How exactly would this help us? We'd still not be under the cap, therefore we wouldn't actually be able to pick up anyone else. All it really does it waste the LLE and give said player more money.
With the salary cap rising from $43 mil to possibly $50 mil, it will be very interesting to see what the Rockets decide to do with their expiring contracts. Assuming Yao is maxed out this summer, the Rockets will already have $40 mill committed next summer (Mcgrady $16m, Yao $11m, Howard $6m, James $3.5m, Sura $3.5m). Add in a MLE player ($5m) and our draft pick ($1m), that doesn't leave us with much cap room to spend. But if we manage to unload Howard's contract (not likely) or Sura/James (shouldn't be too difficult), we could be looking at about 10 mil in cap space. Some notable FA's next summer: Peja Stojakovic, Tyson Chandler, Mike Dunleavy, Tayshaun Prince, Ben Wallace, Samuel Dalembert, Jason Terry, Nene, Matt Harpring, Chris Wilcox, Caron Butler Quite a few quality forwards available. Not too many guards. If the Rockets plan on being free agent players next summer, they would be smart to go after a point guard with their MLE this summer. Another option is perhaps convincing a free agent this summer (Swift, Simmons) to take a 1 year MLE deal with the assurance that the Rockets will reward them next summer when they have the cap room. The Rockets have held true to their word in the past (Ex. Shandon, Mo Taylor), so I wouldn't completely rule out a free agent accepting it.
I explained it. It's not cap space, but the ability to trade for big contracts to get into the tax. And once in the tax, we basically get Juwan "tax-free". With the new trade rules (salaries within 125%+100K) it is a lot easier to trade up in salary. Obviously we would need to target the high priced players, but that's where the value in expiring contracts is anyway. But after thinking about it last night, I think a better way to go about using this new CBA feature, is to trade for a couple of high contract guys (one of them being an albatross that we needed to take on in order to trade for the guy we really wanted), and then cut the albatross, and start heading into LT territory without them counting against the tax. For example, maybe we can trade for Paul Peirce and Raef Lafrentz. Taking Raef's contract is the only way Boston would do this deal. So then we cut Lafrentz and his contract wouldn't count towards the luxury tax. And with 3 max level players in Yao, T-mac and Pierce, along with Lafrentz's cap figure and an MLE signing or two, we would definitely be in luxury tax territory. It would be a bold move, and while Les didn't want to pay the luxury tax when he did the Rice trade, building a legit contender is different. If this team is good enough to go deep into the playoffs, then the team would pay for itself. This luxury tax exception is definitely an interesting option, and one worth looking into.
You CAN NOT add a third superstar to this team or any other team. Yao and T-Mac works because Yao is very unselfish and so is T-Mac to a certain extent. You can't add any players to this team that need the ball to be effective. You already have two players that dominate the ball. You simply can't have a third-one. Pierce is not gonna be happy parking at the three point line waiting for passes to come his way so he can shoot open threes. You can't ask a superstar to be a role player and it's also not economically feasible to pay $14 million to a role player. Juwan Howard is not a superstar, yet he struggled to adjust to his role because he had been a go to guy in the past.
Well I don't want to rehash all the arguments that I made in the "Paul Pierce not wanted" thread. But essentially I think it can work. Yao is unselfish and T-mac is unselfish. And PP is an efficent scorer with a different skill set than Tracy. We run a bunch of plays designed to get Wesley open shots, and Mike James would often look for his own shot too. Give Pierce all of those shots, and he'd be right around his average for fga per game from last year. The "three superstars can't work" rule only applies if the players involved are selfish and don't buy into the system. I think both T-Mac and Pierce are at a point in their careers where they care about winning, and not stats. This past year Pierce's role and burden and spotlight went down when Walker was traded back to Boston. PP shot the ball less, but became much more efficient in his scoring. And he's still got the tools to be a top-flight defender. If JVG can whip Pierce and T-mac into shape, then we are talking about a pair of shutdown swingmen. Pair that with a big presence in the paint and that has all the makings of a dominant defense. Don't get me wrong, Pierce would definitely be a risk. But I think it's a risk worth pursuing. Otherwise, we've got to do something with all these expiring contracts. If it's not Pierce then it will be some other high priced player. I would be pretty pissed if CD and Les decide to let all these expiring contracts expire for nothing.
