"No-ban" pre-ordering going on now...Agree or not?

Well, by your rationale, let's unban biological weapons, mustard gas, fusion bombs, and rail guns.

This is silly hyperbole, and you know it

Yes, any rational reading of the second amendment indicates that it was enacted to allow for the possiblity of paranoid fantasy resistance Red Dawn style campaigns against evil liberal police states.

These moronic pipedreams are as depressingly idiotic -- and in some cases, like McVeigh, Nichols, Rudolph, et al, as destructive -- as wacked out radical islamic jihad fatasies and 77 black eyed virgins. Get a grip.

 

No, it's not silly hyperbole, Sam. That is what Jeff advocates. Denying my 2nd Amendment rights to bear arms because a few stupids leave their guns where kids can find them is ridiculous.

And I wouldn't call this check and balance a moronic pipedream. It might be with the folks in your part of the country where you don't mind and actually love an intrusive govt. with a confiscatory fiscal policy, but for many, it is realistic. I know you'd feel safer if there only guns in the hands of criminals and govt, but I wouldn't.

 

It is silly hyperbole -- and the "few stupids" argument is an artifice that can be used to justify all manner of destructive behavior.

You operate on the premise that your right to bear arms is somehow absolute. It's questionable or not whether or not you even have an individual right to bear arms. And even if you did, it wouldn't be absolute.

Focusing on the free speech portion for a second. This is, by all accounts, a right that you have, but even this right is not absolute. You can't shout fire in a movie theater if there isn't one, obscenity isn't protected, hate speech isn't protected, time place and manner restrictions -- etc.

THere's all sorts of regulations we put on speech.

Now, let's look at the next one.

Notice how the language is completely different from Amendment 1.

It doesn't say, "Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people to bear arms"

Rather it says that "a well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state"

Now, while the phrase "milita" no doubt makes survivalist types pop a boner or two, notice how it is a "well regulated" militia. At a time when the US had no standing army -- this indicates to me, at least, that that is the kind of thing this was intended for -- to allow for the raising of a more formal army rather than a band of citizen freedom fighter rambos.

The real important part though is in the next clause.

"being necessary to the security of a free state.

You and I both know that the term "state" generally refers to the concept of a political entity/apparatus. Notice how it says that the militia is necessary "to the security of a free state".

It doesn't say, as you and a lot of other paranoid types imply
"to security FROM the state", or "to the security of the People from the state" -- rather it corroborates the idea that the militia is an organ of the state and exists to protect it -- as would an army or national guard.

Please, folks in your part of the country love an intrusive government as much as the next person, but they want their intrusion to shield them from the horrific consequences of seeing Janet Jackson's breast, intrusion into the bedroom to prevent consenting adults from engaging in their own personal business, intrusion of religous dogma and junk science into schools because accepted science appears to threaten their self esteem, intrusion of a big ass ugly statue -- which violates both Amendment 1 and Commandment 1 -- onto public property.

So take a number in that regard. As for fiscal policy -- yes, we know, you advocate a money for nothing, chicks for free, quasi state where we finance police, roads, expensive military systems, etc, without having to pay for them. I'm not going to fight that battle.

But anyway, I'd feel much safer if neither you nor criminals had semiautomatic weapons. If there is any rational reason why I shouldn't please think of one and let me know.

 

awesome post SamFisher

 

The right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.

Abridging the law would infringe on the peoples right to bear arms.

 

That of course, is not the full text of the second amendment. See above.

The point I made is pretty clear -- if arms-bearing is an affirmative right on par with speech, etc -- why isn't the language the same -- and why is it qualified?

The answer is that its clearly not -- and most courts are pretty uniform in recognizing this.

 

The constitution is open to interpitation same as the bible. Notice how you zero in on the part you think is most important in the second amendment...

and I focus on the part I think is most important...

The courts have argued this over and over and both sides have had victories that point to the validity of both your point of view and mine.

