It's not just history, and it's not that it's sufficient in one case and not the other. It's just in the case of Kosovo the U.S. only has 6000 out of the 45000 troops there. I was saying that Europe did get involved, and that they have the heaviest involvement. It wasn't a case of the U.S. doing everything against the will of the Europeans.
Pretty much there isn't anyone who contends that Europe would have acted without the US and UK cajoling and threatening to go it alone. Europe wasn't acting on Kosovo just as they didn't act on Bosnia. This is an issue that affects European stability, not US stability - and yet there was no European action forthcoming. Now you want to propose that Europeans are going to invade Iran? Are you kidding? Right. There was a 'global consensus' on Kosovo. Let's take a look: "The worldwide protests against the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by NATO in the last seven days demonstrate that world public opinion finds it utterly unacceptable that a military alliance of some states assigns to itself the responsibilities which under the UN Charter belongs to the UN Security Council..." "Yet the U.S. is being expected to take the lead in Kosovo. More than that, Washington is pushing a form of military intervention with which some European states are quite uncomfortable. It is bad enough to wage war for Europe rather than America when supported by the Europeans. It makes little sense to do so when they don't." Here's a passage that I think speaks to you, FB: "Their preference for social over military spending is matched by a reluctance to act without America. The Europeans whined about the fighting in Bosnia but preferred not to act alone. Without U.S. pressure NATO would not (have made war) on Serbia. In the eyes of some, this demonstrates the necessity of American leadership.
Hayes, one can easily take this quote and use it to show that, with American leadership, the Europeans are capable of acting. G.W. Bush didn't provide that leadership, despite being able to exercise it in Afghanistan. Why? Because he could not present the Europeans with a suffcient reason to invade and occupy Iraq. Given his constantly changing reasons for that war today, based on the latest report to vilify the reasons he was using before, it's not surprising that, when the bulk of the European powers were asked to participate, they replied, "Uh, I don't think so." And please, folks... Keep D&D Civil!!
George Bush has lost the public support and credibility he needed to invade any but the most egregious states. And to my mind, the only state that qualifies for this right now would be North Korea. Iran knows it. And it's daring the rest of the pansy world to bring it on. God knows we all need even HIGHER oil prices.
I'm not against the U.S. acting. I'm against the U.S. not bringing allies along whenever possible. In Kosovo we did take the lead(as I believe we should) thanks to strong leadership and working with our allies, Europe is now handling most of the heavy lifting there. That is exactly what I'm talking about doing. That is what Kerry has been talking about(I know your not a Bush supporter.) But I do think it's important that people understand Kerry's plan is not to let Europe or other lead. He wants the U.S. to lead but will have good enough intel, and leadership to join in and share the burdon. The plan is a good one. If Kerry can't execute then we can vote him out in 4 years, but since he has devised a plan that sounds like it can duplicate the success of Kosovo then I'm for it.
From a few months ago...... <a HREF="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53701-2004Jun18.html">The Allies Must Step Up</a> <i> Critics of the Bush administration at home and abroad have long called for an early return of Iraqi sovereignty coupled with the internationalization of the assistance effort. The U.N. resolution that was passed unanimously June 8, though late in coming, does just that. What's more, the resolution reflects significant efforts by the Bush administration to meet the concerns of key nations that opposed the Iraq war in 2003. Iraq will enjoy full sovereignty after June 30, not limited sovereignty. Iraqi forces will be under Iraqi command, not the command of the multinational force. The mandate of the multinational force will expire once the political transition has been completed. And the forces will be withdrawn if the Iraqi government so desires. One would think, therefore, that the new U.N. consensus on Iraq would offer real hope not only for putting Iraq on the right track but also for healing some of the rifts between the United States and its European allies. France and Germany demanded a significant U.N. role, and they've gotten it. They demanded a rapid turnover of sovereignty to the Iraqis, and they got that, too. With the two countries having gotten their way in the negotiations on the resolution, the time has come for them to pitch in and join in the effort to build a peaceful, stable, democratic future for Iraq. After all, French, German and other European officials have insisted all along that the success or failure of Iraq is as much a vital interest for them as for the United States. They've also insisted, understandably, that if the United States wanted their help, it would have to give them a say over policy in Iraq. Unfortunately, now that the Bush administration has finally