Just because the 'The democrats had the same intel' argument has been stripped way, and the responses in this thread show that Bush, and the dems are doing the rewriting of history here, and you won't be able to rely on those arguments anymore, isn't any reason to feel that bad. Actually, once again you accuse people of valuing the destruction of the president over victory in Iraq without one single shred of evidence to support that. The person who messed up Iraq wasn't the democrats, but this administration. They botched the lead up to the invasion, and they mishandled the aftermath. There were people in the Bush administration who prepared properly for the aftermath and had detailed plans ready to be put in place, but Bush drove those people out, and Rumsfeld and the Whitehouse tossed those plans. I will commend you for posting part of the resolution as having some relevance on the substance in this thread. I guess that when you and bigtexxx, and TJ saw Bush's speach today it resonated with you. You in particular seemed inspired today. It is probably good of Bush to try and rally his base. He needs them now. I don't think it will help in the long run, because so many facts are stacked against him, but it is interesting to see the strategy.
One thing Bush has actually been successful in silencing is the sound of Iwrecki oil rigs pumping crude. The mass insurgency and chaos resulting from the War President's invasion have managed to dwindle down Iwrecki crude production to only a small fraction of what it was prior. I seem to recall on more than one occasion Bush admin officials claiming that "the war would pay for itself," with all the oil spoils gushing into our coffers. Close to $300B out-of-pocket later and the lies just keep piling up with zero accountability, much less even a smidgen of an apology to the American people. On the contrary, dude opts to scold all the "critics" instead. A man who cannot admit to his own mistakes (or in this case admit to even one mistake) is a pretty damn insecure fellow. Actually, between this forum and the WH, the neocon psyche seems to suffer from fragile ego syndrome all around.
My priorities in life, in order of importance: 1. Humiliation of delusional red baiting, opera buff Bush admin syncophantapologists wrapped in flags, who have all sorts of redemptive, yet fierce little scruples about supporting those who want to legalize discriminating against homos. 2. Downfall of President GWB 3. Welfare of Iraqi people. TWO OUT OF THREE AIN'T BAD! WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE!
Bush is getting increasingly shrill as he gets more desperate. Frankly he sounded more like TJ or Bigtexx in his desperation than presidential. The dittos may buy it, but he is just repeating himself as he rallies the dittos and a few militarists who are finally starting to waiver in their enthusiam for the war and who are pretty much all he has left on his Iraq debacle. I think he has perhaps reached the point where he did with his social security plot. Every time he speaks on the issue, the support for his plans go down. It won't be pretty as Dubya keeps repeating himself, not quite realizing that the emperor's clothers moment has arrived for him..
I have a dream for the ideologically bound armchair militarists who think that the unnecesary war in Iraq can be won. that theywill realize that the war was unwise and it is not true that the only thing that actually counts is the propaganda campaign to keep Americans from knowing the truth about wmd, the non-existent big time threat from Iraq and the true costs of the war in terms of American and Iraqi lives and lost American prestige in the world.
Its so sad that this is all the neo-cons have. You wanna know why the Republican party is so split up? Because Bush doesn't stand for what the Republican party is supposed to be. He's the president of his core, not America in general. I wish McCain had gone up against Gore in 2000. Bush is an embarassment to the Republican party. If this leads to Hillary being Pres I will vomit. Oh, and "rewriting history"? I was against the war from the get-go. I thought the evidence was shaky. I thought the govt was a bunch of cowards who were afraid to seem unpatriotic after 911. Those were dark days in our national history...when no one had the balls to stand up to the president's claims against Iraq because they were afraid that they would seem anti - War on Terror. Joe McCarthy would have loved 2002. Nice talking points, by the way.
One time I was sleeping in the same room with my dad and he snores really loud. I silenced him. ...and by silencing him, I put earplugs in, I couldn't stop him snoring. So this analogy works with the thread title. But there must be a serious impact on the credibility on the administration if they are affected by this so much while claiming its untrue.
When I first read the title of this thread I thought that Bush was adding a media wing to Guantanamo Bay before the McCain anti-torture bill was passed...
