[Council on Foreign Relations] Pakistan's Road to Disintegration

This is a great interview that sheds light on a lot of issues regarding Pakistan.

I know there's already the 'Pakistan blasphemy law' thread, but I didn't want to derail that any further.

Pakistan's Road to Disintegration

In the first few days of this year, Pakistan's coalition government was thrust into crisis after losing a coalition partner, and then a top politician--Punjab Governor Salman Taseer--was assassinated. A leading expert on the country, Stephen P. Cohen, says these incidents are symptoms of the profound problems tugging the country apart. "The fundamentals of the state are either failing or questionable, and this applies to both the idea of Pakistan, the ideology of the state, the purpose of the state, and also to the coherence of the state itself," Cohen says. "I wouldn't predict a comprehensive failure soon, but clearly that's the direction in which Pakistan is moving." On a recent trip, he was struck by the growing sense of insecurity in Pakistan, even within the military, and the growing importance of China.

What's the situation in Pakistan these days, given a key partner's withdrawal from the coalition government, and the assassination of a leading member of the ruling coalition, who opposed the blasphemy law which has support among the country's Muslim population?

These are symptoms of a deeper problem in Pakistan. There is not going to be any good news from Pakistan for some time, if ever, because the fundamentals of the state are either failing or questionable. This applies to both the idea of Pakistan, the ideology of the state, the purpose of the state, and also to the coherence of the state itself. Pakistan has lost a lot of its "stateness," that is the qualities that make a modern government function effectively. So there's failure in Pakistan on all counts. I wouldn't predict a comprehensive failure soon but clearly that's the direction in which Pakistan is moving.

Given Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons and its strategic location between Afghanistan and India, for the United States this is a looming crisis, isn't it.

All U.S. policies toward Pakistan are bad, and some are perhaps worse than others. We don't know whether leveling with Pakistan is going to improve things or make it worse. Ideally, we would own a time machine in which we could roll back history and reverse a lot of decisions we made in the past. Hopefully, we won't make any more fundamentally wrong decisions in the future, but that may not prevent Pakistan from going further down the road to disintegration. Someone in the State Department was quoted in a WikiLeaks document [as saying] that if it weren't for nuclear weapons, Pakistan would be the Congo. I would compare it to Nigeria without oil. It wouldn't be a serious state. But the nuclear weapons and the country's organized terrorist machinery do make it quite serious.

If it is anybody's problem in the future, it is going to be China's problem. I just spent several weeks in Pakistan. One thing I discovered was the country insecurity in a way I had never seen it, even in military cantonments. The other was that China's influence in Pakistan was much greater and deeper than I had imagined it to be. In a sense that's India's problem, but in the long run, it will be China's problem.

Describe China's influence.

China is Pakistan's major military supplier. Of course, they supplied military technology and probably put Pakistanis in touch with the North Koreans for missile technology. The Chinese have one concern in Pakistan and that is the training of Chinese militants and extremists inside of Pakistan. The Chinese have no problem with the Tiananmen Square-type of crowd control. When the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) was blown up in Islamabad in 2007, it came after some ten Chinese were kidnapped and the Chinese complained publicly. The Pakistanis had ignored our protests about the Mosque for many years. But they moved quickly when the Chinese protested, killing many women and children in the process. That was one of the turning points in President Pervez Musharraf's career, because that turned many militants against him. Before that time, he had either ignored or supported them, but after Lal Masjid, they became his enemy.

How important are the militants or terrorists? Can they control the state?

Militants--whether you call them anti-American, anti-liberal, or anti-secular--seem to have a veto over politics in Pakistan, but they can't govern the state. The parties control the elections but they can prevent others from governing, and they may prevent the military from governing as well.

Some people have been hoping for a military coup, but you don't think that will happen?

I don't think the military wants to be in that position now. I don't think the military chief Ashfaq Kayani has such a game plan. He is as smart and calculating as President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq [military president from 1977 until his assassination in 1988] was. He is quite different from Musharraf--not an Islamist himself, but he has certainly supported them in the past. I know the Pakistan military cannot govern Pakistan. They've tried it three times in the past and each time failed. This time they would have to deal with more active militants. The liberal forces are in retreat, and I don't see the army supporting the liberal forces in Pakistan.

