Fallujah Handed Over....to Former Saddam General??

Actually, it in part depended on the German in question's profile and value. If you didn;t have that high of a profile, and you were considered an extreme asset, the USSR, Britain and in particular the US was even willing to overlook connections with war crimes which, had you been an ordinary soldier, would have landed you in Nuremberg, or similar.

And the majority of assets like this were used, not for the German reconstruction, but in the subesquent Cold War.

 

I might ad that there is a major difference between some Sgt. and a General. Does anyone really think a General could become a General under Saddam without conditions?

 

Part of it, sure...but this stuff is a little too much into the 20th century for me to say anything with too much confidence. As such, I am not one to discuss this any deeper. Great help, I know.

 

This kind of thing has been on the wires for awhile. De facto getting rid of all Baathists has caused some of the failures in Iraq. Getting rid of all Baathists was recognized as over-reaching so some compromises have been reach. How un-Bush, right?!

 

Via Juan Cole... (I didn't realize it was 4 generals)...
__________________
Ray Close on 'The Real Meaning of Fallujah'

The proposed plan to turn over control of the Fallujah security situation to an Iraqi force under the command of four retired generals is much more significant than might at first be apparent.

On the strategic level, with regard to overall American policy in Iraq, it represents a defeat for those who have contended all along that the insurgency is being carried on by a small group of thugs who do not enjoy widespread support within the Iraqi population at large. Today Donald Rumsfeld is explaining that he is merely acceding to the recommendations of local American military commanders that this compromise arrangement be substituted for the original plan for an all-out assault ---- weakly shifting from himself to them the responsibility for this sudden abandonment of both tough tactics and tough rhetoric. This represents a humiliating defeat for those who have argued that the United States had no choice but to "pacify" Fallujah, arrest the insurgents, confiscate their weapons, and reestablish the authority of the American military occupation forces. The new plan would accomplish none of those explicit and uncompromising assertions made repeatedly over the past few weeks by the president himself, by US military commanders in the field, and (please note) by politicians in the United States of BOTH PARTIES.

Strangely, George W. Bush does not seem willing yet to acknowledge this obvious defeat for his policies. One cannot attribute this merely to bad advice from his mentors, unless one is to believe that the neocons have a complete monopoly on all in-put to his mental processes. That is not a credible explanation. It seems more likely that his stubborn adherence to simplistic explanations of all anti-American sentiments and actions is another sign of his worrisome inability to comprehend the subtleties of this and other similar international challenges falling within the broad title of "the war on terror". Perhaps his intellectual mind-set ("there is no common ground between freedom and terrorism") simply makes it impossible for him to see the world as anything other than a zero-sum conflict between good and evil. That is very troubling quality, especially in the leader of a superpower.

Another conclusion one may draw from events of the past few days is that the general US strategy for dealing with Iraq, which has been based on predictions and recommendations of the neocon cabal in Washington (especially Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle) is becoming exposed at last as the disaster that informed analysts always knew it would become. As the neocons become more and more discredited, the political currency of their chief Iraqi protege, Ahmed Chalabi, sinks rapidly in value. Hence the efforts of the neocon faction to discredit the United Nations and its principal representative for Iraqi affairs, Lakhdar Brahimi, whose ascendancy they recognize as an obvious measure of their own failure.

This morning, I heard the Iraqi foreign minister vehemently protesting the characterization of the four Iraqi generals in Fallujah by the American media as "former Saddam Hussein generals." They are, he insisted very adamantly, IRAQI generals, not "SADDAM" generals. His message seemed very clear. He was saying to all Americans: "We can handle this ourselves, damn it! We may not have your numbers or your firepower, and we may not yet be adequately trained. But if YOU try to pacify Fallujah and the rest of Iraq by brute force, you will make this country impossible for ANYONE to govern, and that means that when you eventually leave Iraq, (God willing!), you will leave us in an even worse mess than we were in before you arrived. So let us do it by ourselves, please, for better or for worse. "

I take all of this as additional strong evidence supporting the points that I made last week, before the new compromise solution in Fallujah was proposed:

1. The political personalities around whom Lakhdar Brahimi and the United Nations will build a transitional governing authority in Iraq after 30 June (whoever they may be; it doesn't matter) have already privately abandoned any expectation that the United States military will be an appropriate or an effective force on which to rely for the establishment of unity and stability in the country; where there is no such expectation, there can no longer be any real trust, and where there is a lack of trust, there will inevitably be conflict, first political, soon violent;

