NYTimes: It's working

Batman Jones · Aug 19, 2007

NewYorker said:

If we leave now, not only are we not giving the surge a chance, but all the gains we have maid and all the blood and sweat, all the soliders lives, will have been in vain
Click to expand...

And how would you characterize the lives of the soldiers who will die between now and the eventual withdrawal which will inevitably occur before that fantasy victory which has yet to be defined in any way whatsoever fails to materialize?

If you continue to call for giving the surge a chance -- if you continue to call for giving "victory" a chance and yet also continue to avoid explaining what victory would even be... it is time to shut the hell up.

Tell us what we're waiting for. Tell us what is supposed to happen. Even in your wildest, most optimistic fantasy. Or shut the hell up.

rimrocker · Aug 19, 2007

While we're waiting, the dominoes are starting to fall here at home as well...

Ammunition Shortage Squeezes Police

ESTES THOMPSON | August 17, 2007 06:49 PM EST | AP
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20070817/ammunition-shortage/

— Troops training for and fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are firing more than 1 billion bullets a year, contributing to ammunition shortages hitting police departments nationwide and preventing some officers from training with the weapons they carry on patrol.

An Associated Press review of dozens of police and sheriff's departments found that many are struggling with delays of as long as a year for both handgun and rifle ammunition. And the shortages are resulting in prices as much as double what departments were paying just a year ago.

"There were warehouses full of it. Now, that isn't the case," said Al Aden, police chief in Pierre, S.D.

Departments in all parts of the country reported delays or reductions in training and, in at least one case, a proposal to use paint-ball guns in firing drills as a way to conserve real ammo.

Forgoing proper, repetitive weapons training comes with a price on the streets, police say, in diminished accuracy, quickness on the draw and basic decision-making skills.

"You are not going to be as sharp or as good, especially if an emergency situation comes up," said Sgt. James MacGillis, range master for the Milwaukee police. "The better-trained officer is the one that is less likely to use force."

The pinch is blamed on a skyrocketing demand for ammunition that followed the start of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, driven by the training needs of a military at war, and, ironically, police departments increasing their own practice regimens following the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The increasingly voracious demand for copper and lead overseas, especially in China, has also been a factor.

The military is in no danger of running out because it gets the overwhelming majority of its ammunition from a dedicated plant outside Kansas City. But police are at the mercy of commercial manufacturers.

None of the departments surveyed by the AP said it had pulled guns off the street, and many departments reported no problems buying ammunition. But others told the AP they face higher prices and months-long delays.

In Oklahoma City, for example, officers cannot qualify with AR-15 rifles because the department does not have enough .223-caliber ammunition _ a round similar to that fired by the military's M-16 and M4 rifles. Last fall, an ammunition shortage forced the department to cancel qualification courses for several different guns.

"We've got to teach the officers how to use the weapon, and they've got to be able to go to the range and qualify with the weapon and show proficiency," said department spokesman Capt. Steve McCool. "And you can't do that unless you have the rounds."

In Milwaukee, supplies of .40-caliber handgun bullets and .223-caliber rifle rounds have gotten so low the department has repeatedly dipped into its ammunition reserves. Some weapons training has already been cut by 30 percent, and lessons on rifles have been altered to conserve bullets.

Unlike troops in an active war zone, patrol officers rarely fire their weapons in the line of duty. Even then, an officer in a firefight isn't likely to shoot more than a dozen rounds, said Asheville, N.C., police training officer Lt. Gary Gudac. That, he said, makes training with live ammunition for real-life situations _ such as a vehicle stop _ so essential.

"We spend a lot of money and time making sure the officers are able to shoot a moving target or shoot back into a vehicle," Gudac said. "Any time we have a deadly force encounter, one of the first things we pull is the officer's qualification records."

