidence in the most prejudicial way possible was not intelligence-led but political. N. Korea Claims to Have Nuclear Weapons, U.S. Officials Say By Glenn Kessler Washington Post Staff Writer Thursday, April 24, 2003; 3:54 PM North Korean negotiators told U.S. officials in Beijing that the communist nation has nuclear weapons and threatened to export them or conduct a "physical demonstration," U.S. officials said today. Miller Time ... The NYT's Judith Miller continues her remarkable run of opaque dispatches from her travels with a chemical and bio-weapons hunting team. Today's report, which (hallelujah) is stuffed by the Times, says that the team has now come across a warehouse "filled with chemicals where Iraqi scientists are suspected of having tested unconventional agents on dogs." Of course, as Miller points out (uncharacteristically), the chemicals can have both military and civilian uses. Nor was there was any "immediate way to verify the claim" about the dogs. Maybe that's because the hunting team still has Miller billeted, apparently happily, in some sort of sensory-deprivation tank: "This reporter was not permitted to visit the warehouse but heard descriptions of it from Americans who went to the site." Tests Made on Possible Iraq Weapons Find By LOUIS MEIXLER, Associated Press Writer BAIJI, Iraq - The Iraqi chief liaison to U.N. weapons inspectors surrendered to U.S. forces Sunday, as American troops reported finding a metal drum that preliminary tests indicated could contain chemicals used to disable and kill. Lt. Gen. Hossam Mohammed Amin — No. 49 on the U.S. list of the 55 most-wanted figures from the regime of Saddam Hussein (news - web sites), the six of clubs in the deck of fugitive playing cards — was taken into custody in Baghdad. Capt. Kellie Rourke, division battle captain with the 101st Airborne Division, said Amin surrendered to soldiers of the division's 2nd Brigade and was taken to the international airport for questioning. April 27, 2003 American Power Moves Beyond the Mere Super By GREGG EASTERBROOK Stealth drones, G.P.S.-guided smart munitions that hit precisely where aimed; antitank bombs that guide themselves; space-relayed data links that allow individual squad leaders to know exactly where American and opposition forces are during battle — the United States military rolled out all this advanced technology, and more, in its lightning conquest of Iraq. No other military is even close to the United States. The American military is now the strongest the world has ever known, both in absolute terms and relative to other nations; stronger than the Wehrmacht in 1940, stronger than the legions at the height of Roman power. For years to come, no other nation is likely even to try to rival American might. Which means: the global arms race is over, with the United States the undisputed heavyweight champion. Other nations are not even trying to match American armed force, because they are so far behind they have no chance of catching up. The great-powers arms race, in progress for centuries, has ended with the rest of the world conceding triumph to the United States. Now only a nuclear state, like, perhaps, North Korea, has any military leverage against the winner. Paradoxically, the runaway American victory in the conventional arms race might inspire a new round of proliferation of atomic weapons. With no hope of matching the United States plane for plane, more countries may seek atomic weapons to gain deterrence. North Korea might have been moved last week to declare that it has an atomic bomb by the knowledge that it has no hope of resisting American conventional power. If it becomes generally believed that possession of even a few nuclear munitions is enough to render North Korea immune from American military force, other nations — Iran is an obvious next candidate — may place renewed emphasis on building them. Iraq May Have Destroyed Weapons Before War -U.S. By Grant McCool NEW YORK (Reuters) - Iraq may have destroyed its purported chemical and biological weapons before the U.S.-led invasion in March, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said on Tuesday in an effort to explain why none had been found. President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair cited their belief that Iraq had banned weapons of mass destruction as the main reason for the March 20 invasion that ousted President Saddam Hussein's government. Rumsfeld told the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations think-tank he did not know why Iraq had not used chemical weapons against the invaders as Washington had predicted it would. He said the speed of U.S. advance may have caught Iraq by surprise, but added: "It is also possible that they decided that they would destroy them prior to a conflict." U.S. Hedges on Finding Iraqi Weapons Officials Cite the Possibility of Long or Fruitless Search for Banned Arms By Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus Washington Post Staff Writers Thursday, May 29, 2003; Page A01 Pressed in recent congressional hearings and public appearances to explain why the United States has been unable to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, senior Bush administration officials have begun to lay the groundwork for the possibility that it may take a long time, if ever, before they are able to prove the expansive case they made to justify the war. In the months leading up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, administration officials charged that Iraq's Saddam Hussein had spent billions of dollars developing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and was poised to hand them over to international terrorists or fire them at U.S. troops or neighboring countries. Nearly two months after the fall of