Found this - thought it was an interesting read. Thoughts? Toward a Long-Range Energy Security Policy NADER ELHEFNAWY © 2006 Nader Elhefnawy -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From Parameters, Spring 2006, pp. 101-14. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Events in recent decades have produced a broader definition of security.1 The entry of phrases like “environmental security,” “resource conflict,” and “energy security” into the lexicon of security experts provides examples of this changing dialogue, but these concepts remain on the margins of the discussion for the most part. Where US energy policy is concerned, the debate generally has been limited to arguments that the United States must preserve its access to the oil reserves of the Middle East and Central Asia, and a vague sense that domestic energy supplies would be highly desirable. Cornucopian optimists continue to insist that oil will remain abundant and cheap for the foreseeable future, and indeed more concern is expressed over the unsavory character of governments in major oil-producing states than over the finite nature of the resources themselves. The vagaries of oil politics (and the ecological problems raised by carbon emissions) are indeed serious problems, and they are not entirely separable from the questions this article means to raise, but the focus here will be on the problem of fossil fuel scarcity at the global level. This article seeks to provide an overview of the situation, including the prospects for an economy based on renewable energy, the security problems likely to result from tightening oil supplies, and a possible basis for making the transition to alternatives widely acknowledged as inevitable in the long run. The Outlook for Energy At the time of this writing, the price of oil has hit $70 per barrel and is projected to rise even higher in the near term. While not a record when the fig- 101/02 ure is adjusted for inflation, this was still commonly taken as a sign that the era of “cheap energy” may be coming to an end. Other numbers bear this out. Annual worldwide oil consumption is roughly 29 billion barrels a year, and estimated to be rising at two percent annually.2 While there is widespread disagreement over their actual size, the world’s total “proven” reserves of oil come to roughly one trillion barrels. A linear projection has oil supplies running out around 2030 after a long period of rising prices and tightening supplies, likely to begin after production peaks, generally expected to be sometime between 2010 and 2020—maybe just five years away. The consequences of a shortfall in oil supplies on the scale of such predictions are as obvious as they are terrifying. A prolonged economic contraction and possibly a desperate scramble for resources that might bring major powers to blows are not out of the question, especially when the cost of other problems likely to place more pressure on the energy base (climate change, water shortages, population growth, etc.) are taken into account.3 In the absolute worst case, modernity might simply grind to a halt, a catastrophe that James Howard Kunstler describes in his recent book on the subject, The Long Emergency. Of course, linear projections have their limitations, and any number of developments could throw them off—unanticipated changes in the character of economic productivity, or an economic slowdown, for instance. Actual oil reserves are likely larger than the proven figure, which would delay the crunch for some years. Rising energy needs will mean higher prices and shorter supplies, which will stretch out the supply by encouraging conservation.4 They also will produce increased efforts to supplement oil with more plentiful coal, “heavy oil,” and natural gas. The degree to which these alternatives can pick up the slack, however, is a subject of intense disagreement, as all these resources will mean higher energy prices.5 Moreover, they do not eliminate the problem of the finite amount of these resources, with natural gas reserves particularly unlikely to last all that much longer than oil. In short, the oil age may end within a generation given the present economic picture, with potentially dire consequences. The prospects of alternatives to fossil fuels are therefore the key issue, such as the expanded use of nuclear energy or, ideally, renewable energy sources. Many observers predict 102/03 that it will be decades at the very least before these inherently more difficult energy sources can be exploited on a sufficiently large scale to meet the needs of advanced societies. The use of renewables has expanded rapidly in recent years, but these energy sources still supply only a small part of overall consumption, even in leaders like Denmark, where wind energy provides 10 to 15 percent of that country’s electricity. If anything, given the scope of the problem and the length of time for which it has been around, the pace of actual progress has been frustratingly glacial. While the pace may be accelerating, a gap between desired levels of energy output and those actually attainable through these means is conceivable. Nonetheless, the doomsday scenario posited by Kunstler and others is not a necessary outcome. The problem is not that substitutes do not exist, but that they are, in