NYTimes: It's working

Today NewYorker is a Cutandrunster. Tomorrow, maybe he'll be a Moonie.

 

This is exactly why so many people immediately disregard everything Bush and minions say about Iraq. It's also why people are skeptical about Petraeus' testimony because rarely do military leaders bite the hand that feeds them. It's no coincidence that the retired guys are the ones that blast what's going on in Iraq because they have nothing to lose by speaking what they really feel. Regardless of the public good or any supposed thought about their future, it's very hard for a general to publicly contradict his commander-in-chief, especially when the results would be politically devastating to said c.i.c. Bush has put Petraeus on top of a pedestal to serve his own despicable political purpose.

 

Today gifford is a reactionary idiot. Tomorrow, he's a reactionary idiot.

Something to be said about consistency.

 

Bush is irrelevant, and anyone who is still quoting bush is clearly beating a horse that's been dead for a very long time now.

You guys saw the positive news, and immediately dismissed it because the very idea of success in iraq would have destroyed your hopes of making bush look bad. Some more rationale people wanted to take pause and wait to see what happens, namely the NIE and GAO report. Those didn't look so well, so there ya have it.

But I find it extremely humorous that anyone would go nuts and aggressively attack others for wanting to wait and be patient to see more evidence. This is the problem with politics, everyone just jumps on a bandwagon and demands decisions and attacks those who want to wait. That's how we got into this Iraq mess mind you! You'd think you'd want to learn from past mistakes.

 

"You guys"? Whatever. "saw the positive news, and immediately dismissed it because the very idea of success in iraq would have destroyed your hopes of making bush look bad". I can't speak for anyone else, but this is a completely idiotic statement. I want what's best for the USA and for you to question motives pretty desperate.

You really must think a lot of yourself. From reading some of the these threads it's obvious you have no idea how you come across. Take my word it: You are no more rational than most people posting here. Annoying would be a better way to describe it. There are members here that I probably disagree with a lot more than you and they are much less irritating. Come off the high horse.

What I dismissed was that the surge would produce long term stability because (1) the Iraqi government is a rotting corpse that would waste whatever could have been gained and (2) we could not continue the surge indefinitely. I haven't been on any "bandwagon" and have been blasting the Iraqi government for quite some time, way before the surge idea.

When it comes to learning from the past, it's been evident the last 2-3 years (from my standpoint) that the Bush administration's reluctance to change course (until it's too late to do much good) has compounded the mistake of invading in the first place. "Staying the course" or "waiting" or "patience" is why the situation is so incredibly desperate now. The longer we wait to plan and execute an exit strategy the more Iraq deteriorates. Our position of strength continues to weaken.

By the way, it's good to know you finally see we must partition and leave. Better late than never. I've been harping on that for months, way before the "bandwagon" you are a part of now.

 

I've always favored partition, i guess you haven't been here very long. Bush is an example of why it's important to keep and open mind and not lock down one way or another. If someone reports positive news and people start attacking liberals as right-wingers, and call them now bushies, you know that they are pulling a political agenda. that's disgusting and small minded in my opinion. I said i was going to wait and see and that's exactly what i did. Now to feel all good about yourself, you can say that I am finally coming around, but the truth is I've just been entertaining the possibility that there might be progress and we should see what's going on. I said let's wait 6 weeks. And it;s been 6 weeks and we see now.

I find it amusing that people have a hard time grasping that.

 

It's interesting because in a recent Iraq thread, you told me I was a "liberal" and I needed to just "admit it" because I was talking like a liberal. I said you had no idea what you were talking about. I called you a right-winger because you threw around the L-word just like right-wingers do, yet you blasted me for saying that. Try being consistent and as hard on yourself as you are on others. I'm not trying to be overly harsh, but try stepping back and reading what you post sometimes. You are the biggest group labeler on this forum besides T.J. and probably don't even realize it. That is "disgusting", "small-minded", "amusing" and "hard to grasp" because you do it so often.

Specifically on the surge, I predict it will come out that everyone from Bush downward knew from the beginning it was a temporary measure that had no hope for long term success because of the complete political failure in Iraq. That is a very cynical viewpoint but I bet it's right. The purpose of the surge was to buy as much time as possible to "stay the course".