i took this from real gm By Dan T. Rosenbaum 1. Introduction Negotiations for a new NBA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) have been underway for more than a year during which time a deal has often seemed tantalizingly close. But the calm before the storm ended in May 2005 as the league’s deputy commission Russ Granik warned that “if the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) doesn’t change its negotiating strategy soon, a lockout is coming.” Since that time the two sides have moved closer together with Granik reporting “significant progress” this past weekend. Despite agreement on a basic framework, both sides see problems – different problems – that they feel need to be addressed in a new deal. And therein lies the rub. Within the existing framework, proposals that fix problems for one side usually make things worse for the other side. It all becomes a zero sum game and that can lead to unproductive bickering and posturing. So the all-too-common media lectures to meet in the middle (often preceded by reflexive and condescending diatribes about the “ridiculousness” and “stupidity” of the parties involved) are kind of like asking the owners and players to split the baby. And with the good news we are hearing this weekend, hopefully that will work. But if not, I would like to use this piece to offer other suggestions that might just work better for both sides. What I think both sides need are slight changes to the existing framework – changes that make both the owners and players better off by fixing inefficiencies in the current agreement. In order to recognize how to do that, we need to step back and better understand the current deal and its problems. For example, the current luxury/escrow tax system often makes adding players much more expensive for average spending teams than for high spending teams. This tends to most severely penalize small and medium market teams with championship aspirations – precisely the teams that we would expect a luxury tax to protect. I do not think anyone really intended the system to work this way. In addition, the luxury/escrow tax system creates a tremendous amount of needless uncertainty. Teams do not know the luxury tax threshold or whether the luxury tax will be triggered until the season is completed. Guessing wrong can cost teams tens of millions of dollars, which means that good luxury tax forecasts often are more critical to profitability than good basketball decisions. And despite the fact that this uncertainty makes an economist like me more marketable, it simply is not good for the league. Slight changes of the structure of the luxury/escrow tax system can ease both of these problems, resulting in a system that is less punitive to competitive small and medium market teams and puts profitability more in line with good basketball decisions. Another problem with the current framework is that the evolution of the “soft” salary cap and the resulting exceptions has led to an explosion of long-term contracts. Salary cap constraints and exceptions, along with maximum salaries, often lead to teams competing on the lengths of contracts rather than per-season salaries. The resulting long-term contracts have led to most teams paying large sums to retired, waived, or unproductive players. Redistributing these salaries to productive players would increase the incentives for players to improve their games and would remove power from players with long-term contracts who hold their franchises hostage with demands to be traded or to have a coach fired. Such behavior damages the marketability of the NBA. But from the players point of view, the guarantees in these long-term contracts are one of the linchpins that have allowed the players’ share of total revenue grow over the years. So they will not give up fully guaranteed contracts without a fight. For that reason I propose an explicit mechanism to guarantee players a growing share of total revenue, thereby eliminating the players’ (and agents’) most important rationale for fully guaranteed long-term contracts. This allows me to propose a substantial relaxation of the guaranteed contract system in the NBA. And finally, previous collective bargaining agreements have dramatically (and unintentionally) increased the incentives for players to enter the NBA early. The subsequent explosion of early entry has reduced the free training and marketing that the NBA has historically received through college basketball. Commissioner David Stern has proposed an age limit to stem this flood of early entrants. Instead I proposal several changes, in particular changes to rookie scale contracts, that would make them longer, riskier, and less lucrative for early entrants. These changes would substantially reduce the incentives for early entry. My proposal would not eliminate early entry, but should reduce it. For the most part, my proposals are attempts to address the negative unintended consequences of previous agreements and thereby create room for both the league and union to be better off in a new agreement. I come at this as an economics professor who consulted for the NBPA in Spring 2003. For some this will mean that I will forever be seen as an advocate for the union, but I do not have a dog in this fight. I am writing this as an analyst – one who does not have all of the answers – with some experience with the insiders in these negotiations. But mostly I write this as a fan who loves the NBA and would like to see an agreement that provides a foundation for long-lasting peace between the owners and players. In the rest of this piece, I will discuss each of my proposals in quite a bit of depth. I will compare them to what is in the current deal and what is being proposed, discussing aspects of previous negotiations where relevant. In some places these discussions will get technical, but with the NBA collective bargaining agreement being an incredibly complex document, that is sometimes unavoidable. 