i was being sarcastic a novel rhetorical device used occasionally in the english language. I have yet to see pictures of 10 year old girls throwing rocks. and even if it was so i can see israel defending its soldiers who are heavily armed and protected (im sure they wear headgear that would protect them from an inch big rock) have to 'protect' themselves by using appache helicopters and f-16s right? and by the way there are literally hundreds of cases of INFANTS being killed by bullets of israeli soldiers. im sure those evil palestinians teach 6 month old kids to throw rocks too. second the argument that why don't those palestinians leave...where the hell would they leave to? realize that most 'arab nations' don't want palestine. does that mean we should say the hell with them? of course not. your logic is so stupid. thats all i can say. if california was given to chinese you could move back to america cause your american. if all of america was taken over by chinese and no country would accept you (given america has thousands of palestinian refugees...still most palestinians are in camps not america) where would you go? you can't go anywhere else and you aren't really able to live where you can. now do you see how these people maybe at times when they have no hope can see why suicide bombings aren't as bad as they seem. you can't use rational reasoning when your talking about people who've lived in camps for generataions and have no worth virtually. yet christians and druze are in high level of government offices. they don't care about religion... oh yeah by the way hizbullah is the only army of lebanon. in iran jews zorastrians and christians are represented in the government (be it limited but they have complete rights under the law).
Great site, Rocketscientist: The review by Professor Finkelstein, whose parents were both concentration camp survivors of the history of the creation of Israel is very revealing. To this honorable list we must now add the late Simha Flapan's extraordinary study, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities (New York, 1987). In some 250 densely argued pages, Flapan, former national secretary of Israel's Mapam party and the founder and former editor in chief of the Middle East monthly, New Outlook, demolishes the version of Israel's genesis enshrined in past scholarship and the popular media. *********************************************** So well known is the conventional picture of Israel's birth that it scarcely warrants repeating: On Nov. 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution partitioning Palestine between its Jewish and Arab constituencies Israel acquiesced to the partition foregoing its claim to the whole of its historical homeland for the sake of justice and peace. The Palestinian Arabs under the Mufti's leadership, balked at partition, initiating an armed resistance that was abetted by the surrounding Arab states, which united as one to strangle the Jewish State at its birth. The Palestinian Arabs abandoned their homes as Arab broadcasts urged them to "clear the field" for the invading armies. The vastly superior force arrayed against it notwithstanding, the Israeli "David" prevailed in its "War of Independence." Armistice lines were subsequently agreed on but the Palestinians and the neighboring Arab countries stood fast in their refusal to recognize Israel's existence. **************************************************** Myths and Realities It is Flapan's thesis that none of the above propositions can withstand serious historical scrutiny: Israel accepted the UN Partition Resolution In fact, Israel never agreed to the division of "Eretz Israel" or to the founding of an independent Arab state in any part of it. In 1937, when partition was first officially raised (by the British), David Ben-Gurion stated flatly what it was only "the beginning of full redemption and the most powerful lever the gradual conquest of all Palestine." The entire spectrum of Zionist opinion shared this view and still held fast to it a decade later. The Zionists' acceptance of the Partition Resolution was—in Flapan's words—only "tactical...a vital step in the right direction...a springboard for expansion when circumstances proved more judicious." Ben-Gurion thus scrupulously avoided any mention of territorial borders in the Declaration of Independence and any negotiations with Palestinian Arabs committed to founding an independent state in the territory allotted them. In either case, the status quo, intolerable to Zionist opinion, would have been legitimized. The Palestinian Arabs united under the Mufti's leadership to foil the partition scheme. In fact, the Mufti did not enjoy much popular support and all his efforts to organize a popular resistance to the Partition Resolution proved unavailing. This is not to say that the Palestinian Arabs supported the division of their homeland, only that they were reconciled to its inevitability. Ezra Danin, a Zionist Arab-affairs expert, observed in January 1948 that, "the majority of the Palestinian masses accept the partition as a fait accompli and do not believe it possible to overcome or reject it." Three months later, Ben-Gurion similarly reported that, "it is now clear, without the slightest doubt, that were we to face the Palestinians alone, everything would be all right. They, the decisive majority of them, do not want to fight us, and all of them together are unable to stand up to us... ." Ben-Gurion rebuffed the various efforts of more pragmatic Palestinian Arabs to reach a modus vivendi since it was his "belief ... that Zionist expansionism would be better served by leaving the leadership of the Palestinians in the hands of the extremist Mufti than in the hands of a 'moderate' opposition. 'Rely on the Mufti' became his motto." Blocked by Zionist policy from officially expressing their opposition to war, the Palestinian Arabs arranged "non-aggression" pacts with their Jewish neighbors. The relatively few who did take up arms did so primarily to defend themselves against feared attacks by the Jews. The neighboring Arab states united as one behind the Mufti and his efforts to crush the nascent Jewish State. In fact, the Arab states were anything but united, did not support the Mufti and had reconciled themselves (albeit with extreme reluctance) to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. The Arab states were divided between the pro-British Hashemites of Iraq and Transjordan and the anti-British regimes in Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Each side sought to enlist the Zionists' support, the Hashemites to abet their long-standing ambition of extending the Kingdom's borders, and anti-British regimes to further their independence struggle. Ben-Gurion opted to cut a secret deal