I suspect Bush and minions don't want to start the exit strategy because it would be admitting the invasion was a failure. That is too galling to them. They want to stay the course and let the next administration do it. Their goal is to somehow stay the course without atomizing the Republican party in 2008. Hence the surge, the temporary success and the supposed need for more time (like, say, another year or so). Just an idea.

 

Except this somehow assumes that this was the first evidence of anything. People have had many years to make conclusions. Why is this particular report the one that finally opened your eyes? Why is now OK to say that it might be time to leave, but 3 months ago wasn't enough? Just because you were unable to see the situation or draw conclusions based on 4 years worth of data doesn't mean other people were unable to do so.

The problem here is that this has been the argument for 4 years now. "Just wait/be patient - it will get better". You chose to take a small article and make a case for continuing to wait and see based on it. The problem - and what makes you so gullible - is that we have seen this exact same thing time and time again over the past several years. For some reason, you decided that we just all had to believe it yet again this time - despite it being wrong over and over again in the past - and that people were crazy anti-Bush people if they didn't. Then, after these latest reports, you've suddenly decided there's enough evidence and that it's OK to argue that we should leave. Unfortunately for you, you don't get to arbitrarily choose how long people should believe the crap you kept believing, and they weren't idiots for not believing it. And it sounds really pathetic when you call them all sorts of names for it and then realize "oops, it turns out their argument that this was all crap might have been exactly right".

 

I'll admit it, your constant personal attacks got under my skin and yeah, I called you a liberal for it because you were attacking blindly just like a liberal. And everyone does apply labels. I do try not to, but lately, I'm sick and tired of trying to take the high road, so high road no more.

The Iraqi army needs another year before it's up to par according to the study, but I don't think we need our full force there.

It will be difficult to push Bush to do a significant withdrawal before he is out of office. That's just not his way to admit defeat - even if congress is able to set a timetable, I doubt they can push him to get a significant amount of troops home before his term ends. He'll leave it for the next president.

The surge wasn't Bush's idea, it came from Patreaus. Bush just liked the idea so much that he embraced it and appointed Patraus as the head of it all. But yeah, it was a desperate ploy by a desperate man. Still, I think it was worth a try and it did have some impact.

The reality is that the amount of forces it would take to stablize Iraq isn't available. Maybe if we had another 100K troops we could really stablize the country, but that's not possible. That's the problem as I see it. Force was too small.

Iraq failed for many reasons...and the chances of success from the beginning were slim. But I thought it was worth while to see how things would net out, and after seeing it, there's no point now to do anything except partition the country, secure borders, and then withdrawal.

 

I think you're misrepresenting what I wrote in a vulgar way. The name calling came primarily from guys like you, who jumped on people who said "we're making progress" since it's a threat to seeing Bush fail.

My stance is the same as before the report came out detailing progress. But when we here some positive news, it deserves taking pause and seeing how that develops. I want what's best for the country, not my political affliations. And just because I am willing to re-analyze a situation as new info comes in, doesn't make me gullible or deserving of caustic attacks. I'm sorry you can't see that.

 

By the way, the current tally among the seven soldiers who wrote the op-ed piece for the NYTimes now stands at 2 deaths and one head injury.

One was a Texan:

(via kos)

 

Pentagon discloses yet another delay for US return of provinces to Iraqi control

WASHINGTON: In another sign of U.S. struggles in Iraq, the target date for putting Iraqi authorities in charge of security in all 18 provinces has slipped yet again, to at least next July.

The delay, noted in a Pentagon report to Congress on progress and problems in Iraq, highlights the difficulties in developing Iraqi police forces and the slow pace of economic and political progress in some areas.

It is the second time this year the target date for completing what is known as "Provincial Iraqi Control" has been pushed back. The Pentagon report submitted to Congress on Monday hinted at the possibility of further delays.

The intent is to give the provincial governments control over security in their area as a step toward lessening, and eventually ending, the U.S. security role.

Thus far seven of the 18 provinces have reverted to Iraqi control.

http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/09/20/america/NA-GEN-US-Iraq-Handover.php

 

I'm going to bookmark this. I happen to agree with you. So do a lot of other people I know, here and "in the real world."



D&D. Impeach Mr. Bankrupt America.

 

Iraqi Leaders: "There Will Be No Reconciliation" --

Top Iraqis Pull Back From Key U.S. Goal

Reconciliation Seen Unattainable Amid Struggle for Power

BAGHDAD -- For much of this year, the U.S. military strategy in Iraq has sought to reduce violence so that politicians could bring about national reconciliation, but several top Iraqi leaders say they have lost faith in that broad goal.

