Comanche Canceled

If anything, we need at least 15 supercarriers. Since we've lost many of our overseas bases thanks to various mistakes, carriers are the only way to get airpower into a situation where it is required. The smaller British carriers you talk about are cramped ships holding only a a few Harriers (short ranged, with little or no load-carrying capacity) without the ability to inflight refuel (they could not support an aircraft with the giveaway capacity fuel-wise) and require a very long supply train to support sustained operations (since they are so small and can carry precious little jet fuel or weaponry). The British were very lucky to win back the Falklands, but the Argentines were hardly a modern force. The bigger the carrier, the more weaponry and JP4 it can carry, which means it can sustain a high op-tempo hardly dreamt about by the puny British carriers.

SPECIAL REPORT: The Case for the Carrier
Aircraft Carriers and Sea-Based Air Power
Smaller Is Not Better

And Numbers Do Count!

By RICHARD C. ALLEN

Vice Adm. Richard C. Allen retired from active duty in 1996 as commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and is the immediate past president of the Association of Naval Aviation.



At the height of the recent crisis between the People's Republic of China and the United States, sparked by the midair collision of a U.S. Navy EP-3E Orion Aries signals-intelligence aircraft and a Chinese F-8 fighter in international airspace, the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) reportedly suggested three courses of action for the two-month-old administration of President George W. Bush.

All of those options depended on having flexible and effective air power at hand--in the form of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk and its multimission air wing, the unstated "big stick" in the quiet and delicate but high-stakes diplomacy between Beijing and Washington.

The carrier was underway in the Gulf of Thailand en route to a port visit in Guam when the incident flared, resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot and forcing the damaged Orion to land on Hainan Island. There the U.S. crew of 24 men and women was detained until diplomats achieved their release.

PACOM's reported suggestions included sending the Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier battle group (CVBG) on a slow northward track through the South China Sea to signal strong U.S. interest in resolving the crisis quickly. Another option called for the carrier and its escorts to "linger" near the Philippines or, the third option, to continue on an easterly course toward the U.S. territory of Guam for its scheduled port visit. When the aircrew was finally liberated, Kitty Hawk remained in position, ready to respond if needed.

One lesson to be drawn from the incident is that having 70-plus tactical and support aircraft at sea__ready where and when they were needed, fully sustained by underway replenishment vessels, and accompanied by multimission surface warships and attack submarines in an area in which U.S. access to land bases and facilities was at best negligible__gave the United States political and military options that could be provided only by naval forces.

Ultimately, the Bush administration opted for a quieter diplomatic approach to resolve the crisis, but sea-based tactical air power embarked on the sovereign U.S. "territory" of a large-deck aircraft carrier was once again shown to be something the United States cannot afford to do without.

At a time when all aspects of U.S. national-defense programs are under increasing scrutiny and the review of "big-ticket" acquisition items by the Bush administration is the order of the day, would-be reformers should take heed of a salient point relating to aircraft carriers and their embarked advanced aircraft: Smaller is not better, and numbers do count.

Why Carriers?

In early 2001, work was well under way, as part of the second Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), to define a new framework for critical decisions about America's defenses when President Bush announced a parallel review that would leave no stones unturned in transforming the U.S. military to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Other calls had already been raised for a radical restructuring of the nation's forces, particularly naval forces.

A central target in some studies has been the large-deck nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs), with pundits and analysts alike offering opinions about: (a) the "real" number of carriers needed in the 21st century; (b) the alleged vulnerability (particularly to asymmetric threats) of these 96,000-ton warships; and (c) the relative attractiveness of smaller, stealthier, and more easily dispersed "air-capable" warships (some no larger than 700 tons) or even submarine "arsenal ships."

Despite real-world experiences that clearly and repeatedly underscored the value and survivability of sea-based tactical aircraft operating from large-deck carriers, their operational requirements and military worth have had to be explained at regular intervals since the end of World War II. The earliest confrontation, in 1948, was cast as a competition between the first "supercarrier," the United States, and the Air Force's B-36 bomber.