Thanks for the logical discussion.

 

Yes, but you focused in on it, as if it existed in a vaccuum, like Amendment 1 -- which it does not. That is my point.

I focused on the same part you did, but with context -- the qualification thereto. There is no such qualification to amendment 1.

That's a bit of an overstatement.

The last supreme court case on the topic was decided in 1939, and to my knowledge, continues to be the supreme law of the land today.

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&court=us&case=/us/307/174.html


which does not find an individualized right to bear arms, and strictly interprets the militia component.

Most courts agree.

 

This is a crazy argument overall that I really want no part of, but if you want to get into the technical issue, the law has a reasonableness factor to it that has to be taken into account. Owning a shotgun and an assault rifle are VERY different things just as the difference between going 65 and 120 on the freeway are very different things.

There are plenty of people who would restrict the press when it comes to protecting privacy and yet freedom of the press is right at the top of the bill of rights. There are those who muzzle certain forms of speech because of the delitirious effects on society as a whole - threatening speech by terrorists for example. Yet, free speech is right at the top as well.

These are lines that have to be drawn based on reasonableness, not hyperbole or guesswork.

By the way, the argument that an armed nation is a safer nation is one that would be disputed by virtually every law enforcement organization in America and they are the one's actually doing the protecting.

 

Of course you will find data in here that supports your view also but I bolded the parts that support mine. Saying that most courts agree with 1939 miller is a bit of an over statement.

Federal Court Cases Regarding The Second Amendment

U.S. Supreme Court Cases

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). This was the first case in which the Supreme Court had the opportunity to interpret the Second Amendment. The Court recognized that the right of the people to keep and bear arms was a right which existed prior to the Constitution when it stated that such a right "is not a right granted by the Constitution...[n]either is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence." The Court held, however, that because the right to keep and bear arms existed independent of the Constitution, and the Second Amendment guaranteed only that the right shall not be infringed by Congress, the federal government had no power to punish a violation of the right by a private individual; rather, citizens had "to look for their protection against any violation by their fellow-citizens" of their right to keep and bear arms to the police power of the state.

Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). Although the Supreme Court affirmed the holding in Cruikshank that the Second Amendment, standing alone, applied only to action by the federal government, it nonetheless found the states without power to infringe upon the right to keep and bear arms, holding that "the States cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, as so to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security and disable the people from performing their duty to the general government."

Presser, moreover, plainly suggested that the Second Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and thus that a state cannot forbid individuals to keep and bear arms.

Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894). In this case, the Court confirmed that it had never addressed the issue of the Second Amendment applying to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. This case remains the last word on this subject by the Court.

Miller challenged a Texas statute on the bearing of pistols as violative of the Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. But he asserted these arguments for the first time after his conviction had been affirmed by a state appellate court. Reiterating Cruikshank and Presser, the Supreme Court first found that the Second and Fourth Amendments, of themselves, did not limit state action. The Court then turned to the claim that the Texas statute violated the rights to bear arms and against warrantless searches as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. But because the Court would not hear objections not made in a timely fashion, the Court refused to consider Miller`s contentions.

Thus, rather than reject incorporation of the Second and Fourth Amendments in the Fourteenth, the Supreme Court merely refused to decide the defendant`s claim because its powers of adjudication were limited to the review of errors timely assigned in the trial court. The Court left open the possibility that the right to keep and beararms and freedom from warrantless searches would apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). This is the only case in which the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to apply the Second Amendment to a federal firearms statute. The Court, however, carefully avoided making an unconditional decision regarding the statute`s constitutionality; it instead devised a test by which to measure the constitutionality of statutes relating to firearms and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing (the trial court had held that Section 11 of the National Firearms Act was unconstitutional). The Court remanded the case because it had concluded that:

In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.

Thus, for the keeping and bearing of a firearm to be constitutionally protected, the firearm should be a militia-type arm.

