1. On fires, we know we'll eventually "win." It may take out lots of acres and homes, but the weather, topography or fuels will change at some point and allow us to put the fire out. Not by any stretch of the imagination do we know we'll eventually win in Iraq. 2. The point of this thread is that the administration is considering cutting and running. Is the idea that they are giving up when it gets tough? They sure talked tough getting us into it and they sure ignored warnings from all elements of society (not just the political opposition). 3. It is absolutely a net loss in my book... blood, treasure, prestige, and standing have all been squandered on a policy based on lies and political ideaology. Not to mention we're probably radicalizing generations of Iraqis, allowed AQ to regroup, and it looks like we're close to proving the Republican canard that this war was supposed to disprove: we will drop out when the deaths mount and things turn against us. As Josh Marshall wrote today: "In this whole unfortunate business, the White House took our preeminence and mistook it for omnipotence or something near to it. And by treating our preeminence as omnipotence they’ve put our preeminence into question." It was idiotic, wrong, and a horrible thing for our country to pursue.
If you want to debate the issue in order to change the policy don't do it with an eye on the 2004 election. That's the real question, can or will they debate the issue without keeping an eye on the 2004 election? I think it is too much about political opportunism. When the going gets rough, start to bail out, call the President a liar, etc. When the going gets tough, the tough get going. Forgive me!
Giddy, it's not the Dems (at least the responsible ones) that are floating the idea of a quick pullout... it's the administration and they are doing it precisely because they have an eye on the 2004 election... too many dead americans and too much chaos = defeat. And what better way to change the policy then to get rid of the people who dreamed it up and implemented it? It's politics. Within minutes of the Trade Center bombing, this crowd was planning on using the tragedy to advance their agenda and yet you criticize people who want to remove these folks?
I know, but who is drawing attention to the 2004 election in the context of criticizing the prosecution of the war in Iraq? Let the war be the war and let the election be the election. I object to the Democrats opportunism. That being said, I have no doubt that were everything in the war going great, the Republicans would likewise be politically opportunistic. It just seems more seemly when things are not going well. I think it will make things worse when it should be time to knuckle down. WTF, the Japanese are backing off sending troops over because of perceived instability. That's exactly why the troops are needed dumbasses... forgive me. We're not asking for geishas!
I think I understand your sentiments, bu the division you wish for will never happen, nor should it, in my opinion.
So, it's safe to assume that you have a problem with Karl Rove's memo regarding the war with Iraq and how it could help in the 2002 elections?
Let's put it this way: I have less of a problem with things that are supposed to going on behind the scenes than I do with things that are going on in front of the cameras. I know that politics is an ugly business because it is about power. That's why I'm fond of but not sold on Term Limits-- power is diluted. How about eligibility for one presidential term of 6 years with no eligibility for re-election? Time for a constitutional amendment?
Maybe I'm not sufficiently famliar with the content of Rove's memo, but typically we know that this political strategizing is going to be going on. Can't stop it. That is Rove's job. It's not Ted Kennedy's. Kennedy is an elected official and he is trying to manipulate the polls nationwide with irresponsible mudslinging.
One reason is that the war itself was a political calculation. Another reason is that it affects all Americans and deserves a real debate. Another reason is that more and more people (damn America-hating Americans!) are questioning whether this is a wise policy for the US to pursue. And finally, George Bush is vulnerable because of the lies, misrepresentations, and screw-ups of his administration related to the intelligence and execution of this endeavor.