the view of many analysts, too expensive or too unwieldy to support desired levels of economic productivity and living standards. There is little doubt that there would be some significant transition costs, as there are in every major economic change. Observers hostile to these technologies, however, routinely play on popular fears that any change in the status quo will force Americans to give up their cars, or kill economic growth. Their exaggerations aside, such arguments conveniently neglect the fact that the exhaustion of oil resources in an unprepared world will be incalculably more devastating than any plausible adaptation, and that the earlier the transition begins, the easier it will be to spread the costs over time. More important, such analyses tend to suffer from three major deficiencies that exaggerate the difficulties involved with alternatives. The first is that calculating the costs and benefits of oil against other energy sources is far more complicated than studies pointing to the cost-ineffectiveness of renewables admit. Many costs of fossil fuel use are easily externalized, distorting the picture. The cost of pollution, military expenditures aimed at securing oil sources, and other kinds of subsidies mask the actual price of “cheap” oil—as do the very low gasoline taxes Americans enjoy.6 Certain savings from the distributed energy production that renewables might allow, while potentially substantial, are not easily or automatically factored into such calculations.7 Moreover, solar, wind, and other sources will become relatively less expensive as oil prices rise. And it also should be noted that many experts regard wind power as already competitive with fossil fuels in some geographically favorable areas. The tendency to underestimate the gains that alternatives may bring is reinforced by a broader tendency to stress costs more than benefits, not only on the part of oil industry boosters, but generally due to the changing nature of political debate.8 The potential for a rapid changeover also tends to be underestimated, observers forgetting that comparably large transformations 103/04 have happened before in a relatively short period of time. Oil became cheaper than coal only in the mid-1950s, a mere 50 years ago. As a result, coal went from generating 100 percent of Europe’s thermal electricity to less than half by 1973, oil picking up much of the slack even as overall energy production grew substantially.9 The second problem with such predictions is their built-in assumption that the relevant technologies will be static. Future improvements cannot be taken for granted, but are a near-certainty nonetheless, given the prolonged drop in the price of solar- and wind-generated energy since the 1970s, and the prospects for both continued research and development and mass production. The already low price of wind power can drop further still, given the potential of innovations like flying wind generators. Capable of exploiting the jet stream and returning the electricity to the ground through a tether, a few clusters of six hundred each could meet the entire energy needs of an industrial nation like Canada.10 There are even strong indications that electricity produced by photovoltaic solar cells will, assuming sufficient effort, become competitive in price with even subsidized, deceptively cheap oil and gas in a matter of years rather than decades. This may be due to new, low-cost materials; designs which use a greater part of the electromagnetic spectrum; more efficient use of their surface area; easily installed, self-assembling liquid solar cell coatings; and architectural structures maximizing output.11 Several of these developments could be flashes in the pan, something to which energy production has sadly been prone; for half a century fusion power has been “30 years away.” Nevertheless, given the long-term trend of improvement and the number of directions from which the problem is being attacked, some approaches will likely pay off. A third problem is the tendency to view the matter as a choice between the outright replacement of fossil fuels or nothing at all. The reality, however, is that partial solutions can provide a cushion until a more complete transition can be brought about. This being the case, it matters little if renewable energy production will at first be undergirded by more traditional supplies. Solar cells and wind turbines will be made in factories powered by oil-burning plants. To state this as proof that alternatives to oil are unrealistic 104/05 is nonsense. The energy base of the future will have to be created using the energy base existing now, just as the oil-based economy was built using previously existing sources. Of greater concern, many schemes for a hydrogen economy involve the extraction of hydrogen from natural gas or other fossil fuels, with power supplied by traditional electricity sources like oil, coal, and nuclear generators. Hydrogen, however, also can be extracted directly from water through photoelectrochemical processes or electrolysis, which could be powered by cheap wind and solar energy.12 The problem, then, is less the “technical ingenuity” needed to produce these technologies than the “social ingenuity” which will implement the technologies on a national and global basis.13 