You're still begging the question. How does one "recognize" a natural right? It can't be determined democratically, as that would mean the popular decision is always the right one. Again, the concept of "rights" can be and has been used to exclude groups from enjoying certain freedoms afforded in a society. Your argument seems to be that natural rights are superior to civil rights (positivism) because the former is better at protecting some set of innate rights. Even if I agreed with you that natural rights exist, though, we still have to determine what they are. Thus, we are no closer to establishing a just set of rights than we would be if we were solely concerned with the question of what civil rights we should have.
Well the natural law would be one way. It's not to hard to come up with a basic set of rights that are inherent in every individual, and the whole point is that natural rights are beyond the scope of the democratic process. Civil rights aren't inferior. They can be very much superior if they recognize all of one's natural rights along with whatever rights a society wants to grant to an individual. Take the work of a guy like John Finnis http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Finnis or Robby George at Princeton. The natural law can be known. It's not a mystery.
Here is the section you're talking about, with the full text of Tertullian's passage: [rquoter]For what is it that constitutes the bliss of this Paradise? We might even guess, but it is better to have it expressly described for us by an authority not to be underestimated in such matters, Thomas Aquinas, the great teacher and saint. "Beati in regno coelesti," he says, meek as a lamb, "videbunt poenas damnatorum, ut beatitudo illis magis complaceat." ["The blessed in the kingdom of heaven will see the punishments of the damned, in order that their bliss be more delightful for them."] Or do you want to hear that message in a stronger tone, something from the mouth of a triumphant father of the church [Tertullian], who warns his Christians against the cruel sensuality of the public spectacles. But why? "Faith offers much more to us," he says, "something much stronger. Thanks to the redemption, very different joys are ours to command; in place of the athletes, we have our martyrs. If we want blood, well, we have the blood of Christ . . . But think of what awaits us on the day of his coming again, his triumph!"—and now he takes off, the rapturous visionary:[/rquoter] And some Summa Theologica from a very conservative (in the real sense of the word) translation of Aquinas [emphasis is mine]: (if you haven't read it yourself, you should at the link above - this interpretation lacks much of the flair of the original, apparently, but gets it basically correct) Nietzsche wasn't responding to the opposite of what Aquinas said - he was responding precisely to what Aquinas said. Your idea that Nietzsche somehow intentionally misrepresented Aquinas because only power, not truth, mattered to him is completely wrong. To Nietzsche there was nothing - absolutely nothing - more important than the truth. Also, there was no power greater than the will to power expressed as the will to knowledge - the will for the truth. From Book II, section 39 of Beyond Good and Evil [rquoter]Something could well be true, although it is at the same time harmful and dangerous to the highest degree. In fact, it could even be part of the fundamental composition of existence that people are destroyed when they fully recognize this point—so that the strength of a spirit might be measured by how much it could still endure of the “truth,” or put more clearly, by the degree it would have to have the truth diluted, sweetened, muffled, or falsified.[/rquoter] and: [rquoter] Here the ways of men part: if you wish to strive for peace of soul and pleasure, then believe; if you wish to be a devotee of truth, then inquire.[/rquoter] Nietzsche spent a great deal of ink railing against nihilists - he most assuredly was not one himself. A cursory reading can give one this impression - Nietzsche intentionally constructed his books so that if one just dipped in and out one could end up with the impression that Nietzsche was actually saying the opposite of what he meant - Nietzsche was an incredibly complex thinker, and just taking a brief glance at his writing will leave just about anyone with the wrong impression. Also, keep in mind that Nietzsche was a university professor in classical philology before he left for reasons of his health - he was incredibly good at translating Greek/Latin. Also, you may want to wonder how your professor is validating his argument that Nietzsche "got it wrong" - is he a Catholic (your professor)? Is this a course in philology, history, philosophy or theology that you're talking about? I would encourage you to read Nietzsche yourself (a warning in a quotation: "A very popular error -- having the courage of one's convictions: Rather it is a matter of having the courage for an attack upon one's convictions!!!") - you have apparently been presented with faulty interpretations, as well as having made one of your own. A great place to start is Walter Kaufmann's Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist if you want to get a full, learned, overview of Fred's works before you dive in.
