Basketball Prospectus Rockets Preview

For those of you who don't know, basketball prospectus is a NBA site focused on advanced statistics in breaking down the NBA. Morey even wrote a foreward to their inaugural basketball prospectus.

So I bought it this year, and I was stunned to see that their "SCHOENE" projection for the Rockets is 36-46, 13th best in the west. Now I am all for the use of statistics in every sport, but how in the hell can anyone think we will be worse than last year?

Here is the season preview:
To borrow a line from former NFL coach Denny
Green, the 2009-10 Houston Rockets both were
and were not who we thought they were. The expectation
that the Rockets would take a significant step
back proved correct, as Houston sunk into the lottery
without injured star center Yao Ming. Yet it wasn’t
for lack of scoring, as was feared, that the Rockets
struggled. Instead, their issues cropped up at the other
end of the floor, shedding new light on Yao’s value as
a defender.
The 2009 postseason
run, which saw Houston
get out of the first round
for the first time since
1997, came at a heavy
price. During Game
Three of a competitive
seven-game series against
the Lakers, Yao suffered a
hairline fracture of the tarsal
navicular bone of his
left foot. With the bone
healing slowly, Yao underwent
surgery in July to
reduce pressure on the injured
area. Subsequently,
he was ruled out for the
entire 2009-10 season.
Yao joined teammate
Tracy McGrady (recovering
from February 2009
microfracture surgery) on
the most expensive inactive
list in NBA history.
Without their two stars,
the Rockets faced the difficult question of where to
find scoring from a group of players previously expected
to play supporting roles. Most of the preseason
analysis about Houston, including the team essay in
last year’s Pro Basketball Prospectus, focused on this
thorny issue. The Rockets lost more of their possession
creation than any other team in the NBA.
The upside for Houston was that neither McGrady
nor Ron Artest (who left as a free agent) was an efficient
option. After all, the Rockets were just a middleof-
the-pack offensive team at full strength; this wasn’t
exactly equivalent to the Cleveland Cavaliers trying
to replace LeBron James. The situation played out
largely as SCHOENE projected. Several players, including
Trevor Ariza, Aaron Brooks and Luis Scola,
stepped into larger roles. Their efficiency declined
from where it had been, but they had enough room
to drop off and still be
just as effective overall as
the Yao-McGrady-Artest
core. In the end, Houston
went from 16th in the
league in Offensive Rating
in 2008-09 to 18th in
2009-10.
The Rockets’ real issues
were at the defensive end
of the floor, which speaks
well to Yao’s defense.
At 7’6”, Yao’s limitations
are easy to see. Like
other behemoths, he has a
tough time when asked to
defend on the perimeter
or step out against the
pick-and-roll. Still, Yao
has made strides in these
regards since entering the
league (no less an authority
than Tom Thibodeau,
an assistant in Houston
under Jeff Van Gundy before
going to Boston, has
praised his improvement) and it’s impossible to duplicate
his size in the paint.
Exacerbating the issue was the Rockets’ lack of size
behind Yao. 6’6” Chuck Hayes replaced him in the
starting lineup, becoming the shortest starting center
in NBA history according to the Elias Sports Bureau
via Fanhouse.com. Hayes is a phenomenal post defender
capable of stonewalling far bigger players, but
ROCKETS IN A BOX
Last year’s record 42-40
Last year’s Offensive Rating 108.9 (18)
Last year’s Defensive Rating 109.9 (17)
Last year’s point differential -0.4 (16)
Team pace 92.7 (6)
SCHOENE projection 36-46 (13)
Projected Offensive Rating 109.9 ( 19)
Projected Defensive Rating 111.8 (25)
Projected team weighted age 28.6 (10)
Projected ’10-11 payroll $72.3 ( 8)
Est. payroll obligations, ’11-12 $43.4 ( 27)
Head coach: Rick Adelman
Last season was just the third time in Adelman’s 19 years as
a head coach that his team missed the postseason, and the
first non-playoff season he’s ever had outside of Golden State
(where his coaching wasn’t nearly good enough to make up
for years of ineptitude). Adelman’s steady approach doesn’t
resonate with fans who want more fire from their coaches, and
his record once in the playoffs is mixed at best. Still, it’s hard
to argue with the success he’s enjoyed at multiple stops. He is
two strong seasons or three average ones away from joining
the 1,000-win club.
98 HOUSTON ROCKETS
his help defense is limited to taking charges. Houston’s
other options were even worse. David Andersen,
brought over from Europe to back up the middle,
was a disappointment. The tallest player on the roster,
Andersen was soft defensively. Rockets coach Rick
Adelman was forced to use 6’9” Luis Scola, a power
forward by trade, in the middle much of the time.
Houston opponents went from making 46.5 percent
of their two-point attempts in 2008-09, the league’s
fifth-lowest mark, to hitting them at a cool 50.3 percent
clip in 2009-10, eighth-highest in the NBA. The
Rockets’ Defensive Rating skyrocketed along with the
shooting percentages, falling all the way from fourth
in the league to 17th.
Houston actually got off to an impressive start to the
season, playing above-.500 basketball despite a torturous
slate of early games. The expectation, at least at
Rockets HQ, was that the team would take off as soon
as the schedule evened out. That never came to pass;
after peaking at 24-18, Houston lost 11 of its next 16
games to slip back to even and never again got more
than four games over .500. In a Western Conference
where 50 wins were needed to make the postseason,
the Rockets were not nearly good enough.
By the trade deadline, Houston was already starting
to look ahead to 2010-11. The Rockets owned
one of the league’s most valuable chips in McGrady’s
enormous expiring contract. Ahead of schedule in his