The case also made clear that the militia consisted of "all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense" and that "when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." In setting forth this definition of the militia, the Court implicitly rejected the view that the Second Amendment guarantees a right only to those individuals who are members of the militia. Had the Court viewed the Second Amendment as guaranteeing the right to keep and bear arms only to "all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense," it would certainly have discussed whether, on remand, there should also be evidence that the defendants met the qualifications for inclusion in the militia, much as it did with regard to the militia use of a short-barrelled shotgun.

Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 95 (1980). Lewis recognized--in summarizing the holding of Miller, supra, as "the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have `some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia`" (emphasis added)--thatMiller had focused upon the type of firearm. Further, Lewis was concerned only with whether the provision of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 which prohibits the possession of firearms by convicted felons (codified in 18 U.S.C.922(g) in 1986) violated the Second Amendment. Thus, since convicted felons historically were and are subject to the loss of numerous fundamental rights of citizenship--including the right to vote, hold office, and serve on juries--it was not erroneous for the Court to have concluded that laws prohibiting the possession of firearms by a convicted felon "are neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties."

United States v. Verdugo-Urquirdez, 110 S. Ct. 3039 (1990). This case involved the meaning of the term "the people" in the Fourth Amendment. The Court unanimously held that the term "the people" in the Second Amendment had the same meaning as in the Preamble to the Constitution and in the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments, i.e., that "the people" means at least all citizens and legal aliens while in the United States. This case thus resolves any doubt that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right.

U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases 3


U.S. v. Emerson, No. 99-10331 (Fifth Circuit, 1999) Emerson had been indicted for possessing a firearm while under a certain kind of restraining order, a violation of federal law [18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8)]. The trial court quashed the indictment on Second and Fifth Amendment grounds, finding that Emerson`s right to arms had been restricted by a mere "boilerplate state court divorce order" and "an obscure, highly technical statute with no mens rea (criminal intent) requirement."

The court agreed with the trial court that the right to arms is an individually-held right, however. "All of the evidence indicates that the Second Amendment, like other parts of the Bill of Rights, applies to and protects individual Americans," the court stated. "We find that the history of the Second Amendment reinforces the plain meaning of its text, namely that it protects individual Americans in their right to keep and bear arms....We reject the collective rights and sophisticated collective rights models for interpreting the Second Amendment.

U.S. v. Cody, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1972). This case involved the making of a false statement by a convicted felon in connection with the purchase of a firearm. After citing Miller for the propositions that "the Second Amendment is not an absolute bar to congressional regulation of the use or possession of firearms" and that the "Second Amendment`s guarantee extends only to use or possession which `has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,`" the court held that there was "no evidence that the prohibition of 922(a)(6) obstructs the maintenance of a well-regulated militia." Thus, the court acknowledged that the Second Amendment would be a bar to some congressional regulation of the use or possession of firearms and recognized that Miller required the introduction of evidence which showed a militia use for the firearm involved.

U.S. v. Decker, 446 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1971). Like Synnes, infra, the court here held that the defendant could "present . . . evidence indicating a conflict" between the statute at issue and the Second Amendment. Since he failed to do so, the court declined to hold that the record-keeping requirements of the Gun Control Act of 1968 violated the Second Amendment. As withSynnes, the court once again implicitly recognized that the right guaranteed belonged to individuals.

U.S. v. Synnes, 438 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds, 404 U.S. 1009 (1972). This is another case involving possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In holding that 18 U.S.C. App. Section 1202(a) (reenacted in 18 U.S.C. 922(g) in 1986) did not infringe the Second Amendment, the court held (based upon its partially erroneous view of Miller) that there needed to be evidence that the statute impaired the maintenance of a well-regulated militia. As there was "no showing that prohibiting possession of firearms by felons obstructs the maintenance of a `well regulated militia,`" the court saw "no conflict" between 1202(a) and the Second Amendment. While Miller focused on the need to introduce evidence that the firearm had a militia use, Synnes at least recognized the relevance of a militia nexus. There was a clear recognition, moreover, that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right.