That carrier was laid down on 18 April 1949, but was canceled four days later. Scrapping of the B-36 bomber began in 1956, and by 1959 all B-36s were out of service. The changing nature of the threat and advancing technology made them obsolete--just as the carrier force began its renaissance. It is worth noting, however, that since 1954 large-deck carriers--and, since 1968, nuclear-powered large-deck carriers--have always been the preferred design for the nation's sea-based aviation forces.

Most fundamentally, naval forces, particularly those centered on large-deck carriers, act as the "eyes, ears, and fists" that assure immediate U.S. access to potential trouble spots with sufficient combat power to protect important U.S. interests and/or to facilitate the deployment of follow-on joint forces. Operating from international waters and airspace--and unencumbered by the need for diplomatic clearance--aircraft carriers and their multimission air wings, surface warships, and submarines constitute agile, mobile, flexible, and effective "forces of choice" that will continue to be of great strategic value to the United States.

A carrier battle group's greatest tactical advantages are endurance (now measured in months, not minutes), access-assurance, on-scene deterrence, sea-control and power-projection, and overland-defensive capabilities--all achieved without infringing upon the sovereignty of any other nation.

Enjoying freedom of movement throughout the high seas and operating from international waters in the littorals of the world, carriers and their associated combat and support forces can assure sustained access that does not depend on a foreign nation's willingness to host U.S. forces, provide supporting infrastructure, or approve overflight requests.

When called upon, sea-based air power can respond at a moment's notice to put ordnance on critical targets, accurately and precisely, 24 hours a day, in all weather, against any foe, and throughout extended periods of operation.

A Multimission Force
And Ordnance on Target

The increasing value of sea-based aviation also is underscored by improvements in the lethality of a carrier air wing's weapons since the early 1990s. Indeed, "tons on target" is no longer an adequate measure of strike effectiveness. In terms of the number of "aimpoints" that can be hit each day with precision munitions, today's air wing enjoys a nearly 500 percent increase in effectiveness compared to the capabilities demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm in 1991--and with a significantly enhanced kill capability per sortie. The Navy expects an additional 200 percent increase in "aimpoint efficiency" by 2008 as newer weapons join the fleet.

Throughout a 30-day campaign, a carrier air wing in 2001 can deliver approximately 5,000 precision-guided weapons; depending upon the exact scenario, it can launch more than 200 sorties per day, and strike nearly 700 discrete aimpoints. By 2010, the air wing will be capable of some 215 sorties that can strike 1,080 aimpoints every 24 hours.

Certainly, land-attack cruise missiles are integral elements of any sea-based strike, and Tomahawks already have been used in large numbers and in a manner that nicely complements the employment of sea-based manned tactical aircraft. Similarly, the contributions of land-based air power, once introduced into an area of operations, are valuable assets during joint campaigns. But their immediate-response capabilities and flexibility are considerably less than those represented by an aircraft carrier and its multimission air wing__on-station, ready to act.

For example, the payload of in-service Nimitz-class carriers goes well beyond the aircraft in their air wings. Each ship carries some 3,000 tons of ordnance and up to 3.5 million gallons of jet fuel. And, because ordnance and jet fuel--along with spare parts for the aircraft, and food and other consumables for the crew--can be replenished at sea, carrier-based aircraft can deliver a large volume of precision ordnance around the clock for an indefinitely sustained campaign, while also conducting numerous other vital missions.

Thus, by being there before the start of a crisis or conflict, a carrier battle group ensures that U.S. military force is immediately employable by the U.S. national command authority. A forward-deployed CVBG ensures that the "door remains open" to enable the deployment of follow-on forces from the continental United States.

Recent crises like NATO's air war in Kosovo have shown that the United States will need all the air power it can muster during the critical early days of a conflict. But today's force of 12 carriers and 10 carrier air wings (CVWs) means that a carrier may not be on-scene when a crisis breaks out, and that it may not be possible to divert additional carriers already forward-deployed for critical missions in other regions.