Talk about the anti-American feeling. How did it develop into such a strong national sentiment?

Historically, the Pakistani elite have created a narrative of U.S.-Pakistan relations which always shows the United States letting Pakistan down. A turning point was the Iranian revolution of 1979, [which] showed a lot of Pakistanis that standing up to the Americans, embarrassing the Americans, humiliating the Americans felt good. Whether they were Sunnis or Shiites in Pakistan, it felt good. It all goes back to everyone in Pakistan concerned about American policy toward Israel and the Middle East. They seem to care more about Israel and Palestine than they do about themselves. The irony of Pakistan is that their major foreign policy obsessions are ones that they can't do anything about, including Israel and Palestine. When the U.S. and NATO forces moved into Iraq and Afghanistan, that was seen as a direct threat to Pakistan. They feared that the Islamist states were being knocked off one after another, beginning with Iraq, and going on to Afghanistan, and winding up with Pakistan. Most of that is imagined, but many Pakistanis believe it is true.

We've had a breakup of the coalition government, which happens all the time around the world, but why was so much gloom and doom expressed in Pakistan?

It's the incapacity of the Pakistani state to educate its own people in a modern fashion; it's the failure of the Pakistani economy to grow at all. If this was an American analogy, you would say Pakistan is a house under water. Except for its territory, which is strategically important, there is not much in Pakistan that is of benefit to anyone. They failed to take advantage of globalization. They use terrorism as an aspect of globalization, which is the negative side of globalization. Go down the list of factors, they are almost all negative. There is not one that is positive. They need outsiders for economic help. The conflict with India drains most of their budget. They can't resolve foreign policy differences with India. They have quarrels with us over Afghanistan, although they are probably right that we don't understand the Afghanis either. The question in my mind is whether these are irreversible so that Pakistan can become a normal state.

What do you think?

Hope is not a policy, but despair is not a policy either. We have to do what we can do and prepare for the failure of Pakistan, which could happen in four or five or six years.

Talk about the terrorists.

There has been an accommodation with the government. Terrorist attacks are down. There seems to be an agreement by the security forces to accommodate the terrorist groups. I don't see the government regaining its position in the frontiers. The Pakistani Taliban is a designated enemy, but the army cannot move against them. The army is worried about its integrity itself.

Discuss Taseer's assassination.

He was like Sherry Rehman, a close associate of Benazir Bhutto. Rehman had introduced a private member's bill to repeal the blasphemy law, and [Taseer] backed her, and that apparently led to his guard killing him. The blasphemy law makes the medieval Catholic Church look liberal. Anyone who stands up and criticizes the law has his life in danger. Rehman is prominently mentioned in press coverage. I don't think she will back down. She is a lady of strong principles, like Benazir.

Is the fear of India genuine?

It is genuine, because it goes back to the identity of Pakistan. They can't figure out how to reconcile their strategic necessity of accommodation with India. Of course, India takes a hard line on a lot of issues, not just Kashmir. India has allowed China to acquire Pakistan as a strategic asset. It is now a trilateral game between the Chinese and Indians with the Pakistanis on the Chinese side.

<a href=" http://www.cfr.org/interactives/CG_Pakistan/index.html?cid=oth-embed-cgpembed-crisis_guide_pakistan-100710" target"_blank"><img src="http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/images/CG_Pakistan_Tease_640_360.jpg" alt="Crisis Guide: Pakistan" style="border: 0pt none; margin: 0px 10px 0px 0px; float: left;" width="640" height="360" /></a>

 

I just ordered his book last week.

 

The article isn't very well written IMO, but what makes him seem like a douche?

