and "anytime you see military action you could substitute invasion" was never mine. ok - tangential objection noted.
OK HS... Here are the signatories to the Clinton letter... the one that mentions military action, military efforts, and military steps... Elliott Abrams Richard L. Armitage William J. Bennett Jeffrey Bergner John Bolton Paula Dobriansky Francis Fukuyama Robert Kagan Zalmay Khalilzad William Kristol Richard Perle Peter W. Rodman Donald Rumsfeld William Schneider, Jr. Vin Weber Paul Wolfowitz R. James Woolsey Robert B. Zoellick Two of the other articles I cited were written by Robert Kagan and William Kristol. The third was written by Reuel Marc Gerecht. Who's he? The articles weren't just picked off the WS and other sites because the people running PNAC thought they were good examples of proper English. They are posted on the PNAC website because they were written by members of PNAC and reflect very well the position of PNAC. Even if "policy" docs are written in a different style than editorial pieces designed to fan the flames, the meaning of both exercises is clear. To use an extreme example, the language in Mein Kampf is much different than the language in German Law and edicts issued by Hitler when he was in power, yet nobody can say Hitler didn't really want to kill Jews because he never expressly said, "Let's gas the Jews, steal their gold teeth, and burn their bodies in ovens." These PNAC guys didn't ride into DC with W and say "Hey, look... 9-11. Let's use the military to do something a little less than invade Iraq." No, they said, "Hey, 9-11. Cool. Let's invade Iraq and alter the ME with Shock and Awe just like we've always wanted to!" You simply cannot parse the "official" writings of PNAC while ignoring their other writings (proudly displayed on thier website!) and actions. They wanted to invade Iraq. They say so in both the official and opinion pieces, even if you sometimes have to think a bit to figure it out. They got their wish. My kid's grandkid's will still be paying for their folly.
Yes, and some of those were AGAINST the invasion of Iraq (see Fukuyama)! Most of the others weren't suggesting invasion simply because it was inconceivable at that point that support could be garnered for such an action, which is why the suggestions emerging were NOT invasion but other actions (as will be made very plain momentarily). Again you're skipping the step of providing material that shows the intention was to invade Iraq. What you've provided so far hasn't done that despite my continued requests. What you've done instead is find papers and articles that talk about supporting internal uprisings, taking a stronger military posture, having more forces in the Gulf and other phrases that translate into invasion only because that is what you've decided they mean. The argument over 'words' is important precisely because you are mistakenly assuming a meaning those 'words' do not convey. I can make this abundantly clear. Read this passage and then match up the names at the bottom of the letter with those from the Clinton letter. The rolls are almost exactly the same. This is an indepth list of exact and specific actions that can be taken, including ***drumroll please**** military action like supporting internal uprisings, taking stronger military posture, having more forces in the Gulf and others that don't include an invasion of Iraq. Going one step farther the author, Jeffrey Bergner (see your list above) specifically points out (I've underlined it below) that this list is the same presented back in 1998! That both reenforces my contention and cuts a big ol' hole in yours. What To Do Now About Iraq (Washington, D.C.): A growing focus of policy debate in Washington and around the world is whether, and if so when, President Bush will launch a second phase of the war on terrorism against Iraq. While there is a growing appreciation that Saddam Hussein must be removed from power, there is considerable uncertainty about--and in some quarters adamant opposition to--the United States launching military operations for that purpose in the foreseeable future. Fortunately, there is much that the Bush Administration could do short of open hostilities to begin the necessary effort to liberate the people of Iraq, as has recently been done for most of the people of Afghanistan. A blueprint outlining such steps was provided to President Bush's predecessor in February 1998 by the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf. Since many of the authors of this plan are now senior members of the Bush team-- including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage--its early adoption and implementation should be accomplished without further, undue internal debate or delay. Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf Open Letter to the President 19 February 1998 Dear Mr. President, Many of us were involved in organizing the Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf in 1990 to support President Bush's policy of expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Seven years later, Saddam Hussein is still in power in Baghdad. And despite his defeat in the Gulf War, continuing sanctions, and the determined effort of UN inspectors to fetter out and destroy his weapons of mass destruction, Saddam Hussein has been able to develop biological and chemical munitions. To underscore the threat posed by these deadly devices, the Secretaries of State and Defense have said that these weapons could be used against our own people. And you have said that this issue is about "the challenges of the 21st Century." Iraq's position is unacceptable. While Iraq is not unique in possessing these weapons, it is the only country which has used them -- not just against its enemies, but its own people as well. We must assume that Saddam is prepared to use them again. This poses a danger to our friends, our allies, and to our nation. It is clear that this danger cannot be eliminated as long as our objective is simply "containment," and the means of achieving it are limited to sanctions and exhortations. As the crisis of recent weeks has demonstrated, these static policies are bound to erode, opening the way to Saddam's eventual return to a position of power and influence in the region. Only a determined program to change the regime in Baghdad will bring the Iraqi crisis to a satisfactory conclusion. For years, the United States has tried to remove Saddam by encouraging coups and internal conspiracies. These attempts have all failed. Saddam is more wily, brutal and conspiratorial than any likely conspiracy the United States might mobilize against him. Saddam must be overpowered; he will not be brought down by a coup d'etat. But Saddam has an Achilles' heel: lacking popular support, he rules by terror. The same brutality which makes it unlikely that any coups or conspiracies can succeed, makes him hated by his own people and the rank and file of his military. Iraq today is ripe for a broad-based insurrection. We must exploit this opportunity. Saddam's long record of treaty violations, deception, and violence shows that diplomacy and arms control will not constrain him. In the absence of a broader strategy, even extensive air strikes would be ineffective in dealing with Saddam and eliminating the threat his regime poses. We believe that the problem is not only the specifics of Saddam's actions, but the continued existence of the regime itself. What is needed now is a comprehensive political and military strategy for bringing down Saddam and his regime. It will not be easy -- and the course of action we favor is not without its problems and perils. But we believe the vital national interests of our country require the United States to: Recognize a provisional government of Iraq based on the principles and leaders of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) that is representative of all the peoples of Iraq. Restore and enhance the safe haven in northern Iraq to allow the provisional government to extend its authority there and establish a zone in southern Iraq from which Saddam's ground forces would also be excluded. Lift sanctions in liberated areas. Sanctions are instruments of war against Saddam's regime, but they should be quickly lifted on those who have freed themselves from it. Also, the oil resources and products of the liberated areas should help fund the provisional government's insurrection and humanitarian relief for the people of liberated Iraq. Release frozen Iraqi assets -- which amount to $1.6 billion in the United States and Britain alone -- to the control of the provisional government to fund its insurrection. This could be done gradually and so long as the provisional government continues to promote a democratic Iraq. Facilitate broadcasts from U.S. transmitters immediately and establish a Radio Free Iraq. Help expand liberated areas of Iraq by assisting the provisional government's offensive against Saddam Hussein's regime logistically and through other means. Remove any vestiges of Saddam's claim to "legitimacy" by, among other things, bringing a war crimes indictment against the dictator and his lieutenants and challenging Saddam's credentials to fill the Iraqi seat at the United Nations. Launch a systematic air campaign against the pillars of his power -- the Republican Guard divisions which prop him up and the military infrastructure that sustains him. Position U.S. ground force equipment in the region so that, as a last resort, we have the capacity to protect and assist the anti-Saddam forces in the northern and southern parts of Iraq. Once you make it unambiguously clear that we are serious about eliminating the threat posed by Saddam, and are not just engaged in tactical bombing attacks unrelated to a larger strategy designed to topple the regime, we believe that such countries as Kuwait, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, whose cooperation would be important for the implementation of this strategy, will give us the political and logistical support to succeed. In the present climate in Washington, some may misunderstand and misinterpret strong American action against Iraq as having ulterior political motives. We believe, on the contrary, that strong American action against Saddam is overwhelmingly in the national interest, that it must be supported, and that it must succeed. Saddam must not become the beneficiary of an American domestic political controversy. We are confident that were you to launch an initiative along these line, the Congress and the country would see it as a timely and justifiable response to Iraq's continued intransigence. We urge you to provide the leadership necessary to save ourselves and the world from the scourge of Saddam and the weapons of mass destruction that he refuses to relinquish. Sincerely, Hon. Stephen