Earlier in this thread you mentioned that Aristotle invented the concept of rights. I pointed out that Aristotle considered women to be deformed men, and his ethics concerning gender roles (i.e. natural laws) were very much informed by his misogyny. Now you link to the wikipedia page for John Finnis, of whom it is said in the article: I have to ask, what do you believe justifies these notions of natural law? If you really believe that natural law isn't a mystery, I expect you would be able to elucidate the method you use to determine it.
Nietzsche was using the whole passage to show that those in heaven rejoice in the sufferings of those in hell in Aquinas' view. But he only looks at Article 1 of question 94. If you look down to Article 3 from that passage you quoted, Aquinas responds: "I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such: and thus the saints will not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly, by reason namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by considering therein the order of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill them with joy. And thus the Divine justice and their own deliverance will be the direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the punishment of the damned will cause it indirectly. To rejoice in another's evil as such belongs to hatred, but not to rejoice in another's evil by reason of something annexed to it. Thus a person sometimes rejoices in his own evil as when we rejoice in our own afflictions, as helping us to merit life: "My brethren, count it all joy when you shall fall into divers temptations" (James 1:2)." Nietzsche leaves this nuanced understanding out of his critique, and all you had to do was look down the page to see that Aquinas was qualifying. I think our learned friend Rimmy's reading is more accurate though. At any rate, we are now doing complex philosophy on a Rockets message board. Awesome. Lscola I'll respond to you tomorrow, it's just too late for two long posts in a night.
Also, I fully agree with you that Nietzsche did not consider himself a nihilist. He fully embraces a philosophy of life. I've long recognized that if Catholicism is not correct, the other choice is Nietzsche. His critique of Hegel and historicism is classic. But, ultimately, the philosophy of life has a hard time reconciling with the reality of death. Question becomes, what's the point? The eternal return right? To me that's just not a better answer than having an immortal soul made for love. But I really do enjoy the discussion, even if we don't agree on things.
Quick answer to your last point. It seems like you are just arguing his conclusion without seeing how he got there. There's plenty of info out there on the web on Finnis, and when he comes back next semester to teach I might try to get into a class with him and give you a better answer. Here's a good starting point, from the Oxford journal on jurisprudence: http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/0-19-927181-X.pdf I don't know if I can view it because I'm on a school account or if it generally available. Let me know if it is not showing up I can copy paste some excerpts for you.
I've read the book ... and struggled through it in the original Latin. And Nietzsche was just getting at the soul of the issue (if you'll pardon the term) - the "nuance" doesn't obviate the fact that the saints rejoice in the suffering of those in Hell, and can watch those torments because it gives them pleasure in their benefiting from "god's justice" - Nietzsche wasn't avoiding the nuance to avoid something that would run counter to his argument (that those who believe in the afterlife do so from the will to power - finding themselves weak in this world, they imagine another world where they will be able to watch the torments of those who held more power than them in this world). The "nuance" of Aquinas's statement doesn't make the fact that those in heaven feel pleasure while viewing the torments of hell irrelevant. Whatever the nuance, he is stating that the "saints" take pleasure in viewing the suffering of the "sinners." You're misunderstanding Nietzsche as well - I'm not trying to pull rank on you or something by saying you should read him. I'm saying you'd benefit from reading him.