Gilbert Equipment Co., Inc. v. Higgins, 709 F. Supp. 1071(S.D. Ala. 1989), aff`d, 894 F.2d 412 (11th Cir. 1990) (mem). The court held that the Second Amendment "guarantees to all Americans` the right to keep and bear arms`. . ."

U.S. v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384 (1Oth Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978). Although the court recognized the requirement of Miller that the defendant show that the firearm in question have a "connection to the militia," the court concluded, without any explanation of how it reached the conclusion, that the mere fact that the defendant was a member of the Kansas militia would not establish that connection. In light of the fact that Miller (which defines the militia as including "all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense") saw no relevance in the status of a defendant with respect to the militia, but instead focused upon the firearm itself, this conclusion is not without basis.

U.S. v. Swinton, 521 F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1975). In the context of interpreting the meaning of the phrase "engaging in the business of dealing in firearms" in 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(1), the court noted, in dicta, merely that "there is no absolute constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm." Emphasis added. Clearly, therefore, the court recognized that the right is an individual one, albeit not an absolute one.

U.S. v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974). This is one of the three court of appeals cases which uses the term "collective right." The entire opinion, however, is one sentence, which states that the Second Amendment "only confers a collective right of keeping and bearing arms which must bear a `reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia`."As authority for this statement, the court cites Miller and Cody v. U.S., supra. Yet, as the Supreme Court in Lewis, supra, made clear, Miller held that it is the firearm itself, not the act of keeping and bearing the firearm, which must have a "reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia." The court did, however, recognize that Miller required evidence of the militia nexus. Moreover, the particular provision at issue in Johnson concerned the interstate transportation of a firearm by convicted felons, a class of persons which historically has suffered the loss of numerous rights (including exclusion from the militia) accorded other citizens.

U.S. v Bowdach, 414 F. Supp. 1346 (D.S. Fla 1976), aff`d, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977). The court held that "possession of the shotgun by a non-felon has no legal consequences. U.S. Const. Amend. II."

U.S. v. Johnson. Jr., 441 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1971). Once again, this decision merely quotes from Miller the statement concerning the requirement of an evidentiary showing of a militia nexus and a consequent rejection, without even the briefest of analysis, of the defendant`s challenging to the constitutionality of the National Firearms Act of 1934 (NFA). Apparently, the defendant failed to put on evidence, as required by Miller, that the firearm at issue had a militia use. Thus, Miller bound the appeals court to reject the defendant`s challenge.

Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983). In rejecting a Second and Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a village handgun ban, the court held that the Second Amendment, either of itself or by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment, "does not apply to the states. . ." The court, in dicta, went on, however, to "comment" on the "scope of the second amendment," incorrectly summarizing Miller as holding that the right extends "only to those arms which are necessary to maintain a well regulated militia." Thus, finding (without evidence on the record) that "individually owned handguns [are not] military weapons," the court concluded that "the right to keep and bear handguns is not guaranteed by the Second Amendment."

U.S. v. McCutcheon, 446 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1971). This is another case involving the NFA in which the court merely followed Miller in holding that the NFA did not infringe the Second Amendment.

Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir 1971). In a one sentence holding, the court simply concluded that the Second Amendment "applies only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not to the individual`s right to bear arms. . ." Merely citing Miller as authority for this conclusion, the court undertook no analysis of Miller or of the history of the ratification of the Second Amendment. This case, moreover, involved possession of firearms by convicted felons, a class of persons whose right traditionally have been more restricted than law-abiding citizens.

U.S. v. Day, 476 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1973). Citing Miller, the court merely concluded, in reviewing a challenge to the statute barring dishonorably discharged persons from possessing firearms, that "there is no absolute right of an individual to possess a firearm." (Emphasis added.) Since there are certain narrowly defined classes of untrustworthy persons, such as convicted felons and, as here, persons dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, who may be barred the possession of firearms, it is a truism to say that there is not an absolute right to possess firearms. In so saying, the court implicitly recognized the individual right of peaceful and honest citizens to possess firearm.