rehab, McGrady had briefly rejoined the team in December,
but it quickly became clear he did not figure
into Houston’s plans for either the short or long term.
He went back to Chicago to continue his rehab under
the guidance of trainer Tim Grover while Daryl Morey
sought to turn his contract into useful assets.
Desperate to shed salary and clear space for the
summer of 2010, the New York Knicks emerged as
the most obvious suitor. Morey refused to budge on
his offer to Knicks president of basketball operations
Donnie Walsh. He’d take back the final season of Jared
Jeffries’ contract, but only if New York gave up its
2009 lottery pick (forward Jordan Hill), the right to
swap first-round picks in 2011 and its 2012 first-round
pick (protected only through the top five picks). The
price was steep, but on the morning of the deadline
Walsh agreed to the deal.
In the interim, Morey had already worked out a related
deal with the Sacramento Kings. The Rockets
sent forward Carl Landry, enjoying a breakout season
in a sixth-man role, to Sacramento in exchange
for shooting guard Kevin Martin. Filler was included
on both sides as part of the eventual three-way trade.
The move was a bold one for Houston, sending out a
proven performer with a bargain contract. In return,
the Rockets got the efficient scorer they had coveted
at the two-guard to replace the inefficient McGrady.
Having made the trade and sacrificed cap space,
Houston was not a player in free agency. The Rockets
hoped to get in on the bidding for free agent Chris
Bosh via a sign-and-trade deal and had the assets to
make a compelling offer to Toronto, but Bosh showed
only cursory interest. Instead, the Rockets focused on
bringing back their own restricted free agents, Scola
and backup guard Kyle Lowry. They matched a fouryear,
$23.5 million offer sheet from the Cavaliers to
Lowry and came to terms with Scola on a deal that
guarantees him $30 million over the next four years (a
fifth year can become guaranteed depending on performance
clauses, per ShamSports.com).
With the mid-level exception to spend, Houston
went shopping for a big man to provide insurance
for Yao and settled on former Chicago center Brad
Miller, who will be a strong backup if Yao is healthy
and is capable of stepping into the starting lineup and
providing size and skill if not. Miller was expensive
on a per-year basis (about $4.5 million annually), but
the Rockets limited their exposure by guaranteeing
only $800,000 of the third and final season, again per
ShamSports.
The Martin trade also had an impact on Houston’s
offseason trade. Getting Martin created a logjam at
small forward, where the Rockets had not only two
starting-caliber players in Ariza and Shane Battier but
also Chase Budinger, who was effective as a rookie.
Houston solved it by dealing Ariza to New Orleans in
a four-team trade that brought back third-year shooting
guard Courtney Lee. Lee is a better fit as a backup
to Martin. More importantly his rookie contract is
much cap-friendlier than Ariza’s deal, which had four
years and $28 million left to go. The team also created
a $6.3 million trade exception that Morey can put to
use.
Because the Rockets are in luxury-tax territory, they
saved nearly $10 million by swapping Ariza for Lee,
having already cut their bill by paying Toronto to take
Andersen off their hands. Despite the moves, the team
still has enviable depth. Houston’s third unit includes
Hill, Jeffries and rookie Patrick Patterson, while the
second group is stocked with solid young contributors.
Lowry might be the best backup point guard in
the league.
HOUSTON ROCKETS 99
Still, a surplus of capable contributors won’t be
enough for the Rockets if they’re lacking in star power.
That’s where Yao comes in, and as the season approaches
it is not entirely clear whether he’ll be back
on the court for the start of training camp. Houston
can’t count on a full season from Yao, and his minutes
will be limited to no more than 24 in any game
all season long to preserve his health. There’s also
the question of just how effective Yao will be after
missing a full season, and even if he had been entirely
healthy, he’s at an age (30) where he might be showing
the early signs of decline. Comparable players, per
SCHOENE, saw their per-minute production decline
by 6.0 percent at the same age.
Those caveats help explain a projection that is surprising
in its pessimism. Could the Rockets actually be
worse in 2010-11 despite Yao’s return and a full season
with Martin? In particular, SCHOENE sees Houston
failing to improve on defense. The Rockets’ projected
shot blocking is even worse than it was a year ago because
Yao is the team’s only consistent shot-blocking
threat. A starting frontcourt of Miller and Scola might
be the league’s worst in terms of blocking shots, since
Miller is a weaker shot blocker than Hayes despite his
superior height. A full season from Yao would help
Houston beat its defensive projection.
There’s also the fact that the Rockets outplayed their
point differential a year ago, winning nearly two more
games than expected. An apparent offensive decline
is really just an issue of how the teams are distributed.
SCHOENE projects Houston to be right at league average
in terms of per-possession offense, with several other
teams bunched in the same area. That’s better than the
Rockets was a year ago, though not dramatically so.
Houston stands an excellent chance of outplaying
their projection if things break right, though the
downside risk is also worth mentioning. As with Yao,
Martin is also prone to injury--he’s missed at least 21
games each of the last three seasons, making him a fitting
replacement for McGrady. If those two players go
down, the Rockets are left with more or less the same
group as last year. Houston has proven it can be competitive
without its stars, but will need them healthy to
really make some noise.
Kevin Pelton