A couple of days late but once again Ms Milbank and Mr Pincus gives us the truth... Asterisks Dot White House's Iraq Argument By Dana Milbank and Walter Pincus Washington Post Staff Writers Saturday, November 12, 2005; A01 President Bush and his national security adviser have answered critics of the Iraq war in recent days with a two-pronged argument: that Congress saw the same intelligence the administration did before the war, and that independent commissions have determined that the administration did not misrepresent the intelligence. Neither assertion is wholly accurate. The administration's overarching point is true: Intelligence agencies overwhelmingly believed that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction, and very few members of Congress from either party were skeptical about this belief before the war began in 2003. Indeed, top lawmakers in both parties were emphatic and certain in their public statements. But Bush and his aides had access to much more voluminous intelligence information than did lawmakers, who were dependent on the administration to provide the material. And the commissions cited by officials, though concluding that the administration did not pressure intelligence analysts to change their conclusions, were not authorized to determine whether the administration exaggerated or distorted those conclusions. National security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, briefing reporters Thursday, countered "the notion that somehow this administration manipulated the intelligence." He said that "those people who have looked at that issue, some committees on the Hill in Congress, and also the Silberman-Robb Commission, have concluded it did not happen." But the only committee investigating the matter in Congress, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has not yet done its inquiry into whether officials mischaracterized intelligence by omitting caveats and dissenting opinions. And Judge Laurence H. Silberman, chairman of Bush's commission on weapons of mass destruction, said in releasing his report on March 31, 2005: "Our executive order did not direct us to deal with the use of intelligence by policymakers, and all of us were agreed that that was not part of our inquiry." Bush, in Pennsylvania yesterday, was more precise, but he still implied that it had been proved that the administration did not manipulate intelligence, saying that those who suggest the administration "manipulated the intelligence" are "fully aware that a bipartisan Senate investigation found no evidence of political pressure to change the intelligence community's judgments." In the same speech, Bush asserted that "more than 100 Democrats in the House and the Senate, who had access to the same intelligence, voted to support removing Saddam Hussein from power." Giving a preview of Bush's speech, Hadley had said that "we all looked at the same intelligence." But Bush does not share his most sensitive intelligence, such as the President's Daily Brief, with lawmakers. Also, the National Intelligence Estimate summarizing the intelligence community's views about the threat from Iraq was given to Congress just days before the vote to authorize the use of force in that country. In addition, there were doubts within the intelligence community not included in the NIE. And even the doubts expressed in the NIE could not be used publicly by members of Congress because the classified information had not been cleared for release. For example, the NIE view that Hussein would not use weapons of mass destruction against the United States or turn them over to terrorists unless backed into a corner was cleared for public use only a day before the Senate vote. The lawmakers are partly to blame for their ignorance. Congress was entitled to view the 92-page National Intelligence Estimate about Iraq before the October 2002 vote. But, as The Washington Post reported last year, no more than six senators and a handful of House members read beyond the five-page executive summary. Even within the Bush administration, not everybody consistently viewed Iraq as what Hadley called "an enormous threat." In a news conference in February 2001 in Egypt, then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said of the economic sanctions against Hussein's Iraq: "Frankly, they have worked. He has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction." Bush, in his speech Friday, said that "it is deeply irresponsible to rewrite the history of how that war began." But in trying to set the record straight, he asserted: "When I made the decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power, Congress approved it with strong bipartisan support." The October 2002 joint resolution authorized the use of force in Iraq, but it did not directly mention the removal of Hussein from power. The resolution voiced support for diplomatic efforts to enforce "all relevant Security Council resolutions," and for using the armed forces to enforce the resolutions and defend "against the continuing threat posed by Iraq." Hadley, in his remarks, went further. "Congress, in 1998, authorized, in fact, the use of force based on that intelligence," he said. "And, as you know, the Clinton administration took some action." But the 1998 legislation gave the president authority "to support efforts to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein" by providing assistance to Iraqi opposition groups, including arms, humanitarian aid and broadcasting facilities. President Bill Clinton ordered four days of bombing of Iraqi weapons facilities in 1998, under the 1991 resolution authorizing military force in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Describing that event in an interview with CBS News yesterday, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said: "We went to war in 1998 because of concerns about his weapons of mass destruction." http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/11/AR2005111101832_pf.html
