Are we actually gonna believe someone named "General Salami". This sounds like a bad p*rn stage name.
a true democracy that has millions of people under occupation denying them the most basic of rights? actually israeli military im sure is quiet capable of handling itself without much US help nowadays. you short change them by using this excuse why is that the only alternative? why do you have 'support' countries instead of working with them as needed?
wow Islamic facists huh? How is it that these Islamic facists in Egypt and Jordan have made peace with Israel? Israel also treats its own citizens, those of arab descent (about a million of them), as second class citizens or worse....imo its the type of democracy we're talking about that's important....britain was a democracy when it controlled portions of the globe through colonialism, US was democracy when it had slaves, South Africa was a democracy for whites, and Israel is a democracy for jews, but all have committed crimes and atrocities and were/are racist in one way or another....you should be concerned with why israel is disliked and not on the fact that they are, because you're dealing with the symptoms instead of the root causes of the problem...also, imo strategically and politically and for any other rational reason you can come up with unequivocal US support for israel doesnt make sense, because there are a lot more arabs/muslims than israelis in this world...it would benefit the US and make more sense to have better relations with 500 million arabs or over a billion muslims even if it comes at the expense of 5 million israelis....one last note, most dictatorships in the arab world are sponsored by the US
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12114512/ U.S. attack on Iran may prompt terror Experts say strikes on nuclear facilities could spark worldwide retaliation By Dana Priest Updated: 12:16 a.m. ET April 2, 2006 As tensions increase between the United States and Iran, U.S. intelligence and terrorism experts say they believe Iran would respond to U.S. military strikes on its nuclear sites by deploying its intelligence operatives and Hezbollah teams to carry out terrorist attacks worldwide. Iran would mount attacks against U.S. targets inside Iraq, where Iranian intelligence agents are already plentiful, predicted these experts. There is also a growing consensus that Iran's agents would target civilians in the United States, Europe and elsewhere, they said. U.S. officials would not discuss what evidence they have indicating Iran would undertake terrorist action, but the matter "is consuming a lot of time" throughout the U.S. intelligence apparatus, one senior official said. "It's a huge issue," another said. Citing prohibitions against discussing classified information, U.S. intelligence officials declined to say whether they have detected preparatory measures, such as increased surveillance, counter-surveillance or message traffic, on the part of Iran's foreign-based intelligence operatives. Bigger threat than al-Qaeda? But terrorism experts considered Iranian-backed or controlled groups -- namely the country's Ministry of Intelligence and Security operatives, its Revolutionary Guards and the Lebanon-based Hezbollah -- to be better organized, trained and equipped than the al-Qaeda network that carried out the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. The Iranian government views the Islamic Jihad, the name of Hezbollah's terrorist organization, "as an extension of their state. . . . operational teams could be deployed without a long period of preparation," said Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism. • Full international coverage The possibility of a military confrontation has been raised only obliquely in recent months by President Bush and Iran's government. Bush says he is pursuing a diplomatic solution to the crisis, but he has added that all options are on the table for stopping Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Speaking in Vienna last month, Javad Vaeedi, a senior Iranian nuclear negotiator, warned the United States that "it may have the power to cause harm and pain, but it is also susceptible to harm and pain. So if the United States wants to pursue that path, let the ball roll," although he did not specify what type of harm he was talking about. Rise in tension raises stakes Government officials said their interest in Iran's intelligence services is not an indication that a military confrontation is imminent or likely, but rather a reflection of a decades-long adversarial relationship in which Iran's agents have worked secretly against U.S. interests, most recently in Iraq and Pakistan. As confrontation over Iran's nuclear program has escalated, so has the effort to assess the threat from Iran's covert operatives. U.N. Security Council members continue to debate how best to pressure Iran to prove that its nuclear program is not meant for weapons. The United States, Britain and France want the Security Council to threaten Iran with economic sanctions if it does not end its