This lesson was forcefully (and unfortunately) illustrated in the Mediterranean Sea during the initial stages of Operation Allied Force in 1999. Because of the current "gapping" policy reluctantly imposed on U.S. unified commanders as the result of insufficient numbers of carriers, the USS Enterprise was redeployed to the Persian Gulf at precisely the wrong moment eight days prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Kosovo--notwithstanding the USCINCEUR (U.S. commander in chief, European Command) requirement for continuous carrier presence in NATO's southern region.

In fact, carrier presence in the Mediterranean dropped to a historic low in 1998--just 40 percent of the year. As Vice Adm. Daniel J. Murphy Jr., then commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, later told Congress, "There are simply not enough carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups, and submarines to meet global requirements."

Numbers Matter

During the height of the Cold War in the mid-1980s, the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy called for 15 "deployable" CVBGs and 600 "battle-group-capable" ships to carry out sequential global operations. A minimum of 15 CVBGs was considered the "prudent-risk" force, although some defense planners knew that the "minimum-risk" force objective was 22 CVBGs__far more than the nation allegedly "could afford." The happy coincidence was that 15 carriers and 14 air wings would satisfy regional warfighting commanders' requirements for peacetime forward-presence and crisis response in important regions of the world.

Today, the 15 CVBG/14 CVW/600-ship Navy is little more than a forlorn memory. The nation's 12 carriers and 10 air wings are still critical "nodes" in the much smaller 300-ship fleet, though--but they are under increasing operational and fiscal strain. Indeed, at a time when U.S. interests and friends both seem to be in jeopardy almost everywhere, the nation's naval forces have been busier than ever. During the Cold War, the Navy responded at the president's direction to a different international crisis every nine weeks or so, on average. By the late 1990s, the response rate had increased to one every three weeks.

Because of the shipbuilding "holiday" of the last 10 years, it has become apparent, according to recent projections, that a 10-carrier/250-ship fleet--or smaller--is increasingly likely unless dramatic changes in approach and funding are made. There are growing concerns that the current reviews may lead to ill-founded decisions about America's carriers from which there may be no easy__or inexpensive__way to recover.

Given the requirements of the regional warfighting commanders, no fewer than 15 large-deck carriers and 14 carrier air wings are needed to provide 100-percent CVBG "coverage" of three major areas of responsibility (AORs): the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Northwest/Western Pacific. Since 1993, however, the U.S. global naval force presence policy has been based on the inevitability of significant "gaps" in carrier coverage in these regions.

As a result of the combination of downsizing and the increased operating tempo, the Navy's carrier force is being stretched increasingly thin to meet even these constrained global commitments. It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a balance between ensuring today's combat readiness and at the same time modernizing and recapitalizing the force needed for the decades ahead. The emphasis on combat readiness for U.S rotational forces is critical; when battle groups deploy today, the odds are great that at some time during their forward-deployed operations they will engage in actual combat. All of the last 11 CVBGs to deploy have experienced this reality.

This unavoidably high operational tempo, coupled with the reality of actual combat, has caused the diversion of more and more resources toward sustaining current readiness--but at the expense of recapitalization. Operational commitments have been met, but only by the cannibalization of scarce parts and by cross-decking critically needed people, ordnance, and equipment. In both the 2001 QDR and the review being conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, therefore, the Navy must underscore the reality that force levels need to take into account the high usage rates expected in any future security environment. The "do more with less" posture of the 1990s can no longer be sustained.

Size and Mobility:
The Keys to Survival

During the Navy League's Sea-Air-Space Exposition in April, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Vern Clark said the following about the alleged vulnerability of carriers to asymmetric threats: "Maybe in the future we will have to worry about it more than we have to worry about it today. But for now and the near term, there is no more powerful, no more capable platform anywhere in the world than an American large-deck aircraft carrier."

Just as quantity has a quality all its own, so does size. Numerous studies and analyses carried out since the mid-1950s have shown that, compared to smaller ships, large-deck carriers are much more survivable against a wide variety of threats. They will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Any susceptibility to attack is mitigated by the carrier's mobility, organic self-defense systems, embarked air wing, and area defenses (afforded by surface warships and submarines).