acquiesced to their requests, it appears that France and Germany are refusing to fulfill their end of the bargain. Leaders of both countries have declared they will not send troops to assist in Iraq under any circumstances. Still more troubling was French President Jacques Chirac's declaration at the Group of Eight summit last week that he opposed any NATO role in Iraq, even though the resolution France supported explicitly calls on "Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute assistance to the multinational force, including military forces." The positions staked out by the French and German governments are an abdication of international responsibility. Everyone knows success in Iraq will require a greater effort on the part of the international community than has so far been forthcoming. The United Nations will have to establish a major operation on the ground if it is to assist the Iraqi government through a difficult political transition over the coming months. Security inside Iraq will have to improve significantly for elections to proceed on schedule and for the economy to begin to grow. An intensive training and equipment program for Iraqi security forces -- including police, civil defense and regular military forces -- will ultimately enable the Iraqis to maintain security. But until then the task will fall mainly on the multinational forces. Thanks to bad planning by the Pentagon, there have never been enough troops in Iraq. At least in the short run, real security requires additional troops. Most of those troops need to come from the United States. But American friends and allies should be sending more forces as well. Beyond the needs in Iraq, there are broader issues at stake. Above all, there is the question of whether there is any meaning left in the term "alliance." Admittedly the United States hasn't been the best of allies over the past two years. We have missed opportunities to work more closely with NATO countries. But it takes more than the United States to make the transatlantic alliance work. If some of the strongest NATO powers refuse to participate in vital security missions, such as that in Iraq, then it should hardly be surprising when Americans and their leaders begin to dismiss those nations as serious strategic partners. Good allies don't join only the causes that they choose and that are already going well. When the United States sent troops to Bosnia and later fought the Kosovo war, it was not because the Europeans had handled those situations well. Nor did a majority of Americans believe that Bosnia and Kosovo were their concern. Much of the reason the United States fought in the Balkans during the 1990s was for the sake of the alliance itself. <b> NATO officials, as well as some allied countries, argue that with the alliance already involved in Afghanistan, taking on Iraq as well is beyond the organization's capacity. But the truth is, if NATO cannot take on a mission such as Iraq, when the United States is providing 90 percent of the forces, then why should Americans continue to value the organization? Germany may be tapped out in Afghanistan and the Balkans, which is a sorry commentary on the state of that enormous and wealthy country's military capabilities. But surely France has several thousand troops to spare, if the French government wants to provide them. </b> Now that the Security Council has opened the door to internationalization in Iraq, the Europeans would be wise to step through. Alliance leaders meeting in Istanbul later this month should agree to take over the security training and equipping mission immediately, with a country such as Germany (which is already involved in training some police) perhaps taking the lead. They should also agree that NATO will take command of the Polish-led sector in southern Iraq immediately and begin planning for eventually placing the entire multinational force under NATO command. It will be a deadly blow to transatlantic relations if NATO does not become involved in providing security in Iraq. Many Europeans believe their problem is only with the Bush administration. That's a dangerous miscalculation. If John Kerry wins in November, one of his first acts will be to request Europe's help in Iraq. If France and Germany are intent on saying no, then future American administrations, including Kerry's, will have to reconsider the value of the alliance. Do Europeans really want to sever their strategic ties to the United States? If not, they need to understand that the ball is now in their court. </i> <hr color=blue> <a HREF="http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/daalder/useuropechapter.pdf">The United States and Europe: From Primacy to Partnership?*</a> <i>......Clinton came to office pledging a more forceful policy toward the former Yugoslavia, notably in Bosnia, which was witness to the most brutal conflict in Europe since the Second World. However, the new administration soon discovered that an effective U.S. policy required a degree of military commitment—notably in the form of ground troops—that the new president was unwilling to provide. For two years, strong rhetoric vied with inaction to make a mockery of America’s Bosnia policy—and, not incidentally, to poison U.S.