uranium enrichment activities. Russia and China, however, have declined to endorse such action and insist on continued negotiations. Security Council diplomats are meeting this weekend to try to break the impasse. Iran says it seeks nuclear power but not nuclear weapons. Former CIA terrorism analyst Paul R. Pillar said that any U.S. or Israeli airstrike on Iranian territory "would be regarded as an act of war" by Tehran, and that Iran would strike back with its terrorist groups. "There's no doubt in my mind about that. . . . Whether it's overseas at the hands of Hezbollah, in Iraq or possibly Europe, within the regime there would be pressure to take violent action." History of reprisals Before Sept. 11, the armed wing of Hezbollah, often working on behalf of Iran, was responsible for more American deaths than in any other terrorist attacks. In 1983 Hezbollah truck-bombed the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241, and in 1996 truck-bombed Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. service members. Iran's intelligence service, operating out of its embassies around the world, assassinated dozens of monarchists and political dissidents in Europe, Pakistan, Turkey and the Middle East in the two decades after the 1979 Iranian revolution, which brought to power a religious Shiite government. Argentine officials also believe Iranian agents bombed a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994, killing 86 people. Iran has denied involvement in that attack. Iran's intelligence services "are well trained, fairly sophisticated and have been doing this for decades," said Crumpton, a former deputy of operations at the CIA's Counterterrorist Center. "They are still very capable. I don't see their capabilities as having diminished." Both sides have increased their activities against the other. The Bush administration is spending $75 million to step up pressure on the Iranian government, including funding non-governmental organizations and alternative media broadcasts. Iran's parliament then approved $13.6 million to counter what it calls "plots and acts of meddling" by the United States. "Given the uptick in interest in Iran" on the part of the United States, "it would be a very logical assumption that we have both ratcheted up [intelligence] collection, absolutely," said Fred Barton, a former counterterrorism official who is now vice president of counterterrorism for Stratfor, a security consulting and forecasting firm. "It would be a more fevered pitch on the Iranian side because they have fewer options." Agencies mum on true threat The office of the director of national intelligence, which recently began to manage the U.S. intelligence agencies, declined to allow its analysts to discuss their assessment of Iran's intelligence services and Hezbollah and their capabilities to retaliate against U.S. interests. "We are unable to address your questions in an unclassified manner," a spokesman for the office, Carl Kropf, wrote in response to a Washington Post query. The current state of Iran's intelligence apparatus is the subject of debate among experts. Some experts who spent their careers tracking the intelligence ministry's operatives describe them as deployed worldwide and easier to monitor than Hezbollah cells because they operate out of embassies and behave more like a traditional spy service such as the Soviet KGB. Other experts believe the Iranian service has become bogged down in intense, regional concerns: attacks on Shiites in Pakistan, the Iraq war and efforts to combat drug trafficking in Iran. As a result, said Bahman Baktiari, an Iran expert at the University of Maine, the intelligence service has downsized its operations in Europe and the United States. But, said Baktiari, "I think the U.S. government doesn't have a handle on this." Facilities make difficult targets Because Iran's nuclear facilities are scattered around the country, some military specialists doubt a strike could effectively end the program and would require hundreds of strikes beforehand to disable Iran's vast air defenses. They say airstrikes would most likely inflame the Muslim world, alienate reformers within Iran and could serve to unite Hezbollah and al-Qaeda, which have only limited contact currently. A report by the independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks cited al-Qaeda's long-standing cooperation with the Iranian-back Hezbollah on certain operations and said Osama bin Laden may have had a previously undisclosed role in the Khobar attack. Several al-Qaeda figures are reportedly under house arrest in Iran. Others in the law enforcement and intelligence circles have been more dubious about cooperation between al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, largely because of the rivalries between Shiite and Sunni Muslims. Al-Qaeda adherents are Sunni Muslims; Hezbollah's are Shiites. Iran "certainly wants to remind governments that they can create a lot of difficulty if strikes were to occur," said a senior European counterterrorism official interviewed recently. "That they might react with all means, Hezbollah inside Lebanon and outside Lebanon, this is certain. Al-Qaeda could become a tactical alliance." Researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report. © 2006 The Washington Post Company i don't understand what Iran has done? can someone please explain