Iraqi leaders argue that sectarian animosity is entrenched in the structure of their government. Instead of reconciliation, they now stress alternative and perhaps more attainable goals: streamlining the government bureaucracy, placing experienced technocrats in positions of authority and improving the dismal record of providing basic services.

"I don't think there is something called reconciliation, and there will be no reconciliation as such," said Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, a Kurd. "To me, it is a very inaccurate term. This is a struggle about power."

Humam Hamoudi, a prominent Shiite cleric and parliament member, said any future reconciliation would emerge naturally from an efficient, fair government, not through short-term political engineering among Sunnis and Shiites.

"Reconciliation should be a result and not a goal by itself," he said. "You should create the atmosphere for correct relationships, and not wave slogans that 'I want to reconcile with you.' "

The acrimony among politicians has strained the Shiite-led government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki close to the breaking point. Nearly half of the cabinet ministers have left their posts. The Shiite alliance in parliament, which once controlled 130 of the 275 seats, is disintegrating with the defection of two important parties.

Legislation to manage the oil sector, the country's most valuable natural resource, and to bring former Baath Party members back into the government have not made it through the divided parliament. The U.S. military's latest hope for grass-roots reconciliation, the recruitment of Sunni tribesmen into the Iraqi police force, was denounced last week in stark terms by Iraq's leading coalition of Shiite lawmakers.

"There has been no significant progress for months," said Tariq al-Hashimi, one of Iraq's two vice presidents and the most influential Sunni politician in the country. "There is a shortage of goodwill from those parties who are now in the driver's seat of the country."

Iraqi leaders say there are few signs that Maliki's government is any more willing to share power now than 15 months ago, when he unveiled a 28-point national reconciliation plan. A key proposal then was an amnesty for insurgents -- an "olive branch," Maliki said at the time -- to bring members of the resistance into the political fold.

But over the summer and fall of 2006, sectarian violence rose to its highest levels, driving thousands of people out of mixed neighborhoods and pushing Sunni and Shiite politicians further apart. The amnesty never materialized, nor has the reconciliation.

Some politicians remain hopeful. Hashimi, the Sunni vice president, recently drafted what he calls the "Iraqi National Compact," a 25-point statement of principles that condemns all types of extremism and sectarian discrimination.

Hashimi's statement calls for candid dialogue among Iraq's various factions. On Sept. 27, he met with the country's most respected Shiite religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, a rare and symbolic gesture that underscored the possibility of cooperation across the sectarian gap. Hashimi said Sistani expressed support for the national compact while requesting minor editing of the document.

"I have started from scratch. I know that," Hashimi said. "This will create a new environment between the Iraqi politicians to talk on sensitive issues face to face in an attempt to alleviate the reciprocal paranoia between the Iraqi sects and ethnic groups."

But Hashimi said he sensed no fundamental willingness from Maliki's government to reconcile with the Sunnis. It has been two months since the largest Sunni coalition walked out of the cabinet when its list of 11 far-reaching demands were not met. Hashimi acknowledges some progress on the demands -- such as a program for releasing prisoners during the holy month of Ramadan -- but calls the steps insufficient.

"Pulling out from the government was not a target, it's just a means, a way to encourage the government to perform in a better way," Hashimi said. "The response of the government has been very, very slow."

Sunni leaders sense that their Shiite counterparts believe the era of Sunni leadership in Iraq is gone for good -- "that Humpty Dumpty had a fall and cannot be put back together again" as one senior Iraqi official put it -- and Sunnis should accept the new reality. Sunni leaders, however, tend to express more limited goals than reclaiming the government.

"I, as deputy prime minister responsible for the portfolio of security and services, until now, have never been consulted on any security operation taking place in Iraq," said Salam Z. al-Zobaee, Iraq's second-highest Sunni official. "The Sunnis, even if they've been participating in the government, are still marginalized in decision-making."

The idea of "reconciliation" in Iraq has always been short on specifics. To Sunnis, it tends to mean Shiites will release their grip on decision-making, allow them greater influence in the government, crack down on militants regardless of their sect and promote peaceful cooperation between politicians. Sunnis demand the release of thousands of prisoners who have never been charged, the purging of all militiamen from the Iraqi security forces and influence in military decisions.