U S. v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir 1976), cert. denied,426 U.S. 948 (1976). Following, and relying upon, its earlier decision in Stevens, supra, the court simply concluded, without any reference to the history of the Second Amendment, that it "is clear the Second Amendment guarantees a collective rather than an individual right." The court also indicated that, in reaching its decision, it was relying upon the First Circuit`s decision in Cases. infra. Yet in concluding that not all arms were protected by the Second Amendment, Cases did not hold, as did Warin, that the Second Amendment afforded individuals no protections whatever. Warin also erred in concluding that Warin`s relationship to the militia was relevant to determining whether his possession of a machine gun was protected by the Second Amendment since the Supreme Court in Miller focused on the firearm itself, not the individual involved. In fact, Miller quite expansively defined the constitutional militia as encompassing "all males physically capable of action in concert for the common defense."

U.S. v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3rd Cir. 1942), rev`d on other grounds, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). This is another case involving possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Despite holding that the failure of the defendant to prove, as required by Miller, a militia use for the firearm was an adequate basis for ruling against the defendant, the court, in dicta, concluded that the Second Amendment "was not adopted with individual rights in mind . . ."This result was based on reliance on an extremely brief--and erroneous--analysis of common law and colonial history. In addition, apparently recognizing that it decided the case on unnecessarily broad grounds, the court noted that, at common law, while there was a right to bear arms, that right was not absolute and could be restricted for certain classes of persons "who have previously. . . been shown to be aggressors against society."

U.S. v. Graves, 554 F.2d 65 (3rd Cir. 1977). Since the defendant in this case did not raise the Second Amendment as a challenge to the "statutory program which restricts the right to bear arms of convicted felons and other persons of dangerous propensities,"6 the only discussion of the Second Amendment is found in a bartnote wherein the court states "[a]rguably, any regulation of firearms may be violative of this constitutional provision."

Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942), cert.denied sub nom., Velazquez v. U. S., 319 U.S. 770 (1943). In this case, the court held that the Supreme Court in Miller had not intended "to formulate a general rule" regarding which arms were protected by the Second Amendment and concluded, therefore, that many types of arms were not protected. Nonetheless, the court in Cases expressly acknowledged that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right when it noted that the law in question "undoubtedly curtails to some extent the right of individuals to keep and bear arms . . ." Id. at 921. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the court in Cases concluded, as properly it should have, that Miller should not be read as holding that the Second Amendment guaranteed the right to possess or use large weapons that could not be carried by an individual.

U.S. District Court Cases


U.S. v. Gross, 313 F.Supp. 1330 (S.D. Ind. 1970), aff`d on other grounds, 451 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1971). In rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the requirement that those who engage in the business of dealing in firearms must be licensed, the court, following its view of Miller, held that the defendant had not shown that "the licensing of dealers in firearms in any way destroys, or impairs the efficiency of, a well regulated militia."

U.S. v. Kraase, 340 F.Supp. 147 (E.D. Wis. 1972). In ruling on a motion to dismiss an indictment, the court rejected a facial constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(5) -- which prohibited sales of firearms to residents of other states. Recognizing that an individual right was protected, it held that "second amendment protection might arise if proof were offered at the trial demonstrating that his possession of the weapon in question had a reasonable relationship to the maintenance of a `well-regulated Militia.`"

Thompson v. Dereta, 549 F. Supp. 297 (D. Utah 1982). An applicant for relief from disabilities (a prohibited person) brought an action against the federal agents involved in denying his application. The court dismissed the case, holding that, because there was no "absolute constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm," there was "no liberty or property interest sufficient to give rise to a procedural due process claim."