In Trenton, N.J., a lack of available ammunition led the city to give up plans to convert its force to .45-caliber handguns. Last year, the sheriff's department in Bergen County, N.J., had to borrow 26,000 rounds of .40-caliber ammunition to complete twice-a-year training for officers.

"Now we're planning at least a year and a half, even two years in advance," said Bergen County Detective David Macey, a firearms examiner.

In Phoenix, an order for .38-caliber rounds placed a year ago has yet to arrive, meaning no officer can currently qualify with a .38 Special revolver.

"We got creative in how we do in training," said Sgt. Bret Draughn, who supervises the department's ammunition purchases. "We had to cut out extra practice sessions. We cut back in certain areas so we don't have to cut out mandatory training."

In Wyoming, the state leaned on its ammunition supplier earlier this year so every state trooper could qualify on the standard-issue AR-15 rifle, said Capt. Bill Morse. Rifle rounds scheduled to arrive in January did not show up until May, leading to a rush of troopers trying to qualify by the deadline.

"We didn't (initially) have enough ammunition to qualify everybody in the state," Morse said.

In Indianapolis, police spokesman Lt. Jeff Duhamell said the department has enough ammunition for now, but is considering using paint balls during a two-week training course, during which recruits fire normally fire about 1,000 rounds each.

"It's all based on the demands in Iraq," Duhamell said. "A lot of the companies are trying to keep up with the demands of the war and the demands of training police departments. The price increased too _ went up 15 to 20 percent _ and they were advising us ... to order as much as you can."

Higher prices are common. In Madison, Wis., police Sgt. Lauri Schwartz said the city spent $40,000 on ammunition in 2004, a figure that rose to $53,000 this year. The department is budgeting for prices 22 percent higher in 2008. In Arkansas, Fort Smith police now pay twice as much as they did last year for 500-round cases of .40-caliber ammunition.

"We really don't have a lot of choices," Cpl. Mikeal Bates said. "In our profession, we have to have it."

The Lake City Army Ammunition Plant in Independence, Mo., directly supplies the military with more than 80 percent of its small-arms ammunition. Production at the factory has more than tripled since 2002, rising from roughly 425 million rounds that year to 1.4 billion rounds in 2006, according to the Joint Munitions Command at the Rock Island Arsenal in Illinois.

Most of the rest of the military's small-arms ammunition comes from Falls Church, Va.-based General Dynamics Corp., which relies partly on subcontractors _ some of whom also supply police departments. Right now, their priority is filling the military's orders, said Darren Newsom, general manager of The Hunting Shack in Stevensville, Mont., which ships 250,000 rounds a day as it supplies ammunition to 3,000 police departments nationwide.

"There's just a major shortage on ammo in the U.S. right now," he said, pointing to his current backorder for 2.5 million rounds of .223-caliber ammunition. "It's just terrible."

Police say the .223-caliber rifle round is generally the hardest to find. Even though rounds used by the military are not exactly the same as those sold to police, they are made from the same metals and often using the same equipment.

Alliant Techsystems Inc., which runs the Lake City plant for the Army, also produced more than 5 billion rounds for hunting and police use last year, making the Edina, Minn.-based company the country's largest ammunition manufacturer. Spokesman Bryce Hallowell questioned whether the Iraq war had a direct effect on the ammunition available to police, but said there was no doubt that surging demand was affecting supply.

"We had looked at this and didn't know if it was an anomaly or a long-term trend," Hallowell said. "We started running plants 24/7. Now we think it is long-term, so we're going to build more production capability."

That unrelenting demand for ammunition will continue to put a premium on planning ahead, said Maricopa County, Ariz., Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who so far has kept his department from experiencing any shortage-related problems.

"If we have a problem, I'll go make an issue of it _ if I have to go to Washington or the military," Arpaio said. "That is a serious thing ... if you don't have the firepower to protect the public and yourself."
Click to expand...