To Shiites, reconciliation is a process fraught with risks that Sunni "supremacists" will attempt to seize their former position of authority over the majority Shiites. Many Shiites believe that reconciliation requires punishing those who, during Saddam Hussein's government, ruthlessly killed and repressed Shiites and Kurds.

"It's clearly perceived by the government that reconciliation is clearly a winner for the Sunnis and not a winner for the Shias," said Brig. Gen. Joseph Anderson, chief of staff for the second-ranking U.S. commander in Iraq. "The question becomes: How do you start balancing that scale a little bit?"

Many Shiites, still aggrieved by the crimes committed against them under Hussein, are not ready for new programs or legislation attempting to force a balance into existence.

"You cannot have reconciliation without justice, and justice has not been accomplished yet in Iraq. They have tried and executed not more than 10 people, Saddam and his people, and that is not enough," a senior Shiite government official said on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly. "The same people who were killing Iraqis at the time of Saddam in the name of the state and in the name of national security are doing it now with the insurgents."

Most of the U.S.-backed "benchmarks" for Iraqi political progress -- intended to push along reconciliation -- have so far not been reached. The government has not passed legislation that would govern the country's oil resources or allow former Baath Party members to reclaim government jobs, nor has it completed a review of the constitution or enacted an amnesty program. A recent report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office judged that only three of 18 benchmarks had been met.

"The polarization of Iraq's major sects and ethnic groups and fighting among Sh'ia factions further diminishes the stability of Iraq's governing coalition and its potential to enact legislation needed for sectarian reconciliation," the report concluded.

Several Iraqi officials say they are hamstrung by the very government structure they are operating within. In 2003, the U.S. government handpicked a 25-member Iraqi Governing Council -- including 13 Shiites and five Sunni Arabs -- that would mirror the population's majority Shiite makeup. In 2005, when voters chose political parties rather than individual candidates, politicians' loyalties to sect over any other criteria solidified.

The resulting Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish blocs emerged as the dominant political actors, with individual politicians subservient to the group. Leadership positions were parceled out in a de facto quota system to achieve at least nominal balance among the rivals.

This imperfect balance of power, deemed the "national unity government," entrenches these sectarian divisions and prioritizes a politician's ethnic or sect background above experience or ability, Iraqi officials say. The system makes selecting Iraqi ambassadors or cabinet ministers an exercise in horse-trading subject to bitter disputes.

"Iraq cannot be ruled by this notion of a national unity government, because that has been a recipe for paralysis," said Salih, the Kurdish deputy prime minister. "We need a government of majority, comprising the moderates, representing the key communities of Iraq and delivering to its constituents, and willing to take on the extremists."

The fragmentation of Iraq's leading Shiite coalition, while potentially leading to more instability, paralysis in parliament and gun battles in the streets, might be an opportunity to lessen the reliance of politicians on their sectarian blocs, one senior government official said.

"We need to break that mold of politics here, this politics where sectarian politics is the norm," the official said on the condition of anonymity because of concern about publicly supporting the disintegration of the Shiite bloc.

The Iraqi government plans to consolidate its cabinet and install skilled technocrats in place of inexperienced political appointees, officials said. Hamoudi, the Shiite member of parliament, said he expected that the 37 cabinet seats would be reduced to 22 or 23 in coming months. Certain public service ministries, such as Justice, Transportation, Health and Agriculture, would in theory become "independent" from political parties, he said.

"It's critical because now the feeling is that the national unity government has proven to be a failure in the region -- in Palestine, in Lebanon, and now in Iraq," Hamoudi said. "We need a strong government that conducts its duty and not that looks good."

Some potential progress toward reconciliation has run into recent trouble. The U.S. effort to recruit Sunni tribesmen to join the police force and fight the insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq was strongly opposed last week by Shiite officials, who asserted that the Sunni recruits were killing innocent people under the guise of fighting insurgents.

"We demand that the American administration stop this adventure, which is rejected by all the sons of the people and its national political powers," the leading Shiite political coalition said in a statement. "Their elements are criminals who cannot be trusted or relied upon."

Special correspondent Saad al-Izzi contributed to this report.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/07/AR2007100701448_pf.html

 

The Real Iraq We Knew

By 12 former Army captains
Tuesday, October 16, 2007; 12:00 AM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/15/AR2007101500841_pf.html

Today marks five years since the authorization of military force in Iraq, setting Operation Iraqi Freedom in motion. Five years on, the Iraq war is as undermanned and under-resourced as it was from the start. And, five years on, Iraq is in shambles.