2. The Current Proposed Deal The deal that Chad Ford is outlining, in my opinion, is a big, big win for the union. It appears much more favorable to the players than the current collective bargaining agreement and the deal I propose in this piece. There could be other details that are very important (such as what is happening with the mid-level exception), but here are some of the major points. · Age limit of 19. · Rookie scale contracts that stay the same, except that the third season becomes a team option. These will be labeled “concessions by the union,” but no player currently in the union is made worse off by these “concessions.” In fact, the current members of the union probably have more reason to support these provisions than does the league, since these provisions will open up jobs for veterans. · Maximum contract length of six years for players who sign with their own team and five years for players who sign with a new team. · Maximum salary increases of ten percent of first year salary for players who sign with their own team and eight percent who sign with a new team. These two provisions are concessions by the union, although much of the effect of the second provision is undone by the increase in the salary cap. · Players are guaranteed 57 percent of basketball-related income (BRI). · Salary cap trigger percentage rises to 51 percent of BRI from 48.04 percent of BRI. Note that in the current collective bargaining agreement, maximum salaries are percentages of the salary cap. If that is not changed, then maximum salaries will increase under this provision. In fact, the total salary of a maximum salary player with maximum raises may end up slightly larger per season than under the old deal, thereby undoing much of what is conceded by the players. I believe that the players’ share of BRI will be higher than 57 percent in this deal, so I do not believe the guarantee to be much of a concession by the owners. · Escrow tax maximum falls in stages from ten to eight percent. By the end of the collective bargaining agreement, this is likely to put $50 million per season more into the pockets of players. · Luxury and escrow tax distributions are equal for all 30 teams. There also is no “super” tax on high-spending teams. This is a huge concession by the owners. The distribution scheme in the current deal arguably reduced team spending more than the luxury tax itself did. Without the 300 or 400 percent effective tax rate on team salary just above the luxury tax threshold, teams will be more willing to pay the luxury tax. The league must have given in on this point due to pressure from its teams. The amount of money being redistributed under the current deal must have been too extreme for too many teams. Now I am figuring that there are details that go in the league’s favor, or else it looks to me that the league has been taken to the cleaners on this proposed deal. Because with what has been described so far, I would expect the players’ share of BRI to push past 60 percent, perhaps well past 60 percent, by the end of this deal. One other point. If this pretty much is the current outline for the next deal, I would expect an explosive free agent market this summer. Teams should expect to pay substantially more for free agents than they did in the last few summers. The higher salary cap will result in more teams having more room under the salary cap and the change in how luxury and escrow taxes are distributed will greatly lessen the effect of luxury taxes on spending. 3. Reducing the Guarantees in Long-Term Contracts Because of restrictions on competing on salary due to the salary cap, mid-level exception, and maximum salaries, teams often compete on the length of a contract. This has led an explosion of long-term contracts, which present moral hazard problems. First of all, neither players (as a group) nor owners are particularly happy when tens of millions of dollars are being paid to players waived or buried on a team’s bench. More importantly, long-term contracts reduce the incentive for players to improve their games and get along with teammates, coaches, and general managers. These long-term contracts have had the effect of making these players very powerful, often putting coaches and general managers into no-win situations when a player on a long-term contract demands a trade or wants a coach ousted. These demands feed the perception that the NBA is full of spoiled, prima donna players. Such perceptions – despite not being true for most NBA players – make it difficult to market the NBA to fans outside the NBA’s core constituencies. For this reason reducing long-term contracts could benefit both owners and players alike by making the NBA more marketable. The league and union have discussed shortening the maximum length of long-term contracts. My proposal goes much further. • Once a player is waived, teams would be obligated to pay just 50 percent of a player’s salary during the first calendar year after waiving him, 25 percent during the second calendar year, and 0 percent thereafter. • Maximum contract lengths would remain seven years for free agents signing with their own teams and six years for free agents signing with other teams. • Maximum salary increases (or decreases) would continue to be 