couldn't agree more, as i mentioned the first time this article was posted. in fact, let's look at what Jay Rockefeller, he of the senate intelligence committe, said as he cast his vote to support the war. http://rockefeller.senate.gov/news/2002/flrstmt0102002.html I've helpfully highlighted some key phrases. -- MR. ROCKEFELLER: Mr. President, we are here today to debate one of the most difficult decisions I have had to make in my 18 years in the Senate. There is no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein is a despicable dictator, a war criminal, a regional menace, and a real and growing threat to the United States. The difficulty of this decision is that while Saddam Hussein represents a threat, each of the options for dealing with him poses serious risks, to America’s servicemembers, to our citizens, and to our role in the world. It is clear that none of the options that confront us is easy or risk free. For all of us, the upcoming vote on this critical issue will reflect our best judgment on which path will minimize the risk to our fellow Americans -- because we all know that the risk cannot be eliminated. And that judgment will, in turn, depend on a complex interaction of many factors, some of which we do not know and perhaps cannot know. It is clear that military operations against Saddam Hussein, of the sort that are being discussed, pose serious risks, and we should all admit that. Any military campaign runs very serious risks to our servicemembers. On paper we surely have an overwhelming advantage against Saddam Hussein -- in the skill, technology, and, of course, dedication of our armed forces. We defeated Saddam quickly and conclusively in 1991, and in the decade since, our force effectiveness has improved dramatically, while many of Saddam’s capabilities have deteriorated. But a new battle against Saddam Hussein, if it comes to that, will be a different and more difficult battle. U.S. victory might be quick and painless -- one hopes so. But it might not. The American people need to know that a war against Saddam will have high costs, including loss of American lives. Our confident assertions that Saddam Hussein will quickly be deposed by his own people have, in the past, been too optimistic. Presumably Saddam Hussein will be more determined to use all the weapons and tactics in his arsenal if he believes our ultimate goal is to remove him from power. The Administration assures us our troops have equipment and uniforms that will protect them from that risk, should it arise. We can only hope to God they are right. We also have to acknowledge that any military operations against Saddam Hussein pose potential risks to our own homeland, too. Saddam’s government has contact with many international terrorist organizations that likely have cells here in the United States. Finally, we also need to recognize that should we go to war with Iraq, it could have a serious impact on America’s role in the world, and the way the rest of the world responds to American leadership. We are told that if Saddam Hussein is overthrown, American soldiers will be welcomed into Baghdad with liberation parades. That may be true; in fact, the people who have suffered most at Saddam’s hands are his own citizens. But for many people around the world, an American-led victory over Saddam would not be a cause for celebration. No matter how strong our case, there will inevitably be some who will see U.S.-led action against Iraq as a cause for concern. At its most extreme, that concern feeds the terrorist paranoia that drives their mission to hurt America. We can affect how deep that sentiment runs by how we conduct ourselves, whether we work with allies, whether we show ourselves to be committed to the reconstruction of Iraq and to reconciliation with the Arab world. But we ignore it at our peril! So, clearly there are many risks associated with the resolution we are considering today. But it is equally clear that doing nothing and preserving the status quo also pose serious risks. Those risks are less visible, and their time frame is less certain. But after a great deal of consultation and soul-searching, I have come to the conclusion that the risks of doing nothing -- for our citizens and for our nation -- are too great to bear. There is unmistakable evidence that Saddam Hussein is working aggressively to develop nuclear weapons and will likely have nuclear weapons within the next five years. And that may happen sooner if he can obtain access to enriched uranium from foreign sources -- something that is not that difficult in the current world. We also should remember we have always underestimated the progress Saddam has made in development of weapons of mass destruction. When Saddam Hussein obtains nuclear capabilities, the constraints he feels will diminish dramatically, and the risk to America’s homeland, as well as to America’s allies, will increase even more dramatically. Our existing policies to contain or counter Saddam will become irrelevant. Americans will return to a situation like that we faced in the Cold War, waking each morning knowing we are at risk from nuclear blackmail