with Transjordan's King Abdallah, which in effect divided Palestine between them. (The agreement was never formalized, principally because Ben-Gurion intended to expand the Jewish State's borders beyond the Partition Resolution boundaries tacitly agreed on with Abdallah.) The main obstacle to Abdallah's plans for annexing the territory allotted by the UN for a Palestinian state was, of course, the Mufti. Abdallah accordingly "regarded the Mufti, not the Jews, as his most dangerous enemy," even encouraging the Zionists to "deliver heavy blows" against him. The Arab chiefs of staff only began coordinating plans for a military intervention two weeks before the end of the Mandate and harbored no illusions about their ability to prevail over the Zionists. Indeed, the Arab states "tried until the last moment to prevent the invasion." However, "[o]nce Israel and Transjordan had decided to partition Palestine between themselves by force of arms, they refused to explore any interim solution that might have prevented ... total war." For Transjordan, the outbreak of hostilities would provide a convenient cover for annexation; for Israel, a "justification for the acquisition of additional territory." When the Arab armies did finally attack, Abdallah "honored his commitment not to disturb the creation of the Jewish state or attack its forces," thus crucially contributing to the Israelis' eventual victory. The invading armies of the other Arab states sought, not to abort the creation of a Jewish state, but rather to check the grandiose territorial ambitions of Abdallah and his imperialist British mentors. The Palestinian Arabs fled their homes in response to Arab broadcasts urging them to "clear the field" for the invading armies. In fact, "there is no evidence" to support this claim. The statements "quoted" by Israeli and Zionist sources are "now seen to be largely fabricated." The actual documentary record rather testifies to the "considerable efforts" of the Palestinian Arab leadership and the Arab states "to constrain the flight." Indeed, "from the point of view of military logistics," the conventional view "makes no sense at all. The Arab armies, coming long distances and operating in or from the Arab areas of Palestine, needed the help of the local population for food, fuel, water, transport, manpower, and information." So, why did the Arab indigenes abandon Palestine? Primarily because of a calculated (if unofficial) Zionist effort "to reduce the number of Arabs in the Jewish state to a minimum, and to make use of most of their lands, property, and habitats to absorb the masses of Jewish immigrants." No "direct orders" for expulsion were issued, but "the goal and spirit of real policy were understood and accepted by the army." Hence, Ben-Gurion's remark in May of 1948 that he was "not surprised" by the "flight of the Arabs." Latter in the same year, he stated flatly that, "I am for compulsory transfer, I don't see anything immoral in it." The 1948 "War of Independence" pitted an Israeli "David," struggling for survival and always on the defensive, against an Arab "Goliath," commanding vastly superior forces. In fact, "the superiority of the Jews over both the Palestinian Arabs and the invading Arab armies was never in dispute." The consensus in 1948 among both Jewish and Arab military experts as well as foreign observers was that the Zionists would certainly prevail in the event of war. In the first place, the Israelis "were not outnumbered." Indeed within weeks of the outbreak of hostilities, they were able to field significantly more troops than the combined Arab armies. Further, "The Arab states invaded Israel not as united armies determined to defeat a common enemy but as reluctant partners in an intrigue-ridden and un-coordinated coalition, whose members were motivated by mutual suspicion and mistrust." The Israelis were on the defensive only during the first month of the war. All told, they incurred most of their casualties not defending Jewish but attacking Arab settlements, not in areas within but in areas outside the UN-assigned borders. Despite the cessation of armed hostilities, the Arab states stood fast in their refusal to recognize Israel's existence. In fact, by signing the protocols to the UN-sponsored peace negotiations in Lausanne, Switzerland, the Arabs had "accepted the legitimacy of the UN partition Resolution ..., abandon the idea of Palestine as a unitary Arab state, accepted the reality of Israel, and agreed to solve the dispute by political means." The real obstacle to an Israeli-Arab peace accord was the Zionist leadership's adamant refusal, first, to accept token responsibility for the refugees' plight and, second, to return any of the conquered territories not included in the Partition Plan. In any case, Ben-Gurion "was determined to impose armistice treaties by force of military might rather than agreement," so much so that he peremptorily dismissed the extraordinary offer by Syria to absorb and resettle 300,000 of the Palestinian Arab refugees. Of the latter proposal, Flapan cites the following verdict of a fellow Israeli historian: "[Syria] gave Israel every opportunity to bury the hatchet and lay the foundations for peaceful coexistence in the long term. If [the] overtures were spurned, if [the] constructive proposals were frittered away. ..the fault must be sought not with [Syria] but on the Israeli side."
I won't get into all of this, much of which is exaggeration, except to say that having better technology does not neccessarily make you the bad guy. I find it hard to believe that every Palestinian is forced to remain within Israel. Especially since I happen to know several Palestinians living in America. Obviously my stupid logic, and little things that I like to call facts, can't stand up to your blanket generalizations. Not all of Palestine must go to the same place. Take the number of Palestinians living in Israel, divide by the number of nations in the world, I think the globe can handle it. The Palastinians are not staying because they have to, they are staying because they don't want to accept that Israel has won. No, being poor does not excuse someone from moral responsibility. No matter what happens to me, I will never think that it is okay to walk into a public place and murder innocent people. Again, if I were living in a country where I had "no worth", (ie. a Palestinian living in Israel, according to you, despite AsherOcket's statements to the contrary) I would move to a different country, like Canada, the US, Germany, England, France, Italy, etc. There are many countries in the world that do not have the racist policies that you complain of. Germany, for example, has a large Turkish population. The Geramn government has no restrictive laws against Turks.