Vietnamese Fishermen`s Assoc. v. KKK, 543 F.Supp. 198 (S.D.Tex. 1982). Like the statute faced by the Supreme Court in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1876), the Texas statute and the injunction at issue here prohibited private military activity. Mis-characterizing Miller, the court held that the Second Amendment "prohibits only such infringement on the bearing of weapons as would interfere with `the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia,` organized by the State." Later, however, the court, following Miller, explained that the "Second Amendment`s guarantee is limited to the right to keep and bear such arms as have `a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.`" The courts`s understanding of the Second Amendment is thus inconsistent and, given the facts of the case, largely dicta.

U.S. v. Kozerski, 518 F.Supp. 1082 (D.N.H. 1981), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 842 (1984). In the context of a challenge to the law prohibiting the possession of firearms by convicted felons; the court, while holding correctly (see discussion of Nelson, supra) that the Second Amendment "is not a grant of a right but a limitation upon the power of Congress and the national government, "concluded that the right "is a collective right . . . rather that an individual right," citing only Warin, supra. As a district court in the First Circuit, however, the court was bound by Cases, supra, which expressly recognized that the right belonged to individuals

 

I want my own nuclear warhead. Thanks.

 

http://www.leaa.org/righttocarry.html

LEAA Supports Right To Carry (RTC)

The Law Enforcement Alliance of America (LEAA) has supported right to carry efforts across the country for over a decade._ LEAA leaders and law enforcement officer members have testified in state capitols in favor of common sense measures that trust citizens with the right to self-defense._Our member officers know that bad guys carry guns regardless of the law and right to carry laws serve only to offer law-abiding citizens an improved opportunity for self-defense.


THE LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE FROM THOSE WHO HAVE STUDIED - EVEN EXPERIENCED - THE RIGHT TO CARRY TRACK RECORD


"In a recent poll, more than eighty-five percent of our 1352 members favored Right-to-Carry.", Letter to St. Louis Police Chief Ron Henderson, from Sgt. John J. Johnson, President St. Louis Police Officers Association, 1/23/99.


" 'I'm detecting that I'm eating a lot of crow on this issue,' Harris County District Attorney John Holmes recently professed. Holmes's jurisdiction, the third most populous county in the United States, includes Houston. Holmes was one of many who predicted that 'blood would run in the streets' when the Texas concealed-carry law came into effect 14 months ago. It hasn't happened. In fact, with 112,000 new concealed-carry permits issued, there have been all of 57 'incidents' recorded among licensees, mostly, according to The Texas Lawyer, involving possessing while intoxicated or failing to conceal the weapon. Eating crow is 'not necessarily something I like to do,' Holmes told The Texas Lawyer, 'but I'm doing it on this.' ", from 'THE CLOSED AMERICAN MIND: From the Hip', by Daniel J. Poslby in the 24Mar97 issue of the National Review.


"The Executive Board of the St. Louis Police Officers Association (SLPOA), representing over 1300 commissioned officers employed by the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, has voted to support the passage of the April 6, 1999 Right-to-Carry referendum.", St. Louis Police Officers Assn., 1/99 Press Release


"I lobbied against the law in 1993 and 1995 because I thought it would lead to wholesale armed conflict. That hasn't happened. All the horror stories I thought would come to pass didn't happen. No bogeyman. I think it's worked out well, and that says good things about the citizens who have permits. I'm a convert." -- Glenn White, President of the Dallas Police Association, Dallas Morning News, December 23, 1997.


"From a law enforcement perspective, the licensing process has not resulted in problems in the community from people arming themselves with concealed weapons." -- Commissioner James T. Moore, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Memo to the Governor, 3/15/95.


"As we have seen in other states and had predicted would occur in Texas, all the fears of the naysayers have not come to fruition. A lot of critics argued that the law-abiding citizens couldn't be trusted... But the facts do speak for themselves. None of these horror stories have materialized." -- Sheriff David Williams, Tarrant County, TX, Fort Worth Telegram, 7/17/96.