A would-be attacker must penetrate sophisticated theater-wide and area-layered defenses--and land numerous hits--to put a carrier out of action. Carriers can withstand considerable damage, thanks to their large size, the distribution of redundant systems throughout the ship, their high-strength steel and sophisticated armor, their ballistic plating, and their underwater protective systems.

The carrier's ability to withstand severe punishment was--unfortunately and unintentionally--vividly demonstrated in 1969 when nine 500-pound bombs (the equivalent of six Soviet cruise missiles at the time) exploded on the flight deck of the USS Enterprise during a fire resulting from the detonation of a rocket's warhead. Despite the damage done, the Enterprise could have resumed flight operations within hours. Today's new carriers are even tougher and more survivable.

Before it can be hit, moreover, the carrier must first be detected. Targeting a carrier is much more difficult than finding its general operating area--which, during a 24-hour period, could encompass several thousand miles of ocean. The intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance challenges facing a would-be attacker, therefore, are both complex and resource-intensive.

Few potential adversaries possess such capabilities today, and their sensors and weapons are themselves vulnerable to operational deception and attack. "These platforms [aircraft carriers] are tough with all kinds of defensive but also powerful offensive systems," the CNO told the Navy League. "They are mobile, and they are fast ... which translates into a 700-square-mile area of uncertainty in 30 minutes. In an hour-and-a-half it grows to 6,300 miles and, friends, that presents one heck of a targeting problem."

Size also contributes significantly to seakeeping qualities and to the ability to conduct flight operations safely in severe weather around the clock. While today's larger high-performance tactical aircraft have imposed design requirements for larger flight decks--from the 81,500 tons (full load) of the first post-WWII carrier, USS Forrestal, to today's 96,000-ton Nimitz-class CVNs--so too has the demand to conduct flight operations 24 hours per day and in sea states and weather conditions that would completely shut down a much smaller ship.

Taking into consideration both the size and the capabilities of the new aircraft coming into service, the large-deck carrier and its air wing will have the ability to operate "24/7" and in virtually all weather conditions. The question that must be asked, therefore, is whether "part-time" sea-based air power staged on small "air-capable" ships is acceptable in future crises and conflicts. If past is prologue, the answer is a resounding "No!"

The tangible and intangible contributions of nuclear propulsion to operational effectiveness also must be factored into this complex equation. The endurance of today's nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is measured in millions of miles. The CVNs are capable of 25 years of operations before having to be refueled. Nuclear-powered carriers have the ability to steam at high speed from one operating area to another, without the need to replenish. They arrive on station ready for immediate action.

A Needed Investment
In U.S. National Security

Despite the hopes of most Americans to transition to an era of reduced conflict and crises during the post-Cold War era, there has been no reduction in the operational and personnel tempos required to meet U.S. global commitments, and the increased pace of operations has strained the Navy's people and their equipment. In short, the delicate balance between matching strategic requirements with needed resources has been thrown off-center. But "doing much more with much less" has become the mantra and the reality of the U.S. armed forces in recent years.

If the United States expects to preserve its position of world leadership, to assure access to world regions of importance, and to have the credible military force needed to deter conflict--and/or to respond to crises and win wars--it must invest more in all elements of U.S. national security, particularly in its versatile, capable, and forward-deployed naval expeditionary forces. The Bush administration is now poised to make a dramatic course-change to make things right.

The dramatist and writer Ben Jonson once remarked, "Good fortune smiles on the audacious." It is past time for the Navy to be audacious in articulating its "real" requirements, as the chief of naval operations has emphasized. Analysis and real-world experience clearly show that any reductions below the current force structure of 12 aircraft carriers and 10 air wings would pose great risk to U.S. national security and to the well-being of this nation's allies around the world.