i dont think iran has done anything illegal...the only crime they're "guilty" of is not being an ally or client regime of the US, which would allow them to get away with murder literally
Is this another Saddam-like bluff or are we headed towards brinkmanship? http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/04/02/iran.missile.ap/index.html TEHRAN, Iran (AP) -- Iran announced its second major new missile test within days, saying Sunday it has successfully fired a high-speed underwater missile capable of destroying huge warships and submarines. The tests came during war games that Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards have been holding in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea since Friday at a time of increased tensions with the United States over Tehran's nuclear program. The Iranian-made underwater missile has a speed of 223 miles per hour, said Gen. Ali Fadavi, deputy head of the Revolutionary Guards' Navy. That would make it about three or four times faster than a torpedo and as fast as the world's fastest known underwater missile, the Russian-made VA-111 Shkval, developed in 1995. It was not immediately known if the Iranian missile, which has not yet been named, was based on the Shkval. "It has a very powerful warhead designed to hit big submarines. Even if enemy warship sensors identify the missile, no warship can escape from this missile because of its high speed," Fadavi told state-run television. It was not immediately clear whether the ship-fired missile can carry a nuclear warhead. The new weapon could raise concerns over Iran's naval power in the Gulf, where during the war with Iraq in the 1980s Iranian forces attacked oil tankers from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, prompting a massive U.S. naval operation to protect them. The U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet is based on the tiny Arab island nation of Bahrain in the Gulf. Cmdr. Jeff Breslau of the 5th Fleet said no special measures were taken by U.S. forces based on Bahrain in reaction to the Iranian war games, even after the latest missile test. "They can conduct excercises whenever they want and they frequently do, just as we do. We conduct excercises throughout this region," he told The Associated Press by telephone. On Friday, the first day of the war games, Iran test-fired the Fajr-3 missile, which can avoid radars and hit several targets simultaneously using multiple warheads. The Guards said the test was successful. More than 17,000 Revolutionary Guards forces are taking part in the weeklong maneuvers. On Sunday, paratroops practiced a drop in an attack on a mock enemy position, and warships, jet fighters, helicopters and sophisticated electronic equipment were used in other exercises. Iran, which views the United States as an arch foe and is concerned about the U.S. military presence in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan, says the maneuvers aim to develop the Guards' defensive capabilities. Iran has routinely held war games over the past two decades to improve its combat readiness and test locally made equipment such as missiles, tanks and armored personnel carriers. The missile tests and war games coincide with increasing tension between Iran and the West over Tehran's controversial nuclear program. The United States and its allies believe Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons, but Tehran denies that, saying its program is for generating electricity. The U.N. Security Council is demanding that Iran halt its uranium enrichment activities. But an Iranian envoy said its activities are "not reversible." Iran launched an arms development program during its 1980-88 war with Iraq to compensate for a U.S. weapons embargo. Since 1992, Iran has produced its own tanks, armored personnel carriers, missiles and a fighter plane. Copyright 2006 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
Under an American Attack, irans Navy and airforce would be Obselet. there technology is too outdated to matter. however, there ballastic and short range Missile program however is pretty lethal. it will be alot tougher then iraq hence a very , very high casulaty rate will be sufferd by the us. were talking about 50 to a 1oo Thousend us soldiers dead. bush is not stupid to even contemplate to start a such a war.
of course i can, i woldnt've said it otherwise the burden of proof is acutally on the person making the accusation if you cant substantiante your claims then the accusations are baseless what "illegal" things have they done? they certainly havent violated international like the us and israel on many occsaions
LOL! I completely missed that one...yah, I am suspicious of the guy as well, sounds more like a p*rn name...