by a dictatorship that has declared itself to be our enemy. Only, back then, our communist foes were a rational and predictable bureaucracy; this time, our nuclear foe would be an unpredictable and often irrational individual, a dictator who has demonstrated that he is prepared to violate international law and initiate unprovoked attacks when he feels it serves his purposes to do so. The global community -- in the form of the United Nations -- has declared repeatedly, through multiple resolutions, that the frightening prospect of a nuclear-armed Saddam cannot come to pass. But the U.N. has been unable to enforce those resolutions. We must eliminate that threat now, before it is too late. But this isn’t just a future threat. Saddam’s existing biological and chemical weapons capabilities pose a very real threat to America, now. Saddam has used chemical weapons before, both against Iraq’s enemies and against his own people. He is working to develop delivery systems like missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles that could bring these deadly weapons against U.S. forces and U.S. facilities in the Middle East. And he could make those weapons available to many terrorist groups which have contact with his government, and those groups could bring those weapons into the U.S. and unleash a devastating attack against our citizens. I fear that greatly. We cannot know for certain that Saddam will use the weapons of mass destruction he currently possesses, or that he will use them against us. But we do know Saddam has the capability. Rebuilding that capability has been a higher priority for Saddam than the welfare of his own people -- and he has ill-will toward America. I am forced to conclude, on all the evidence, that Saddam poses a significant risk. Some argue it would be totally irrational for Saddam Hussein to initiate an attack against the mainland United States, and they believe he would not do it. But if Saddam thought he could attack America through terrorist proxies and cover the trail back to Baghdad, he might not think it so irrational. If he thought, as he got older and looked around an impoverished and isolated Iraq, that his principal legacy to the Arab world would be a brutal attack on the United States, he might not think it so irrational. And if he thought the U.S. would be too paralyzed with fear to respond, he might not think it so irrational. Saddam has misjudged what he can get away with, and how the United States and the world will respond, many times before. At the end of the day, we cannot let the security of American citizens rest in the hands of someone whose track record gives us every reason to fear that he is prepared to use the weapons he has against his enemies. As the attacks of September 11 demonstrated, the immense destructiveness of modern technology means we can no longer afford to wait around for a smoking gun. September 11 demonstrated that the fact that an attack on our homeland has not yet occurred cannot give us any false sense of security that one will not occur in the future. We no longer have that luxury. September 11 changed America. It made us realize we must deal differently with the very real threat of terrorism, whether it comes from shadowy groups operating in the mountains of Afghanistan or in 70 other countries around the world, including our own. There has been some debate over how "imminent" a threat Iraq poses. I do believe that Iraq poses an imminent threat, but I also believe that after September 11, that question is increasingly outdated. It is in the nature of these weapons, and the way they are targeted against civilian populations, that documented capability and demonstrated intent may be the only warning we get. To insist on further evidence could put some of our fellow Americans at risk. Can we afford to take that chance? We cannot! The President has rightly called Saddam Hussein’s efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction a grave and gathering threat to Americans. The global community has tried but failed to address that threat over the past decade. I have come to the inescapable conclusion that the threat posed to America by Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction is so serious that despite the risks -- and we should not minimize the risks -- we must authorize the President to take the necessary steps to deal with that threat. And so I will vote for the Lieberman/McCain resolution. This is a difficult vote, but I could not sleep knowing that faced with this grave danger to the people of my state and to all Americans, I had voted for nothing more than continuing the policies that have failed to address this problem in the past. Two months ago, or even a month ago, I would have been reluctant to support this resolution. At the time, it appeared that the Administration’s principal goal was a unilateral invasion of Iraq, without fully exploring every option to resolve this peacefully, without trying to enlist the support of other countries, and without any limitation on the use of U.S. force in the Middle East region. The original use-of-force resolution the White House sent to the Congress was far too broad in its scope, and ignored the possibility that diplomatic efforts might just be able to resolve this crisis without bloodshed. Moreover, it appeared the Administration planned to cut back its efforts in the war on terrorism and shift all its attention and resources to Iraq. That would be a tragic mistake. I believe the war against global terrorist networks remains the greatest current threat