Moreover, the increasingly chaotic and troubled international-security environment of recent years, combined with the higher-threat scenarios projected for the future, suggests that 15 large-deck carriers and 14 air wings would really be "the right stuff" for the United States of America. *

link

 

Nothing militarily is impossible, but when our SPY-1 radar system (carried by our Aegis cruisers and destroyers) was designed to destroy mega-fast, wavetop formations of thousands of russkie missiles, we should have no problem with anything in the forseeable future. Nobody has the massed numbers of cruise missiles that the Russkies had at one point. Unmanned aircraft are the future, but I wouldn't discount manned aircraft quite yet.

 

Missile Defense = yet another Reagan scam.

http://slate.msn.com/id/2097087/

Bush's Latest Missile-Defense Folly
Why spend billions on a system that might never work?
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Friday, March 12, 2004, at 2:48 PM PT


Forces are finally converging for a genuine debate on President Bush's missile-defense program. The Republican-controlled Congress is looking for ways to cut $9 billion from the military budget (which, at $420 billion, is getting unmanageable even for hawkish tastes). It's becoming painfully clear that rogues and terrorists are more likely to attack us with planes and trains than with nuclear missiles. And a recent series of technical studies—bolstered on Thursday by a high-profile Senate hearing—has dramatized just how difficult, if not impossible, this project is going to be.

Bush's budget for next year includes $10.7 billion for missile defense—over twice as much money as for any other single weapons system. This summer, he's planning to start deploying the first components of an MD system—six anti-missile missiles in Alaska, four in California, and as many as 20 more, in locations not yet chosen, the following year.

Yet, except by sheer luck, these interceptors will not be able to shoot down enemy missiles. Or, to put it more precisely, Bush is starting to deploy very expensive weapons without the slightest bit of evidence that they have any chance of working.

In the past six years of flight tests, here is what the Pentagon's missile-defense agency has demonstrated: A missile can hit another missile in mid-air as long as a) the operators know exactly where the target missile has come from and where it's going; b) the target missile is flying at a slower-than-normal speed; c) it's transmitting a special beam that exaggerates its radar signature, thus making it easier to track; d) only one target missile has been launched; and e) the "attack" happens in daylight.

Beyond that, the program's managers know nothing—in part because they have never run a test that goes beyond this heavily scripted (it would not be too strong to call it "rigged") scenario.

It's as if some kid were to hit a baseball thrown by a pitching machine straight down the middle at 30 mph and, on the basis of that feat, claimed he could hit whatever Mark Prior might throw him from a real mound, pitch after pitch after pitch, without fail.

There is, in other words, a vast distance between the Pentagon's current level of testing and the level that would need to be done before anyone could begin to claim that a missile-defense system might shoot down real enemy missiles in a real nuclear attack.

The latest annual report by Thomas Christie, the Pentagon's director of operational testing and evaluation, reveals just how incalculably vast this distance is. (The report was published with no fanfare at the end of last year and has appeared on private Web sites—but not the Pentagon's—in the past two weeks.)

Christie's bottom line is that we're rushing into this thing blind. Assessments of the system's capabilities are based primarily on "modeling and simulations" or on canned tests of "components and sub-systems," not on "operational tests of a mature, integrated system." Nothing can be reliably inferred from these data, because we don't know enough about the actual system that might be built and, therefore, don't know whether it bears any resemblance to the simulations. Or, as Christie puts it: "Due to the immature nature of the systems they emulate, models and simulations cannot be adequately validated at this time."

Step back and look at what a missile-defense system would involve. Broadly speaking, it would be a meshing of six separate operations: 1) an early warning radar, which would detect a missile launch; 2) satellite-based sensors that would distinguish missiles from deliberate decoys and random space clutter; 3) X-band radar that would track the missiles and control the firing of "kill vehicles" (anti-missile missiles that would shoot down enemy missiles); 4) the kill vehicles themselves; 5) booster rockets to launch the kill vehicles; and 6) the automated command-control-communications network that would connect all the above into a seamless system.

The anti-missile missiles that Bush plans to deploy later this year are the simplest elements of this system. Yet, Christie notes, they aren't ready for prime time, either—or, as he puts it, their development has been "hindered" by several shortcomings. There is currently no deployable rocket to boost them into space. Sensors, which would guide the kill vehicles to their targets, are not placed in the most optimal locations. (In the tests to date, a "transmitter" has been attached to the target, making it easy for radars to track.) A ship-based radar, which would be more flexible, won't be ready even for testing until, as Christie delicately puts it, "the post-2005 time-frame."