Long before the politicians or the press in this country noticed the king had on no clothes, news outlets in European and Asian countries and the populace of the vast majority of those countries called BS on the war of so called pre emption, we were just slow to react because of the Bushies wrapping themselves in the flag. There is nothing more disgusting than this sort of fascism. There is nothing opportunistic about speaking the truth, and our country would be far worse off if we all meekly do what our leaders tell us to do. Are Hagel and McCain traitors for not toeing the company line? We would have been better off if the Bushies had gotten off their high horse on Day 1 of the occupation and learned from the reality on the ground and not the *truth* in their minds. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38342-2003Nov13.html Analysis New Urgency, New Risks in 'Iraqification' By Robin Wright and Thomas E. Ricks Washington Post Staff Writers Friday, November 14, 2003; Page A01 At least four factors forced the administration to overhaul its military and political strategy in Iraq, despite the danger that a new approach might actually diminish U.S. control over the country's future. The foremost factor is the security risk -- from an Iraqi opposition that has become more intense, more effective, more sophisticated and more extensive. The other three are the failure of the Iraqi Governing Council to act, the Dec. 15 U.N. deadline for an Iraqi plan of action and the U.S. elections just a year away, according to administration and congressional officials and U.S. analysts. All four factors produced a new sense of urgency in Washington. "In an atmosphere of heightened violence and instability, Iraq urgently requires a new political formula. The U.S. administration, increasingly alarmed at the turn of events, is considering a range of options. This will be its second chance to get it right; there may not be a third," the International Crisis Group, a nonpartisan watchdog, warned in a report issued yesterday. The new approach amounts to Iraqification, or the handing over of responsibility for both a deteriorating security situation and a stalled political process to Iraqis. The goal, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice told reporters yesterday, "is that we find ways to accelerate the transfer of authority to the Iraqi people." "They are clamoring for it; they are, we believe, ready for it. And they have very strong ideas about how that might be done," she said. But Iraqification also poses significant hazards -- risks that emerge from the same security and political considerations that drove the administration's decision to change strategy. As the administration sorts out a plan in talks with the Governing Council over the weekend, the first test may be in averting the appearance that the United States intends to cut and run. U.S. officials already sound defensive. "We are not in a rush to leave. We will stay as long as we need to to ensure that Iraq is secure, that the hand-over makes sense and that a moderate Iraqi government emerges. And we're very capable of doing that," Army Gen. John Abizaid, the U.S. commander for Iraq and the Middle East, said at a news conference in Tampa yesterday. Abizaid used the word "prudent" four times to describe his plans for Iraq. President Bush said yesterday that the revamping of his policy was a "positive development" because it will get Iraqis "more involved" in the governance of their country. But others were more skeptical. "If the policy is to more rapidly Iraqify the situation -- as in Vietnamization during the Vietnam War -- then that is another version of cutting and running. One way to cut and run is to simply say we're pulling out. Another is to prematurely turn over security to Iraqi forces and draw down American forces. That's a near-term prescription for disaster," said Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. "All the political body language coming out of Washington these days seems to show that we are going to cut and run," said Thomas Mahnken, the acting director of strategic studies at Johns Hopkins University. "That is precisely the wrong signal to be sending." For an administration loath to concede it has made mistakes, redirecting U.S. policy is an open admission that the situation has reached a crisis point. Under mounting pressures, the White House had little choice but to effectively jettison the seven-point plan outlined by its own governor in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, just two months ago. "We so underestimated and underplanned and underthought about a post-Saddam Iraq that we've been woefully unprepared," said Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.), a Vietnam War veteran and member of the Foreign Relations Committee who has frequently visited Iraq. "Now we have a security problem. We have a reality problem. And we have a governance problem. . . . And time is not on our side." Page 2 of 2 < Back New Urgency, New Risks in 'Iraqification' Iraqification includes its own challenges. On the security front, experts worry that it will overburden the new and fragile Iraqi military and police units with limited training as they confront other Iraqis, particularly better-trained loyalists from Saddam Hussein's army. "I'm not optimistic," said Gordon W. Rudd, a peacekeeping expert who earlier this year served on the staff of the U.S. occupation authority in Baghdad. "On the one hand, it's the right thing to do. On the other hand, you simply can't rush it." Rudd said he is especially concerned that the faster the training, the more Iraqi police and other officials will simply be inclined to resume their old corrupt, authoritarian ways. Some experts say, however, that Iraqification could create a more effective anti-guerrilla force because indigenous units understand their own society and can identify opposition forces. "I think it is logical," said Frances West, who participated in an initiative in Vietnam similar to the creation of Iraqi civil defense forces now. "If our soldiers have six months with such small units, they will turn out Iraqi forces superior to the threat as it now appears." Accelerating the political transition is also risky -- and it could even jeopardize the goal of creating a democratic government. As part of the new strategy, the United States is prepared to endorse some form of elections before a new constitution is written -- reversing the order outlined in Bremer's seven-point plan -- to ensure that a new governing body would have the legitimacy that the current 24-member council, handpicked by the United States, lacks. "Elections are always chancy. You don't know the outcome, and some of the wrong people may win out. But if we're advocating democracy, we'll have to take that risk," Hagel said. There are no guarantees, for example, that either the constitutional committee or a reconstituted provisional government would back democratic ideas for a constitution. The most organized political forces in Iraq are the Islamist parties, particularly among the majority Shiite population, and the former Baathists among Sunni Muslims. The two greatest U.S. fears are that Iraq will end up with a new autocrat or will become a theocracy rather than a democracy. Some U.S. officials fear that a transfer of authority before Iraq gets a new constitution could pose the danger that an interim leader becomes president for life. Other dangers include handing over power to people who are not fully prepared to take political office or ending up after elections with a fractious constitutional committee or a provisional government unable to agree on the major political challenges ahead. If the United States draws down forces before political stability has been ensured, the differences among Iraqis could deteriorate into conflict. "If [a new body] lacks strong grass-roots support, then it will be vulnerable to a violent takeover and Iraq could revert to its violent past," said Judith Yaphe, a former CIA analyst now at the National Defense University. As Abizaid described the U.S. dilemma, however, the key question is not whether Iraqis can take over their own security and governance, but whether the U.S. public has sufficient patience to let that happen. "The goal of the enemy is to break the will of the United States of America," he said. "It's clear, it's simple, it's straightforward. Break our will, make us leave before Iraq is ready to come out and be a member of the responsible community of nations." Staff writer Mike Allen contributed to this report.