Renewable energy technology can potentially do the job; what is really at issue is whether or not good use will be made of that potential. Nonetheless, the political problem posed by the demise of the fossil fuel era is not limited to the challenge of constructing a new energy base. Security Concerns Even without taking into account related problems like the greenhouse effect, the security problems posed by the exhaustion of supplies of easily accessible, cheap oil and gas are highly varied and daunting. The likely result would be the exacerbation of familiar problems like resource conflict, weapons proliferation, and state failure. However, other problems are more novel, not least of all the potential for changes in the international balance of power based not only on which countries control the lion’s share of the world’s fossil fuel supplies, but which are most dependent on those supplies. New Resource Wars The most obvious concern is a reinvigoration of resource conflict. As the oil deposits believed to lie under a disputed piece of ground or sea floor become more valuable economically, governments might be more prepared to fight for them. Since the War on Terrorism began in 2001, China, seeing itself in a more vulnerable strategic position, has been more willing to negotiate its claims over the South China Sea.14 However, the issue has yet to be resolved, and an oil-hungry China can yet take a harder line, especially if this becomes more profitable. China also has behaved provocatively elsewhere, sending naval vessels into Japanese claims around the Senkaku Islands.15 Similar conflicts remain unresolved in other regions, including sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.16 Moreover, even states unlikely to go to war over territory would face greater prospects of involvement in an armed conflict, and find a powerful incentive to develop and deploy long-range power-projection capabilities. 105/06 Resource wars also can be a cause of internal conflicts or unrest. The war in the Indonesian region of Aceh is partly driven by the government’s determination to hold onto an oil-rich region, and the resentment of the inhabitants has been partly a response to the damage oil production has done to local communities. Oil also was at stake in the fight over East Timor, which on the first day of its independence concluded a deal with Australia regarding its oil-rich offshore claims. The problem may in fact be exacerbated by certain solutions to the world’s energy problems. To give one example, the development of new technologies which permit cost-effective drilling for oil in deeper waters could create new flash-points. Cheaper deep-water drilling, for instance, would make the oil under the South China Sea a more valuable prize.17 As certain kinds of alternative energy technologies are developed, the value of certain resources is also likely to become more strategically important (like platinum for hydrogen fuel cells), with similar results. As the situation stands, two-thirds of what were the high seas in 1958 have been “territorialized” to some degree. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea extended territorial waters from three to 12 miles, recognized 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones and 350-mile continental shelf claims, and permitted the enclosure of the internal waters of archipelagic states like Japan.18 At the same time, the mineral wealth of these regions has remained largely unexploited. While the ambitious ocean mining schemes of 30 or 40 years ago amounted to little, rising energy costs and improved technology could give them a future—and make the right to profit from them a new cause of conflict. Increased Disorder Resource conflict, however, is likely to be confined within particular regions. The economic effects of an oil shortage would be global. With less energy at their disposal, societies and governments everywhere will have more difficulty coping with problems likely to be of a more severe character—burgeoning populations, climate change, and shortages of such critical resources as water and arable land. The problem of the salinated and damaged farmland on which a third of the world’s crops is presently grown is a case in point. Aside from expensive repair, costly methods like drip-irrigation will be needed to keep such lands arable, necessitating more, not less energy.19 Another likely ramification of such an energy shock is a new wave of debt crises and state failures. As in the 1970s, those most vulnerable would be developing nations short on hard currency and dependent on oil imports, which might see their development progress strangled by a spike in prices. If the prospect of 2050s America resembling a Mad Max movie is far-fetched 106/07 and extreme, it is not so for less fortunate regions where such regressions have already happened, as in Somalia.20 Lacking appropriate or adequate capital, institutions, and technical knowledge, their situations will much more readily degenerate to the point of collapse.21 And, as events in recent years have demonstrated, advanced nations will not easily insulate themselves from these problems, given the refuge for criminal activity and terrorism such areas will provide, as well as the waves of refugees they may generate. It may even