12.5 percent of the first-season salary for players signing with their own teams and 10 percent for players signing with other teams. This proposal in essence eliminates long-term guaranteed contracts for unproductive players and thus it is a big concession to the owners. Without revenue guarantees (described above) that are a bit uncomfortable for the owners and rise when BRI increases, it would be suicide for the players to agree to the elimination of guaranteed contracts. But with appropriate revenue guarantees this proposal is good for the league and for the players, since the guarantees requires that this money would be redistributed from unproductive players to productive players (and their agents). But wouldn’t the agents object to the elimination of guaranteed contracts? My friend puts it this way. “Agents would likely throw a fit. Say Arn Tellem wrangles a $50 million contract for Kwame Brown. Then after the first season, the Wizards decide to cut Brown when he quits on the team again. Tellem then loses his percentage of that money that Brown won’t receive. Players as a group would still get the same amount of money, but that individual player and his agent lose out.” Of course, there will be individual players and agents who are better off with guaranteed contracts, but in this case teams probably would be a lot more willing to sign Brown to a lucrative long-term contract if they knew they could get out of it if he quit on them. And with more money being available to the players, that also would help Brown in free agent negotiations. More importantly, Tellem represents lots of other clients. What he might lose if Brown quits he would more than likely make up with his other clients. If players as a whole are getting more money, Tellem more than likely will be making more money. So my point is that players and agents should be willing to give up guaranteed contracts if they believe that this proposal puts more money in their pockets. At the end of the day the money available to the players (and thus to the agents) is what matters to agents. And finally, with teams having the ability to get out of bad contracts there seems to be little rationale for making changes to the maximum number of years of contracts or the maximum salary increases. Long contracts with maximum raises will increase the probability that a player is waived in the later years of the contract, so these provisions are not nearly as critical as they are in the current agreement. 4. Escrow Taxes (and Subsidies) The mechanism for guaranteeing the shares of revenue going to the players and owners would be the escrow tax and a new wrinkle which I call an escrow subsidy. Under this proposal the escrow tax could exceed 10 percent of player compensation and it could be an escrow subsidy. • Escrow taxes (subsidies) would guarantee that league-wide player compensation equaled the designated percentage of BRI. • The escrow tax rate would be equal to the share of total player compensation that exceeded the designated percentage of BRI. • In the highly unlikely event of an escrow subsidy, each team would be responsible for the total amount of the subsidy divided by the number of teams. The subsidies would be given to individual players in shares proportional to their salaries. Example #1: BRI = $3.000 billion 57.7% of BRI = $1.731 billion Player salaries and benefits = $1.940 billion Player salaries and benefits above $57.7% of BRI = $209 million Escrow tax rate = $0.209/$1.900 = 10.8 percent Example #2: BRI = $3.000 billion 57.7% of BRI = $1.731 billion Player salaries and benefits = $1.600 billion Player salaries and benefits below $57.7% of BRI = $131 million Escrow subsidy rate = $0.131/$1.600 = 8.2 percent Escrow subsidy cost to teams = $131/30 = $4.4 million per team Players and their agents hate the escrow tax and so the prospect of an even larger escrow tax would seem to be a big concession. But it isn’t in the context of a deal that gets them more (after escrow tax) money. The bottom line for the players is “showing them the money.” In this proposal the escrow tax simply is a convenient mechanism to guarantee players and owners a given share of the revenue. 5. Luxury Taxes By discouraging teams in larger markets (or with deep pockets owners) from excessive spending, the luxury tax helps to level the financial playing field and enables small market teams to remain competitive. The success of small market teams, such as Indiana, Minnesota, Sacramento, and San Antonio, is evidence of the success of the league’s cost containment strategy, especially relative to other sports, such as Major League Baseball. However, due to luxury taxes and lost luxury/escrow tax distributions these small market teams with championship aspirations often face 300 to 400 percent effective tax rates for adding players. In fact, the costs of adding players often are higher for average spending teams than it is for high-spending teams. Such a system may seem capricious to successful small market teams who are forced to give up key players because of these exorbitant effective tax rates. Moreover, approximately $680 million was redistributed through luxury and escrow taxes over the past two seasons. With the huge luxury/escrow tax distribution checks (roughly $30 million over the past two seasons) being received by teams below the luxury tax threshold, teams with salaries under the luxury tax threshold generally are profitable. This has dramatically reduced the incentives for these teams to aggressively pursue a championship, in some cases making cost-control on par with winning. This hyper-focus on cost control