Solarz, Former Member, Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. House of Representatives Hon. Richard Perle, Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Hon. Elliot Abrams, President, Ethics & Public Policy Center; Former Assistant Secretary of State Richard V. Allen, Former National Security Advisor Hon. Richard Armitage, President, Armitage Associates, L.C.; Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Jeffrey T. Bergner, President, Bergner, Bockorny, Clough & Brain; Former Staff Director, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hon. John Bolton, Senior Vice President, American Enterprise Institute; Former Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Bryen, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Hon. Richard Burt, Chairman, IEP Advisors, Inc.; Former U.S. Ambassador to Germany; Former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Hon. Frank Carlucci, Former Secretary of Defense Hon. Judge William Clark, Former National Security Advisor Paula J. Dobriansky, Vice President, Director of Washington Office, Council on Foreign Relations; Former Member, National Security Council Doug Feith, Managing Attorney, Feith & Zell P.C.; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy Frank Gaffney, Director, Center for Security Policy; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces Jeffrey Gedmin, Executive Director, New Atlantic Initiative; Research Fellow, American Enterprise Institute Hon. Fred C. Ikle, Former Undersecretary of Defense Robert Kagan, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Zalmay M. Khalilzad, Director, Strategy and Doctrine, RAND Corporation Sven F. Kraemer, Former Director of Arms Control, National Security Council William Kristol, Editor, The Weekly Standard Michael Ledeen, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute; Former Special Advisor to the Secretary of State Bernard Lewis, Professor Emeritus of Middle Eastern and Ottoman Studies, Princeton University R. Admiral Frederick L. Lewis, U.S. Navy, Retired Maj. Gen. Jarvis Lynch, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired Hon. Robert C. McFarlane, Former National Security Advisor Joshua Muravchik, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute Robert A. Pastor, Former Special Assistant to President Carter for Inter-American Affairs Martin Peretz, Editor-in-Chief, The New Republic Roger Robinson, Former Senior Director of International Economic Affairs, National Security Council Peter Rodman, Director of National Security Programs, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom; Former Director, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State Hon. Peter Rosenblatt, Former Ambassador to the Trust Territories of the Pacific Hon. Donald Rumsfeld, Former Secretary of Defense Gary Schmitt, Executive Director, Project for the New American Century; Former Executive Director, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Max Singer, President, The Potomac Organization; Former President, The Hudson Institute Hon. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution; Former Counsellor, U.S. Department of State Hon. Caspar Weinberger, Former Secretary of Defense Leon Wienseltier, Literary Editor, The New Republic Hon. Paul Wolfowitz, Dean, Johns Hopkins SAIS; Former Undersecretary of Defense David Wurmser, Director, Middle East Program, AEI; Research Fellow, American Enterprise Institute Dov S. Zakheim, Former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=01-D_76
*sigh* Same ol' Hayes: Now this is good data, but again I think you are drawing an imaginary line. You are essentially arguing that because alternatives to direct invasion are mentioned, all deduction that said authors are pro-invasion is false. That's a bit of a reach. I'm sure, as you put it, multiple options for Saddam's removal were investigated, but this does not preclude military invasion - and that's what happened. There are plenty of people in positions of real knowledeg (Paul O’Neill for example ) that would dispute the claim you make, i.e., that invasion was never discussed or contemplated. They were pro-invasion, if that was necessary, because nothing was going to stop them from removing Saddam. Why the heck they were so stuck on Saddam is an even better question, especially following 9/11 and OBL - but totally offtopic.
actually, its more ontopic than the back and forth with hayes. i dont think its offtopic at all. this country needs to look more closely at the connections b/t 9/11 and the neocons desire to take out saddam.
Agreed. I was preemptively avoiding the "changing the subject" charge from ol' Hayes. There is only one connection, IMO. 9/11 gave them the final justificaiton (albeit false and deceitful) to invade, whereas before they were relegated to options like those Hayes keeps bringing up. The underlying motivation regarding Saddam is a mystery to me: unfinished business, corporate motivation, or even the delusional Hayesian notion of "middle eastern democracy to stabilize the region" all seem plausible. That being said, that latter motive (condoned by Hayes) seems irrational, since it was never used as rationale until all the other excuses ran out. But such debate/inquiry is "truly" offtopic in my opinion, since the more important item is that they ignored the real threat, choosing rather to utilize it to trick the American populace into an unnecessary war.