Baghdad, officials continue to express confidence that the weapons will be found. "No one should expect this kind of deception effort to get penetrated overnight," Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz said in an interview yesterday. Wolfowitz said the administration's prewar emphasis on the existence of weapons of mass destruction stemmed from "one of the most widely-shared intelligence assessments that I know of. . . . We're a long way" from exhausting the search. Britain finds Iraq's 'smoking gun': a top-secret missile By Con Coughlin in Baghdad (Filed: 5/25/03) British military officers have uncovered an attempt by Saddam Hussein to build a missile capable of hitting targets throughout the Middle East, including Israel, The Telegraph can reveal. Plans for the surface-to-surface missile were one of the regime's most closely-guarded secrets and were unknown to United Nations weapons inspectors. Its range of 600 miles would have been far greater than that of the al-Samoud rocket - which already breached the 93-mile limit imposed by the UN on any Iraqi missiles. Saddam's master plan for the new missile, which was being developed by Iraq's Military Industrialization Commission (MIC), the body responsible for weapons procurement, constitutes the most serious breach uncovered so far of the tight restrictions imposed on Iraq's military capability after the 1991 Gulf war. The range of Saddam's missiles was restricted to prevent him from using them as a delivery system for weapons of mass destruction. U.K. dossier on Iraq weapons 'unreliable' By Al Webb United Press International Published 5/29/2003 10:46 AM LONDON, May 29 (UPI) -- Britain's dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was rewritten on orders from Prime Minister Tony Blair's government to make it look more dramatic in the months leading up to the U.S.-led war against Baghdad, a top intelligence official said Thursday. CIA opens report on Iraq trailers By John Diamond WASHINGTON — The CIA took the unusual step Wednesday of making public an intelligence report concluding that two equipment-packed trailers seized in Iraq were intended to make biological agents, the only solid evidence to date supporting the Bush administration's allegations about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Iraq weapons questions dog allies U.S. downplays issues; Blair faces criticism May 29 — They stood shoulder-to-shoulder to convince the world that military action was the only way to disarm Saddam Hussein. Now the United States and Britain are facing growing criticism about the initial rationale for invading Iraq — the imminent threat posed by the nation’s weapons of mass destruction. NEARLY TWO MONTHS after the end of the war, British and American experts have yet to find evidence of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction — and reports from captured regime figures suggest they have denied their existence. Reassessing Miller U.S. intelligence on Iraq's WMD deserves a second look. So does the reporting of the New York Times' Judith Miller. By Jack Shafer Posted Thursday, May 29, 2003, at 4:11 PM PT The failure so far to find any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the prime justification for an immediate invasion, or definitive links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda has raised serious questions about the quality of American intelligence and even dark [sic] hints that the data may have been manipulated to support a pre-emptive war. [Emphasis added.] If the government must re-examine whether data may have been "manipulated" to support the war, surely the New York Times should conduct a similar postwar inventory of its primary WMD reporter, Judith Miller. In the months running up to the war, Miller painted as grave a picture of Iraq's WMD potential as any U.S. intelligence agency, a take that often directly mirrored the Bush administration's view. Failed Iraq Arms Hunt Stumps Top Marine By ROBERT BURNS, AP Military Writer WASHINGTON - The top commander of U.S. Marines in Iraq said Friday he is surprised that extensive searches have failed so far to discover any of the chemical weapons that American intelligence had indicated were supplied to front line Iraqi forces at the outset of the war. Lt. Gen. James Conway, commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, said in a video teleconference from his headquarters in southern Iraq that he was convinced before and during the war that at least some Republic Guard units had been provided with chemical weapons at forward areas. "It was a surprise to me then — it remains a surprise to me now — that we have not uncovered weapons, as you say, in some of the forward dispersal sites," he told reporters at the Pentagon "Believe me, it's not for lack of trying," he added. "We've been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad, but they're simply not there." WMD just a convenient excuse for war, admits Wolfowitz By David Usborne 30 May 2003 The Bush administration focused on alleged weapons of mass destruction as the primary justification for toppling Saddam Hussein by force because it was politically convenient, a top-level official at the Pentagon has acknowledged. Intriguingly, the prime instigator of the investigation was Mr. Rumsfeld who, disappointed by the lukewarm findings of the CIA, set up an intelligence unit inside his office to assess the Iraq threat. This body is known to have relied heavily on information provided by the Iraqi National Congress exile group, led by Ahmed Chalabi, long the preferred choice of the Pentagon and the Vice-President, Dick Cheney, to lead post-Saddam Iraq. Save Our Spooks By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF Day 71 of the Hunt for Iraqi W.M.D., yesterday, once