 

How Cricket Explains Pakistan

In some countries, like England and Australia, cricket is played as recreation; in others, like India, as meditation. Watching Pakistani cricketers, however, one senses the sport is their purest physical expression. They are like Argentine footballers: unpredictable, a little shady, a bit dangerous, full of eccentrics and cranks, often inefficient and blundering, but possessed of a mercurial passion and an utter magic. When the legendary cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan led Pakistan to an improbable World Cup win in 1992, it wasn't just a triumph of skill, it was a celebration of cricket itself -- a game, its followers like to say, of "glorious uncertainties." Then, as now, in the lanes of Karachi and Lahore, in track pants and tees with duct tape wrapped around a tennis ball, or on parched Punjab dustlands, barefoot in salwar kameezes with homemade bats and bricks for stumps, youngsters are to be found tearing in to bowl, in a performance always.

So when the brilliant light of Pakistan cricket dims, the rest of the cricket world takes notice. And these days, Pakistan is confronting some of its dimmest times, in cricket as in everything else.

In November 2008, following the Mumbai attack launched by Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba, India broke cricket ties with Pakistan, causing the game there a significant financial blow. A few months later, in March 2009, a terrorist group attacked a visiting Sri Lankan team. This attack, undertaken in clear morning light, as the team bus drove to the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore, injured several of the players and killed six security men and the bus driver. Pakistan has not been able to host international cricket on home soil ever since. Then, in 2010, the national team was rocked by a match-fixing scandal: Three leading players, including the captain, were suspended as a result of a sting operation conducted by the British tabloid News of the World (the players are currently in Doha at a special cricket corruption court for hearings that are expected to conclude on Jan. 11), and a widening investigation has placed several other players under suspicion. Three years, three body blows to Pakistani cricket. It now stands on the brink of collapse.

Each of these events has deep roots. The modern concept of sport as big business came late to cricket. Not until India's economy was opened up in the mid-1990s, attracting multinational companies trying to reach a mammoth audience through advertising spots, could international cricket dream of signing television or player contracts worth even a fraction of those in, say, soccer or baseball. The coming of big money led to the thoughtless overscheduling of tournaments and, in an underregulated atmosphere, an explosion of interest from underworld betting cartels.

These factors combusted into cricket's first match-fixing crisis in 2000, tarring big names across the world but especially in India, Pakistan, and South Africa. One may argue that India is scarcely a less corrupt nation than its neighbor -- the founder-commissioner of the big-bucks Indian Premier League, in fact, is under investigation on a wide range of corruption charges -- but at least it has been able to reward its elite cricketers spectacularly.

At 170 million, Pakistan's population is the second-largest among cricketing nations, but its middle class is too minute to draw corporate money. Its cricket administration, structured to serve under a crony chairman appointed by the nation's president and invested with virtually unlimited power, is utterly dysfunctional. Pakistan's cricketers, with increasingly little opportunity to play and governed by this fickle administration, are by international cricket standards glaringly underpaid.

A friend in Pakistan speaks of teenagers on the streets placing bets on outcomes of every delivery -- the pitch, in baseball terms -- of local cricket games. The phenomenon, when rigged, is known as "spot fixing." For a hustling youngster like Mohammad Amir, the stunningly gifted 18-year-old at the center of Pakistani cricket's current fixing scandal, for whom gambling is the daily stuff of the street (in a land where the president is nicknamed "Mr. Ten Percent") temptation is an easy trap. All he would have to do to improve his income is perform the seemingly innocuous act of overstepping the bowling crease -- a "no-ball," cricket's equivalent of a foot fault -- at a pre-decided moment.

As the scandal unfolds, it appears that Amir is only a pawn in the game. He was allegedly roped into the scam by his captain, Salman Butt; and Salman Butt through his agent, a British businessman by the name of Mazhar Majeed. Majeed, in turn, colluded with gambling cartels, and everyone, if reports are right, raked in the money.