2. The leadership group on which Lakhdar Brahimi bestows "legitimacy" on 30 June will have the intention (perhaps not publicly expressed at first) of vesting complete responsibility for military and security decision-making to a strictly IRAQI command authority just as quickly as possible; in the short term, this may seem virtually impossible because of insufficient resources, but it has become the clear objective of even the most moderate and reasonable Iraqis of the leadership class; the political imperative of independence may very well trump the obviously high short-term risks of chaos; the Iraqi people place a very high value on stability, and rightly so, but the force of national self-determination can become irresistible in an atmosphere of foreign occupation, and reason is sometimes the loser in that contest. Ask the Hungarians in 1956. Ask the Palestinians today

3. This means that the US Army will probably be obliged to leave Iraq before Bush, Rumsfeld & Company are prepared to manage the retreat as if it were a triumphant event for freedom; the Americans will therefore be seen by the rest of the world, and particularly the Muslim world, in much the same light as were the Israelis when they departed from Southern Lebanon ---as a frustrated and defeated occupation force expelled by victorious nationalists; this will make many Americans who supported the "liberation" of Iraq extremely angry and resentful; the British and other members of the glorious "coalition of the willing" will effectively have to make the best of a bad situation --- if they haven't wisely removed themselves from the scene in the meanwhile;

4. All of which makes the probabilities of chaos and civil war in Iraq next year even higher than we pessimists have been predicting. (UNLESS the "expulsion" of the American "occupiers" serves to unify Iraqis and restore their sense of national unity and common purpose; my fear is that this would be only a temporary triumph at best; historic divisions and rivalries would very soon resurface, and chaos would pick up where it left off.) "

Ray Close is the former CIA Station Chief for Saudi Arabia.

 

Well it is better than a few weeks ago in which we attempted to employ our new "Coalition" Iraqi forces, in which only the Kurds stayed to fight the Sunnis and Shiia. Meanwhile we continue to --occupy because there will be a civil war if we leave!!

At any rate is good to see that Bush or his advisors are beginning to get beyond the "wit us or agin us" simplicity that Bush feels so comfortable with.

It would have been better to have let the inspectors do their job, but now that has been screwed I feel it is best to just leave.

The way this is going, will we see Chemical Ali back? Maybe even Sadam. Bush can claim that Sadam has had a religious conversion, looked at himself in the mirror and has made a complete change.

 

"mein fallujah, uber alles..."

 

I totally agree. This guy isn't a junior office but one who was probably at one time close to Saddam's inner circle.

While yes letting Baathists back in is a step toward self-rule the problem is that one of our stated goals is to change the mindset of the Iraqis. Putting high ranking Baathists back in charge isn't going to do that. More likely what that means is that after we leave the Kurds and Shiites will go to war against the Sunnis and the new Iraqi government since it is being run by some of the same people who oppressed them. At the same time this guy and many of his troops probably had it good under Saddam and have been shamed by how easily the US defeated them. Its just as likeley that some of them will be inclined to aid, or at least look the other way, the insurgency. We've already seen this happen when some of the Iraqi police sent into quell Sadr City instead turned their guns on us.

Unfortunately there are no good solutions to Fallujah but I'm not sure if this is even the best of the bad.

 

Anything that helps get Iraq closer to taking care of themselves is a good thing to me.

Many Nazi Generals did not believe in Hitler and they tried to kill him several times.

Even Rommel.

I am sure there were generals in Saddam's armies that would be in the same boat.

It is a good move....albiet WAY too late.

DD

 

I anticipated the Rommell example, but of course there is a world of difference. For one thing, Hitler inherited many of the German generals who later conspired against him. For another, he was operating a military machine of immense proportions, unlike Saddam, during an extended period of war, again, unlike Saddam.

There isn't much of a comparison. I donlt have the information about the regular lines of prommotion and communication in Iraq, but as Saddam has been sole dictator for decades and in the machine for longer, unlike Hitler, it could be assumed that his generals were pretty close to him.

 

Are you assuming that the Americans would choose this man with no consideration for the role he played under Saddam and, more importantly, the risk of trechery they assume by putting him in charge? While I agree it isn't hard to guess that a general of Saddam would have had close ties with him. But, it also isn't hard to guess that the Americans would want to control for that and select the best man (of those available) for the job. Maybe none are fit. But, it is also possible that he's a decent upright fellow that Saddam kept as a General not because he was an evil b*stard but because he was good at his job. I don't doubt that journalists aren't all over this question right now and I expect we'll be getting some articles about what exactly his past is.