again nothing turned up. Maybe we'll do better on Day 72. But we might have better luck searching for something just as alarming: the growing evidence that the administration grossly manipulated intelligence about those weapons of mass destruction in the run up to the Iraq war. A column earlier this month on this issue drew a torrent of covert communications from indignant spooks who say that administration officials leaned on them to exaggerate the Iraqi threat and deceive the public. Blair Says Iraq Weapons Secrets Will Be Publicized By Mike Peacock ST PETERSBURG, Russia (Reuters) - Prime Minister Tony Blair (news - web sites) insisted on Sunday that Britain and the United States would unearth evidence of Iraq (news - web sites)'s "weapons of mass destruction" and make it public before long. In an interview with Britain's Sky Television at a Russia-European Union (news - web sites) summit, Blair said he had already seen plenty of information that his critics had not, but would in due course. "Over the coming weeks and months we will assemble this evidence and then we will give it to people," he said. "I have no doubt whatever that the evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction will be there." Weapons of Mass Destruction: Who Said What When CounterPunch Wire Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. Dick Cheney August 26, 2002 Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons. George W. Bush September 12, 2002 If he declares he has none, then we will know that Saddam Hussein is once again misleading the world. Ari Fleischer December 2, 2002 We know for a fact that there are weapons there. Ari Fleischer January 9, 2003 Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. George W. Bush January 28, 2003 We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more. Colin Powell February 5, 2003 We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons -- the very weapons the dictator tells us he does not have. George Bush February 8, 2003 So has the strategic decision been made to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction by the leadership in Baghdad? I think our judgment has to be clearly not. Colin Powell March 8, 2003 Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. George Bush March 17, 2003 Well, there is no question that we have evidence and information that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical particularly . . . all this will be made clear in the course of the operation, for whatever duration it takes. Ari Fleisher March 21, 2003 There is no doubt that the regime of Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction. As this operation continues, those weapons will be identified, found, along with the people who have produced them and who guard them. Gen. Tommy Franks March 22, 2003 I have no doubt we're going to find big stores of weapons of mass destruction. Kenneth Adelman, Defense Policy Board , March 23, 2003 One of our top objectives is to find and destroy the WMD. There are a number of sites. Pentagon Spokeswoman Victoria Clark March 22, 2003 We know where they are. They are in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad. Donald Rumsfeld March 30, 2003 Obviously the administration intends to publicize all the weapons of mass destruction U.S. forces find -- and there will be plenty. Neocon scholar Robert Kagan April 9, 2003 I think you have always heard, and you continue to hear from officials, a measure of high confidence that, indeed, the weapons of mass destruction will be found. Ari Fleischer April 10, 2003 We are learning more as we interrogate or have discussions with Iraqi scientists and people within the Iraqi structure, that perhaps he destroyed some, perhaps he dispersed some. And so we will find them. George Bush April 24, 2003 There are people who in large measure have information that we need . . . so that we can track down the weapons of mass destruction in that country. Donald Rumsfeld April 25, 2003 We'll find them. It'll be a matter of time to do so. George Bush May 3, 2003 I am confident that we will find evidence that makes it clear he had weapons of mass destruction. Colin Powell May 4, 2003 I never believed that we'd just tumble over weapons of mass destruction in that country. Donald Rumsfeld May 4, 2003 I'm not surprised if we begin to uncover the weapons program of Saddam Hussein -- because he had a weapons program. George W. Bush May 6, 2003 U.S. officials never expected that "we were going to open garages and find" weapons of mass destruction. Condoleeza Rice May 12, 2003 I just don't know whether it was all destroyed years ago -- I mean, there's no question that there were chemical weapons years ago -- whether they were destroyed right before the war, (or) whether they're still hidden. Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, Commander 101st Airborne May 13, 2003 Before the war, there's no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical. I expected them to be found. I still expect them to be found. Gen. Michael Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps May 21, 2003 Given time, given the number of prisoners now that we're interrogating, I'm confident that we're going to find weapons of mass destruction. Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff May 26, 2003 They may have had time to destroy them, and I don't know the answer. Donald Rumsfeld May 27, 2003 For bureaucratic reasons, we settled on one issue, weapons of mass destruction (as justification for invading Iraq) because it was the one reason everyone could agree on. Paul Wolfowitz May 28, 2003
My guess is they either found one more centrifuge or a couple of grams of anthrax in dirt at a farm. Still looking for : 500 hundred more tons of chemical and biological weapons.
