'Black Hawk Down' Was Set to Blame Clinton for 9/11

Guess I got my "its" confused. Didn't know which "it" you were referring to. Sorry.

 

RM Tex:

Actually, rereading my posts, I can understand the confusion. I could have worded it more clearly...

cmrockfan:

I agree, but we've been sending mixed signals like that for decades. When Bush didn't finish Saddam off, it was taken as a sign of weakness (particularly by him). When Carter retreated after the Desert One fiasco, it was taken as a sign of weakness. When Slick killed some cleaning ladies in Iraq it was taken as a sign of weakness.

Considering the past trends and events, the Clinton administration didn't really do anything spectacularly cowardly, he was really just carrying on with a long tradition of half-hearted half-measures that began long before his tenure.

That said, however, we haven't been challenged with anything remotely as serious as 9/11 in 60 years. If they think we're going to back down this time then they are in for a big surprise...

 

That's ridiculous. If you are correct that Osama only acted because he was monitoring US power projection, he would have been much more influenced by LATER events, like US intervention in the Taiwan straits, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Haiti than in Somalia. And you should also realize that the alternative to pulling out of Somalia was staying engaged. You have to show that we could have taken the warlords and reconstructed the country if you are going to blame Clinton. Otherwise the likelyhood is that staying engaged in Somalia would have resulted in further defeats, more casualties, and an even lower worldwide opinion of the US military capability. Even if the events Treeman describes did not happen, the overall mission of capturing the warlords more than likely would have failed, and the resulting decrease in US military credibility would have happened anyway. And I think it should be obvious that while the original mission was humanitarian, it was inevitable that the intervening countries would be drawn into conflict with those warlords. As we've learned from Ethiopia to Afghanistan, food is used as a weapon by the local combatants. Somalia was no different. Bush drew aces and eights and passed it off to Clinton. Certainly the decision to not have a viable relief outfit ready was a blunder. But one blunder or another was inevitable in Somalia unless we wanted to level whole sections of the country and occupy the whole damn thing ala Afghanistan. There was no US nor international mandate for that.

 

HayesStreet:

You're implying that There was just flat no way to succeed in the warlord hunt in Somalia, and I just don't buy it. Most of the "snatch and grab" and similar missions carried out there were actually successful, but the decisions made that day/night in Mogadishu were terrible and resulted in a strategic defeat, even though tactically the mission was successful (the gang leaders were apprehended).

Tactically speaking, had the Rangers had armored extraction and night vision devices (they attacked in daylight - a no-no in special ops - and left all of their NVGs at base), it is unlikely that any of them would have been killed. Had they not lost 18 dead and 70-someodd wounded, we would not have pulled out of Somalia. Aidid would have been captured eventually.

But the major problem in Somalia was that the entire military effort against the warlords was half-assed from the moment the Marines were pulled out; that was Les Aspen's decision. When the Marines (and their armor) were there, things went pretty smoothly - nobody wants to screw around with US Marines - but the second they left all hell broke loose. Had they not left, and had better tactical decisions been made on that fateful day, the battle against the warlords would have been won, IMO.

All in all, I think that that particular conflict could have ended much better had some different decisions been made, and Somalia could actually have a functioning govt right now. I do not think it was an impossible mission, or even particularly difficult (relatively) had we maintained a credible force in-country. But hindsight is 20-20...

 

No snatch and grab missions against Somali warlords were successful, so I'm not sure what you're talking about. I'm not implying anything, I'm flat out saying that the mission in Somalia was doomed to fail unless the forces were willing to occupy the country and flatten large populated areas, which they had no mandate to do. To say that you could have tinkered with one or two operational decisions and that would have changed the eventual outcome is wishful thinking. If that particular mission HAD NEVER got the greenlight, there would have been some other trap set and triggered, and the reaction and subsequent pullout would have happened anyway.

Tactical success relies on good intelligence. The fact that our intelligence was coming from Aidid operatives makes the likelyhood of success nil. The whole fouled up op was based on intel specifically designed to draw the US forces into a trap, which it did. Even if there had been armored relief column, SOME of those troopers still would have died in the interim ambush and those images of troopers being dragged around would still have appeared in the media, fueling our withdrawl. Keep in mind that strategically 18 soldiers KIA is pretty insignificant (not saying that each US trooper is not significant). Even if I'm wrong, and the US could have eventually taken the warlords, there is no chance they could have done that without casualties, and those casualties would have resulted in the same public reaction. If anything its the fact that Osama saw the US public recoil from the loss of such a small amount of people that gave him the confidence to attack US forces.

