Yeah impeachment is a completely political process. If enough legislators wanted to they could impeach the President for picking his nose.
Are you serious? Government memos are what are known as primary sources. This particular govt. memo is from the actual minutes of a govt. meeting. It doesn't get any more reliable than that. In addition I have linked time and time again Bush's lie involving the IAEA report, and his subsequent lies/coverups about that particular report. Let's also look at the way organized debate, court trials, etc. are run. First there is a resolution. One side is assigned the negative, and the other side is assigned the affirmative. In this case the resolution would be paraphrased like, GW Bush lied about the threat posed by Iraq and their WMD's in order to build support for a war. The affirmative has presented its case and provided its evidence. Now it is the up to the negative to cast doubt on that evidence, provide contradictory evidence which would be able to trump the affirmitive team's evidence, or show evidence that would somehow aid your case and refute the other case. The affirmitive has presented the memo as evidence. If you disagree with that primary source material, then you are free to show evidence which negates it. You have not done so. The evidence is there, and you are welcome to attempt to discredit it if you like. But writing it off as not credible, and then providing no reason why it shouldn't be credible won't cut it. As far as batman educating you, I hope he can, because it appears by your scoffing off government memos that are first hand sources you need some help learning what is and isn't credible.
basso: I hadn't been back to this thread in a while, but if this is the request you alluded to in the other thread, wow. You're in serious Troller Jorge territory here. I don't have anything to add to what andy, giff and FB said. You discount any and all reports that deliver unpleasant news to you. As long as you continue to do that, I can't help.
Here you go, basso. It's a nice summation of where Bush has placed this country... up to it's neck in trouble. I don't agree with the last part of his column, although I have to admit it may be looking more like the course we should consider, as day by day more Iraqis die in the dozens, and more of our troops are killed and maimed, and countries like Iran and North Korea become even more bold in their pursuit of atomics, which we really need to do something about. May 16, 2005 Staying What Course? By PAUL KRUGMAN Is there any point, now that November's election is behind us, in revisiting the history of the Iraq war? Yes: any path out of the quagmire will be blocked by people who call their opponents weak on national security, and portray themselves as tough guys who will keep America safe. So it's important to understand how the tough guys made America weak. There has been notably little U.S. coverage of the "Downing Street memo" - actually the minutes of a British prime minister's meeting on July 23, 2002, during which officials reported on talks with the Bush administration about Iraq. But the memo, which was leaked to The Times of London during the British election campaign, confirms what apologists for the war have always denied: the Bush administration cooked up a case for a war it wanted. Here's a sample: "Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and W.M.D. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy." (You can read the whole thing at www.downingstreetmemo.com.) Why did the administration want to invade Iraq, when, as the memo noted, "the case was thin" and Saddam's "W.M.D. capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea, or Iran"? Iraq was perceived as a soft target; a quick victory there, its domestic political advantages aside, could serve as a demonstration of American military might, one that would shock and awe the world. But the Iraq war has, instead, demonstrated the limits of American power, and emboldened our potential enemies. Why should Kim Jong Il fear us, when we can't even secure the road from Baghdad to the airport? At this point, the echoes of Vietnam are unmistakable. Reports from the recent offensive near the Syrian border sound just like those from a 1960's search-and-destroy mission, body count and all. Stories filed by reporters actually with the troops suggest that the insurgents, forewarned, mostly melted away, accepting battle only where and when they chose. Meanwhile, America's strategic position is steadily deteriorating. Next year, reports Jane's Defense Industry, the United States will spend as much on defense as the rest of the world combined. Yet the Pentagon now admits that our military is having severe trouble attracting recruits, and would have difficulty dealing with potential foes - those that, unlike Saddam's Iraq, might pose a real threat. In other words, the people who got us into Iraq have done exactly what they falsely accused Bill Clinton of doing: they have stripped America of its capacity to respond to real threats. So what's the plan? The people who sold us this war continue to insist that success is just around the corner, and that things would be fine if the media would just stop reporting bad news. But the administration has declared victory in Iraq at least four times. January's election, it seems, was yet another turning point that wasn't. Yet it's very hard to discuss getting out. Even most of those who vehemently opposed the war say that we have to stay on in Iraq now that we're there. In effect, America has been taken hostage. Nobody wants to take responsibility for the terrible scenes that will surely unfold if we leave (even though terrible scenes are unfolding while we're there). Nobody wants to tell the grieving parents of American soldiers that their children died in vain. And nobody wants to be accused, by an administration always ready to impugn other people's patriotism, of stabbing the troops in the back. But the American military isn't just bogged down in Iraq; it's deteriorating under the strain. We may already be in real danger: what threats, exactly, can we make against the North Koreans? That John Bolton will yell at them? And every year that the war goes on, our military gets weaker. So we need to get beyond the clichés - please, no more "pottery barn principles" or "staying the course." I'm not advocating an immediate pullout, but we have to tell the Iraqi government that our stay is time-limited, and that it has to find a way to take care of itself. The point