to the security of the American homeland and to our forces overseas, as we have seen in Kuwait earlier this week. America cannot be diverted or distracted from our war on terrorism. In the past month or so, we have begun to see an encouraging shift in the Administration’s approach. The President stated earlier this week that war is neither imminent nor unavoidable. The Administration has assured us that whatever action we take toward Iraq, it will not be permitted to divert resources or attention from the war on terrorism. And Secretary Powell has been working with the United Nations Security Council to put together a new resolution to make clear that Iraq must disarm or face the consequences. We have already begun to see some encouraging movement on the issue of Iraqi disarmament. Other Security Council members (such as France and Russia), as well as other Arab states in the Middle East have begun to talk seriously about forcing Saddam to comply with the U.N. resolutions. And Saddam Hussein has begun to make offers on inspections and disarmament, offers that -- while inadequate, so far -- indicate he has at least begun to move off his hardline position against inspections. Obviously, much important work remains to be done, and that will take tough negotiating with the other members of the United Nations, and a firm line with Iraq. We need to be realistic about how best to move forward. Any headway we are making toward getting Saddam to disarm has not occurred in a vacuum. U.N. members did not just suddenly decide to debate a new resolution forcing Iraq to disarm; and Saddam Hussein did not just suddenly decide to re-invite U.N. inspectors and remove the roadblocks that had hindered their efforts in the past. Progress is occurring because the President told the United Nations General Assembly that if the U.N. is not prepared to enforce its resolutions on Iraqi disarmament, the United States will be forced to act. At this point, America’s best opportunity to move the United Nations and Iraq to a peaceful resolution of this crisis is by making clear the U.S. is prepared to act on our own, if necessary, as one nation, indivisible. Sometimes the rest of the world looks to America not just for the diversity of our debate, or the vitality of our ideals, but for the firm resolve that the world’s leader must demonstrate if intractable global problems are to be solved. And so, that is the context in which I am approaching this vote. This resolution does authorize the use of force if necessary. Saddam Hussein represents a grave threat to the United States, and I have concluded we must use force to deal with him if all other means fail. That is the core issue, and whether we vote on it now, or in January, or in six months time, that is the issue we all have to confront. War, if it comes to that, will cost money I dearly wish we could use for other domestic priorities, to address the very real needs that West Virginia and other states face in this tough economy. But ultimately, defending America’s citizens from danger is a responsibility whose costs we must bear. But this is not just a resolution authorizing war; it is a resolution that could provide a path to peace. I hope that by voting on this resolution now, while the negotiations at the United Nations are continuing, this resolution will show to the world that the American people are united in our resolve to deal with the Iraqi threat. And it will strengthen the hand of the Administration in making a final effort to try to get the U.N. to deal with this issue. Given the difficulty of trying to build a coalition in the United Nations, I could not, in good conscience, tie the President’s hands. The Administration is in negotiations on which the safety and security of all Americans depend; I believe we must give the President the authority he will need if there is any hope to bring those negotiations to a successful conclusion. So, Mr. President, I will vote for the Lieberman/McCain resolution. Preventing a war with Saddam Hussein -- whether now or later -- must be our top priority, and I believe this resolution will strengthen the president’s hand to resolve this crisis peacefully. By my vote, I say to the United Nations and our allies that America is united in our resolve to deal with Saddam Hussein, and that the U.N. must act to eliminate his weapons of mass destruction. By my vote, I say to Saddam Hussein, "Disarm, or the United States will be forced to act." September 11 has forever changed the world. We may not like it, but that is the world in which we live. When there is a grave threat to Americans’ lives, we have a responsibility to take action to prevent it. -- and here is the distinguished gentleman from West Virginia last week in an interview with Chris Wallace: WALLACE: But you voted, sir, and aren't you responsible for your vote? SEN. ROCKEFELLER: No. Isn't it rich Are we a pair you here at last on the ground me in thin air... ...Don't you love farce? My fault I fear. I thought that you'd want what I want. Sorry, my dear.
basso, as of the invasion did Saddam Hussein have weapons banned by the UN? Answer this, your credibility is on the line. If he didn't, then how the hell are you justifying Bush going to war?
I wonder if Rockerfeller would have come to those conlusions had he been able to see all of the intelligence and caviats that went them.
I bet yes. There was enough doubts at that time (e.g. alumnium tubes mischaracterization) for a reasonable person vote against the President. The President's poitical power at that time 'won' the day.