So many assertions. So little substance. Since you quantify 'most,' please point out which Arab countries have dictatorships and which are US sponsored. Syria is a dictatorship and it is not US sponsored, as Libya is a dictatorship and not US sponsored. Sudan is an Arab dictatorship and not US sponsored. Do tell. Is America Responsible for Arab Dictatorships by Barry Rubin, 2006. To understand the situation better, let’s contrast the Middle East with Latin America. There, such arguments do make sense. In Latin America, military dictatorships rotated with civilian, often elected governments. There were strong democratic movements which always offered alternatives, as well as mass opposition to military regimes. At times, U.S. support for dictatorships were a significant factor in their taking power or staying in power. The Middle East, however, has been totally different. There is not a single Arab government in power because it was helped into office or kept there by the United States. With the exception of Lebanon, there have been no real democratic alternatives in the past. The dictatorial regimes, both radical Arab nationalist and traditionalist monarchies have enjoyed mass support. Indeed, in sharp contrast to Latin America, where only Communist Cuba was at odds with the United States, the worst repressive regimes in the Middle East were not clients but enemies of America. There are many ironies in the newly minted notion that the United States is responsible for Arab dictatorships. One of them is that any American pressure on such regimes was portrayed not only by the rulers but by Arab intellectuals, academics, and journalists as imperialistic, anti-Arab and at times anti-Muslim. Even many of those who are now relative liberals who complain about U.S. policy were in the past on the regimes’ side and attacked any American efforts to encourage moderation and reform. Another factor is that the United States did periodically push for change, as one can see not only from the public record but from the diplomatic archives. In the early 1950s, U.S. policymakers believed--albeit wrongly--that young, clean-cut, earnest army officers might bring honest government which was both nationalist (and anti-Communist) and modernizing. Only when these rulers, notably Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, showed themselves to be both pro-Moscow and bent on dominating the region did the United States turn against them. In 1958, when U.S. forces did intervene in Lebanon to end the civil war there, they pressed the government to make reforms to balance out ethnic grievances. President John Kennedy’s urgings of reform in Iran had some effect on the shah’s policies, while President Jimmy Carter’s similar efforts helped unintentionally spark the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 which led things in quite the opposite direction. Even during the revolution, the U.S. government never urged the shah toward repression and tried--again a miserable failure--to bring about a transition to a moderate, nationalist, democratic regime. In the mythology of radical Islamism, the United States was the reason for their failure to make revolutions in the 1990s. What is notable, however, is the lack of U.S. intervention. Not a single Arab regime sought American troops, counterinsurgency advice, or special military aid to combat the Islamists. During the Algerian civil war, for example, U.S. policy followed what might be called a position of strict neutrality. The Islamists don’t want to admit that a combination of their own failure to win mass support plus the clever maneuvering of the regimes was the cause of their defeat everywhere. The notion that Saudi Arabia is not a democratic state because of U.S support for the monarchy there is ludicrous, given the legitimacy enjoyed by the regime, the strength of its controls, and the even more totalitarian nature of its--extremely limited--opposition up until very recently. Part of the problem is that the radical Arab nationalist regimes which have ruled Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and several other countries during the past half-century have been able to present themselves as “progressive.” In fact, though, they have been miserable failures at modernization, the most ruthless in terms of repression, and pursued social policies that were generally conservative. A citizen of the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, or Jordan has been far better treated by his government than a counterpart in Iraq, Libya, or Syria. The truly repressive regimes have been Soviet clients and the main proponents of anti-Americanism. If the United States helped to a limited degree to prevent a radical Arab nationalist takeover in, say, Jordan, this was a blow for a less repressive regime. And all of this leaves out the fact that for the last few years the United States been the main proponent of democratic reform in the region, truly putting this issue on the agenda. At a time when European states did relatively little, it was the U.S. policy that urged reform. All of this has led Gamil Mattar, director of Arab Center for Development and Future Research, to conclude that the result of the U.S. pro-democratization policy has been at least to make Arab government pretend to be doing more for change while their people are watching them more critically and might some day demand that those promises be fulfilled. He concludes: “If I were one of the architects of Washington's reform offensive, I would feel quite smug at the effect I produced.” http://gloria.idc.ac.il/columns/2006/rubin/is arab dictatorship.htm
