Frist Endorses Constitutional Amendment to Ban Gay Marriage

Apparently W supports a ban on gay marriage but feels a Constitutional Amendment may not be necessary "yet". Just incredible...


Bush: Gay Marriage Ban May Not Be Needed
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WASHINGTON - President Bush (news - web sites) said Wednesday that a constitutional ban on gay marriage that has been proposed in the House might not be needed despite a Supreme Court decision that some conservatives think opens the door to legalizing same-sex marriages.


"I don't know if it's necessary yet," Bush said. "Let's let the lawyers look at the full ramifications of the recent Supreme Court hearing. What I do support is a notion that marriage is between a man and a woman."


Bush's words were aimed at calming members of the GOP's right wing, who are upset about the Supreme Court decision, said Patrick Guerriero, director of the Log Cabin Republicans (news - web sites), a gay advocacy group. "I think what you're seeing is a momentary time-out from the radical right's temper tantrum," he said.


In striking down a Texas law that made homosexual sex a crime, the Supreme Court on June 26 overturned its earlier ruling that said states could punish homosexuals for having sex.


Conservative Justice Antonin Scalia (news - web sites) fired off a blistering dissent of the ruling.


The "opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned," Scalia wrote. The ruling specifically said that the court was not addressing that issue, but Scalia warned, "Do not believe it."


The Supreme Court's decision was a broad ruling addressing privacy, and gay rights groups are saying they will use it to push for more legal rights.


"We have a powerful new weapon in our legal battles on behalf of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered people, but the impact of this ruling also stretches well beyond the walls of our nation's courtrooms," Kevin Cathcart, director of New York-based Lambda Legal, a gay rights advocacy group, said Wednesday in announcing a new online resource that maps out how the group will use the ruling to win full recognition of same-sex relationships, among other things.


Legal authorities are also combing the decision to see what its impact will really be on other gay rights issues.


"I don't know that there is any clear assessment — that anybody has at this point — about the legal ramifications of a just-made decision," White House press secretary Ari Fleischer (news - web sites) said.


The president was asked about whether he supported a federal constitutional amendment that would define marriage as a union between a man and a woman during an impromptu news conference that followed his announcement of a new global AIDS (news - web sites) ambassador.


Rep. Marilyn Musgrave, R-Colo., was the main sponsor of the proposal offered May 21 to amend the Constitution. It was referred on June 25 to the House Judiciary subcommittee on the Constitution.


To be added to the Constitution, the proposal must be approved by two-thirds of the House and the Senate and ratified by three-fourths of the states.


On Sunday, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., said the Supreme Court's decision on gay sex threatens to make the American home a place where criminality is condoned. He said he supported the proposed constitutional amendment to ban homosexual marriage in the United States

 

Just like every bloody thing that comes about brings a state of oblivion to discrimination from you. Nice job Reffie. Why don't you climb back into that hole you're keeping yourself in and let the people who care about the issue discuss it.

 

Originally posted by goophers
It opens the door to polygamy arguments because many of the arguments I hear that support gay marriages also support polygamy. Heterosexual marriage doesn't open the same door because the current law allows it, but not homosexual or polygamic marriages.

That makes no sense. Does gay marriage then open the door to bestiality and marriage to inanimate objects since the current laws don't allow it? It absolutely doesn't open any door.

Your argument here to support gay marriages seems to be that it's not a new thing to have two people joined in marriage. As others have said in this thread, it's not a new thing to have more than two joined in marriage.

Our laws protect people against discrimination based on gender, race, origin, religion, sexuality, etc. The government recognition of only hetero marriage is therefore discrimination. The government ban on polygamy stems from the values within our society that don't discriminate on the basis of the things mentioned above. (Unless someone is going to claim polygamy as a religious right or something then I don't know where you go there, there have probably been cases on that. Of course religious freedom is not absolute.) We can ban behavior that is inconsistent with our values as a society but not while we discriminate in the process.

And as for the huge potential for fraud and harm, is there really a big difference between polygamy and gay marriages? I would think that the number of fraudulent marriages would go up if gay marriages were allowed because people that were roommates could have incentive to say they're married even if they're both straight (for company benefits, etc).

The fact that a polygamist could marry hundreds of people obviously means the potential for fraud is significantly higher than it could be with gay or straight marriages. Someone could marry an illegal alien every day to get them green cards and then just accept "services" or a fee in return. Two people of different sexes who are roommates can claim to be married right now to get benefits so how would gay couples be any different?

 

Originally posted by goophers
I'm still not seeing the difference between gay and polygamic marriages. See comments below for more detail. It doesn't open the door to bestiality or inanimate objects because marriage is a legal arrangement made between consenting people. An animal or inanimate object can't consent.

Marriage as it stands is a legal arrangement made between two consenting people. Gay and straight marriage have that in common. Polygamy does not.