Oops ... sorry, didn't see this before I typed the response above. For Nietzsche, the point of existence is self-overcoming. His idea that the distance (in terms of development) between a monkey and the average man is the same distance between the average man and someone like Plato points in this direction - one must "become what one is" by creating a self essentially. He also advocated amor fati - love of fate - and that's where the eternal recurrence comes from in his analysis of self-overcoming. At any rate, I find the whole eternal recurrence aspect of his philosophy rather off-putting - it seems more like a direct attempt to create new values (since, in Nietzsche's view, the values of Christianity were dead - "and we have killed them" as the quotation goes) than a thoughtful perspective on things. It was a very important idea to Nietzsche, but I think it's deeply flawed. And the "what's the point?" question is one that I have struggled with myself - a long time ago, when I essentially stopped believing in any sort of afterlife and found myself believing that people turned to religion, not because it was true, but because it helped them be less fearful and so they didn't consistently suffer with the knowledge of their weakness in this world. If one is satisfied with who they are in this life, a belief in the afterlife becomes unnecessary - because there is no longer the need to ask "what's the point?"
But why would this matter? What does it matter if you are a completely morally depraved person? What if that's just what you've decided to like and be satisfied with in yourself? What if in the course of this moral deprivation you become a serial killer? Where is the "value added" to life?
Where does a doctrine of morality help a serial killer "value add" to life? You are using an example that is out of the equation for any set of "living well". A serial killer can be perfectly content with their life because they generally do not have the facility to even comprehend right or wrong in a human way. Aside from that, why does there have to be a point? I can agree with the thadeus that I see afterlife themes in Jude-Christian (since that has been in this discussion - but applies to others as well) as themes of loss or dissatisfaction. You can, of course, take that one or two abstract steps farther and point out that dissatisfaction is at the root of J-C beliefs in that God created man (why create people and new worlds if you are satisfied with what is already going on?). Then within humans is the fear and dissatisfaction of a limited, mortal life...why create them with that? When I read Nietzsche I don't think he is always right or the answer, but I do feel an affinity for his thinking and his style. I suppose most of that is personality (I am a self-struggler/fighter) but also for his critiques of much of what came before. As the thadeus (and I previously) stated, his conclusions were often contradictory or way off due to his desire to establish "new" thoughts that he challenged himself to create. Ultimately with morality I have come to a similar conclusion as the thadeus (yes, I just want to use his full title as much as possible) where I am a somewhat relativist egoist misanthrope who believes that most people will do the right things and that true satisfaction with one's life can only come from living within a certain limit that one's culture and experiences will form. I think morality is relative for each individual but that there are much more general and loose moral "truths" that are overcome only through extreme personal circumstances or through some kind of utilitarian override button. I think it now becomes apparent why contradictory, tortured, and generally odd writers of philosophy appeal to me. If I wrote a book, though, I would not be famous.
Well, I'm confused, morality is relative, but there are general and loose moral truths? I can see why you like contradictory thinkers.
Haha, my job is complete! No, all I really mean is that I do believe there are general human "right and wrongs" that most people will come up with when asked - regardless of religious belief. Following from that, I think that some of those those "right and wrongs" can flip or have a 0 value on the morality scale depending on personal situations or, again, if overwhelmed by some greater utilitarian good. As such, I see moral code as fairly universal and powerful but not concrete. There - I actually gave some thought to writing it more clearly - did it actually help?
Never heard of him. I guess he is pro Aquinas? Life is ambiguous, my little bunny. At the end of the day I don't worry about following any moral code or general philosophy. I am hyper critical by nature (and I guess training). All I see are holes and flaws and that extends most powerfully first to myself and my own thinking. I just absorb all I can and my main goal in life is to live well by learning.
You didn't really answer any of my points, though. Natural law, from its very beginning, has been predicated on misogynistic conceptions of the natural. Even if I grant you that there exists some set of objective human rights, you still have to do the leg work to find out what those rights are. I really don't care to read the 70-page Finnis article, especially after reading the first 10, so I ask you to respond to me in your own words or at least post an excerpt that does so.