is that something has to give. We either need a much bigger army - which means a draft - or we need to find a way out of Iraq. http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/16/opinion/16krugman.html?incamp=article_popular_1 The memo... SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY DAVID MANNING From: Matthew Rycroft Date: 23 July 2002 S 195 /02 cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq. This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents. John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based. C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action. CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August. The two broad US options were: (a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait). (b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option. The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were: (i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons. (ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition. (iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions. The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections. The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force. The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change. The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work. On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions. For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary. The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN. John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real. The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush. Conclusions: (a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options. (b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation. (c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week. (d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam. He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states. (e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update. (f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers. (I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.) MATTHEW RYCROFT (Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide) [emphasis added] -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Notes regarding the document's validity: "The newly disclosed memo, which was first reported by the Sunday Times of London, hasn't been disavowed by the British government. The British Embassy in Washington did not respond to requests for comment. A former senior U.S. official called it "an absolutely accurate description of what transpired" during the senior British intelligence officer's visit to Washington. He spoke on condition of anonymity. A White House official said the administration wouldn't comment on leaked British documents..." • Memo: Bush manipulated Iraq intel, Newsday, May 9, 2005 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "British officials did not dispute the document's authenticity..." • Bush asked to explain UK war memo, CNN, May 12, 2005 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- "Since Smith's report was published May 1, Blair's Downing Street office has not disputed the document's authenticity. Asked about them Wednesday, a Blair spokesman said the report added nothing significant..." • Indignation Grows in U.S. Over British Prewar Documents, LA Times, May 12, 2005 http://www.downingstreetmemo.com/memo.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Iraq is nothing. Atomics in the hands of extremists is everything. That is the foremost problem of our times, and one of the strongest reasons I despise George W. Bush. While he crows about his "War on Terror," and Iraq being central to that war, he has weakened our military with his voluntary adventure, and made us look weaker to those who would be our enemies. He has destroyed the way the world looks at our country. It will take generations to repair our reputation. John F. Kennedy, American University in Washington June 10, 1963... "The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough - more than enough - of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just. We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid, we labor on - not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace." Keep D&D Civil!!
The White House REFUTES the UK Iraq memo. Perhaps the liberals shouldn't have jumped to such premature conculsions, no matter how bad they wished them to be true. I'm sure that none of them (Paul Krugman, pfffft!) have any hidden agendas or anything. NONE. White House refutes UK Iraq memo http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/05/16/iraq.memo/index.html
How about Paul O'Neill? http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0743255453/002-7549328-5374424?v=glance
Remember, countries like Iran and North Korea were working on Nukes well before GWB became president so you can't really say that Bush motovated them to start a nuclear program. It's clearly documented that North Korea played Clinton and Carter for fools with regard to promise not to develop nukes. If NK says that Bush is the reason for developing nuces they are lying as they were working on them way before Bush was even elected. Currently we are doing it the way "everyone says it should be done" with regard to handling those countries (Iran and NK) and it's not really going anywhere. We are negotiating. We are involving other countries. But they are not going to stop developing their weapons. Since they started their programs before Bush became president, should we blame Clinton's presidency? No, of course not. It's not the U.S.s fault. It's their fault. The problem with being nice is that it only works when you are dealing with "nice" people. You just get taken advantage of when you are dealing with jerks. You simply can't be nice to someone who has an opposing agenda and is determined to see it through. So, what do you suggest we do with regard to NK or Iran?
Once again I didn't post them because they've been posted a million times. I will indulge your laziness though, just because it is funny to watch you disappear That is enough to get you started.
Once again, you attempt to skew information to support your beliefs. Contigency planning is a good thing. A good commander in chief will always think through plans before going to battle. Your links do not prove ANYTHING about the decision to go to war already being made, merely that there was planning going on, which is a normal part of any military's duties.