So, a cop guests that you are hiding cocaine in your bedroom, but you know you aren't. He and his team bust in and find nothing but a plastic bag. Do you think it is ok for the judge to convict you, based on the cop's statement:"I think he had cocaine in his bedroom, but MAYBE he had destroyed the drugs before the bust." ? Now, everyone can be convicted. Everyone destroyed cocaine before busts.
By Stephen Dinan THE WASHINGTON TIMES July 4, 2003 Senior Republican senators returning from Iraq yesterday said U.S. officials there showed them proof of Saddam Hussein's weapons programs, and the lawmakers expect the information to be made public soon. "In my judgment, any fair-minded, objective individual upon learning of that information, which I'm sure in the future will be divulged, will clearly come to the conclusion that these weapons did exist, that they were in the hands of those who could use them and, thank God, they weren't used," said Sen. John W. Warner, Virginia Republican. However, Mr. Warner, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the information was "of the highest classification, which we cannot divulge." He and seven other senators — a bipartisan group of members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Select Committee on Intelligence — briefed reporters at the Capitol after returning from a three-day, fact-finding mission to Iraq. The senators visited with U.S. military forces, Iraqi civilians, and U.S. and Iraqi officials involved in trying to rebuild the country's political system and infrastructure. They paid visits to the Kurdish north, Sunni center and Shi'ite south. Sen. Pat Roberts, Kansas Republican and chairman of the intelligence committee, said he is optimistic that U.S. forces will find Saddam's banned programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. "We are finding volumes of documentation, and it takes us time to go through it. That has led us to a couple of what I would call breakthrough pieces of information that I hope in the near future will be very positive news," Mr. Roberts said. "Now the focus is on people information and document exploitation. That will lead to the final puzzle to prove without a doubt he had the WMD," he said. After the briefing, Mr. Roberts told reporters, "I'd be a little careful were I overly critical of the lack of finding any WMD — you may end up with WMD and some egg on your face." President Bush declared victory in Iraq two months ago. Since then, specialists have been combing the country for evidence of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and trying to determine what happened to the programs known to exist from the early 1990s. But as confident as the two Republicans were of finding evidence, some of the Democrats said they didn't reach the same conclusion. "There is troubling evidence of exaggeration and stretching on the part of the intelligence community relative to the presence in Iraq, right before the war, of weapons of mass destruction," said Sen. Carl Levin, Michigan Democrat. "That was the immediate reason that was given," Mr. Levin said. "And the accuracy and objectivity of that intelligence is under review in a number of places, as it should be." He said the question of whether Saddam had a weapons program — the new focus for the investigative team — is different from the question of whether Iraq had weapons at its disposal. But Sen. Mark Dayton, Minnesota Democrat, was skeptical about the worth of the search for Saddam's weapons. "I think this hunt for the weapons of mass destruction, like the hunt for Red October, is a huge red herring that's distracting resources and personnel in Iraq for what should be under way, which is to win this engagement," he said. Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV, West Virginia Democrat, said one key to determining the fate of the programs is to capture Saddam or to prove to the Iraqi people he is dead. That would allow those with information about the programs to come forward without fear of retribution. "There is a shadow over that country — far more so than I thought when I went there — of the lack of the proven death of Saddam Hussein and his two sons," Mr. Rockefeller said. Senators from both parties said lifting that uncertainty surrounding Saddam's fate will aid the search for weapons, as well as help the coalition rebuild the country and quell resistance. "There's a pervasive climate of fear that is impeding the recovery, particularly in central and southern Iraq," said Sen. Susan Collins, Maine Republican. "There is a fear that he will return, that he will come back. And that fear prevents us from making progress as rapidly as we otherwise would, and that fear emboldens those who would attack our troops." Senators said they do not believe the attacks, which have killed 25 U.S. soldiers since Mr. Bush's declared end of major combat, are part of a coordinated effort. "I don't think in the judgment of the intelligence community and the military that this is a really fine-tuned organization by any means," Mr. Roberts said. "It's very loose-knit. But the word is, it could come to that if, in fact, we don't make progress in the next 100 days to six months." Mr. Rockefeller described chilling leaflets explaining how to kill a U.S. soldier by pointing out the most vulnerable areas. The senators said they were impressed by how well the military was handling what promised to be a difficult job for a long time to come. Sen. Jack Reed, Rhode Island Democrat, said that even in the mostly Kurdish northern part of Iraq, which is considered the most stable, more than 2,300 individual ammunition supply points remain to be secured. "It just gives you an indication of the proliferation of small arms and conventional weapons throughout Iraq," he said. Still, several senators said they also detected a rising national sentiment of unity. Miss Collins said the fear that Iraq would split into three nations after the war proved unfounded. Mr. Roberts noted a symphony concert last week that closed with the old Iraqi national anthem, "My Nation," which Saddam didn't like and was played rarely in his 35-year rule. "All of the Iraqis, which was a packed house, stood up, cheered, and there wasn't a dry eye in the place. The key issue is resolve: We can do this thing, we can do it well, and I think we are doing it well," Mr. Roberts said.