has the potential to alienate the fans of these teams and reduce revenue for the league. It also may create resentment among the high-spending owners providing the subsidies to the low-spending teams – subsidies an order of magnitude greater than those in any other professional sports league. Furthermore, many of these high-spending teams have shifted from earning average profits before the luxury tax to suffering huge losses with the luxury tax. The league has to be concerned about the dissension among its owners that the luxury/escrow tax system may create. Perhaps a more serious problem is the uncertainty involved with the luxury/escrow tax system. Whether the luxury tax is triggered depends on the ratio of league-wide player compensation to revenues – both of which are unknown until after the season. Thus, owners must make free agent decisions without knowing the full costs of signing those players. In addition, the league has been fortunate to not have a season where small movements in revenue could trigger (or fail to trigger) the luxury tax. Given the hundreds of millions at stake, we could see teams below (above) the luxury tax threshold understating (overstating) revenue in order to trigger (not trigger) the luxury tax. Such behavior is wasteful for the league as a whole and is sure to cause resentment among the teams. The league should seek to put into place safeguards against such a scenario developing. Defining Luxury Tax Threshold based upon Projected BRI: • The luxury tax threshold would be based upon projected BRI and computed prior to the season (much like the current salary cap). It would be equal to the average team salary level at which league-wide player compensation is equal to the designated percentage of projected BRI divided by 0.9. Defining the Luxury Tax and “Super” Luxury Tax: • Teams would pay a 100 percent share of luxury tax for every dollar their team salary exceeded the luxury tax threshold. • Teams would pay an additional 100 percent share of luxury tax for every dollar their team salary exceeded 125 percent of the luxury tax threshold. (This is the “super” luxury tax.) • In the event of an escrow tax, the luxury tax rate would be set so that the luxury tax rate times the total number of shares of luxury tax is equal to the escrow tax paid. Thus, in seasons where high levels of escrow tax are paid, the luxury tax rate could be 100 percent or higher. In seasons where very little escrow tax is paid, the luxury tax rate could be very low. Defining the Distribution of Luxury and Escrow Taxes: • Distributions of luxury and escrow taxes would be equal to the total of luxury and escrow taxes divided by the number of teams. All teams (both those above and below the luxury tax threshold) would get an equal share of these distributions. Example #1: Projected BRI = $2.990 billion Projected benefits = $110 billion Luxury tax threshold = {[(0.577 x 2990) ÷ 0.9] – 110} ÷ 30 = $60.2 million Super luxury tax threshold = 1.25 x 60.2 = $75.3 million Shares of luxury tax above luxury tax threshold = $182 million Shares of luxury tax above super luxury tax threshold = $40 million Total shares luxury tax = $222 million BRI = $3.000 billion 57.7% of BRI = $1.731 billion Player salaries and benefits = $1.940 billion Player salaries and benefits above $57.7% of BRI = $209 million Luxury tax rate = $209/$222 = 94 percent Super luxury tax rate = 2 x 94 = 188 percent Team distributions of luxury and escrow taxes = ($209 + $209)/30 = $13.9 million Example #2: Projected BRI = $2.990 billion Projected benefits = $110 billion Luxury tax threshold = {[(0.577 x 2990) ÷ 0.9] – 110} ÷ 30 = $60.2 million Super luxury tax threshold = 1.25 x 60.2 = $75.3 million Shares of luxury tax above luxury tax threshold = $84 million Shares of luxury tax above super luxury tax threshold = $10 million Total shares luxury tax = $94 million BRI = $3.000 billion 57.7% of BRI = $1.731 billion Player salaries and benefits = $1.600 billion Player salaries and benefits above $57.7% of BRI = $0 million Luxury tax rate = $0/$94 = 0 percent Super luxury tax rate = 0 percent Team distributions of luxury and escrow taxes = $0 million Under my proposal the luxury tax would be triggered in any season that players paid escrow tax. Also, the luxury tax threshold would be known before the season. What would be uncertain would be the luxury tax rate. Mistakes in forecasting the luxury tax rate would not be nearly as costly as forecasting mistakes under the present system. In addition, there would be no perverse incentives to generate less revenue. With the luxury tax being in effect almost every season, teams consistently below the luxury tax threshold could plan on distributions every year versus the uncertain stream of distributions under the present system. Teams in the middle of the team salary distribution would not face the 300 or 400 percent effective marginal tax rates they face under the current system. This would benefit competitive small market teams who are facing the rising costs of retaining their star players. 6. An Increase of the Salary Cap and Changes in Trading Rules • The percentage of BRI determining the salary cap would rise from 48.04 percent to the designated percentage. This would have the effect of increasing the salary cap by approximately $10 million. It would also increase maximum salaries. • The 115% + $100,000 rule for trades would increase to 125% + $1 million. The difference between luxury tax threshold and the salary cap creates an approximately $10 million wedge which increases the period of time over which teams over the luxury tax threshold must wait before rebuilding. During this period it may be hard for teams to avoid losing fans. Given the salary controls in the previous proposals, this increase in the salary cap will not increase overall player costs. It simply will allow rebuilding teams to rebuild more quickly. Also, with the salary cap being less important in controlling salaries, there is less danger in relaxing the trading rules. Such a change might allow teams to rebuild more quickly. 