Saturday Night. Wife is out of town. And I'm tired from Law School. So what do I do? I excerpt a 70 page article on the history of jurisprudence through the natural law for you. Because I am a dork. First, you keep drawing the conclusion that the natural law is misogynistic. All I can say is, no it's not? And to the excerpting I go, and I excerpt for the sake of being articulate, because Finnis is smarter than I'll ever hope to be. Crap, it won't let me copy and paste. I'll have to summarize for you. Finnis first looks at what is called "Classical Natural Law Theory" He sums up 3 points about the natural law tradition. 1. It's guiding purpose is to answer the parallel questions of an individual, group, or judge on the questions, "What should I do?", "What should we enact, decide, promote?" Finnis says these questions can't be answered in a without an understanding of the facts of how the world works. HE goes on to say that societies can be understood as they would by the judge or society that makes the rules. They are judged on the quality of the rules they make, and a good rule does not necessarily just promote the society's consensus. The question becomes what "ought" a society promote through enacted laws. On positivism he says, "Positivism...fails to meet this demand of logic coherently...everything that Positivism reasonably wishes to insist upon is clearly and coherently accommodated in classical natural law theory." 2. Classical natural law theory does not reduce ought to is because it is clear about the irreducibility of four kinds of order which correspond to four kinds of theory. I. Orders which are what they are, independently of our thinking, nature, laws of nature, natural sciences, and metaphysics. II. the order which we can bring into our thinking , and correspondingly the standards and discipline of logic, III. the order which we bring into our deliberating, choosing, and acting in the open horizon of our whole life, and correspondingly the standards of morality and the reflective discipline of ethics, IV. the order which we can bring into matter (including our own bodies) subject to our power, as means to relatively specific purposes, and correspondingly the countless techniques, crafts and technologies. He even says, "Morality, and natural law (in the relevant sense of that term), cannot be reduced to, or deduced from, the principles of natural science or metaphysics, logic, or any craft." That's further than I've gone in my discussions here. 3. "None the less, the tradition has a clear understanding that one cannot reasonably affirm the equality of human beings, or the universality and binding force of human rights, unless one acknowledges that there is something about persons which distinguishes them radically from sub-rational creatures, and which, prior to any acknowledgment of status, is intrinsic to the factual reality of every human being, adult or immature, healthy or disabled" Next... He goes on to Modern Natural Law Theory, next post.
Finnis on Modern Natural Law Theory: Critiques Hobbes, Locke, and Pufendorf for their understanding of obligation and the law as being matters of superior will. States that having a superior will doesn't equate to correct deductions about the facts of things. Takes this back to the idea of God as superior will. "To be sure, when natural law (morality) is at issue, the superior, God, is assumed to be wise. But the idea of divine wisdom is given no positive role in explaining why God's commands create obligations for a rational conscience. God's right to legislate is explained instead by the analogy of sheer power." Then takes on Kant, "Kant's reductions of moral rationality to logic all fail. They were bound to, because his basic theory lacks the concept of a substantive reason for action-- a reason which is not a true judgment about natural facts, nor a logical requirement, nor a technical necessity of efficient means to a definite and realizable end...He articulates with power the radically anti-utilitarian principle that one must always treat humanity, in oneself as in others, as an end and never as a mere means. But his own official definition of humanity would rob this categorical imperative of its significance. For if our humanity is, as he says, our rationality, and that rationality has no directive content save that one be consistent, we are left with neither rational motivation nor intelligent direction that could count in deliberation." Basically says that Kant lacks all the building blocks of classical natural law theory, the substantive first principles, basic reasons for actions. The rest of the article attacks positivism, goes through the relationship between the law and philosophy, etc. I can keep going if you want, but basically, for Finnis, modern natural law misses the point. Classical natural is better because it gets to the fundamental nature of things. Hope that clarifies.
And because this thread needs to lighten up... <object width="425" height="344"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/QXgMhnI3QOI&hl=en_US&fs=1&color1=0x3a3a3a&color2=0x999999"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/QXgMhnI3QOI&hl=en_US&fs=1&color1=0x3a3a3a&color2=0x999999" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="425" height="344"></embed></object>
