[ClutchFans] How we got here: A look back at the end of the Yao era to now

Hey Nike, the NYT forgot to cite you as a source:

Twisting Path Put Rockets in Position to Sign Howard

ORLANDO, Fla. — The transaction is simple on the surface, familiar and mathematically sound. An N.B.A. team creates salary-cap room. An N.B.A. star signs a rich deal using that room. The Houston Rockets sign Dwight Howard and become instant contenders.

When the Rockets persuaded Howard to dump Kobe Bryant, spurn the Lakers and trade Hollywood for Houston, it was the culmination of a two-year campaign based on hope and hunches. It was the success of a strategy no one had tried. It may be the new template for rebuilding in the modern age.

For 24 months, Rockets General Manager Daryl Morey did nothing but shuffle bodies — acquiring talent, trading that talent, then packaging the new talent with draft picks to acquire newer, better talent, until those assets could be cashed in for a franchise star — like a kid at the carnival trading up for the grand prize.

Last October, the Rockets converted some of those assets into James Harden, an electrifying young shooting guard. Last week, they landed Howard, using Harden as the main draw.

Two years ago, the Rockets were a 43-win team loaded with role players. Next fall, they will be one of the top contenders in the West, anchored by two of the top 15 players in the league.

“I think obviously it requires preparation and good fortune,” Morey said, speaking generally about the Rockets’ approach. “I think we’ve had a little of both.”

It also requires a bold, creative vision, and the conviction to carry it out — qualities that are not found in every front office.

Until now, there have been three conventional paths to land a superstar: the draft lottery, trades and free agency. But the draft is fickle, and high picks require a lot of losing. Trades for superstars are rare and tough to execute. The free-agent route requires cap room, and when the stars don’t come, that room is often filled by flotsam (see Bobcats, Charlotte).

Morey’s impulse in 2011 was to strip down Houston’s roster and gamble on the lottery — the “bottoming-out” approach. According to the statistics-minded Morey, that route has the highest probability of success.

There was just one problem: no one in the Rockets brain trust had the stomach for losing, least of all the owner Les Alexander.

Morey needed an alternate path, a middle way.

“There’s this other way we can try it,” Morey told Alexander then, “but no one’s ever done it.”

Thus began the roster churning and the asset hoarding and a truly revolutionary rebuilding process.

In March 2012, Morey sent Jordan Hill, a former Knicks lottery pick, to the Lakers for Derek Fisher and a 2014 first-round pick. He sent two other young players, Jonny Flynn and Hasheem Thabeet, to Portland for Marcus Camby.

Two months later, Morey swapped the promising Chase Budinger for Minnesota’s first-round pick, which he used to take Terrence Jones. He sent Samuel Dalembert to Milwaukee in a deal that allowed him to swap picks with the Bucks and select Jeremy Lamb.

That was just a warm-up.

Last July, Morey sent his starting point guard, Kyle Lowry, to Toronto in exchange for the Raptors’ 2013 first-round pick — with conditions that practically guaranteed it would be in the lottery. He flipped Camby to the Knicks for three players and two second-round picks. He picked up three more players and a second-round pick in a deal with Boston.

“A mad scientist,” a rival team executive said of Morey last July.

The payoff came in October, when the budget-minded Thunder deemed Harden too expensive. They sent him to Houston in exchange for Lamb, Kevin Martin and two first-round picks — including the lottery pick from the Lowry trade.

Every team in the league theoretically had a shot at Harden. The Rockets had the best assets to make the deal.

“It required a lot of pain and too much turnover, more than anyone would want,” Morey said. “It wasn’t safe to buy a jersey for awhile.”

There was also no guarantee it would work. In recent years, Morey had chased Carmelo Anthony, Pau Gasol, Chris Paul, Chris Bosh and Howard, failing in every pursuit. But he kept churning.

Between February and last week, Morey made four more trades that netted the Rockets more picks and more cap room, allowing him ultimately to sign Howard to a maximum contract while still keeping the core of his team intact.

Of the five teams that chased Howard, only the Rockets could offer a partnership with a player as young and talented as the 23-year-old Harden. Only the Rockets had all of their future first-round picks in hand, ensuring a steady influx of young talent to support the superstars. (It also helped that Houston is one of the more popular cities among players.)