A_3PO · Aug 19, 2007

NewYorker said:

If we leave now, not only are we not giving the surge a chance, but all the gains we have maid and all the blood and sweat, all the soliders lives, will have been in vain:

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/world/middleeast/19falluja.html?hp
Click to expand...

Be brave and tell us what you hope the surge accomplishes and what the aftermath will be based on the current state of the pathetic Iraqi government. Perhaps you will have the courage since none of the others supporting the surge will reply.

rimrocker · Aug 19, 2007

basso said:

another one climbs aboard the victory train.
Click to expand...

And these 7?

The War as We Saw It
By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY

Baghdad
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/opinion/19jayamaha.html?_r=1&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print

VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)

The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.

A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.

As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.

Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a “time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.

Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.

Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.

The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment.

Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.

Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.

At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.

In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, “We need security, not free food.”

In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal.

Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.

We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.

Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.
Click to expand...

gifford1967 · Aug 19, 2007

rimrocker said:

And these 7?
Click to expand...

rim,

I was just about to post that op/ed. You should put it in its own thread and explain who these guys are.

jo mama · Aug 19, 2007

Ottomaton said:

You have to view every stupid decision in the context of the Cold War. We became involved in reaction to Mosaddeq aligning himself with the Communists. We would not have become involved if not for that.
Click to expand...

or was it because he was about to nationalize irans oil and dismantle british petroluems monopoly? any communist sympathies the guy had or any communist style land reforms he was trying to pass were just an excuse by the brits and americans to overthrow him over this issue, imo.

jo mama · Aug 19, 2007

rimrocker said:

While we're waiting, the dominoes are starting to fall here at home as well...
Click to expand...

good - less bullets for austin police to use to shoot unarmed black and brown people in the backs with!

rimrocker · Aug 19, 2007

gifford1967 said:

rim,

I was just about to post that op/ed. You should put it in its own thread and explain who these guys are.
Click to expand...

Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.

All with the 82nd Airborne Division.

Ottomaton · Aug 19, 2007

jo mama said:

or was it because he was about to nationalize irans oil and dismantle british petroluems monopoly? any communist sympathies the guy had or any communist style land reforms he was trying to pass were just an excuse by the brits and americans to overthrow him over this issue, imo.
Click to expand...

Actually he already had done that. But the Americans didn't have any petrochemical interests in Persia. The Brits very clearly did it for their oil, and if you read the declassified documents the Americans were wary of the information they were getting from the British for that reason.

But the Americans did get involved as part of 'the fight against the red menace'.

The web page for the National Security Archive has quite a bit of good info on this subject.

A_3PO · Aug 19, 2007

That op/ed is devastating to Bush-ites and their supporters who continue to ignore facts that contradict their wooly-headed dreaming about Iraq. Perhaps in some alternate universe their wishful thinking is the reality.

ham · Aug 19, 2007

Why has the thread title still not been changed?

mc mark · Aug 20, 2007

re: the NYTs OpEd --

Second, like John Cole, I can't help but wonder how the right will respond to something like this. I suppose there will be a temptation to kick the Smear Machine into high gear, but it's probably more likely that conservatives will simply pretend the op-ed doesn't exist. It would be far easier than challenging the piece's conclusions.

--Steve Benen
Click to expand...

rocketsjudoka · Aug 20, 2007

ROXRAN said:

http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2006/12/13/cstillwell.DTL

Jimmy Carter's Legacy of Failure
Cinnamon Stillwell

Wednesday, December 12, 2006
Click to expand...

That's a highly questionable article that seems to be more focussed on the title of Carter's book rather than an on an indepth look at the implications of Carter's presidency. While it raises a few points regarding what Carter did as president those are very questionable. The fact is that since the 1979 Camp David Accords there has not been a military engagement between Egypt and Israel who prior to then were sworn enemies. Israel giving back land to Egypt did result in peace. While the street of Egypt might still not like the Isrealis that's hardly Carter's fault. The fact is that peace has held between what once were mortal enemies due to Carter.