Well according to Fox News they've found WMD at least 3 times, and maybe more. My cable switched and I don't get that channel anymore so I don't know how many other times they supposedly found them.
"Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat," Wilson wrote. Wilson said he spent eight days in Niger meeting current and former government officials and people associated with the uranium business to check if there had been an Iraq-Niger deal. "It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place," he said. Wilson said that if the administration had ignored his information "because it did not fit certain preconceptions about Iraq, then a legitimate argument can be made that we went to war under false pretenses." According to news reports, the allegations of an Iraq-Niger deal were based on forged letters obtained by Italian intelligence from an African diplomat. U.S. Envoy Says Bush 'Twisted' Iraq Intelligence Reuters NEW YORK (Reuters) - A former U.S. ambassador who investigated a report about Iraq buying uranium from Niger accused the Bush administration on Sunday of twisting intelligence to exaggerate the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Joseph Wilson, Washington's envoy to Gabon from 1992 to 1995, said in an article in the New York Times that he went to Niger in February 2002 at the request of the CIA to assess the intelligence report -- which the International Atomic Energy Agency later dismissed as being based on forged documents. Before the IAEA gave its verdict, the report was cited by President Bush and Britain to support their charges that Saddam was trying to obtain nuclear weapons and to justify their invasion of Iraq in March. "Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat," Wilson wrote. Controversy is raging in both Britain and the United States over charges that the governments of the two countries manipulated intelligence about weapons of mass destruction to justify the war. No evidence of such weapons has been found by the occupying forces in Iraq. Wilson said he spent eight days in Niger meeting current and former government officials and people associated with the uranium business to check if there had been an Iraq-Niger deal. "It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place," he said. Wilson, who helped to direct Africa policy for the National Security Council under former President Bill Clinton, said the CIA would have passed on his findings to the office of Vice President Dick Cheney. Wilson noted that in January 2003 Bush "repeated the charges about Iraqi efforts to buy uranium from Africa." "If the president had been referring to Niger, then his conclusion was not borne out by the facts as I understood them," he said. Wilson said that if the administration had ignored his information "because it did not fit certain preconceptions about Iraq, then a legitimate argument can be made that we went to war under false pretenses." According to news reports, the allegations of an Iraq-Niger deal were based on forged letters obtained by Italian intelligence from an African diplomat. The allegations were apparently passed to British intelligence and then to the CIA.