From the article... Yeah, the WH has no agenda to REFUTE the memo. Deny, Deny, Deny Modus operandi by the apologists.
bigtexx- All this planning was going on prior to 9-11 that was the purpose of the Project for the New American Century in 1997 From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. The Project for the New American Century, or PNAC, is a Washington, DC based think tank. The group was established in spring 1997 as a non-profit organization with the goal of promoting "American global leadership". The chairman is William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard. The group is an initiative of the New Citizenship Project, a non-profit 501c3 organization that is funded by the Bradley Foundation. [1] (http://www.mediatransparency.org/funders/bradley_foundation.htm) Present and former members include several prominent members of the Republican Party and Bush Administration, including Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Jeb Bush, Richard Perle, Richard Armitage, Dick Cheney, Lewis Libby, William J. Bennett, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Ellen Bork, the wife of Robert Bork. A large number of its ideas and its members are associated with the neoconservative movement. PNAC has seven full-time staff members, in addition to its board of directors. The PNAC is quite controversial. Some have raised concerns that the project has been proposing military and economic domination of land, space, and cyberspace by the United States, so as to establish American dominance in world affairs (Pax Americana) for the future—hence the term "the New American Century", based on the idea that the 20th century was the American Century. The military is not planning war with Sudan, Lybia, China, Indonesia, Columbia, Cuba, or any number of other rogue regimes. That is NOT their business. They may be working on some plans for Iran. Planning for war is costly, systematic, precise, thoughtful and carefully directed by the military. They plan what they intend to accomplish. Not til the world trade center attacks was there ANY public talk about war. Going after Osama and WMD triggered public discussion. But to deny that the president didn't have previous knowledge of the plans for regime change in Iraq and that he gave erroneous justification deliberately concerning terrorist training in Iraq and WMD is head in the sand talk. Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Jeb Bush, Richard Perle, Richard Armitage, Dick Cheney, Lewis Libby, William J. Bennett, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Ellen Bork, the wife of Robert Bork all knew the plan. The plan was carried out as designed and we are over there doing our best to get control of roughly 20% or so of potential oil production in Iraq. As best I can tell it is all going according to plan so far. I will believe the President was informed. He 'skewed the truth' I voted for him with that knowledge.
if bush began to plan the war 3 months after 9/11, how can it be argued he "rushed to war?" that's 18 months before the invasion! D-Day was planned in less time.
It can be argued that he rushed to war, because his plans for war didn't include an exit strategy, failed to prepare for looting, and insurgency after the fall of the regime, didn't incorporate proper training for military folks running the prisons, failed to properly build a significant coalition beforehand, etc. Or maybe because of those things it was just poorly planned. Another instance is knowledge of culture on the ground. The British soldiers have had far less difficulty in dealing with Iraqis on the ground, because they were trained and learned better how to deal with the culture. There are still problems, but far less, and a far less feeling of animosity towards them. They had enough time to get their troops that proper training, so maybe it was just poorly planned But, most importantly it can be said that despite the early planning Bush rushed to war because there were still a number of peaceful options left to be exhausted. Anytime someone starts a war or goes to war and it isn't a last resort then there has been a rush to war.
you could make a similar arguement regarding D-day, that eisenhower shouldn't have launched the invasion until he'd adequately planned for the battle of the bulge. it a ridiculous argument. no war plan ever survives contact w/ the enemy, and no war plan is ever executed flawlessly. similarly one can never plan for every contingency. sure, you could argue that they should have foreseen certain outcomes, but that's 20/20 hindsight, not a valid criticism. and criticism of the conduct of the war is not an arguement against [i[waging[/i] the war.
Actually it isn't 20/20 hindsight. It was ignored forewarning. There were numerous officials and military personell that warned against the very things that came to pass. They were saying this before the invasion, which would eliminate it from being hindsight. The following article as a whole talks extensively about the warnings that were layed out BEFORE the invasion. Here's more. The list goes on and on, but warnings were there before the invasion. As I said that is only one reason why it was a rush to judgement. The fact that peaceful options still existed is another reason.
No, because we are talking about the difference between proper planning BEFORE the war starts as opposed to proper planning for a battle in a war which has been ongoing for years. Again, you are talking apples and oranges. All of the concerns we are saying should have been considered were totally ignored before we ever invaded. The concerns were discarded before we ever made "contact w/ enemy" in the first place. Again, we are saying that there was not sufficient planning in the first place, not that the plan wasn't "executed flawlessly." Who cannot "foresee" that if you remove a country's government that looting may occur? How hard is it to "foresee" that you will need far more troops than were put into Iraq when many, many people said as much before the war? How hard is it to "foresee" that some people might not want American occupiers and as such, may start an insurgency? I would not expect them to "foresee" every contingency, but all of these issues, along with many others, were brought up and totally ignored by the people responsible. That is VERY valid criticism.