be possible for practitioners of a radical ideology to seize power in a major state. Even without that happening, we could see an inward turn on the part of major powers seeking to establish self-contained economic empires, as happened during the Great Depression.22 Nuclear Proliferation Alternatively, oil shortages, or the prospect of them, may put pressure on states to follow France’s path in the 1970s and invest heavily in nuclear technology. The problems posed by greater nuclear proliferation (or poorly built and operated reactors) need little elaboration. Perceiving a heightened threat environment amid more widespread resource conflict and state failure, states may be more likely to seek out such systems regardless of the inherent dangers. With greater insecurity and the need for alternatives to fossil fuels feeding each other, the nonproliferation regime will be under greater pressure than it is today. A Return to 1973? America’s dependence on foreign oil (a problem that Arctic oil drilling will not even come close to solving) makes the nation susceptible to foreign leverage, and the Middle East aside, other major oil-producers may have strategic interests or goals conflicting with those of the United States.23 Given the present diversity of suppliers, a future version of the OPEC embargo may be unlikely, but the contraction of oil supplies is still likely to mean shocks ahead. Moreover, it must be noted that the pain of a shock will not be felt evenly. Efficient energy users will suffer less, and vice-versa. At present, that would be to the disadvantage of the United States relative to other developed nations like Germany.24 Correspondingly, states which derive a higher proportion of their energy from renewables would be less vulnerable economically, a condition easier to achieve if energy use is already efficient. This raises another issue of particular concern for the position of the United States, one generally given short shrift. The hype about information technology in the 1990s contributed to a complacent assumption of American technological dominance, which is simply baseless where renewable energy is concerned.25 The small but rapidly growing world market in photovoltaics, fuel 107/08 cell-based vehicles, and wind turbines is dominated by Europe and Japan, where the most promising research continues. In fact, America’s profile has actually shrunk in this area, with its share of the world market in photovoltaics falling to 11 percent in 2004 from 25 percent just five years earlier.26 One result is that, short of a change in this situation, a conversion of the national energy base will likely expand the already massive US trade deficit, rather than constituting a new opportunity for American growth. The possibility must therefore be considered that an oil shock may hurt the United States more severely than the other developed nations, weakening its international position relatively as well as absolutely. Meeting the Challenge The most obvious response, at least from the perspective of traditional national security, is to take the dangers described above into account in threat planning. In other words, in the event of a new energy crisis, there may be more state failures, weapons proliferation, and resource conflict. Nonetheless, military force is inadequate to deal with the larger problem of relieving the dependence on finite fossil fuels—although government research and development (R&D), military as well as civilian, can play (and already is playing) a role in creating a path out of that dependence. The predominance of neoliberal economic theory makes it easy to forget the degree to which key economic innovations have been pioneered and supported by government.27 While it is the robber barons who are celebrated, the railroads of the 19th century were built with massive government assistance in the form of loans, land grants, and other subsidies. In the 1950s, no one waited for the private sector to step in and provide a highway system. Modern computers, the internet, and space technology all benefited immeasurably from government research, and indeed may have been inconceivable without government efforts. The job of government is precisely to step in where a need exists when the private sector is either unwilling or unable to satisfy it. This is the case at present with renewable energy, and at this point it is worthwhile to reflect on America’s history in this area. “Big Science” in the United States has been most successful when explicitly oriented toward a particular goal, as with the early space program. The Soviet launch of the first Sputnik satellite was a profound shock, but America responded effectively with massively enlarged investment in scientific education and research. Half a century later the United States is in a dominant position in space, its satellite networks a cornerstone of its unprecedented military superiority. Where energy is concerned, the “Sputnik moment” has long since come and gone. The project of freeing the American economy from oil depend- 108/09 ence arguably deserves the same priority the moon mission enjoyed 40 years ago, speaking as it does to a far more central national interest, and it is worthwhile considering why the results achieved to date have been so modest. The simple fact is that