 

We captured a decent number of fairly high ranking members from a number of groups, particularly Aidid's group; they're the ones who gave up most of the intelligence we got. We didn't get any warlords - we were, after all, only trying to get one (Aidid), and the mission was terminated before he could be caught. Incidentally, that raid in Mogadishu was an effort to capture Aidid's top aides, and Aidid if he was there. They did capture some of his top aides in that raid... So technically you're right - we didn't catch any warlords. But I didn't say we did, did I? We caught a good number of lesser fish.

Don't buy it. It is not always necessary to pull a Panama in order to win a conflict. In the case of Somalia, had they left the Marines there and kept doing what they were doing - and not pulled out at the first sight of blood - they would have gotten Aidid sooner or later. Most of the other chiefs/warlords could be bought (many were). It was not an impossible mission, and it would not require leveling the country. And in case you forgot, the UN had already occupied the country.

What the hell are you talking about? All I said was that had the mission been carried out as per normal special ops procedures (having a backup E/E plan, carrying NVGs, attacking at night - all standard procedures) that particular scenario would not have happened. It's SOP for a reason: it works. That day they ignored it.

And it was not a "trap". The Somalis weren't sitting there waiting for a bunch of stupid Americans to walk into their cleverly concealed clutches. The Rangers simply got trapped behind enemy lines, outnumbered about 100:1, and had to fight their way out. It wasn't a "trap".

Then where were we supposed to get intel? Remote viewers?

No, it was not. They lost a helicopter (hence the title "Blackhawk Down") and didn't have enough transport to get everybody out. Rangers never leave anybody behind, so they all stayed. But had they not lost the helo, they'd have evacuated just fine, and we wouldn't be talking about this right now. As it was they had to cajole Pakistani and Indian peacekeepers into letting them borrow APCs to evac the Rangers.

But the point is, it was not a trap. The "faulty intel" led to the capture of a number of high ranking Aidid aides. Do you think they conspired to get themselves captured by the Americans?

Maybe, maybe not. But it would have increased the likelihood that they would have gotten out OK, and had they had their NVGs with them, the chances would have been significantly higher that no one would be killed... Little things like that make the difference between life and death in battle, particularly at night.

I agree. 18 is a relatively small number (don't forget the 78 or so wounded, some very badly), and casualties are to be expected in any war. I also agree that the public reaction to those casualties (particularly fueled by the TV images of soldiers being dragged thru the streets) played a large part in Clinton's decision to withdraw. He should have stayed the course, IMO, but he was too worried about his approval rating.

We either should not have engaged in the hunt for Aidid in the first place, or we should have prosecuted that hunt to the end. What we did was run away when we got a bloody nose, and I'm sure that did embolden Osama, among others. I would have prefered just leaving altogether after the famine was stopped (original mission) rather than adding the extra mission of battling warlords. But if you're gonna do it, then damn it, do it all the way. We shouldn't have run.

 

Personally, I blame Bin Laden.

 

A statement of 100% clarity by Gascon.

 

Right, your definition of occupation leaves something to be desired. Several warlords, including Aidid, retained their arms for their militias. Aidid's militia was estimated to be 10,000 +. The same militia killed the 25 Pakistanis in the ambush that started the whole hunt for Aidid in the first place. The UN had simply opened corridors within the city for aid delivery. They had not 'occupied' the country as happened in Panama or Grenada.

Uh, what are you talking about. The meeting they were targeting was being held in the day, so that's when they had to go. Even with NVGs and a more rapid relief force, there still would have been casualties. Casualties = pullout.

The Somali militia knew when the US troopers left the airfield. They knew that the troopers could rope in but that the choppers wouldn't have room in the narrow streets to extract. They had militia with RPGs on the rooftops to engage the choppers. They started erecting barriers in the streets (to stall a relief column) as soon as the choppers left the pads. They had put out calls to rally militiamen in the streets with loudspeakers! Are you sensing a pattern here? Strange response to a mission that is supposed to be COVERT wasn't it? The CIA Station Chief at the time has written that he feared they were suckered by what he termed a 'double agent.' If you'd rather say they 'got trapped' instead of they 'walked into a trap,' I guess that's ok with me .