There is a simple premise at work here, one that many teams still fail to grasp: that mediocrity is a dead end, resulting in first-round playoff exits, low draft picks and clogged salary caps. Championships require superstars. Renewal requires suffering.

The smarter teams get it.

The Utah Jazz, with Dennis Lindsey at the helm, just acquired two first-round picks and three second-round picks as the reward for acquiring two large, expiring contracts from Golden State. The Jazz could have re-signed Paul Millsap and Al Jefferson and remained a 43-win team. Instead, they let them walk, and used the cap room as a means to collect assets.

In Philadelphia, Morey’s former assistant Sam Hinkie is following the same blueprint. On draft night, he traded his best player, Jrue Holiday, to New Orleans in exchange for the Pelicans’ first-round picks in 2013 (Nerlens Noel) and 2014, when the draft will be loaded with talent. With Holiday, the 76ers had a chance to be decent. Without him, they have a chance to be awful enough to land a star next June.

To various degrees, the Cleveland Cavaliers and the Orlando Magic have also been executing the Rockets’ game plan over the last few years, collecting young players and picks and keeping their payrolls modest until worthy players come along.

Better to have cheap assets than overpaid role players. Better to have cap flexibility than a shot at the eighth seed. Better to chase the next available superstar than to chase perpetual mediocrity.

That’s the new way, the Rockets’ Way.

“I said, ‘Look, no one’s ever done this,’ ” Morey said, “but I don’t see why it can’t work.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/s...ition-to-sign-howard.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

 

The facts are clear. The details and the rationalization don't turn getting rid of a guy (to keep three guys who we subsequently got rid of) then paying top dollar the next year, into a well thought out strategy.

Not hating or criticizing, just pointing out what a chaotic churning of players we had. Perhaps the exact opposite of the way we like to think of building a team. Draft smarter than everyone else and mold the young players into a championship team.

Nothing is wrong with correcting a misstep. Whatever works, works.

 

Yao could have been an all time great, and he disappointed the ROckets greatly IMO.
I was a huge fan of his

 

To say you dont understand the rational behind cutting a UNGUARANTEED contract over three GUARANTEED ones when you arent the one paying the bills is easy.....but that is EXACTLY what happened.

During the short period the Rockets had to see what Lin could do, he did not show anything worth keeping him and paying extra money for guys who arent even playing for them. The fact that he eventually showed he had enough talent does not factor into the equation.....if he would have shown the Rockets the same stuff he showed in NY, they would have never got rid of him.

You new to the Rockets? Choatic churning of players is the Rockets MO over the last three years.

and that is the problem with going by "conventional wisdom"....most people *think* there is only one way to build a team....Morey obviously doesnt agree...he found another way.

 

I'm sure there's nobody more disappointed than Yao himself. It's hard to be disappointed in such a great guy that wanted to contribute so badly. Overall, he took this organization to a whole new level on several different spectrums.

 

It's pretty simple. Daryl Morey valued cap flexability more than he valued Jeremy Lin. Simple as that. You don't have to agree with it but it was a very well thought out strategy that was criticle to landing Dwight Howard.

 

Lol, all TMac fans are now Morey fans. :grin:

 

I saw Yao.

 

I wonder if Dwight remembers all the beatings he took from Yao

 

I understand moneyball, perhaps not as well as those signing the checks. You and Lex are dual signatories on all Rockets disbursments?

Believe it or not, you were not the only one to watch the whole Lin scenario unfold, but does that make it a "well thought out strategy", to let him go, he improves a whole lot, then buy him back at top dollar?

It may or may not have been the right thing to do, playing the cards one at a time as they are dealt, but let's not make it into 12 chess moves ahead of the other guy. The things folks expect one to believe on these forums is beyond belief.

I am fairly new to the Rockets. I remember watching Rudy, Calvin and Moses. My apologies for being new to the game.

Call it "A twisting path" or a chaotic path, it is what happened. We have no disagreement there.

Go Rockets.

 

I agree that the overall churning of assets looks like a successful overall strategy, but inherent within that is are small miscues that you can recover from. How important getting Lin back is at his dollars still remains to be seen.

A strategy is essentially a plan. No one plans specifically to do something that has that large of an effect on overall salaries.