The exact same argument (that laws are based on our societal values) can be made versus gay marriages. It doesn't hold water IMHO. You said our laws protect people against discrimination based on sexuality, and isn't that what polygamy is? Also, polygamy is a religious belief for hundreds of years (Mormons) and also in some cultures (see Cameroon example from another's earlier posts). So it looks to me like a case *COULD* be made that not allowing polygamy is trampling on the protection the law gives under sexuality, race, origin, and religion.

Polygamy isn't indicative of a sexuality or gender. It's a marriage between more than two people. We limit all the time how many people can do something in order to secure public safety. Resricting polygamy is the same thing. Religious belief isn't absolute in this country when it comes in conflict with the public good. As long as you're not discriminating on the issues I mentioned previously, you can outlaw practices, even religious ones, that conflict with our values. Human sacrifices for example.

If you're really interested, here is the text from the Supreme Court case that outlaws polygamy. It's pretty long but interesteing. It explains the religious aspect of it and how polygamy goes against our society's values. Gay marriage may also go against our values but restricting it constitutes discrimination while restricting polygamy does not.



U.S. Supreme Court

REYNOLDS v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878)

98 U.S. 145

As to the defence of religious belief or duty.

On the trial, the plaintiff in error, the accused, proved that at the time of his alleged second marriage he was, and for many years before had been, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, commonly called the Mormon Church, and a believer in its doctrines; that it was an accepted doctrine of that church 'that it was the duty of male members of said church, circumstances permitting, to practise
polygamy ; . . . that this duty was enjoined by different books which the members of said church believed to be of divine origin, and among others the Holy Bible, and also that the members of the church believed that the practice of polygamy was directly enjoined upon the male members thereof by the Almighty God, in a revelation to Joseph Smith, the founder and prophet of said church; that the failing or refusing to practise polygamy by such male members of said church, when circumstances would admit, would be punished, and that the penalty for such failure and refusal would be damnation in the life to come.' He also proved 'that he had received permission from the recognized authorities in said church to enter into polygamous marriage; . . . that Daniel H. Wells, one having authority in said church to perform the marriage ceremony, married the said defendant on or about the time the crime is alleged to have been committed, to some woman by the name of Schofield, and that such marriage ceremony was performed under and pursuant to the doctrines of said church.'

Upon this proof he asked the court to instruct the jury that if they found from the evidence that he 'was married as [98 U.S. 145, 162] charged-if he was married-in pursuance of and in conformity with what he believed at the time to be a religious duty, that the verdict must be 'not guilty." This request was refused, and the court did charge 'that there must have been a criminal intent, but that if the defendant, under the influence of a religious belief that it was right,-under an inspiration, if you please, that it was right,-deliberately married a second time, having a first wife living, the want of consciousness of evil intent-the want of understanding on his part that he was committing a crime-did not excuse him; but the law inexorably in such case implies the criminal intent.'

Upon this charge and refusal to charge the question is raised, whether religious belief can be accepted as a justification of an overt act made criminal by the law of the land. The inquiry is not as to the power of Congress to prescribe criminal laws for the Territories, but as to the guilt of one who knowingly violates a law which has been properly enacted, if he entertains a religious belief that the law is wrong.

Congress cannot pass a law for the government of the Territories which shall prohibit the free exercise of religion. The first amendment to the Constitution expressly forbids such legislation. Religious freedom is guaranteed everywhere throughout the United States, so far as congressional interference is concerned. The question to be determined is, whether the law now under consideration comes within this prohibition.

The word 'religion' is not defined in the Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think, than to the history of the times in the midst of which the provision was adopted. The precise point of the inquiry is, what is the religious freedom which has been guaranteed.

Before the adoption of the Constitution, attempts were made in some of the colonies and States to legislate not only in respect to the establishment of religion, but in respect to its doctrines and precepts as well. The people were taxed, against their will, for the support of religion, and sometimes for the support of particular sects to whose tenets they could not and did not subscribe. Punishments were prescribed for a failure to attend upon public worship, and sometimes for entertaining [98 U.S. 145, 163] heretical opinions. The controversy
upon this general subject was animated in many of the States, but seemed at last to culminate in Virginia. In 1784, the House of Delegates of that State having under consideration 'a bill establishing provision for teachers of the Christian religion,' postponed it until the next session, and directed that the bill should be published and distributed, and that the people be requested 'to signify their opinion respecting the adoption of such a bill at the next session of assembly.'