 

Granted, but I think you are assuming that 'best man ( of those available) for the job' and close to Saddam are mutually exclusive, which I don't think is a given. We don't know their alternatives.

Another point: That Saddam was capable of meritocratic leadership, while possible, completely contradicts everything we've been saying about him for the past couple of years.

 

At the minimum couldn't we have given this guy and his troops some different uniforms?

I mean letting him parade around in the uniform of Saddam's Republican Guard? I doubt that the Allies in Germany let former SS officers wear their uniforms even if they were working for the Allies.

 

Maybe it's a setup. They'll get all of those old Republican Guard guys in Fallujah, and then they'll level it! Nah, too easy and bad for PR.

 

Guest Commentary: Ray Close on 'The Real Meaning of Fallujah'

Guest Commentary

Ray Close


' The proposed plan to turn over control of the Fallujah security situation to an Iraqi force under the command of four retired generals is much more significant than might at first be apparent.

On the strategic level, with regard to overall American policy in Iraq, it represents a defeat for those who have contended all along that the insurgency is being carried on by a small group of thugs who do not enjoy widespread support within the Iraqi population at large. Today Donald Rumsfeld is explaining that he is merely acceding to the recommendations of local American military commanders that this compromise arrangement be substituted for the original plan for an all-out assault ---- weakly shifting from himself to them the responsibility for this sudden abandonment of both tough tactics and tough rhetoric. This represents a humiliating defeat for those who have argued that the United States had no choice but to "pacify" Fallujah, arrest the insurgents, confiscate their weapons, and reestablish the authority of the American military occupation forces. The new plan would accomplish none of those explicit and uncompromising assertions made repeatedly over the past few weeks by the president himself, by US military commanders in the field, and (please note) by politicians in the United States of BOTH PARTIES.

Strangely, George W. Bush does not seem willing yet to acknowledge this obvious defeat for his policies. One cannot attribute this merely to bad advice from his mentors, unless one is to believe that the neocons have a complete monopoly on all in-put to his mental processes. That is not a credible explanation. It seems more likely that his stubborn adherence to simplistic explanations of all anti-American sentiments and actions is another sign of his worrisome inability to comprehend the subtleties of this and other similar international challenges falling within the broad title of "the war on terror". Perhaps his intellectual mind-set ("there is no common ground between freedom and terrorism") simply makes it impossible for him to see the world as anything other than a zero-sum conflict between good and evil. That is very troubling quality, especially in the leader of a superpower.

Another conclusion one may draw from events of the past few days is that the general US strategy for dealing with Iraq, which has been based on predictions and recommendations of the neocon cabal in Washington (especially Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle) is becoming exposed at last as the disaster that informed analysts always knew it would become. As the neocons become more and more discredited, the political currency of their chief Iraqi protege, Ahmed Chalabi, sinks rapidly in value. Hence the efforts of the neocon faction to discredit the United Nations and its principal representative for Iraqi affairs, Lakhdar Brahimi, whose ascendancy they recognize as an obvious measure of their own failure.

This morning, I heard the Iraqi foreign minister vehemently protesting the characterization of the four Iraqi generals in Fallujah by the American media as "former Saddam Hussein generals." They are, he insisted very adamantly, IRAQI generals, not "SADDAM" generals. His message seemed very clear. He was saying to all Americans: "We can handle this ourselves, damn it! We may not have your numbers or your firepower, and we may not yet be adequately trained. But if YOU try to pacify Fallujah and the rest of Iraq by brute force, you will make this country impossible for ANYONE to govern, and that means that when you eventually leave Iraq, (God willing!), you will leave us in an even worse mess than we were in before you arrived. So let us do it by ourselves, please, for better or for worse. "

I take all of this as additional strong evidence supporting the points that I made last week, before the new compromise solution in Fallujah was proposed:

1. The political personalities around whom Lakhdar Brahimi and the United Nations will build a transitional governing authority in Iraq after 30 June (whoever they may be; it doesn't matter) have already privately abandoned any expectation that the United States military will be an appropriate or an effective force on which to rely for the establishment of unity and stability in the country; where there is no such expectation, there can no longer be any real trust, and where there is a lack of trust, there will inevitably be conflict, first political, soon violent;