Here's the entire Wilson article, worth the read: What I Didn't Find in Africa By JOSEPH C. WILSON 4th WASHINGTON Did the Bush administration manipulate intelligence about Saddam Hussein's weapons programs to justify an invasion of Iraq? Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little choice but to conclude that some of the intelligence related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program was twisted to exaggerate the Iraqi threat. For 23 years, from 1976 to 1998, I was a career foreign service officer and ambassador. In 1990, as chargé d'affaires in Baghdad, I was the last American diplomat to meet with Saddam Hussein. (I was also a forceful advocate for his removal from Kuwait.) After Iraq, I was President George H. W. Bush's ambassador to Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe; under President Bill Clinton, I helped direct Africa policy for the National Security Council. It was my experience in Africa that led me to play a small role in the effort to verify information about Africa's suspected link to Iraq's nonconventional weapons programs. Those news stories about that unnamed former envoy who went to Niger? That's me. In February 2002, I was informed by officials at the Central Intelligence Agency that Vice President Dick Cheney's office had questions about a particular intelligence report. While I never saw the report, I was told that it referred to a memorandum of agreement that documented the sale of uranium yellowcake — a form of lightly processed ore — by Niger to Iraq in the late 1990's. The agency officials asked if I would travel to Niger to check out the story so they could provide a response to the vice president's office. After consulting with the State Department's African Affairs Bureau (and through it with Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick, the United States ambassador to Niger), I agreed to make the trip. The mission I undertook was discreet but by no means secret. While the C.I.A. paid my expenses (my time was offered pro bono), I made it abundantly clear to everyone I met that I was acting on behalf of the United States government. In late February 2002, I arrived in Niger's capital, Niamey, where I had been a diplomat in the mid-70's and visited as a National Security Council official in the late 90's. The city was much as I remembered it. Seasonal winds had clogged the air with dust and sand. Through the haze, I could see camel caravans crossing the Niger River (over the John F. Kennedy bridge), the setting sun behind them. Most people had wrapped scarves around their faces to protect against the grit, leaving only their eyes visible. The next morning, I met with Ambassador Owens-Kirkpatrick at the embassy. For reasons that are understandable, the embassy staff has always kept a close eye on Niger's uranium business. I was not surprised, then, when the ambassador told me that she knew about the allegations of uranium sales to Iraq — and that she felt she had already debunked them in her reports to Washington. Nevertheless, she and I agreed that my time would be best spent interviewing people who had been in government when the deal supposedly took place, which was before her arrival. I spent the next eight days drinking sweet mint tea and meeting with dozens of people: current government officials, former government officials, people associated with the country's uranium business. It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place. Given the structure of the consortiums that operated the mines, it would be exceedingly difficult for Niger to transfer uranium to Iraq. Niger's uranium business consists of two mines, Somair and Cominak, which are run by French, Spanish, Japanese, German and Nigerian interests. If the government wanted to remove uranium from a mine, it would have to notify the consortium, which in turn is strictly monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Moreover, because the two mines are closely regulated, quasi-governmental entities, selling uranium would require the approval of the minister of mines, the prime minister and probably the president. In short, there's simply too much oversight over too small an industry for a sale to have transpired. (As for the actual memorandum, I never saw it. But news accounts have pointed out that the documents had glaring errors — they were signed, for example, by officials who were no longer in government — and were probably forged. And then there's the fact that Niger formally denied the charges.) Before I left Niger, I briefed the ambassador on my findings, which were consistent with her own. I also shared my conclusions with members of her staff. In early March, I arrived in Washington and promptly provided a detailed briefing to the C.I.A. I later shared my conclusions with the State Department African Affairs Bureau. There was nothing secret or earth-shattering in my report, just as there was nothing secret about my trip. Though I did not file a written report, there should be at least four documents in United States government archives confirming my mission. The documents should include the ambassador's report of my debriefing in Niamey, a separate report written by the embassy staff, a C.I.A. report summing up my trip, and a specific answer from the agency to the office of the vice president (this may have been delivered orally). While I have not seen any of these reports, I have spent enough time in government to know that this is standard operating procedure. I thought the Niger matter was settled and went back to my life. (I did take part in the Iraq debate, arguing that a strict containment regime backed by the threat of force was preferable to an invasion.) In September 2002, however, Niger re-emerged. The British government published a "white paper" asserting that Saddam Hussein and his unconventional arms posed an immediate danger. As evidence, the report cited Iraq's attempts to purchase uranium from an African country. Then, in January, President Bush, citing the British dossier, repeated the charges about Iraqi efforts to buy uranium from Africa. The next day, I reminded a friend at the State Department of my trip and suggested that if the president had been referring to Niger, then his conclusion was not borne out by