"Some of the public safety concerns which we imagined or anticipated a couple of years ago, to our pleasant surprise, have been unfounded or mitigated." -- Fairfax County VA Police Major Bill Brown, The Alexandria Journal, 7/9/97.


"I was wrong. But I'm glad to say I was wrong." -- Arlington County VA Police Detective Paul Larson, previously an opponent of Right to Carry, The Alexandria Journal, 7/9/97.


"Virginia has not turned into Dodge City. We have not seen a problem." -- Virginia Public Safety Secretary Jerry Kilgore, The Fredricksburg Freelance Star, 2/2/96.


"The concerns I had - with more guns on the street, folks may be more apt to square off against one another with weapons - we haven't experienced that." -- Charlotte-Mecklenburg NC Police Chief Dennis Nowicki, The News and Observer, 11/24/97.


"The preponderance of the evidence suggests that the vast majority (of permit holders) act responsibly." -- State Sen. Jerry Patterson, R-Pasadena, author of Texas' firearm carry law.


"To set the record straight... The process is working... The statistics show a majority of concealed firearms or firearm licensees are honest, law-abiding citizens exercising their right to be armed for the purpose of lawful self defense." -- Sandra B. Mortham, Florida Secretary of State.


"Allowing citizens to carry concealed firearms deters violent crimes and it appears to produce no increase in accidental deaths. If those states which did not have right to carry concealed gun provisions had adopted them in 1992, approximately 1,570 murders, 4,177 rapes and over 60,000 aggravated assaults would have been avoided yearly." -- Professor John R. Lott, Jr., and David B. Mustard, University of Chicago.


"The facts are in and the record is clear: Right to Carry gives law enforcement, their families and our communities real protection from violent criminals." -- James J. Fotis, Executive Director, Law Enforcement Alliance of America.

 

OK -- I know that this was probably an oversight, but if you're going to post verbatim NRA propaganda in favor of this concept you have to at least let us know that that is what you are doing by providing a link to it, or telling us that's what you're doing.

A few points:

1. The cases decided before last century are largely irrelevant.

2. The assessment of the NRA's legal scholars of this jurisprudence, is self-serving and inaccurate, to put it mildly.

Let's take an example, the assessment of the Miller case I linked to earlier.

FIrst, all the crap about the second and 14th amendment is a a distraction that is largely irrelevant to our own subject and deals with federalism concerns -- what is important to know about that is that the 14th amendment is interpreted to require the bill of rights to apply to state as well as federal gov'ts.


Second off, it shears off the context that inconveniences it:

Here's what they say about Miller.

 

Uhh, no. I addressed this several posts back. You didn't quote the Second amendment, you quoted the part of the Second amendemnt that is most favorable to you -- and what you wish it meant.

It has no bearing on the fragment you quoted, but it does have bearing on this "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed. " The fragment is not to be viewed in a vaccuum, and never has been. This is stupid, second grade level argument -- and even the court cases cited by the NRA aren't so stupid as to make the argument that you are making.

 

Give it up ROXRAN. He only see's what he wants to see.

I'm done with this discussion.

 

ROXRAN,
I am thinking about buying a gun and was wondering what your opinion of a Kimber .45 is?

 

WTF?

That's a pathetic retreat, voodoopope. I expected better of you.

I posted my own independetn analysis on multiple occasions (which required a modicum of time and effort)

You responded with a rote copy and paste job -- most of which I am beginning to seriously doubt you even understand.

And this is your response.

Pathetic, even more pathetic than the NRA's tortured reading of 2nd amendment and its disingenuous intepretation of the jurisprudence-- enjoy your weekend and your sour grapes.

 

You were being intentionally misleading and only emphasizing the part that was favorable to your view.

I have a word for that: it's called "lying".

Fortunately, your view of constitutional interpretation isn't shared by any federal court that I know of.

Have fun at the range this weekend. I mean that.