For that matter its unlikely that Jordan would've made peace with Israel without the precedence of Camp David or that other Arab countries would've joined the US coalition in the first Gulf War. Saddam's tactic of sending Scuds at Israel to draw the other Arab countries to his side failed miserably largely because the precedence of peace had been established already.

mc mark · Aug 20, 2007

Now that the administration will back off and allow Patraeus to publicly testify, BushCo will try once more to subconsciously tie Iraq to 911.

no shame --

Petraeus To Testify Before Senate On September 11

The much-anticipated Senate testimony of Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, regarding the situation on the ground in Iraq has now been scheduled for September 11th. Petraeus’ testimony will accompany a September 15 status report from the White House that is expected to be a key moment in the debate over American involvement in Iraq.

The timing of Petraeus’ testimony was first revealed by Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) this morning in a conference call with conservative bloggers. According to the National Review’s Jim Geraghty, McCain said he had “been told” Petraeus would testify on the 11th:

http://thinkprogress.org/2007/08/20/petreaus-911-hearing/#comments

basso · Aug 20, 2007

Hillary gets on board

[rquoter] Clinton acknowledged that new tactics have brought some success against insurgents, particularly in Iraq's al-Anbar province.

''It's working. We're just years too late in changing our tactics,'' she said. ''We can't ever let that happen again. We can't be fighting the last war. We have to keep preparing to fight the new war.''[/rquoter]

didn't rummy say the same thing?

rimrocker · Aug 20, 2007

Almost comical...

They want Petraeus to testify on... September 11.

http://www.salon.com/politics/war_room/

[Edit: Sorry MC... didn't see your post.]

rimrocker · Aug 20, 2007

basso said:

Hillary gets on board
Click to expand...

Hardly. Read the entire AP article.

NewYorker · Aug 20, 2007

rimrocker said:

Hardly. Read the entire AP article.
Click to expand...

It's funny how dems are now admitting the situation is improving in Iraq but saying it's "too late".

I think we're seeing the shift now - that progress is being made in Iraq, and liberals are mortified by this. It's really sad to see politics trumping the greater good of the country.

DonkeyMagic · Aug 20, 2007

NewYorker said:

It's funny how dems are now admitting the situation is improving in Iraq but saying it's "too late".

I think we're seeing the shift now - that progress is being made in Iraq, and liberals are mortified by this. It's really sad to see politics trumping the greater good of the country.
Click to expand...

like they always said, you gotta have an exit stragety

mc mark · Aug 20, 2007

New Yorker/DonkeyMagic care to comment on the article that rim posted from the 7 GIs that have actually fought in the war?

Forums

NYTimes: It's working

Batman Jones Member

rimrocker Member

A_3PO Member

rimrocker Member

gifford1967 Member
Supporting Member

jo mama Member

jo mama Member

rimrocker Member

Ottomaton Member
Supporting Member

A_3PO Member

ham Member

mc mark Member

rocketsjudoka Member

mc mark Member

basso Member
Supporting Member

rimrocker Member

rimrocker Member

NewYorker Ghost of Clutch Fans

DonkeyMagic Member
Supporting Member

mc mark Member

Share This Page

About ClutchFans

Rockets Content

Support ClutchFans!

NYTimes: It's working

Batman Jones Member

rimrocker Member

A_3PO Member

rimrocker Member

gifford1967 Member Supporting Member

jo mama Member

jo mama Member

rimrocker Member

Ottomaton Member Supporting Member

A_3PO Member

ham Member

mc mark Member

rocketsjudoka Member

mc mark Member

basso Member Supporting Member

rimrocker Member

rimrocker Member

NewYorker Ghost of Clutch Fans

DonkeyMagic Member Supporting Member

mc mark Member

Share This Page

gifford1967 Member
Supporting Member

Ottomaton Member
Supporting Member

basso Member
Supporting Member

DonkeyMagic Member
Supporting Member