the facts as I understood them. He replied that perhaps the president was speaking about one of the other three African countries that produce uranium: Gabon, South Africa or Namibia. At the time, I accepted the explanation. I didn't know that in December, a month before the president's address, the State Department had published a fact sheet that mentioned the Niger case. Those are the facts surrounding my efforts. The vice president's office asked a serious question. I was asked to help formulate the answer. I did so, and I have every confidence that the answer I provided was circulated to the appropriate officials within our government. The question now is how that answer was or was not used by our political leadership. If my information was deemed inaccurate, I understand (though I would be very interested to know why). If, however, the information was ignored because it did not fit certain preconceptions about Iraq, then a legitimate argument can be made that we went to war under false pretenses. (It's worth remembering that in his March "Meet the Press" appearance, Mr. Cheney said that Saddam Hussein was "trying once again to produce nuclear weapons.") At a minimum, Congress, which authorized the use of military force at the president's behest, should want to know if the assertions about Iraq were warranted. I was convinced before the war that the threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein required a vigorous and sustained international response to disarm him. Iraq possessed and had used chemical weapons; it had an active biological weapons program and quite possibly a nuclear research program — all of which were in violation of United Nations resolutions. Having encountered Mr. Hussein and his thugs in the run-up to the Persian Gulf war of 1991, I was only too aware of the dangers he posed. But were these dangers the same ones the administration told us about? We have to find out. America's foreign policy depends on the sanctity of its information. For this reason, questioning the selective use of intelligence to justify the war in Iraq is neither idle sniping nor "revisionist history," as Mr. Bush has suggested. The act of war is the last option of a democracy, taken when there is a grave threat to our national security. More than 200 American soldiers have lost their lives in Iraq already. We have a duty to ensure that their sacrifice came for the right reasons. Joseph C. Wilson 4th, United States ambassador to Gabon from 1992 to 1995, is an international business consultant.
I wonder why this information would still be under such a high secrecy classification at this point. Sometimes it seems to me that the administration may be holding back on releasing proof (if it exists) of WMDs to make any critics look as bad as possible when the evidence is presented. The Clinton administration used this tactic at times to diffuse critics, one example I remember is his taped deposition during "Lewinsky Gate". Information was leaked saying he "loses control" during the questioning when in fact he was composed during the interview. It made anyone who hyped up the information that he lost composure look very silly. Could missing WMDs be a similar circumstance on a much grander scale?
I have actually considered this possibility before...what it would do is this: Marginalize the pre-war arguments that A) It wasn't about the weapons, but the evidence of weapons being sufficient, and B) It wasn't about the weapons, but the imminent threat they were supposed to have posed...and reduce it all to a public question fo whether or not we can find any WMD. My strongest point against this theory, as plausible as it is, is this: Lately, from the White House, and even from those in here, we have begun to see the latest shift in the argument, as terms like " WMD program or the intent to pursue a WMD program. " have been passed around as though they mean the same thing, and as though the latter justifies the war. That leads me to believe that at most we have found papers indicating that Iraq had some intentions of trying to develop a WMD program, and intent is neither sufficient cause, nor outlawed by the UN treaty. I do think that the admin. is going to try and make that leap as their latest attempt to win the spin war.
I think with this admission and likely more to come-- --I have to agree with you, I don't think the administration would let themselves fall this deeply into a web of lies. Even though it doesn't seem to matter what they do, public opinion just doesn't seem to change-- there must be some leftover teflon from the Clinton years.
Well public belief that the war is going well is starting to slip. This is from July 1. http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/06/30/sprj.irq.iraq.poll/ WASHINGTON (CNN) -- As a new poll shows fewer Americans believe things are going well in Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said Monday that the fighting there would continue "for some time." Only 56 percent of Americans think current U.S.-coalition efforts as going well, according to a new CNN/USA Today Gallup poll. That is much lower than the 70 percent in late May and the 86 percent in early May who thought things were going well.
Yes, and from the poll that is based upon: Public More Positive Than Negative Despite the decline, public opinion about the war remains more positive than negative. The reasons a majority of Americans remain positive are found in the open-ended question asking respondents why they said the situation in Iraq was worth going to war over. Still Worth Being in Iraq Although a modest majority of Americans, 56%, say the situation was worth going to war over, a much larger majority, 69%, say that it is worth having U.S. troops in Iraq now. This view is reinforced by another question that finds 68% of Americans expressing a high degree of confidence that the United States will be able to rebuild the Iraqi economy. Also, only 24% of Americans believe that the casualties sustained by the American armed forces over the last two months -- 23 Americans have died since May 1 – are unacceptably high. Three-quarters say that this number is to be expected. http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr030701.asp Sorry guys. We're not pulling out yet.