Here's an interesting retort since your argument is so similar to Walt's: To recap: Walt thinks that by any objective measure, U.S. support for Israel is a liability. It causes Arabs and Muslims to hate America. Since he thinks the United States should disengage from the Middle East, and follow a policy of 'offshore balancing,' he believes America needs to cultivate a sense of shared purpose with Arabs and Muslims, many of whom detest Israel or its policies or both. The less the United States is identified as a supporter and friend of Israel's five million Jews, the easier it will be for the United States to find local proxies and clients to keep order among the billion or so Muslims. And the only thing that has prevented the United States from seeing this clearly is the pro-Israel lobby, operating through fronts as diverse as AIPAC, The Washington Institute, and--yes--even the Brookings Institution. . . . To answer Walt's simple argument, I'll respond with a simple question. If you need an ally somewhere, don't you want it to be the smartest, most powerful, and most resourceful guy on the block, who also happens to admire you? And what is the point of having an ally who's backward, weak, irresolute, and thinks in his heart of hearts that you're his enemy? That's the choice the United States faces in the Middle East. It took the United States some twenty years to figure this out. Between 1948 and 1967, it believed in Walt's zero-sum concept of the Middle East. The United States recognized Israel in 1948, but it didn't do much to help it defend itself, for fear of alienating Arab monarchs, oil sheikhs, and the 'Arab street.' That was the heyday of the sentimental State Department Arabists and the profit-driven oil companies. * * * . . . The fact that the United States hadn't backed Israel before 1967 didn't prevent key Arab capitals from falling into the Soviet orbit. To the contrary: along with Nasser, they tried to play Washington off Moscow, with a preference for Moscow since it made policy by uncomplicated diktat. America's Arab allies were in a precarious position, and in 1958 it had to send the Marines to Lebanon to bail some of them out. In 1967, Israel showed itself to be stronger than the whole lot of its neighbors, transforming U.S. perceptions. Israel looked to be the strongest, most reliable, and most cost-effective ally against Soviet penetration of the Middle East, because it could defeat any combination of Soviet clients on its own. It could humiliate them, and in so doing, humiliate the Soviet Union and drive thinking Arabs out of the Soviet camp. That worked: expanded U.S. support for Israel persuaded Egypt to switch camps, winning the Cold War for the United States in the Middle East. Egypt thus became an American ally alongside Israel, not instead of Israel, and became integrated into an overall Pax Americana. The zero-sum theory of the Arabists--Israel or the Arabs, but not both--collapsed. U.S. Middle East policy underwent its Copernican revolution. Before 1973, the Arab states thought they might defeat or destroy Israel by some stroke of luck, and they tried their hand at it in 1948, 1967, and 1973. Since 1973, the Arab states have understood not only that Israel is strong, but that the United States is Israel's guarantor. As a result, there have been no general Arab-Israeli wars, and Israel's Arab neighbors have either made peace with it (Egypt, Jordan), or keep their borders quiet (Syria, Lebanon). The Levant corner of the Middle East, for all the saturation coverage it gets from an overwrought media, has not been a powder keg, and its crises haven't required direct American military intervention. This is due to U.S. support for Israel--a support that appears so unequivocal to Arabs that they have despaired of overturning it. United States support for Israel has enhanced its standing in another way, as the only force, in Arab eyes, that can possibly persuade Israel to cede territory it has occupied since 1967. In a paradoxical way, the United States has been a major beneficiary of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories: Arab leaders who wish to regain lost territory must refashion themselves to pass an American test. When they do, the United States sees to it that they are rewarded, and the result has been a network of U.S.-endorsed agreements based on U.S.-mediated Israeli concessions. . . .Walt's notion that Israel has enjoyed total and unqualified support from the United States blinds him to the ways the United States has leveraged its support for Israel into Israeli concessions that are the bedrock of the Pax Americana in the Levant. . . . Compare this to the situation in the Gulf, where U.S. allies are weak. There, the absence of a strong ally has wreaked havoc with U.S. policy, and forced the U.S. to intervene repeatedly. The irresolute Shah, once deemed a U.S. 