In general, Christie writes, kill vehicles need to be tested "at higher closing velocities and against targets with [radar] signatures, counter-measures [such as decoys], and flight dynamics more closely matching the projected threat." For now, he continues, "the small number of tests would limit confidence" in the performance of the system—or, for that matter, of any component in the system.

For many of these components, tests will not be ready for a while. The upgraded version of the Patriot air-defense missile, known as PAC-3, has shown "shortcomings" in operational testing. Further tests are scheduled—three this year, 12 next year, five in 2006, and seven in 2007—but, Christie notes, "the adequacy of this testing cannot be fully assessed because detailed objectives for most of the tests ... are not yet defined." In other words, the program managers not only haven't yet tested the missile; they haven't yet figured out what they need to test. Ditto for the vital Space Tracking Surveillance System. "The full capabilities of STSS," Christie writes, "cannot be tested until ... 2006 and 2008."

Meanwhile, the Pentagon is not exactly stepping into gear. In the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on Thursday, Sen. Carl Levin, the panel's ranking Democrat, pointed out that seven of the eight flight tests scheduled for 2003 and 2004 have been canceled or delayed until next year.

The trade publication Aerospace Daily reports today that the Airborne Laser—a program that involves attaching a kill laser to a modified Boeing 747—is suffering major cost overruns (its $3 billion budget over the next five years is soaring to $5 billion), and its first tests, once scheduled for December 2004, have been pushed back to the middle of next year at the earliest.

Here's the question smacking us all in the face, proponents and opponents alike: How much are we willing to spend, over how long a period of time, not to build an effective missile-defense system but just to discover whether such a thing is feasible?

The Pentagon plans to spend at least another $50 billion over the next five years—through about the time when the Space Tracking Surveillance System will just be starting its tests (in other words, not just well before the system is ready for action but well before we'll have discovered whether it will ever be ready). If at the end of the day we ended up with an effective defense against missiles, it would almost certainly be worth the cost. But in fact, we might discover that it isn't feasible after all.

Already, the $10.7 billion that Bush is spending for fiscal year 2005 is more than the entire U.S. Army is spending on research and development. More to the point, it's nearly twice as much as the Department of Homeland Security is spending on customs and border patrol.

The world poses a "spectrum of threats," as strategists like to say, and there's only so much money to deal with them. Where should we focus our attention and resources: on tangible, present-day threats that can be addressed by means that don't involve bumping up against the laws of physics—or on hypothetical threats of the future that this administration is trying to defeat with technology that might never get out of the lab?





http://www.slate.com/Default.aspx?id=2086724

Shooting Down Missile Defense
Even the Pentagon admits the program is in trouble.
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Thursday, Aug. 7, 2003, at 12:53 PM PT


If the generals in charge of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency followed the wispiest trail of logic, they would have slashed the program and moved on to more promising pursuits long ago. This month brings yet another bit of news (for earlier bits, click here and here) indicating not only that the program has scant chance of producing a workable missile-defense system, but that its managers know of its dim prospects.

The latest flash, from the Aug. 1 edition of the trade journal Defense News, is that the agency has suspended one of the program's most crucial components on the grounds that the technology it involves is "not mature enough" to fund.
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Since Woofer brought this thread back up (which I had forgotten), I thought I would clarify my take on the carrier thing and correct something I said.

As for supercarriers, the alternative I was interested in wasn't the small, mostly anti-sub platforms morphed into an offensive Harrier carrier for the Falklands, but the new carriers being built for the British Navy. (assuming they don't fall victim to the budget axe) We don't need a 6000 man target for force projection. We could go a little smaller and still scare the hell out of many adversaries.

