What is hilarious (or sad, or pathetic) is that we already know what is going to happen in September. Every reliable source will come back and say the surge is a failure Petraeus and Bush will come back and lie that it's working and needs more time (at least until January 20, 2009). And republicans will fall in step...
by your, and mc blade's standards, good old honest abe must be the greatest failure in american history, since he failed so often before he...didn't...
Fox altered false story but failed to issue correction A June 14 FoxNews.com article (retrieved via Yahoo cache) mischaracterized a question posed to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) during a press conference to convey the false impression that Reid suggested that Army Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of the multinational force in Iraq, is "incompetent." FoxNews.com reported that Reid was asked whether he "considered Petraeus competent," and that "Reid responded, 'Not as far as I'm concerned.' " In fact, according to the transcript provided by Congressional Quarterly transcription services -- as well as a video aired on Fox News Channel -- Reid was asked whether he believed Petraeus was incompetent, answering, "Not as far I'm concerned." Fox later altered the story online to accurately reflect the exchange but never issued a formal correction to note that a change had been made. Rather, the new version of the article simply changed the word "competent" to "incompetent," indicating Reid's denial that he regards Petraeus as incompetent. Fox News congressional correspondent Major Garrett, who is listed as having contributed to the FoxNews.com article, similarly mischaracterized the exchange on Fox News' Special Report. Later in the program, after playing a video clip of the exchange, Fox News Washington managing editor and host Brit Hume properly characterized the exchange, but he did not note Garrett's false report. Reuters, which also reported the exchange, correctly noted, "Asked if he thought Petraeus was incompetent, Reid said, 'Not as far as I'm concerned,' but he added, 'I'm not going to get into what I said or didn't say.' "
You really are in bizarreo world if you believe that Chimpy McFlightsuit is anywhere near the stature of president Lincoln.
it wasn't in a press conference, it was on a con call with some lefty bloggers, and reid confirmed he said it.
The difference was that Abe didn't reward incompetence, and didn't try the same old thing over and over. In fact Abe was so forward thinking in his war plans that he had ideas that would have avoided the whole Reconstruction nightmare that so damaged the South after the war. He was different in almost every significant way than Bush.
GW got his butt handed to him many times and i believe was on the verge of getting the boot before redeeming himself. george washington. im not comparing or anything..lord knows that what someone will imply. i just mean that sometimes people fail but there is always a chance to turn it around.
http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110010228 [rquoter]AT WAR Unifying Iraq Partition is the path to more war--multiple wars, in fact. BY DONALD L. HOROWITZ Tuesday, June 19, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT Many people seem to think that if the Iraq war was a mistake, it follows that we should undo the mistake and withdraw our forces--a questionable syllogism at best. Meanwhile, popular sentiment against the war has been so strong that Congress has been following, rather than leading, public opinion. It is time for a much more nuanced debate. Whether the war was a mistake doesn't answer the critical questions: What are the likely consequences of continuing it? What are the likely consequences of withdrawal? In favor of withdrawal, it is said that one consequence of our remaining in Iraq is that we're prevented from finishing the war in Afghanistan. Perhaps, although there are hazards to flooding Afghanistan with foreign troops, as the Soviet Union discovered. While we are vulnerable in Iraq, we are also prevented from taking a much more threatening line against Iran's nuclear program, and while we are tied down there, the credibility of our military power elsewhere in the world is weaker than it should be. But what about the consequences of withdrawal from Iraq? In the south, where Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim's party has pushed the creation of a nine-province Shia region, the region would be wide open to Iranian influence. Mr. Hakim is receptive to that influence, though many other Shia and the parties that represent them are hostile to Iran. Iraq's Shia are Arabs, not Persians, and they fought loyally on Saddam's side in the Iran-Iraq war. A single southern region would be a serious setback for them and for us. Without American pressure, Mr. Hakim is likely to win. And in the north? The 2005 Iraq constitution was close to a Kurdish dream come true, and the 2006 constitution of the Kurdistan region edges right up to the brink of independence, in defiance of some of the few remaining strictures of the Iraq constitution. American withdrawal would leave the Kurds determined to defend their autonomy and assert their de facto independence. But Turkey resents support by Iraqi Kurds for the Kurdish rebellion in southeastern Turkey. The Turks could not, under any conditions, tolerate an independent Iraqi Kurdistan, which would be a beacon for its own Kurds. Tens of thousands of Turkish troops have already been moved toward the Iraq border. As of now, Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds have flourishing commercial relations, which would be undone in a flash by the conflict that would probably ensue upon an American departure. We would be faced with a likely war between two allies. In central Iraq, there are signs that Sunni opinion is turning against Islamist insurgents. If there is a successful revision of the de-Baathification law, the Baathist part of the insurgency, militarily more sophisticated, might decline. But if the U.S. withdrew, the Sunni heartland would become, in unpredictable proportions, a mix of Baathist and radical Islamist forces. Both would have an irredentist agenda, seeking to recapture the Shia south and the Kurdish north for an Iraq to be governed by the worst principles that Baathists and radical Islamists would like Iraq to live by. Eventually these two would come to blows, as they also would with Sadrists and the Madhi Army. They would surely agree on the desirability of revenge against the U.S. War among the regions and a surge in terrorism should be anticipated. With a territorial base, radical Islamist and Baathist forces would find ways to damage our interests here and abroad. Worse, our withdrawal would tacitly establish the principle, which we forcibly rejected in Afghanistan and more recently in Somalia, that we are prepared to live with a regime dedicated to our destruction even when we might be in a position to do otherwise. Finally, a sundered Iraq would assuredly become a tempting target for external forces. Iran, already influential in the south, might aid the Madhi Army in the center. Arab Sunni regimes worried by the growth of Iranian power would likely move into parts of the vacuum we left behind. In these rivalries, played out in Iraq, there is considerable potential for wider war, with unpredictable consequences for regional stability and the fortunes of our various allies and antagonists. Some in Congress and elsewhere believe the solution in Iraq is a three-way partition. They have not done their homework. Partition is the way to more war--multiple wars, in fact--not the way to peace, and it is the way to increased Iranian influence. It is of course still possible to argue that withdrawal is preferable to an open-ended involvement, on the grounds that the high costs to us of involvement exceed the high costs of withdrawal. But the opposite position--which happens to be mine--is also tenable: The consequences of withdrawal are worse than the costs of continuing involvement. That is where the debate should be joined, based on a careful assessment of the comparative advantages of each course and of middle courses, such as partial withdrawal. That would be a serious debate, rather than the vacuous one that Congress has so far engaged in. Is it too much to ask that Congress rise to the occasion, as it did during the Cold War, and get serious about assessing the interests of our country? Mr. Horowitz is a professor of law and political science at Duke University and author of "Ethnic Groups in Conflict" (California, 2000). [/rquoter]
don't know much about history, i see? try googling mcclellan antietam, the very definition of incompetence. and little mac was reinstalled as commander just before the battle...
When you have measurables and you fail to meet your measurables on a consistent basis, that's generally defined as "failure". I guess if you avoid giving measurables to avoid defining failure, that's fine. But then you can never have success either. Do you have ANY measurables or targets you can point to in order to define either failure or success? I'm not talking about rhetoric like "defeating al queda". I'm talking actual specific goals and targets.