US energy policy traditionally aimed at an expansion of oil and gas production, while investing heavily in nuclear energy. There was a brief enthusiasm for renewable sources and conservation in the 1970s, but the economic reforms of the 1980s are generally considered to have ended this. Research and development funding for energy was substantially reduced, and tax credits and regulations were abandoned to the end of creating a “free market” in energy.28 The nascent alternative energy industry was not only left to sink or swim among more mature competition, but as a net result of assorted tax policies and subsidies it was put at a disadvantage, and it withered. When considering the character of the energy business, it is hardly surprising that they did not pick up the slack. Energy firms invest relatively little in R&D, about 0.5 percent of revenue, compared with 10 percent in high-tech fields, the figure actually declining in the 1980s and 1990s.29 Moreover, the emphasis has not been on “system-shattering” research, but on “conservative innovations able to pay off in the short term,” a category which generally has excluded renewables.30 All of this made alternative energy an especially poor candidate for the free-market path, though to be fair, previous energy technologies typically required massive government support before becoming sustainable. Of some $150 billion spent subsidizing solar, wind, and nuclear energy between 1947 and 1999, more than $145 billion went to nuclear (96 percent of the total).31 This may seem appropriate, given how much more energy nuclear generators are producing today compared with wind and solar. Between 1947 and 1961, however, federal subsidies toward nuclear energy on a per-kilowatt basis were 40 times those provided to wind (which had then been comparably important), and it is difficult to imagine nuclear energy’s comparative efficiency having come about without such massively disproportionate early investment.32 Since then research dollars have continued to favor fossil fuels and nuclear energy, arguably beyond a point of diminishing returns.33 R&D spend- 109/10 ing for renewables has been about $10 billion, compared with $20 billion and $40 billion for fossil fuels and nuclear energy, respectively.34 While that figure still appears large, it is less impressive when broken down by area. American spending on hydrogen fuel in the 1970s, for instance, totaled a paltry $24 million and represented only a third of Western Europe’s spending on the same area of research.35 The quality of that research spending also has been questionable, as the spectacular success of Denmark’s much smaller R&D program in wind turbine technology demonstrates.36 In short, renewables were never given a proper chance because of a conventional wisdom that says “let the market do it,” no matter how unwilling the market proves to be, and the disinterest of the powerful oil, gas, and nuclear lobbies, which have continued to receive the lion’s share of government support.37 The progress of sources like wind and solar energy since the 1970s occurred not because of but in spite of the policies of the last quarter-century, and, given political realities, this seems unlikely to change. Nevertheless, with each passing year it becomes harder to deny that change is called for, and that the arguments against a change simply do not hold water. The resistance to planning that left the United States without an industrial policy has resulted in a $700 billion annual trade deficit, caused in large part by American imports of manufactured products once made at home. With the beginning of the end of the oil age possibly around the corner, the United States cannot afford to be without an energy policy. A logical starting point is a program to nurture renewable sources and conserve fossil fuels on a scale far more ambitious than anything previously attempted or currently being considered. Even the aforementioned $10 billion figure is modest in comparison with the sums spent on major national projects like the Manhattan Project and the Apollo moon missions in much shorter periods of time, adjusting for inflation and economic growth. For that matter, it is modest in comparison with public R&D spending generally, which exceeds $100 billion a year—despite the continuing decrease of federal spending as a share of the country’s total R&D funding.38 Whatever its precise size, this program ideally should be aimed not only at making the United States a world leader in the field of renewable energy sources, but at reducing America’s fossil fuel consumption below present levels in absolute terms before 2020 and eliminating fossil fuel dependence no later than 2040 and preferably earlier. To that end, the United States should pursue a broad range of approaches, not only hydrogen (the production of which should be delinked from fossil fuels and rare minerals to the extent possible), but also photovoltaics, wind, ethanol, biomass, and, while they are more dependent on geography, tidal and geothermal. The characteristics of some of 110/11 these energy sources offer a variety of practical benefits, making them worthy of military R&D dollars. One advantage is the potential that renewable sources offer for distributed power.39 Given the prospect that US forces will increasingly