'pillar,' collapsed in the face of an anti-American upsurge, producing the humiliation of the embassy seizure and a hostile, entrenched, terror-sponsoring regime still bent on driving the United States out of the Gulf. Saddam Hussein, for some years America's ally, launched an eight-year bloody war against Iran that produced waves of anti-U.S. terror (think Lebanon), only to turn against the United States by occupying Kuwait, and threatening the utterly defenseless Saudi Arabia. Absent a strong ally in the region, the United States has had to deploy, deploy and deploy again. In the Kuwait and Iraq wars, it has put something like a million sets of boots on the ground in the Gulf, at a cost that surely exceeds a trillion dollars. It's precisely because the Gulf doesn't have an Israel--a strong, capable local ally--that Walt's offshore balancing act can't possibly succeed. If the United States is not perceived to be willing to send in troops there--and it will only be perceived as such if it sometimes does send them--then heavily populated and technologically advanced states (formerly Iraq, today Iran) will attempt to muscle Saudi Arabia and the smaller Arab Gulf states, which have the bigger reserves of oil. In the Gulf, the United States has no allies. It has only dependencies, and their defense will continue to drain American resources, until the day Americans give up their SUVs. In Israel, in contrast, the U.S. is allied to a militarily adept, economically vibrant state that keeps its part of the Middle East in balance. The U.S. has to help maintain that balance, with road maps and diplomatic initiatives, but this is at relatively low cost, and many of the costs flow back to the U.S. in the form of arms sales, useful Israeli technological innovations, etc. In the overall scheme of the Pax Americana, then, U.S. policy toward Israel and its neighbors over the past thirty years has been a tremendous success. Has the U.S. brought about a final lamb-lies-down-with-lion peace? No; the issues are too complex. Are the Arabs happy about U.S. support for Israel? No; they still dream of pushing Israel off the map. But any time U.S. interests are upheld without the dispatch of U.S. troops, it's a success. That Walt can't see this suggests that his own vision is marred by a bias against Israel, the depth of which only he knows. * * * Indeed, for argument's sake, let's imagine that we have followed Walt's policy--that we have somehow tumbled back to the pre-Copernican policy. The United States has decided that Israel should 'go it alone,' since Israel isn't willing to concede all things to the insatiable Arab appetite for Israeli concessions. How long would it be before the Arabs would revert to their pre-1967 fantasy of defeating or destroying Israel? (The medieval-minded Islamists have never abandoned it.) How long would it be before Israel felt compelled, as it did in 1967, to launch a preemptive strike against Egypt, with its massive conventional force, or Iran, which even now rattles a nuclear saber against Israel? Remember, pace Walt, Israel isn't Norway: it can and will defend itself against threats, be they real or perceived, present or anticipated. It is populated by the remnant of a people that was nearly obliterated in the twentieth century, and that's unlikely to take chances in the twenty-first. Less American support would mean less Israeli restraint, less Israeli maneuverability, and a quicker Israeli finger on the trigger. How long would it be before the United States would have to pull out all the stops to defuse gigantic crises, or clean up the mess in the aftermath of another war? How long would it be before the United States would have to deploy forces--to save an Arab regime that didn't join the frenzied free-for-all, or to position peacekeeping forces between hostile armies, or to reassure Israel to keep its nukes in the silos? Why would any serious policymaker even contemplate exchanging the present stability--and the situation is stable--for these uncertainties and imponderables? And for what? Some boost for America in Arab public opinion polls, which seem to have Walt all twisted in knots of anguish? In short, the Levant in Walt's World would become a far more dangerous place than it is now, for Israelis, for Arabs, and ultimately for Americans. Without a strong Israel, buttressed by the United States, it might begin to look like it did before 1967, or as the Gulf has looked over the last three decades. http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2006/3/20/21659/0421
US sponsored dictatorships in the Arab world: 1 - Kuwait 2 - Bahrain 3 - Oman 4 - Yemen 5 - Qatar 6 - Jordan 7 - Egypt 8 - Saudi Arabia 9 - Tunisia 10 - Algeria 11- Morocco 12 - Everybody's favorite: the United Arab Emirates Honorable mention: Pakistan, although not an Arab country (not like people make the distinction anyway), Pervez Musharaff, the country's military dictator, did receive $1 billion in aid from the US
Huh??? According to some posters on this board, Iran isn't tied to terrorists! I don't know who to believe!!! After reading this board, I thought Iran was blameless!