Some info:

Future Aircraft Carrier CVF (002)

The new larger class of Aircraft Carrier, as a replacement for the three existing Invincible Class ships. Initial estimates are that the ships could be 300 metres long and displace about 40,000 tons capable of carrying up to 50 aircraft, resulting in a ship that would be twice as large as the current Invincible class. These carriers are likely to be among the biggest ships ever built for the Royal Navy.

CVF is a flagship programme for the UK and central to the commitment in the Strategic Defence Review to modern, flexible and highly capable forces. The two larger and more capable vessels will replace the current Invincible class aircraft carriers. Assessment work is investigating aircraft carrier design options. These include designs capable of accommodating short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) and conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft. They will be conventionally powered. The carrier design taken forward will be dependent on the final choice of aircraft that the UK buys. There are two carrier-borne versions of JSF planned: one taking off using a ski-jump and landing vertically; the other launched with a catapult and landing with the aid of an arrestor wire.

Estimated procurement costs of £2.7 Bn at out-turn prices. The Project awarded two competitive contracts for the Assessment Phase in November 1999 to industry teams headed by BAE SYSTEMS and Thomson-CSF (now Thales Naval Systems). Each contract is potentially worth up to £30m. The contract for the Demonstration and Manufacture of the vessels is planned for 2004. In-service dates are 2012 and 2015.

The requirement for the Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF) was endorsed in the Strategic Defence Review (SDR). The need for rapidly deployable forces with the reach and self-sufficiency to act independently of host-nation support confirmed the requirement for aircraft carriers, but SDR also concluded that the ability to deploy offensive air- power would be central to future force projection operations, with carriers operating the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles. The current Invincible Class of carriers were designed for Cold War nti-submarine warfare operations. With helicopters and a limited air-defence capability provided by a relatively small number of embarked Sea Harriers, it was judged that this capability would no longer meet future UK requirements. It was therefore decided to replace the Invincible Class with two larger and more capable aircraft carriers able to operate up to 50 aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopters. It is planned that CVF’s offensive air-power will be provided primarily by the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft (FCBA). The carrier air group will also operate the Future Organic Airborne Early Warning (FOAEW) system together with helicopters from all three Services in a variety of roles.

CVF received Initial Gate approval in December 1998 and Invitations to Tender were issued in January 1999. Responses were received in May 1999 from industry teams led by British Aerospace (now BAE Systems) and Thomson-CSF. Following tender evaluation, competitive firm price contracts for the Assessment Phase, each potentially worth some £30m, were awarded to both teams in November 1999. The Assessment Phase breaks down into two stages. The first involves the examination of various carrier designs including conventional take-off and landing, short take off and vertical landing, and short take-off but arrested recovery. The second stage will involve detailed work to determine CVF design parameters and reduce technological risk for the preferred carrier option that is to be taken forward.

The two industrial teams led by BAE Systems and Thomson-CSF. Both teams are working to investigate a range of aircraft carrier design options and, by 2003, will deliver their proposals. Orders for the two carriers should be placed in 2004 if they are to enter service in 2012 and 2015.

In the House of Commons on 22 June 2001, the Secretary of State for Defence reaffirmed the Government's commitment to buy two aircraft carriers to replace the current Invincible class. The first of the new carriers is planned for 2012, the second 2015, and they will offer significantly greater capability than the present carriers, carrying up to fifty aircraft. The aircraft themselves will include the most modern types, with the Joint Strike Fighter the most likely choice for the fast jet role.

If built, the CVF carriers will easily be the biggest warships ever built for the Royal Navy, far larger than the old fleet carrier Eagle or the battleship Vanguard. The CVF is intended to be between 275 and 300 meters long (ie about 900 to 1,000 feet), with a full displacement between 50,000 to 60,000 tons [the higher figures for CTOL, lower for STOVL]. Assuming that 50,000 tons (metric) is the light displacement, the full load displacement of CVF could easily be 65,000 tons compared with the 50,800 short tons (50,000 metric tons) of Ark Royal in her later days.