-European relations. The failure of Europe and the United Nations to act forcefully without the United States taking equal risks left the Bosnian people with little assistance to ward off the violence that engulfed them. The logic of war—and international failure to act—culminated in the disaster of Srebrenica, when in the short span of ten days nearly eight thousand Bosnian men were murdered in cold blood as the world stood by. The Srebrenica debacle emphasized the complete bankruptcy of UN, European, and U.S. policy toward Bosnia. The collective failure to prevent this crime galvanized a policy reassessment in Washington, which resulted in a decision to take the lead in ending the Bosnian war—through negotiations if possible, but through military intervention if necessary.31 Not only did this decision set in motion the process that would lead to the peace agreed on at Dayton, but it also finally and completely committed the United States and, with it, the Atlantic Alliance, to bringing peace..... ......A similar evolution is now underway in the security sphere. Although Europe accepted—indeed welcomed—its reliance on the United States for its security throughout the cold war period, it was the crisis in the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s that finally convinced European governments that this dependence was no longer tenable. Notwithstanding the fact that Europe had, with Washington’s full support, taken the lead in addressing the crisis as it enveloped southeastern Europe in the early 1990s, American diplomatic and military power proved crucial both in ending the Bosnian war in 1995 and in curtailing a major humanitarian calamity in Kosovo in 1999. Not only did American intervention demonstrate Europe’s essential diplomatic and military weakness, but it also underscored that this weakness enabled Washington to dictate the strategy and tactics for resolving an essentially European conflict. It was this latter aspect, fully underscored by the response to the Kosovo crisis, that proved to be most troubling in European capitals...... ......Of course, achieving even this modest defense effort will prove to be a major task, if not an insurmountable one. At least four obstacles stand out. First, for all the progress in the political realm, Europe remains—and will remain for some time—a collection of fifteen independent countries in the security field whose aggregated power is in important ways less than the sum of its parts. Efficiencies and joint efforts are both possible and necessary, but the reality of national division will pose an ineluctable limit on the effectiveness of the whole. Second, even if the EU manages to achieve the headline goal—including by identifying the 150,000 to 180,000 troops necessary to sustain a major operation over an extended period of time—that would still fall short of what will be needed for Europe to be able to conduct major military operations autonomously. Indeed, conducting just the current peacekeeping operations in the Balkans would be a stretch for the EU. Third, it does not seem very likely that the EU will achieve the headline goals by 2003. Even if it proves able to deploy the troops and basic equipment, it will not be possible to support them logistically over any significant distance. In other words, by 2003 the EU may be able to take over the operations in the Balkans, given existing lines of communication and the relatively quiescent security environment there, but it would not be able to embark on a similar type mission anywhere else. Finally, given the wide and continuing disparity in defense spending generally and on research and development in particular, the technological gap between the United States and Europe in the military field—already wide—will continue to grow inexorably. None of this is to suggest that Europe will lack the military (or political or economic) capacity to be a strategic partner of the United States. Clearly, Europe is moving in the right direction, but much more will have to be done, especially in the defense realm. Part of the problem is the time frame; given the state of European militaries following a decade or more of declining defense budgets, it is not realistic to expect fundamental changes in just a few years’ time. A more realistic timeframe would be the next ten to fifteen years, based on a demonstrated commitment to embark on a major overhaul of European militaries immediately......</i> <hr color=blue> It doesn't seem that the <i>Continent</i> would be of much help in regards to Iran (<i>tip of the spear</i> scenario).
I agree. Where does that leave us? Why is it that Europe WON'T act without US lead, but will only act if the US is for an action they agree with? Shouldn't they ALSO act when a cause is just, rather than only acting when the US leads and they agree? As for the civil part...I was going to go back and edit out d******d because i'm not sure if that's on some no-no list, but samfisher IS a d******d. I'm not sure why he should be able to call me bizarre, longwinded, a simpleton who makes meaningless points and doesn't understand the big complex world - and then act all offended when someone responds in kind. I figured to save time and cut to the chase rather than enumerating my opinion of him, hence d******d. But maybe my language is just too rough for his big corner office sensibilities...OR he's getting punished and has decided to withdraw and recoup. I figure more of the latter than the former. Last I checked big city lawyers aren't too easily offended.