The Empire Strikes Back: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051113.html Setting the Record Straight: The Washington Post On Pre-War Intelligence The Washington Post Implies That The Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) Was Superior To The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Given To Congress. "But Bush does not share his most sensitive intelligence, such as the President's Daily Brief, with lawmakers. Also, the National Intelligence Estimate summarizing the intelligence community's views about the threat from Iraq was given to Congress just days before the vote to authorize the use of force in that country." (Dana Milbank And Walter Pincus, "Asterisks Dot White House's Iraq Argument," The Washington Post, 11/12/05) But The PDB Was The Focus Of Intelligence Reform And Was More "Problematic" Than The NIE Given To Congress. The Robb-Silberman Commission Found The PDB To Contain Similar Intelligence In "More Alarmist" And "Less Nuanced" Language. "As problematic as the October 2002 NIE was, it was not the Community's biggest analytic failure on Iraq. Even more misleading was the river of intelligence that flowed from the CIA to top policymakers over long periods of time--in the President's Daily Brief (PDB) and in its more widely distributed companion, the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB). These daily reports were, if anything, more alarmist and less nuanced than the NIE." (Charles S. Robb And Laurence H. Silberman, The Commission On The Intelligence Capabilities Of The United States Regarding Weapons Of Mass Destruction, 3/31/05, Pg. 14) The Robb-Silberman Commission Reported That The Intelligence In The PDB Was Not "Markedly Different" Than The Intelligence Given To Congress In The NIE. "It was not that the intelligence was markedly different. Rather, it was that the PDBs and SEIBs, with their attention-grabbing headlines and drumbeat of repetition, left an impression of many corroborating reports where in fact there were very few sources. And in other instances, intelligence suggesting the existence of weapons programs was conveyed to senior policymakers, but later information casting doubt upon the validity of that intelligence was not." (Charles S. Robb And Laurence H. Silberman, The Commission On The Intelligence Capabilities Of The United States Regarding Weapons Of Mass Destruction, 3/31/05, Pg. 14) The Washington Post Implies That There Have Been No Findings On The Use Of Intelligence. "But the only committee investigating the matter in Congress, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has not yet done its inquiry into whether officials mischaracterized intelligence by omitting caveats and dissenting opinions. And Judge Laurence H. Silberman, chairman of Bush's commission on weapons of mass destruction, said in releasing his report on March 31, 2005: 'Our executive order did not direct us to deal with the use of intelligence by policymakers, and all of us were agreed that that was not part of our inquiry.'" (Dana Milbank And Walter Pincus, "Asterisks Dot White House's Iraq Argument," The Washington Post, 11/12/05) But Congressional And Independent Committees Have Repeatedly Reported No Distortion Of Intelligence The Bipartisan Senate Select Committee On Intelligence Report "Did Not Find Any Evidence" Of Attempts To Influence Analysts To Change Intelligence. "Conclusion 83. The Committee did not find any evidence that Administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities. Conclusion 84. The Committee found no evidence that the Vice President's visits to the Central Intelligence Agency were attempts to pressure analysts, were perceived as intended to pressure analysts by those who participated in the briefings on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs, or did pressure analysts to change their assessments." ("Report On The U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments On Iraq," U.S. Senate Select Committee On Intelligence, 7/7/04, Pg. 284-285) The Robb-Silberman Commission Finds "No Evidence Of Political Pressure." "These are errors serious errors. But these errors stem from poor tradecraft and poor management. The Commission found no evidence of political pressure to influence the Intelligence Community's pre-war assessments of Iraq's weapons programs. As we discuss in detail in the body of our report, analysts universally asserted that in no instance did political pressure cause them to skew or alter any of their analytical judgments. We conclude that it was the paucity of intelligence and poor analytical tradecraft, rather than political pressure, that produced the inaccurate pre-war intelligence assessments." (Charles S. Robb And Laurence H. Silberman, The Commission On The Intelligence Capabilities Of The United States Regarding Weapons Of Mass Destruction, 3/31/05, Pg. 50-51) The British Butler Report Finds "No Evidence" Of Intelligence Distortion. "In general, we found that the original intelligence material was correctly reported in [Joint Intelligence Committee] assessments. An exception was the '45 minute' report. But this sort of example was rare in the several hundred JIC assessments we read on Iraq. In general, we also found that the reliability of the original intelligence reports was fairly represented by the use of accompanying quali cations. We should record in particular that we have found no evidence of deliberate distortion or of culpable negligence. We examined JIC assessments to see whether there was evidence that the judgements inside them were systematically distorted by non-intelligence factors, in particular the in uence of the policy positions of departments. We found no evidence of JIC assessments and the judgements inside them being pulled in any particular direction to meet the policy concerns of senior of cials on the JIC." ("Review Of Intelligence On Weapons Of Mass Destruction," Report Of A Committee Of Privy Counsellors, 7/14/04, Pg. 110)
Setting the Record Straight: We are sorry bunch of liars. But we control the WH and Congress, so if you don't like it, in the immortal word of The Dick, you can go ...
I don't really want to step in the middle of this, but yes - Saddam did have weapons he was not supposed to have according to the UN.