No. Since I already agreed this is a disagreement over two formed opinions my position isn't that the data precluded military invasion as an option, but rather that other options were what they were actually discussing as far back as 1998. I guess we can dissect what 'discussing' means if you want to go that far. I don't think I would say the idea of invading Iraq never came up between this group of people, rather that the options they forwarded and proposed as recommendations for action did not include invasion. As the article you site brings up I am not sure O'Neill was in a position to be involved in those discussions. His position certainly doesn't jive with what the PNAC et al publicly called for (as in the Clinton letter and the second release I posted above). To claim that their public recommendations to those two Presidents were that much different than their private goals, and that the administration's public position was that much different than their publicly announced goals, walks the conspiracy line a little too much for my taste. Why would the administration even come out publicly pre 9/11 saying Iraq was not an immediate concern if they actually were planning to invade Iraq. That doesn't make sense to me. I think its understandable that Saddam was a concern, but I'd agree that the timing is something that should be delved into. Seems part of the topic to me. Not sure where this 'changing the subject charge' charge comes from. Could be, but again why the public announcements that contradict that point of view? How can it be delusional and plausible at the same time? Your knee jerk reaction to discredit my opinions seem to have you contradicting yourself. I don't think anyone can dispute that the most emphasized rationale for war with Iraq was the danger of WMDs. At the same time it is revisionist to claim the other rationales were not present in the beginning, albeit less emphasized. Since neoconservatives are considered to be the driving force behind the intervention it only makes sense that the other rationales were integral to the decisionmaking such as Saddam being a genocidal dictator and that there could be a greater democratization of the ME. Those both are core concerns of the ideology itself. I think you're mistaking the movement of emphasis as the search for WMDs came up empty with a creation of new justifications and I don't believe that is borne out by the data.
Fair enough. IMO, because the american public was sick of the gulf situation prior to 9/11, and did not want to bother with another war without a good reason. Thus my charge that 9/11 gave them the justification. We were talking about PNAC documents, now we're discussing Bush policy. Hmmmm - nevermind. You are right - not offtopic at all. lol - now it's you "sliding off the edge". Calm down. It's plausible Bush et. al. bought into the delusional neocon ideology of "stabilization through regime change, even if that means war". Take your meds. Now it's you ignoring the explicit. I could waste a lot of time and (in Hayesian fashion) delve up all the justification brought forward by the Bush Junta and claim that these other rationales you mention were not explicitly given by the administration. But I won't. I'm bigger than that. I think you're right, that other interpretations and deductions could lead one to the conclusion that WMDs were not the only motivating factor, despite the lack of explicit data to prove it. There was a neocon ideology at the root of this, misguided as that may be. That such ideology still required a false accusation of WMDs to stir up legitimate support is certainly indicative of both it's acceptance and it's logic/plausability. I don't think I'm mistaking anything about the WMD horsecrap and the subsequent backpedaling by the administration. I never even bothered to mention the WMD debacle, as I don't think it was ever a real motivator for Bush in the Iraq saga. It was only useful in that it stirred up fear enough to allow for support at home regarding invasion. Well, that and a consistent shady linkage of Saddam and al quaida. This was a great post Hayes, but it betrays some other motives behind your emphasis on "explicit and well defined" discussion.
Hmmm...certainly 9/11 gave them room to move Iraq up on the agenda. But how does that affect our disagreement on whether or not that an invasion was in the making? Unless they anticipated 9/11 it would be a waste of time to 'plan' to invade Iraq (other than Pentagon contingency planning which in which they run through thousands of different scenarios) as they would never have the political capital to take the action. Bergner explicitly says as much when he explains why they offered the alternate solutions they did both in '98 and after the 2000 elections. Well, I think we're in agreement that PNAC documents do not call for the invasion of Iraq. I think the Bergner analysis at least gives reasonable weight to the argument that invasion was not the recommendation. Since he was an insider AND since the subsequent letter enumerates those options as things other than invasion (providing an explicit public record of the actual recommendations) I think that discussion is reasonably settled. Or, in the alternative, we've taken it as far as we can. This would seem to be the logical next progression in the conversation. Hah. And you accuse me of word play. They were. It's a matter of record. Feel free to contest it if you want. That the WMD threat was the cause of the mobilization to support the theory has nothing to do with the validity of the theory itself. That's the 'logical fallacy of appealing to the masses.' One person can be right and lots of people wrong. Like in this discussion, maybe... How many people believe a certain thing has no bearing on its correctness. I want to make sure that my position is clear. I don't disagree WMD was at the forefront of the justification for the intervention in Iraq. My dispute is that the emphasis shifted as time went by from WMD and the link to AQ to Saddam being a genocidal dictator/humanitarian intervention and movement for democratization. It is simply false that the other rationales were created later. I guess you're implicitly making a statement but I'm not sure what. If you want to be explicit about what you mean then please do so.