This brought out a determined opposition. Amongst others, Mr. Madison prepared a 'Memorial and Remonstrance,' which was widely circulated and signed, and in which he demonstrated 'that religion, or the duty we owe the Creator,' was not within the cognizance of civil government. Semple's Virginia Baptists, Appendix. At the next session the proposed bill was not only defeated, but another, 'for establishing religious freedom,' drafted by Mr. Jefferson, was passed. 1 Jeff. Works, 45; 2 Howison, Hist. of Va. 298. In the preamble of this act (12 Hening's Stat. 84) religious freedom is defined; and after a recital 'that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous fallacy which at once destroys all religious liberty,' it is declared 'that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order.' In these two sentences is found the true distinction
between what properly belongs to the church and what to the State.

In a little more than a year after the passage of this statute the convention met which prepared the Constitution of the United States.' Of this convention Mr. Jefferson was not a member, he being then absent as minister to France. As soon as he saw the draft of the Constitution proposed for adoption, he, in a letter to a friend, expressed his disappointment at the absence of an express declaration insuring the freedom of religion (2 Jeff. Works, 355), but was willing to accept it as it was, trusting that the good sense and honest intentions of the people would bring about the necessary alterations. [98 U.S. 145, 164] 1 Jeff. Works, 79. Five of the States, while adopting the Constitution, proposed amendments. Three-New Hampshire, New York, and Virginia-included in one form or another a declaration of religious freedom in the changes they desired to have made, as did also North Carolina, where the convention at first declined to ratify the
Constitution until the proposed amendments were acted upon. Accordingly, at the first session of the first Congress the amendment now under consideration was proposed with others by Mr. Madison. It met the views of the advocates of religious freedom, and was adopted. Mr. Jefferson afterwards, in reply to an address to him by a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (8 id. 113), took occasion to
say: 'Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions,-I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore man to all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.' Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the measure, it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus secured. Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.

Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people. At common law, the second marriage was always void (2 Kent, Com. 79), and from the earliest history of England polygamy has been treated as an offence against society. After the establishment of the ecclesiastical [98 U.S. 145, 165] courts, and until the time of James I., it was punished through the instrumentality of those tribunals, not merely because ecclesiastical rights had been violated, but because upon the separation of the ecclesiastical courts from the civil the ecclesiastical were supposed to be the most appropriate for the trial of matrimonial causes and offences against the rights of marriage, just as they were for testamentary causes and the settlement of the estates of deceased persons.

By the statute of 1 James I. (c. 11), the offence, if committed in England or Wales, was made punishable in the civil courts, and the penalty was death. As this statute was limited in its operation to England and Wales, it was at a very early period re-enacted, generally with some modifications, in all the colonies. In connection with the case we are now considering, it is a significant fact that on the 8th of December, 1788, after the passage of the act establishing religious freedom, and after the convention of Virginia had recommended as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States the declaration in a bill of rights that 'all men have an equal, natural, and unalienable right to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience,' the legislature of that State substantially enacted the statute of James I., death penalty included, because, as recited in the preamble, 'it hath been doubted whether bigamy or poligamy be punishable by the laws of this Commonwealth.' 12 Hening's Stat. 691. From that day to this we think it may safely be said there never has been a time in any State of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence against society, cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less severity. In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of social life. Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless, in
most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required to deal. In fact, according as monogamous or polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the principles on which the government of [98 U.S. 145, 166] the people, to a greater or less extent, rests. Professor, Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy. Chancellor Kent observes that this remark is equally striking and profound. 2 Kent, Com. 81, note (e). An exceptional colony of polygamists under an exceptional leadership may sometimes exist for a time without appearing to disturb the social condition of the people who surround it; but there cannot be a doubt that, unless restricted by some form of constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its dominion.

In our opinion, the statute immediately under consideration is within the legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and in places over which the United States have exclusive control. This being so, the only question which remains is, whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent her carrying her belief into practice?

So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? [98 U.S. 145, 167] To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.

A criminal intent is generally an element of crime, but every man is presumed to intend the necessary and legitimate consequences of what he knowingly does. Here the accused knew he had been once married, and that his first wife was living. He also knew that his second marriage was forbidden by law. When, therefore, he married the second time, he is presumed to have intended to break the law. And the breaking of the law is the crime. Every act necessary to constitute the crime was knowingly done, and the crime was therefore knowingly committed. Ignorance of a fact may sometimes be taken as evidence of a want of criminal intent, but not ignorance of the law. The only defence of the accused in this case is his belief that the law ought not to have been enacted. It matters not that his belief was a part of his professed religion: it was still belief, and belief only.

In Regina v. Wagstaff (10 Cox Crim. Cases, 531), the parents of a sick child, who omitted to call in medical attendance because of their religious belief that what they did for its cure would be effective, were held not to be guilty of manslaughter, while it was said the contrary would have been the result if the child had actually been starved to death by the parents, under the notion that it was their religious duty to abstain from giving it food. But when the offence consists of a positive act which is knowingly done, it would be dangerous to hold that the offender might escape punishment because he religiously believed the law which he had broken ought never to have been made. No case, we believe, can be found that has gone so far.