2. The leadership group on which Lakhdar Brahimi bestows "legitimacy" on 30 June will have the intention (perhaps not publicly expressed at first) of vesting complete responsibility for military and security decision-making to a strictly IRAQI command authority just as quickly as possible; in the short term, this may seem virtually impossible because of insufficient resources, but it has become the clear objective of even the most moderate and reasonable Iraqis of the leadership class; the political imperative of independence may very well trump the obviously high short-term risks of chaos; the Iraqi people place a very high value on stability, and rightly so, but the force of national self-determination can become irresistible in an atmosphere of foreign occupation, and reason is sometimes the loser in that contest. Ask the Hungarians in 1956. Ask the Palestinians today

3. This means that the US Army will probably be obliged to leave Iraq before Bush, Rumsfeld & Company are prepared to manage the retreat as if it were a triumphant event for freedom; the Americans will therefore be seen by the rest of the world, and particularly the Muslim world, in much the same light as were the Israelis when they departed from Southern Lebanon ---as a frustrated and defeated occupation force expelled by victorious nationalists; this will make many Americans who supported the "liberation" of Iraq extremely angry and resentful; the British and other members of the glorious "coalition of the willing" will effectively have to make the best of a bad situation --- if they haven't wisely removed themselves from the scene in the meanwhile;

4. All of which makes the probabilities of chaos and civil war in Iraq next year even higher than we pessimists have been predicting. (UNLESS the "expulsion" of the American "occupiers" serves to unify Iraqis and restore their sense of national unity and common purpose; my fear is that this would be only a temporary triumph at best; historic divisions and rivalries would very soon resurface, and chaos would pick up where it left off.) "

Ray Close is the former CIA Station Chief for Saudi Arabia

link

 

May 2, 2004
As a New Iraqi Force Goes to Work in Falluja, Questions Arise About Its Leader's Record
By JOHN KIFNER, NYTIMES

FALLUJA, Iraq, May 1 — The new Marine-approved Iraqi force began taking up positions on Saturday on a few quiet street corners in this embattled city amid reports that some residents were celebrating its arrival as a victory over the Americans.

But the record of the man chosen to lead the force — a commander in Saddam Hussein's feared Republican Guard — appeared to be raising questions in the American command, which has appeared somewhat confused over the sudden turnabout here in which old enemies have become new allies.

Although some officials in the Pentagon told reporters on Friday that the force's leader, Maj. Gen. Jasim Muhammad Saleh, had not been a member of the Republican Guard, intelligence and other Marine officers here reconfirmed their own Friday comments that General Saleh had been a ranking officer in the guard, one of the special units close to Saddam Hussein, before being chosen to command the Iraqi Army's 38th Infantry Division.

Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the chief military spokesman for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, said the authority and the new Iraqi Ministry of Defense would have to investigate General Saleh's background, including whether he had been in the Republican Guard.

"I would suspect that the First Marine Expeditionary Force doesn't have access to all the background information on General Saleh," General Kimmitt said, "or any of the other leadership" of what the Marines are calling the First Battalion of the First Falluja Brigade.

"It will be important for all the leaders to go through a vetting and approval process conducted by the Ministry of Defense and the coalition," he said. "In terms of the Falluja Brigade leadership, we'll wait and see what the vetting and approval process brings up."

The military said Saturday that two American sailors had been killed Friday in Al Anbar Province, the mainly Sunni area around Falluja stretching toward the Syrian border, which is the operating area for the Marines. In addition, an Army soldier was killed Saturday by a roadside bomb in northern Iraq. A soldier who was wounded in a similar attack in the same area on Friday died of his injuries on Saturday, Reuters reported.

Reuters also said that the United States military reported that a foreign security man working with allied forces was killed by a roadside bomb in Mosul.

Also on Saturday, several British soldiers and an Iraqi policeman were wounded in a rare clash between British forces and the militia loyal to the rebel cleric Moktada al-Sadr, Reuters said, quoting a British military officer.

The militiamen, from the Mahdi Army, attacked British forces in Amara, 230 miles south of Baghdad, after some militia officials were arrested and arms and bomb-making equipment seized, Reuters reported.

A British military spokeswoman said three soldiers were wounded in a firefight during which a rocket-propelled grenade was fired at a convoy. British forces then pulled out of parts of the city, Reuters reported a British spokeswoman as saying, and talks were under way to restore order. Local sources said the militiamen were demanding the release of 10 of those arrested.