be based in less-developed regions like the Middle East, Central Asia, and even sub-Saharan Africa, not being dependent on local power grids can be an advantage. For example, at present the self-sustaining Navy base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has a wind turbine installation which produces 5 to 12 percent of its energy during the spring, and up to 25 percent during the windy period of the fall months, reducing diesel imports by 650,000 gallons annually.40 At the same time, the unique needs of military programs make them a logical starting point for at least some research in this area. Running information-age campaigns with industrial-age logistical systems is already problematic, and renewable energy sources or conservation technologies might provide a partial solution. The Army is presently funding a program to develop flexible solar panels that may ultimately be woven into the fabric of tents or uniforms to supply power for communications equipment, computers, and other electrical appliances.41 A hydrogen fuel cell able to get more miles per gallon could be a considerable boon to mechanized Army units, to say nothing of Navy and Air Force units, which may see benefits even sooner. Submarines using fuel cells are not only possible, but, in the form of the Type 212A, are already entering service with the German navy.42 Research into technologies facilitating conservation also would play a role in a balanced strategy, since more efficient energy use makes it easier for still-developing renewable energy power sources to meet a given need—and, in any event, these are seen by many observers as more promising in the near term. Energy savings can come from sources less familiar than the typical examples of hybrid or electric cars, more efficient appliances, and solar water heating. The use of strong, ultralight materials such as new, carbon-based ceramics can reduce fuel consumption. A car made out of carbon nanotubes, for instance, would weigh 50 pounds, and while a 50-pound car may be unattractive for one reason or another, it demonstrates the potential for very large fuel economies. The development of substitutes for oil in products like plastics, fertilizers, and pharmaceuticals also can assist, as can improved mass transit systems, a modern rail system, modernized power grids, support for zero-energy housing, and practical superconductors.43 All of the above hold the promise of reducing electricity and fossil fuel consumption to a fraction of present levels without sacrificing modern conveniences. There also are ways in which technology can aid conservation by enabling people and goods to move less without sacrificing economic productivity or the quality of life (and in some cases, perhaps increasing them), 111/12 as by enlarging telecommuting.44 Another is a reduction of “production sharing,” the practice of widely dispersing the manufacture of a single item or, more radically, the movement of production closer to markets via replicating technologies like the three-dimensional printer, a technology that exists today, albeit in its infancy. Beyond research and development, every reasonable effort should be made to facilitate the mass production of these technologies and adopt them at home and abroad, including carefully thought-out tax credits and buyback rates for net-excess power. Should American companies seriously enter the market in new types of energy and conservation technologies, the broadening of effort, greater production, and increased competition could drive prices down further. Purchases of the relevant technology can be subsidized, and government and military facilities can assist by purchasing their power from such sources, boosting the market. Protectionist measures, however, are uncalled for as a way of bringing about this end. Indeed, cooperation would be a preferable approach, given that this already belated process might be disrupted by very little interference. Such a project also could be a basis for collaborating with allies irked by a perceived lack of US concern for the natural environment. Moreover, it must be remembered that the greatest increases in oil consumption are coming not from the developed nations, but from developing ones like China and India. These represent perhaps an even more promising market than developed nations for the technology in key respects. Precisely because their energy consumption is growing more rapidly than anywhere else, their infrastructures are still being built; according to one estimate, a third of the world’s population is still unconnected to an electric grid. Additionally, their energy consumption will be lower for the foreseeable future, making at least some of their demand more easily met through renewables. Sales of the technology can be facilitated through foreign aid programs, and such an action shouldn’t be viewed as charitable. To the extent that the access of other nations to this technology will reduce the emission of greenhouse gases, conserve the fossil fuel supplies which will continue to meet much of America’s energy needs for decades to come, expand the market for US companies working in this arena, and diminish the security burden resulting from a scramble for cheap oil, then doing so will be very much in the national interest of the United States. The program proposed here no doubt appears exceedingly ambitious, and it certainly is, but this is a different matter from saying that it is impossible, undesirable, or unnecessary. One might also protest that despite the unease surrounding oil prices of $70 a barrel, there is no “emergency” yet. The point, however, is to prevent the situation from ever becoming one. 112/13 http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06spring/elhefnaw.htm