As Army captains who served in Baghdad and beyond, we've seen the corruption and the sectarian division. We understand what it's like to be stretched too thin. And we know when it's time to get out.

What does Iraq look like on the ground? It's certainly far from being a modern, self-sustaining country. Many roads, bridges, schools and hospitals are in deplorable condition. Fewer people have access to drinking water or sewage systems than before the war. And Baghdad is averaging less than eight hours of electricity a day.

Iraq's institutional infrastructure, too, is sorely wanting. Even if the Iraqis wanted to work together and accept the national identity foisted upon them in 1920s, the ministries do not have enough trained administrators or technicians to coordinate themselves. At the local level, most communities are still controlled by the same autocratic sheiks that ruled under Saddam. There is no reliable postal system. No effective banking system. No registration system to monitor the population and its needs.

The inability to govern is exacerbated at all levels by widespread corruption. Transparency International ranks Iraq as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. And, indeed, many of us witnessed the exploitation of U.S. tax dollars by Iraqi officials and military officers. Sabotage and graft have had a particularly deleterious impact on Iraq's oil industry, which still fails to produce the revenue that Pentagon war planners hoped would pay for Iraq's reconstruction. Yet holding people accountable has proved difficult. The first commissioner of a panel charged with preventing and investigating corruption resigned last month, citing pressure from the government and threats on his life.

Against this backdrop, the U.S. military has been trying in vain to hold the country together. Even with "the surge," we simply do not have enough soldiers and marines to meet the professed goals of clearing areas from insurgent control, holding them securely and building sustainable institutions. Though temporary reinforcing operations in places like Fallujah, An Najaf, Tal Afar, and now Baghdad may brief well on PowerPoint presentations, in practice they just push insurgents to another spot on the map and often strengthen the insurgents' cause by harassing locals to a point of swayed allegiances. Millions of Iraqis correctly recognize these actions for what they are and vote with their feet -- moving within Iraq or leaving the country entirely. Still, our colonels and generals keep holding on to flawed concepts.

U.S. forces, responsible for too many objectives and too much "battle space," are vulnerable targets. The sad inevitability of a protracted draw-down is further escalation of attacks -- on U.S. troops, civilian leaders and advisory teams. They would also no doubt get caught in the crossfire of the imminent Iraqi civil war.

Iraqi security forces would not be able to salvage the situation. Even if all the Iraqi military and police were properly trained, equipped and truly committed, their 346,000 personnel would be too few. As it is, Iraqi soldiers quit at will. The police are effectively controlled by militias. And, again, corruption is debilitating. U.S. tax dollars enrich self-serving generals and support the very elements that will battle each other after we're gone.

This is Operation Iraqi Freedom and the reality we experienced. This is what we tried to communicate up the chain of command. This is either what did not get passed on to our civilian leadership or what our civilian leaders chose to ignore. While our generals pursue a strategy dependent on peace breaking out, the Iraqis prepare for their war -- and our servicemen and women, and their families, continue to suffer.

There is one way we might be able to succeed in Iraq. To continue an operation of this intensity and duration, we would have to abandon our volunteer military for compulsory service. Short of that, our best option is to leave Iraq immediately. A scaled withdrawal will not prevent a civil war, and it will spend more blood and treasure on a losing proposition.

America, it has been five years. It's time to make a choice.

This column was written by 12 former Army captains: Jason Blindauer served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Elizabeth Bostwick served in Salah Ad Din and An Najaf in 2004. Jeffrey Bouldin served in Al Anbar, Baghdad and Ninevah in 2006. Jason Bugajski served in Diyala in 2004. Anton Kemps served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Kristy (Luken) McCormick served in Ninevah in 2003. Luis Carlos Montalván served in Anbar, Baghdad and Nineveh in 2003 and 2005. William Murphy served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Josh Rizzo served in Baghdad in 2006. William "Jamie" Ruehl served in Nineveh in 2004. Gregg Tharp served in Babil and Baghdad in 2003 and 2005. Gary Williams served in Baghdad in 2003.

 

Caravaggio would be proud.

 

how?

 

I think it's the other way around. I mean really...

That's a little over-dramatic don't you think? Sounds like something my 10 yo would write.

On another topic, why would they put a hat rack on top of a church?