Two quotes via Josh Marshall followed by his analysis... _____ "If the policy is to more rapidly Iraqify the situation -- as in Vietnamization during the Vietnam War -- then that is another version of cutting and running. One way to cut and run is to simply say we're pulling out. Another is to prematurely turn over security to Iraqi forces and draw down American forces. That's a near-term prescription for disaster. " Sen. Joe Biden (D-Del) "The United States will fail in Iraq if our adversaries believe they can outlast us. If our troop deployment schedules are more important than our staying power, we embolden our enemies and make it harder for our friends to take risks on our behalf. When the United States announces a schedule for training and deploying Iraqi security officers, then announces the acceleration of that schedule, then accelerates it again, it sends a signal of desperation, not certitude. When in the course of days we increase by thousands our estimate of the numbers of Iraqis trained, it sounds like somebody is cooking the books. When we do this as our forces are coming under increasing attack, we suggest to friends and allies alike that our ultimate goal in Iraq is leaving as soon as possible – not meeting our strategic objective of building a free and democratic country in the heart of the Arab world. " Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz) No doubt about it. We are in a really bad position. We should have given our operation a stronger and more durable international footing when we could act from a position of relative strength in the spring and early summer. We should also have created a road-map for the transition to at least nominal Iraqi sovereignty that was clear, predictable, and rapid. But things which make sense when done with consideration and from a position of strength don't necessarily make sense when done at gunpoint. Let's not fool ourselves. The calculus at the White House is being driven by an effort to ward off a potential political transition in the United States rather than an effort to lay the groundwork for one in Iraq. This is political -- as many of the original architects of this war are now realizing and ruing. Let's be honest: if the United States Army can't get a handle on this insurgency, how likely is it that a hastily-assembled US-built Iraqi Army will do any better? Same goes for a hastily-assembled Iraqi government put together in a climate of US withdrawal. We've boxed ourselves into a very bad range of choices. But if we're going to cut and run, let's at least be honest about what we're doing and clear-eyed about the consequences. What we need is some clear thinking about how best to manage this situation for a good outcome for American interests. Unfortunately what we're getting from the right, or at least some on the right, is the ridiculousness of today's editorial on the Wall Street Journal editorial page, which essentially argues that it's all the State Department's fault. Where we went wrong, they say, was in not turning the place over to Ahmed Chalabi in the first place. This really is the ultimate articulation of the Chalabistas' trinity of accountability, responsibility and blame ... Neocons come up with the harebrained idea. The US Army takes it on the chin. And the CIA, the State Department, the Democrats and miscellaneous foreign moderates and other deviants get saddled with the blame. A nice division of labor, ain't it? Everyone needs to lend a hand to figure out how to prevent a descent into catastrophe. But first there's got to be some accountability, a threshold recognition that the people who navigated us into this mess aren't the best suited to help us find our way out of it. Telling us we didn't give them enough control over things the first time isn't a particularly convincing response.
Forgot to bold the following... _____ "The calculus at the White House is being driven by an effort to ward off a potential political transition in the United States rather than an effort to lay the groundwork for one in Iraq. This is political -- as many of the original architects of this war are now realizing and ruing. "