I don't think they "planned" the invasion even after they got the green light via their WMD falsehoods. lol we never were. Fom the beginning I said they "suggested". Then I said they are pro-invasion. We debated. Now we've moved on. No doubt. Feel free to try and convince me those were the explicit primary reasons for invasion. Correct, which is why I said it's indicative of common perceptions, not how right or wrong it is. Nevermind, you've made a complete red herring of my comment. It's not the neocon ideology I was arguing about (we've done that MANY times) - I was commenting on the fact that the Bush Junta relied on the WMD claim for support, not the aforementioned silly neocon delusions of grandeur. They were always there, but they never mattered to Bush and the rest of the war supporters until he got busted on the WMD claims. Which is why Colin Powell, who was as duped as the rest of the nation, despondently stepped down and later referred to his WMD philandering as "a painful blot on his record". You are perfectly willing to make deductions and logical progressions if it supports your case. If I or Rimrocker (in this case) do it, we are ignoring "explicit data" and the proper meaning of words.
Nice try. That wouldn't make much sense as I've already stated the emphasis clearly was on WMD and the AQ connection. Therefore my burden wouldn't be to convince you those were the 'explicit primary reasons for invasion,' only that they were present in the beginning and emphasized more as time went by. The record clearly shows this to be the case and you admit as much in the next passage. Not sure what this does for you other than contradict your earlier assertion that the administration made NEW justifications after WMDs weren't found. Please. If there is explicit data there is usually not much to argue about. My contention with you is usually when your deductions and 'logical progression' are either wrong or unsupported by the data, IMO. This thread is a prime example of that: using your power of deduction and logical progression you claimed that 'use of military power' meant 'invasion,' and that they were in fact 'synonymous.' I supplied a letter that spelled out what those options were and they didn't include invasion. You made a mistake in your logical progression. I challenged that. I never said you can never use deductive reasoning or that you can't look for a logical progression in an argument.
You seem to be continually ignoring the nasty query as to why those false WMD claims were the root rationale. The term "never used" was too much. The above question remains. Nice. I acknowledged your tangential objection to "synonymous". You acknowledged that there is nothing wrong with calling the two synonymous, provided the context is appropriate, which in this case is a matter of opinion and of (drumroll) deduction. However, you don't like that since it takes away from your argument, so you piss and moan about dictionary definitions while claiming I said (still claiming, mind you) "military power=invasion". Which of course, I did not. I said it can be, I said it was not precluded, I said basing a large theme (particuarly one as inflammatory as preemptive war) on a single word is specious. You supplied a letter that, like PNAC, noted multiple options but never explicitly called for invasion. Similarly like PNAC, the letter never ruled invasion out either. Moreover, the letter (again, like PNAC) was not exactly forthcoming with options other than the removal of Saddam, and was less than sparing in it's version of the consequences should said action not be taken. It is not difficult to discern that the authors/signatories of that letter or the pax americana document would have advocated invasion if necessary to remove this "grave threat". But miraculously, unlike the supposition that Bush had neocon altruism in his heart when he decided to invade, this conclusion - in the eyes of the supremely logical Hayes - is far-fetched and illogical to the point of ridicule. You made the same mistake you always make, applying standards to my arguments you don't apply to yours. This thread is a prime example of that: using your power of linguistic nit-picking you determined that military intervention and invasion are not the same. When confronted with an opposing example, you admit the potentiality, and then proceed to continue to berate me for the very same claim. Repeatedly. Over and over again. Even after I note your objection. And then one more time. Yet you already admitted I could be right, but miraculously, your conclusion is that I am wrong. And not just any wrong, 100% totally undeniably wrong. Yet, you say I could be right. Now that's some masterful deductive ability.
by 1998 isn't everyone aware that saddam is too powerful to be ousted by just an internal uprising? how many internal attempts to remove him has taken place and thwarted? when the neocons were pushing for his removal through internal uprising with US military power, they it will take some sort of invasion to make that successful.. and even if saddam ousted internally without US invasion, Iran, Turkey, Syria, will go in and US will invade no doubt.. they might not say the word invade but that's the plan, their goal is to remove saddam, anyone who has half a brain knows removing saddam will take an invasion of some sort..