You generally try to verify info so that you don't get burned by a double agent. In the CIA report after the fact, they clearly state that they didn't verify the info, as was normal procedure, and as I've stated above, the Station Chief feared they were double crossed.

No, that's revisionist history. First, they lost two choppers. Second, they couldn't evac out of the location where the meeting was, it required they move to another location. This assertion that 'they stayed' is untrue, they didn't have a choice. As it was they had to cajole Pakastani and MALAYSIAN peacekeepers to help them.

You are just overestimating the importance of NVGs. These guys were attacked by literally thousands of Somalis. The fire was so heavy that having NVGs would not likely have saved any casualties. Reports state that many of the casualties came in the first hours, when it was still light outside. And when you take into account that we lost 18 KIA and the Somalis lost an estimated 500+, how much more accurate do you think NVGs would have made our troopers. Aidid HAD a plan. The Somalis knew they could not match a US trooper one-to-one, so the plan was to send overwhelming numbers against us. Against those tactics the NVGs would not have made much of a difference. Remember that these guys were trapped on the streets. What, were they gonna freeze and pretend they were lamp posts, and hope the Somali militia all around them didn't notice cause they (the Somalis) didn't have NVGs?

I think the real problem was the national mood at that point in time. The American public was not very interested in taking casualties in a place where we had no national interest. Coming out of a recession the public's mind was elsewhere. That is why I say that withdrawl was inevitable. SOME casualties were bound to ensue in the chase of Aidid. WHEN those happened there would have been pressure to withdrawl (just as happened). It was inevitable.

Treeman, I agree with you that we should not take an action without being fully committed to the task. But that doesn't mean you ALWAYS stay engaged in a situation that has rapidly changed merely to gain retribution for lost personnel. No doubt the whole affair was a clusterf**k, but I think there was plenty of blame to go around.

BTW: I have found several Osama quotes that point to the US withdrawl from Lebanon (Reagan) and Somalia (Clinton) as formative in his conclusions of US weakness. Both are examples of the US public's aversion to casualties in actions where they don't perceive a national interest.

 

Did anyone actually go see the freaking movie?

 

It was a two minute hop from the airbase to the target area. Two minutes. The Somalis didn't have time to do what you've stated. After they knew the task force had touched down... well, that's another story.

I don't know where you got the idea that a double-agent set it all up, and I'm not calling you a liar, but it makes absolutely no sense that Aidid's leadership would set themselves up to be captured.

It was not a "trap". It was a case of being trapped behind enemy lines without an adequate E/E plan. Major no-no for special ops.

And in general, striking in daytime is a no-no for special ops. I understand that they had info that the meeting was to be held in daytime, and that it seemed like a golden opportunity to capture some really important people, but the effort was thrown together without any planning - and that's where they f*ed up. They should have either not executed the mission in a daylight setting (call it off and wait for another opportunity), or gone in fully supported and equipped. They did neither...

No, it is not revisionist history. When they lost the first helo they all knew they were staying. Rangers do not leave anyone behind - dead or alive - and the second that RPG knocked that helo down the mission changed from "extraction - mission accomplished" to "evacuation - wounded incoming".

You are right about the Malaysian armor, and I was wrong about the Indian armor. My memory is not perfect, and my books are 150 miles away...

NVGs... They make a hell of a difference at night. The usual chaos of the battlefield diminishes significantly if you have them, and even more so if the enemy doesn't. See the Marine evac of civilians out of the US embassy in Liberia. Heavily outnumbered there as well, but no casualties...

Of course it was. It's the terms I dispute...

Some casualties should be expected in every conflict. But 18 dead/78 or so wounded did not have to happen in a single day. That is my whole (and really, my only) point. Better planning and preparation could have avoided that single climatic battle that ended in strategic defeat. Given the circumstances, that particular mission should never have been launched in the first place. It happened, but it was not inevitable.

I agree.

I've seen similar info, and also agree. But I think they've severely miscalculated; when our national interests are clearly at stake (like now) the American public is very supportive. Or so Gallup tells us.