7. Reducing the Number of Young Players in the NBA The league has expressed several reasons for limiting early entry. First, lacking the training provided by the college system, players may lack fundamentals, which long-term could result in a deterioration of the NBA product. This claim rests heavily on the assumption that young players are more effectively trained in college than in the NBA, a dubious assumption at best. Second, when American players bypass some or all of college, the league loses access to the huge exposure these players might bring with them to the NBA. In many parts of the country, NCAA basketball is far more popular than the NBA. Having more players come through the college system is a marketing opportunity that could benefit both the league and the players if it results in league-wide revenue increasing. Defining Rookie Scale Contracts based upon College (or Professional) Experience: • Players entering the NBA without college experience (or at age 18) would receive five-year rookie scale contracts with team options in the third, fourth, and fifth seasons and restricted free agency in the sixth season. • Players with one year of college experience (or one year of professional experience after age 18) would receive four-year rookie scale contracts with team options in the third and fourth seasons and restricted free agency in the fifth season (the present rookie scale contract with an additional team option). • Players with two years of college experience (or two years of professional experience after age 18) would receive three-year rookie scale contracts with team options in the third season and restricted free agency in the fourth season. • Players with three or more years of college experience (or three or more years of professional experience after age 18) would receive two-year rookie scale contracts with restricted free agency in the third season. • The match period in restricted free agency would be reduced to one week. Defining a Salary Premium for Rookies with College (or Professional) Experience: • Rookie scale contracts would be a function of draft position and college (or professional) experience. Premiums would be paid for players with college (or professional) experience. These premiums would not count as team salary for salary cap or luxury tax purposes and would be paid by the teams selecting early entrants. Teams selecting younger early entrants would pay a higher share of the premiums. Redefining NBA Experience: • Up to four years of college experience (or professional experience after age 18) would count fully as NBA experience. This provision would also apply to current players, thereby resulting in these players being subject to higher allowable maximum salaries and higher minimum salaries. This proposal lengthens rookie scale contracts for early entrants and shortens them for players with three or more years of college (or professional) experience, which should make college more worthwhile for marginal early entrants. It also institutes a team option year in the third season, which raises the risks for marginal early entrants who may not be ready for the NBA. In addition, this proposal includes a wage premium for players with more college experience – paid by teams who select early entrants. All of these provisions should increases the incentives for marginal early entrants to stay in school, and this last provision should discourage teams from selecting early entrants. But under this proposal players who are productive right away, such as LeBron James and Dwight Howard, would still enter the NBA early. The NBA still would benefit from star early entrants, while the marginal early entrants would gain more seasoning (and marketing) by playing more years in college (or overseas). This proposal would not completely get NBA scouts out of high school gyms, but given the need for scouts to evaluate players over long periods of time, neither would an age limit of 19 or 20. 8. Conclusion Overall, I think the players have a stark choice. They can continue to try to increase their share of revenue through new or expanded exceptions and using guaranteed contracts to preserve their gains. Or they can agree on a structure that legislates an increasing share of the pie. In return they would agree to other changes that increased the marketability of the NBA. In that way hopefully bold sides could come out winners. Dan T. Rosenbaum is an assistant professor of economics at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro who has been widely cited for his expertise on luxury tax/collective bargaining agreement issues, as well as the use of statistics to evaluate NBA players and teams.
But you still have to trade away salary to get salary in return. Yes, I guess it allows you to absorb that extra 25% you trade for a little easier...but I really don't see it impacting the decision making process of the team (i.e. - they would have made the deal anyways, or not)
Is the new developmental league going to mean we may see players like Badiane playing here in the states? It'd be interesting if more of us could get a look at him and players like him. (developing over seas)