Thanks for the article, Hayes. I hope there will be more like the writer who see the economic potential of environmentalism and the markets it could add to our future position in a globalized economy. The balanced approach for energy investment is long overdue. Though China's landgrabs for oils is more noticable, they are carrying out their own energy plans for acquiring all resources including R&D into alternatives. Yet every year we see the same grotesque energy bills that label nuclear as green (just like saying corn is a vegetable) and have multiple riders on deep sea offshore drilling, coal technologies, and on improving technologies for extracting oil from spent fields.... The writer views the alternative energy movement and Denmark's in particular as glacial, but Denmark doesn't have an economy of scale to reduce costs and further innovations. I also don't believe the outreach for government intervention will come in the near future, unless a wave of pro-environmental legislators mirroring the congress of the early 1970s strike again. That era had visible proof of environmental neglect, ranging from brown rivers, smoggy skies, and deformities among newborns. The next catastrophe appears to be a slow boil. Another reason is that there's an overwhelming burden of proof upon alternative energy proponents to guarantee a smooth transistion from fossil fuels. There's a lot of reasons this isn't possible. Off the top of my head, they are: an aging infrastructure that favors fossil fuels over alternative temporal energy generation, entrenched legacy interests, and economic concerns. Our current energy grid wastes a lot of energy during transit, and one of the complaints against solar and wind is that it can't be continuous or "on demand". However, recent strides into kinetic energy storage would allow generators to run at capacity during downtimes or at night when hours aren't peak. When energy is needed, such as on a hot summer day, these kinetic energy batteries would be run in conjunction with the power plants. This could easily apply to solar and wind to store energy during days. Another knock is that solar and wind are very region (political and topographical) intensive. This wouldn't have to be a large hurdle if we overhaul the existing grid, but Congress might just call for intermittent repairs than address the efficiency and age issue. The other two reasons could be topics itself.... The energy crisis and resource crunch are related, but solving one doesn't solve the other. The US can realize its wind potential and the Middle East can tap it's solar potential, but there will still be environmentally driven conflicts in the future world. The US is in a great position because it has abundant natural water resources (though we still import from the north) and it has a low population density of arable land compared to countries in Asia or Africa. A large chunk of China's population reside on coastal land resembling the Eastern Seaboard. I guess my point is that environmental tragedies will continue to be abstract in the American mind.... The current policy seems to want to ride out the shock by consuming more and finding more sources.... A study by the Rocky Mtn. Institute funded by the Pentagon claimed we could save 133 billion a year by improving and enforcing fossil fuel efficiencies, reducing foreign imports to negligable levels, and supplimenting gasoline with ethanol and other fossil fuel alternatives. The study was formed to end foreign dependency while still relying on oil. The bill spread out in ten years would be 180 billion, but the savings would be annual. With studies like these it appears many people in Washington still believe what Sheikh Yamani, the Saudi oil minister during the 1970s, said, "The Stone Age did not end for lack of stone, and the Oil Age will end long before the world runs out of oil."
Typical anti-China slant there by American warmonger. And in this case, it's anti both Mainland and Taiwan. The Diaoyu Islands can at best be called disputed territories. The author wasted no time to spew very biased view in favor of Japan on the contested issues where the U.S. should take a neutral stance.
No I've never claimed China is infallible. Nice try, hayes. The comment I made is of course relevant to the American's newly acquired China threat syndrome, in the broader view of global energy crisis. The author unequivocally sided with Japan wrt the disputed Diaoyu Tai Islands, which Taiwan also lays claim to. Let's for a moment put PRC aside, why in the hell all out of a sudden U.S. forgets its "moral obligation" to Taiwan/ROC's interest? Couldn't it be that the Taiwanese are Chinese after all, so that anything that's anti-Chinese's interest is a fair game?
Do you want to retype this because I can't make any sense out of it? Take a deep breath first, though.