 

Unless there are any Hollywood insiders here, no. It hasn't opened yet. I'm just going off of what I've read from Blackhawk Down - the book (nonfiction). And a few other sources...

Can't wait to see the movie.

 

Who was the theater commander for US operations in Somalia. It would seem to me that he should at least shoulder some of the blame when it comes to specific ops.

 

That one's easy. Aidid wasn't there. He could have been eliminating some of his own people (its happened historically hundreds if not thousands of times). He could have been baiting a trap, knowing that such a gathering would draw US attention. Its possible he didn't know who was on the US payroll and who wasnt, so setting up a fake meeting would not sucker the US in. So you are correct that the guys who got captured probably didn't set themselves up (although it is POSSIBLE they willingly gathered to draw US forces in), but that doesn't mean that Aidid didn't.

And I got the idea, as I stated in the last post, from the CIA Station chief at the time. If you want to email him and reassure him that your souces have confirmed he didn't screw up, I'm sure he'd appreciate it .

The intel on where this meeting took place came from CIA assets. The Station Chief said there was a strong possibility they were set up. The Rangers didn't just get an address and take off. The CIA asset went through a specific procedure to mark the house, which included lifting the hood of his car at a specific time (so overheads could confirm the location) while he was at the house in the days preceding the raid. So there was some advance prep, and if there was a doublecross, then there was advance prep on both sides. I've also read some interviews with Somali militia commanders who say they had people on the ground at the airport and every other place the US or UN forces were. Most of the telephone systems in town were down, but Aidid's men did have radios...so letting Aidid know they were on their way would not have been hard.

Overall I agree that the public mood is different now, and that is good.

That is all.

 

On the set-up scenario:

From General Tommy Franks:

 

HayesStreet:

Do you have an insider CIA contact or something? Because you seem to have a different account from what has been published... Again, not calling you a liar (I really only know what I've read and can recall), but do you?

Two minutes. Count it. You can't do too much in that time...

Ottomaton:

Good read. That's about what I've surmised.

 

Treeman,

Well, I probably wouldn't be writing all this if I DID have a CIA contact, since I wouldn't want those large black SUV's pulling up outside my flat. Wait a minute, there someone at the door......doh!

You've got tunnel vision on the 'two minutes' thing. I already explained that Aidid could have had 24 or more hours to prepare for the snatch and grab mission. In two minutes his assets at the airport could get on the radio and say "They just took off." If the assets were in place (which is likely since they DID shoot two of the choppers down) then its only a matter of waiting for them to show up.

The CIA Station Chief (at the time) Garrett Jones has left the 'company' and is talking about the incident. The CIA is apparently trying to silence him...(CIA tries to muzzle former Mogadishu Station Chief, Vernon Loeb, Washington Post, Tuesday, June 13, 2000)

This is from an earlier article about Jones and the intel for the snatch...

[With the rescue convoy still consolidating at the first crash site, Jones got on the radio and ordered all his men to go to bed for an hour or two and be ready to go at first light to look for missing troops with all of their Somali assets on the street. The rescue convoy blasted its way back to a makeshift aid station inside a stadium on 21 October Road at 7 a.m. By then, 18 Americans had been killed and 84 wounded. It was the most intense ground combat involving U.S. infantry since the Vietnam War. As the smoke cleared over Mogadishu, Jones could no longer contain the anguish and fear he'd been wrestling with all night. "Did I take these guys into an ambush?" he asked a Navy SEAL commander.]

Ottoman, what do you expect the US military to say? "Yeah, we got suckered in and stomped on." While there were intial reports of an 'intelligence leak,' it was pretty much whitewashed by the military, CIA, and Congress. Which would make sense since we looked like fools and its better to say 'they got lucky' than to say 'they outfoxed us.' And per Aidid being all shook up, he had upwards of 10,000 militiamen, I seriously doubt he was concerned with losing 500. Especially when he had just scored a massive PR coup against the US.

I'm not a conspiracy theorist or anything, but I also am not so naive as to believe that the government won't cover up something as embarrassing as an intelligence led sucker punch.

 

And thanks for 'not calling me a liar' (twice).

 

I figured one of the insiders on this board had. Heck someone say the Royal Tenenbaum's like two months ago.

Movie is getting great reviews, USA Today.com gave it four stars if that means anything.

I wanna go see it, Tom Sizemore rules!