Pretty good retort, I think there are many good counter-arguments made here. Overall, I understand what the author above is trying to say, and I think he makes a valid point that total and complete U.S. disengagement from the Middle East would prove detrimental to the region's security in the long-run, and I also agree that while Israel is undoubtedly a proxy state in the region, U.S. involvement acts somewhat as a 'check' against their aggressive tendencies, although one could also argue that the regional 'imbalance' -- militarily speaking -- does not nearly favor Israel as much as it once did over three decades ago, and even then the backwards and ill-equipped Egyptian military gave the Israelis quiet a scare. This is also precisely why I am not advocating 'total disengagement' from the region. I simply think that playing a more 'balanced' hand in the region could go a long way in helping stabilize it and somewhat polish U.S. image amongst the natives. In fact, I could argue this from the standpoint of Israel's own interests (long-term, of course). For instance, it would be foolish for the Israelis to believe that their favorable position vis-a-vis their 300-350 million Arab neighbors will last forever, and therefore the best bet to achieving a prosperous and secure future is to do it while they're still in a position of strength. It doesn't serve their best interests to continue to be surrounded by a sea of hostility and an unfavorable demographic trend. It doesn't serve their best interests (long-term, that is) to continue to undermine any viability of a future Palestinian state, it only means that more and more Palestinians will insist on a one-state solution down the line, and the demographic trends will ensure that Israel can't and doesn't remain a Jewish state (which is what the Israelis ultimately want and are working towards). Just my two cents...
What do you mean by sponsored? Having relations with a country is far from 'sponsoring' it. Other than the government in Kuwait, which we actively put back in power as part of the UN mission in '91, we have had anything to do with installing these governments. And most of these aren't dictatorships, lol. 1 - Kuwait is a constituational monarchy and has the first directly elected parliament in the Persian gulf Arab countries. 2 - Bahrain is a constitutional monarchy headed by the King, Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa; the head of government is the Prime Minister, Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa who presides over a cabinet of 15 members. Bahrain has a bicameral legislature with a lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, elected by universal suffrage and the upper house, the Shura Council, appointed by the King. Both houses have forty members. The inaugural elections were held in 2002, with parliamentarians serving four year terms. 3 - Oman - Please explain how we are a 'sponsor' of the former British protectorate of Oman. A total 14 countries maintaining diplomatic presence in the country-- Bangladesh Brunei China France Germany India Italy Malaysia Netherlands Pakistan Philippines Turkey United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States. A special treaty relationship permitted the United Kingdom close involvement in Oman's civil and military affairs. Ties with the United Kingdom have remained very close under Sultan Qaboos. 4 - Yemen. Yemen is a republic with a bicameral legislature. Under the constitution, an elected president, an elected 301-seat House of Representatives, and an appointed 111-member Shura Council share power. The president is head of state, and the prime minister is head of government. The constitution provides that the president be elected by popular vote from at least two candidates endorsed by Parliament; the prime minister is appointed by the president. The presidential term of office is 7 years, and the parliamentary term of elected office is 6 years. Suffrage is universal over 18. OK, I'm not even going to go through the rest of them. You're an idiot and you're wasting our time. You apparently got a map out and just made a list of countries. The first four aren't dictatorships and aren't 'sponsored' by the US anymore than they are by a host of other countries. I don't mind informed debate, but if I'm going to take the time to express an informed opinion I expect at least the same from you. You have ZERO credibility from here on out and need to link to a source backing up your claims from now on or I'm just going to ignore you. The paragraphs attached to each country above are from the wikipedia, not the best source but an easy place to start with general info.
Hey Tigermission, Yeah I thought it was pretty good although he's obviously tilted towards Israel. I don't think any of your counterarguments are exactly that though. I posted this in response to CreepyBoyFloyd's assertion that we would be better of abandoning Israel for the Arabs. You seem to say its in our and probably Israel's interest to get along with the Arabs. The probability is that you're right but I'm not sure Rubin would disagree with you. I think he is simply countering the argument that if we are forced to chose, we should do so toward the Arab nations.
a monarchy is just a nice way of saying that its a family dictatorship wikipedia...haha....not exactly a place for academic scholarship...a great deal of the info on wikipedia is either subjective, inacurrate, or just plain wrong and false israeli sources are biased as well give me objective info and then i might consider what you have to say i do real research, which involves actually going to a library and reading scholarly texts and not taking the easy route and going to tellmewhatiwannahear.com or going to google...also, i did give you a book to look into on the saudi regime by said k. aburish earlier in one of these threads btw, name-calling is the last refuge of a desperate foe
Isn't it funny who you can say that about - hint hint. It isn't slander if its true. I called you a name because it pisses me off that I give you the benefit of the doubt, and go ahead and start going down your list only to discover that you points are baseless. So I'm wasting my time and I don't appreciate that. Hence I express my displeasure. As I said before: Provide a link to a source or begone. I'll waste no more time on you.