The so-called "International Relations Expert" made several horrendous blunders when he brought up China into a brief discussion, in which almost every statement is nonsensical, false, or strongly biased. First of all, the much hyped WOT waged by U.S. in late 2001 was NOT directed at China. On the contrary, U.S. and PRC have been on the same side of the WOT, thus that "China seeing itself in a more vulnerable strategic position" is complete nonsense. Second, PRC had been negotiating with the neighbouring Southeast Asian countries on the sovereignties over the islands in South China Sea for decades. The WOT had absolutely zilch to do these negotiations. Third, and the crux of argument is the claim on the Diaoyu Island. Without any consideration to the contentiousness of the issue, the author squarely sided with Japanese' claim, displaying total lack of objectivity, geographic knowledge, and historical perspective. China owned the Diaoyu Island and its peripherals as early as in Ming Dynasty. Japan took it from the Qing Dynasty in the late 19th century during its imperialist military expansion. While Taiwan was officially returned to the Chinese after the Japan's defeat at the end of WWII, the sovereignty over the uninhabited Diaoyu island chain remains disputed. For decades both PRC and Japan had been negotiating the ownership of these islands in relatively good will until in 1996 when a group of Japanese right wing civilians set up a lighthouse on one of the disputed islands. This sparked strong protests from the Chinese, including the people of Taiwan and Hong Kong. In fact, the Taiwanese fishermen and Hong Kongese are the more aggressive volunteers who have been trying to reclaim the islands. Geographically, the Diaoyu Islands lie 410 kilometres from Japan's Okinawa Islands, but only about 300 kilometres from the Chinese mainland and less than 100 kilometres from Taiwan. One of Japan's arguments is that the Diaoyu island chain are part of Japan's Ryukyu Islands. This is both ridiculous and groundless (pun intended). Anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of geography knows the Diaoyu Islands have no direct link with Japan's Ryukyu Islands. The Diaoyu Islands lie on the periphery of the continental shelf in the East China Sea, divided from the Japanese Islands by the Okinawa Oceanic Trough. According to the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, the geographical scope of an archipelagic country includes the islands, waters, and other natural terrains that in essence constitute a geographical, economic and political entity. Granted Taiwan has not been united with the Mainland yet, but this gives no wriggle room to Japanese' claim whatsoever. Now the the question is, is the author being deliberately obtuse, arrogant, ignorant, or all of the above? Since your lack of knowledge on China is well documented, hayes, this is a free lesson to you.
wnes, you are to china what creepyfloyd is to iran, lol. the funny thing is that if the issue was as clear cut as you claim there wouldn't be any dispute. The ownership of the islands by Japan is recognized by the United States, and it Japan's by treaty with China - that is the perspective which the author assumes. Further, the point that China has acted provactively in terms of the islands is not in dispute (that they sent Chinese naval vessels to the area), nor that it is isolated (they've have clashes in the Spratly's with other claimant nations as well).
While it's true I presented my view that mostly reflected the position of China (including both Mainland and Taiwan) in my previous post, I did state clearly from the onset in my earlier posts that the issue has been in dispute involving three parties, two of which represent China. A number of treaties could be cited when different parties tried to lay their claim over the islands. Officially, the U.S. government since 1972 has taken a neutral stance on the dispute. Specifically, the U.S. State Department stated that its involvement could "... in no way prejudice any underlying claims ... The United States considers that any conflicting claims are a matter for resolution the parties concerned." The author's personal view (which is full of ****) is therefore NOT in line with his own government's position, that is, to studiously avoid involvement in the dispute. Both China and Japan agreed to "shelve" the issue and leave it for future generation to find a solution acceptable to all when PRC's paramount leader Deng Xiaoping visited Japan in 1979. During the decade-long scuffles between the Chinese (including the fishermen and protesters from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Mainland) and Japanese, all sides displayed some form of aggression. In fact, as recent as in last year, after Japanese patrol boats harassed Taiwanese fishing vessels on disputed water, Taiwan/ROC sent a naval frigate to intervene. To say that only China (apparently referring to the PRC/Mainland) acted provocatively is extremely one-sided and thus doesn't tell the whole story. Now hayes, faced with these facts, are you gonna admit that by agreeing with this author, you too have strong bias against China, which is deeply rooted in jingoistic neo-fascist hatred towards the Chinese in general?
Are you kidding? If you weren't so hypersensitive about anything relating to China I think you'd realize that the islands were mentioned in passing - not a core function of the article, lol. There is nothing jingoist or neo-facist about it.
The statements wrt China are not necessarily the theme of the article, but they surely reflects the author's personal view on China, which is strongly biased, to say the least. You have not acknowledged it, as far as I am concerned.