In early November, two months after News of the World broke the story, the case took a sinister turn. Another young cricketer, Zulqarnain Haider, disappeared from Dubai, where Pakistan was in the middle of a series against South Africa, and surfaced at London's Heathrow Airport, seeking asylum. He'd received death threats, he claimed, for refusing to throw a match. He had ignored the threats, helped win the match for Pakistan, and then, fearing for his family's life and his own, fled. Details haven't been forthcoming: who exactly issued the threat, why Haider flew to England rather than to his family in Pakistan, why he did not report the threat to the administrators in the first place. What is clear is the kind of control gambling cartels can take of a sport once they have access.

This moment is, one hopes, the nadir of a wretched few years that have included doping revelations, ball-tampering controversies, mass sackings and recalls, captaincy musical chairs, the in-tournament death of a coach, and the shenanigans of the cricket chief, Ijaz Butt. Butt's response to the security complaints of an English official who was caught up in the 2009 attack on Sri Lankan cricketers was to call the comments "obnoxious"; his response to the News of the World exposé was to turn around and accuse the English cricketers of corruption, without basis. The International Cricket Council has tried to intervene with a "task team" to enforce basic anti-corruption procedures, but the problem is really much more endemic than that.

Pakistani cricket has become intimately bound up with the country's broader implosion. No international team, naturally, has toured Pakistan since the attack on its soil in 2009. Next year, it will be the only one of four subcontinental cricket nations not hosting any part of the big World Cup gala. Its "home" games, few and far between, are staged in the United Arab Emirates or England. The distance places a further strain on the resources of a maladministered cricket board, which, at a conservative estimate, has incurred losses of $250 million over the past three years from tour cancellations. Meanwhile, the militancy in the heartland of Pakistan is growing gradually worse, with more frequent terrorist attacks and an inept governmental response. What price a couple of manipulated no-balls in this environment?

The continuing decay of Pakistan is terribly unfortunate for cricket at large. The game is played seriously in two handfuls of Britain's former colonies, among them devastated Zimbabwe, impoverished Bangladesh, tiny New Zealand, post-civil-war Sri Lanka, and the West Indies -- which doesn't even exist except for the purpose of cricket (and a common university). Pakistan's collapse will make it a smaller and grimmer world, depriving it of flair, variety, beauty.

Its subcontinental rival would be hard-put to disagree. From India, the view of Pakistan is never clear; it is hard with all the barbed wire. We see the terrible poignancy of separation at birth, guns and missiles trained on one another, territorial wars that are also in some ways wars of faith. But through the clouds and fences -- now you see it, now you don't -- there is cricket. For about half their history, India and Pakistan have kept their cricket teams from touring in each other's countries. Yet, even those Indians who view a cricket loss to Pakistan as the grossest national humiliation cannot help a grudging fascination with them.

In better times the two countries congregate around cricket. When in 2004 the Indian team did a full tour of Pakistan after a long freeze, it occasioned the largest people-to-people exchange since Partition. With visa rules relaxed, thousands of Indians and Pakistanis met somebody from across the border for the first time in their lives. There always was sound economic sense to cricket diplomacy. Through the years of governmental restrictions, the cricket boards found ways to make money from TV revenues while staging matches in neutral venues such as Sharjah and Toronto. But this spirit of cooperation between the boards has now dwindled, and international cricket's most marketable product -- the Indian Premier League -- has not featured Pakistani players in any edition since early 2008.

The cricket world's loss is nothing compared with the tragedy for Pakistan's own citizens. Cricket has thrilled them through dark days, provided them the hope on a mass level that only sport can. In the past three years they've lived through an emergency rule imposed by a military dictator, the assassination of their favorite daughter Benazir Bhutto, and the efforts of a compromised and fragile civilian government to keep their country from rising above No. 10 in Foreign Policy's Failed States Index -- the only non-African nation, along with Iraq and Afghanistan, in that top bracket. And then -- just as a young cricket team led by a seemingly idealistic captain and energized by the teenaged, dimpled Amir held the promise of glory -- came the floods of August.

When sportsmen, heroes for a people, become afflicted with a self-seeking cynicism, it is a sad day. In this case, the old Victorian disapproving tut, "It's not cricket," is both metaphorically and literally true. No, it's not cricket. Nor is it just cricket: The crisis here is much bigger than a game.