The announcement of the death of the sailors said only that they were killed "while conducting operations against anticoalition forces" in conjunction with the Marines.

Navy forces operating here include medical personnel who serve with Marine combat units; construction battalions, or Seabees, who conduct major building projects and are unlikely here to be involved in direct combat; and some Seals, the Navy's Special Operations teams.

Inside Falluja, Reuters reported, some people were celebrating the replacement of the American presence with Iraqi forces. Guerrilla gunmen were said to be dancing in the streets under green Islamic banners.

"God has given this town victory over the Americans," a voice called from the loudspeakers of a mosque, the Reuters report said. "This victory came by the acts of the brave mujahedeen of Falluja who vanquished the American troops."

Lt. Gen James T. Conway, the commander of the First Marine Expeditionary Force, said the creation of the new Iraqi force "marked the formation of a military partnership that has the potential to bring a lasting, durable climate of peace and stability to Falluja and Al Anbar Province as a whole.

"The army has always been the most respected institution in Iraq," the general told a news conference at the Marine base here. "At 1600 yesterday, on schedule, a group of former members of the Iraqi Army, many from Falluja, answered their nation's call.

"That call was to reduce bloodshed and devastation in and around Falluja and to help secure the future of the people of Iraq by a return to duty."

The siege of Falluja began April 5, after four American security contractors were killed and their bodies mutilated. Marines drew a tight cordon around the city, but faced a persistent armed resistance. Hundreds of Iraqis have been killed.

General Conway said that at the beginning, the new Iraqi force would be stationed in relatively stable areas of the city. But he said that he expected in coming days that the force would be able to provide security for a Marine convoy driving through the center of town.

As of Saturday, he said, the force numbered around 300 with hopes of moving up to around 1,000 soon.

 

Just because they did not believe in Hitler does not make them a good person.

We let this guy hire a ton of his friends who were great *Nazis*.

http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Fascism/ManBox1142_B_CS.html

http://www.consortiumnews.com/2001/051601a.html

 

Now it seems like we won't turn it over to the general. At least 11 more US soldiers died in the last 24 hours.

**********************

MSNBC News Services
Updated: 3:16 p.m. ET May 02, 2004BAGHDAD, Iraq - At least 11 U.S. service members were killed in Iraq on Sunday, the military said, signaling the possibility that U.S. casualties in Iraq may continue at the same grisly pace as in April, until now the bloodiest month since the conflict began 13 months ago.

News of the attacks comes after the top U.S. military commander said that reports that Gen. Jasim Mohamed Saleh, a former general in Saddam Hussein’s elite Republican Guard, would take charge in the volatile Iraqi city of Fallujah, have been “very, very inaccurate.”


Six U.S. service members were killed and another 30 were wounded in a mortar attack near the western city of Ramadi, about 60 miles west of Baghdad, in Anbar province. That province includes such flashpoint cities as Fallujah in the Sunni Triangle, long a hotbed of Iraqi resistance.

A military spokeswoman gave no further details and did not say whether the victims were Marines or Army soldiers, but most Americans stationed there are Marines.

Another U.S. soldier was killed and 10 were wounded in a bomb and small arms attack on a coalition base near the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk.

Overnight, Shiite militiamen attacked a U.S. convoy with small arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades near the southern city of Amarah, 180 miles south of Baghdad. Two soldiers were killed, the military said. Through the night and into Sunday morning, Iraqis set fire to the long line of abandoned vehicles, jumping on the hoods and beating them with sticks.

An attack in northwest Baghdad killed two other soldiers and wounded two Iraqi security officers and another American, the military said.

The deaths raised the U.S. death toll to 151 since a wave of violence began on April 1. At least 753 U.S. troops have died in Iraq since the war began in March 2003. Up to 1,200 Iraqis were also killed in April.

U.S.: Ex-Saddam general to be replaced
Meanwhile, Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on Sunday that Saleh, a former general in the Republican Guard, is unlikely to take charge in Fallujah and is still being vetted to lead a possible Iraqi peacekeeping force.

“There’s another general they’re looking at,” Gen. Richard B. Myers told ABC’s This Week. “My guess is, it will not be General Saleh. ... He will not be their leader ... He may have a role to play, but that vetting has yet to take place,” said Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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