The latest BAE artists concept [as of mid-2001] of its CTOL CVF design shows a number of changes since the pictures earlier in the year. The island is now much smaller (but with a very prominent and almost observatory style bridge and FLYCO) and very stealthy. The SAMPSON MFR radar is replaced with a rotating long range antenna radar. The VLS silo for Aster 15 missile is eliminated, presumably on cost grounds. The Phalanx CIWS mounts have been relocated, and a closer look reveals Sea RAM not Phalanx. There's now a separate "main mast" aft of the island. An elevator has been relocated to starboard deckside, aft of the radar mast. Two EMALS type catapults are very prominent, as these are 93 meters long they give a reasonable idea of scale, and a 300 meters overall length still looks about right. The catapults have steam or mositure rising off them which suggest steam, and no arrestor wires are shown.

Following the Strategic Defence Review, options are being examined for a successor to the Royal Navy Sea Harrier and the Royal Air Force Harrier GR7 from 2012. FCBA is to provide the Joint Force 2000 (joint command for all Harrier forces) with a multi-role fighter/attack aircraft. The FCBA in-service date will coincide with the first of the new aircraft carriers (CVF) to enter service. The current planning assumption is the Short Take Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) being developed for US Air force, Navy and Marine Corps. Feasibility Studies into alternative options to JSF for a cost effective solution to the FCBA requirement are also being conducted. These options are the Conventional Carrier Variant of JSF, the US F18E, the French Rafale-M, a ‘navalised’ Eurofighter and an advanced Harrier. The plan is to submit a Business Case in October 2000, seeking approval to either sign the MOU or to carry out further work on the non-JSF options.

On January 30, 2003 the Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon announced that the Royal Navy's new generation of aircraft carriers will be designed and built by an Alliance between the Ministry of Defence and industry, bringing together the UK's best design capability and project management expertise.

Subject to detailed final negotiations, BAES Systems will take the leading position as preferred prime contractor, with Thales UK performing a major role as key supplier. The project will develop the carrier design put forward by Thales UK. The ships will be designed and built entirely in the United Kingdom, with shipyards at Babcock BES at Rosyth in Scotland, BAE Systems on the Clyde, Swan Hunter in the North East and Vosper Thornycroft at Portsmouth playing key roles, creating or sustaining around 10,000 jobs in the United Kingdom.

The two vessels, which are expected to displace around 60,000 tonnes each, will be the largest and most powerful surface warships ever built in the UK. They will be equipped with the world's most advanced stealthy and supersonic jump-jet, the Lockheed Martin F35.

The MOD carefully reviewed the work carried out by BAE Systems and Thales UK in the Assessment Phase, and concluded that BAE Systems had demonstrated a better understanding of the programme and its complexity and had developed a good relationship with the key shipyards. Thales UK had provided a robust technical solution and a strong flexible design.

The MOD therefore approached both BAE Systems and Thales UK to discuss a possible alliance with the MOD on the programme. Both companies have accepted the logic of the approach. Detailed contractual discussions will now start to determine formally how the Alliance will operate.

Specifications
Displacement 60,000
Length 290m
Beam 75m
Draft
Speed 25+ knots
Range ~ 10,000
Propulsion conventional
Integrated Full Electric Propulsion Using gas turbines and/or diesels.
Armament
Aircraft Carrier Air Group of up to 48 fixed and rotary wing aircraft:
Future Carrier Borne Aircraft (FCBA) – Joint Strike Fighter
Future Organic Airborne Early Warning (FOAEW) - Options for FOAEW could include: EH101 (Merlin) helicopter; V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor; E-2C Hawkeye; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles(UAVs)/ Lighter Than Air Vehicles (LTAVs)
Helicopters in a variety of roles that could include anti-submarine warfare, support and attack

Crew ~1,200

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/cvf.htm

Now the end result might turn out to be a little smaller than this due to budget considerations, but we don't seem to have those, do we?


I'll give my take on the BB's later.

 

Where the f-ck is airwolf when you need it?

 

The crew and plane payload is surprisingly low compared to US carriers. I wonder if the US and Britain are still pursuing the same respective strategies they did in WW2, the US going for speed and capacity, the UK going for survivability.