Arab Initiative Still The Best Deal Around

OP-ED: Alon Ben-Meir – Dying initiative

Arab Initiative Still The Best Deal Around

http://www.metimes.com/Opinion/2008/03/04/op-ed_alon_ben-meir_dying_initiative/8949/

The Arab summit, scheduled for the latter part of March in Damascus, is in serious trouble even before it begins because of several political discords among Arab states as well as the region's continuing violent conflicts. Whereas a resolution to the crisis in Lebanon over the selection of a new president seems a prerequisite to holding the summit in Damascus, no one expects its leaders to even attempt to resolve the many other crises that have plagued the Arab world. The one critical issue that will resurface in Damascus is what to do about the languishing 2002 Arab Peace Initiative with Israel to prevent it from becoming another relic in the annals of the unending Arab-Israeli conflict.

This is not the time to threaten to withdraw the initiative or to present Israel with an ultimatum to either accept or face the consequences, as some Arab leaders have suggested. Both sides have failed to do enough and both share equal blame for the lack of progress. The initiative represents the most important position the Arab states have taken collectively, and it must remain the bedrock on which to base the peace process until a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace is achieved.

The current negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority will lead nowhere and the bloody conflict with Hamas will persist unless the collective Arab will and weight, especially Syria's, are positively engaged in the process. All previous peace plans – including the road map, the Clinton-Barak parameters, and the Oslo Accords – failed because they lacked the comprehensiveness of the Arab Peace Initiative and excluded Syria from the peace process.

Although Israel has certain reservations about the initiative, it must fully embrace it and publicly state its willingness, in order to achieve peace, to exchange territories captured in the 1967 war, participate in the search for a humanitarian solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, and seek a mutually accepted solution to the future of Jerusalem, all of which represent the initiative's principle requirements. Taking this position should not preclude Israel from clearly stating its basic four requirements for peace, which are reconcilable with the principles of the initiative:

(1) ensuring Israel's national security and territorial integrity,

(2) sustaining Israel's Jewish national identity,

(3) securing Jerusalem as Israel's capital, (this should not preclude the Palestinians from establishing their own capital in the same city), and

(4) establishing normal relations with the entire Arab world.

Israeli leaders must understand that for the Arab states to offer this initiative represents a monumental leap forward. They are bewildered as to why Israel does not grasp this historic opportunity to secure the peace it has presumably been seeking for 60 years. The initiative offers Israel peace with security and an acceptance into the Arab fold. Can the Israeli leaders imagine the implications of raising the Israeli flag in 22 Arab capitals? Can they imagine the transformation that would engulf the entire region?

Meanwhile, although the initiative is a momentous document, the Arab states cannot simply wait for Israel to act. They must make clear and open overtures toward Israel to demonstrate to their own masses that their leaders have made a strategic choice for peace while simultaneously assuring the Israeli public of their commitment to peace.

This is what the Israeli public wants to see. They remember very well the late Anwar al-Sadat's offer of peace with Egypt in exchange for the territories captured in 1967. Sadat traveled to Jerusalem before receiving any assurance that Israel would concede even a single inch of territory. He journeyed there because he wanted by his action to demonstrate his commitment to peace. This, more than anything else, persuaded the Israeli public to fully support the Camp David negotiations in 1979, which led to peace between the two nations and Israel's total withdrawal from Egyptian territories.

Imagine the effect on Israelis if Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah traveled to Jerusalem to worship at Islam's third holiest shrine and while there address the Israeli parliament on the merits of the initiative. Imagine the dramatic shift in Israeli public opinion if the public saw Arab officials other than Jordanians or Egyptians (as designated by the Arab League to pursue the initiative with Israel) meeting with their Israeli counterparts inside or outside of Israel. Imagine the effect of these encounters on Arab extremists who seek the destruction of Israel, as they face the collective Arab will.

Such overtures do not suggest acceptance of the Israeli position or the endorsement of its policies. That is, they do not signify that the Arab world recognizes Israel's borders or Jerusalem as its capital or the settlements as legitimate. What they mean is that the Arab world simply accepts Israel as a state, and is thus willing to translate a declaration of principles into a peace process. When Sadat addressed the Israeli parliament he made absolutely clear the price Israel had to pay for peace. He was cheered and hailed by the vast majority of Israelis as a most courageous, visionary, and trustworthy leader. Now, nearly 30 years later, Egypt remains at peace with Israel. The Arab League courageously put forth the Arab Peace Initiative, a document that would have been unthinkable without Sadat's historic journey.

How do the Saudis expect their initiative to provide the basis for Arab-Israeli peace-making if they continue to refuse even a handshake with an Israeli official? Although a host of issues separate Israel from the Arab states, Israel's distrust remains the underlining factor as long as there are radical Arab groups and Islamic states such as Iran that openly avow and actively seek its destruction. Israel may be accused of paranoia regarding its national security, but then how do the Arab states intend to address this paranoia when Israelis measure their national security in existential terms? Efforts to persuade Israel to embrace the initiative must include concrete and transparent steps that clearly demonstrate a real change in the conflict's dynamic, as the Israeli public sees it.

"Public," is the key word here. The Arab states seeking peace must be unequivocal in their readiness to interact with Israel. They must appeal directly to the Israeli public, which despite its factional nature, agrees on the terms for real peace. If the Arab states do not want this initiative to meet the fate of the earlier version in Lebanon, in 2002, then they must change strategy.

Israel is open to persuasion but it must recognize this historic chance and publicly endorse the initiative. Considering, however, the long and bitter history of the conflict it will take more than a declaration by the Arab states to be persuaded.

--

Prof. Alon Ben-Meir is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiations and Middle Eastern studies. alon@alonben-meir.com www.alonben-meir.com

 

The cycle of collective punishment/'bigger holocaust' continues...

 

Ottomaton,

Thoughtful post, per usual. Here's how I see it...

I think a comprehensive peace would deliver on the Palestinian and the Lebanese fronts, and here's why. Hamas leaders themselves have said in the past they would agree to pre-67 borders, which is what the Arab states are asking for; I might be more optimistic than most on that front, but one thing Hamas has shown in the past is that they tend to mean what they say and say what they mean, so I will take them at their word. But I will tell you one thing for sure: excluding them from the conversation altogether won't get anyone anywhere. Israel is in a peculiar situation right now because they are trying to make peace with an enemy that has no leader; something tells me they might be missing Arafat right about now, at least all Palestinian factions used to defer to him and the Israelis knew he was 'the guy'.

On the Hezbollah front, that's precisely why Israel has to have a comprehensive peace agreement in place with all Arab states, which would include Syria. The Syrians can and will use their leverage with Hezbollah if they have a good reason to do so. They know Lebanon/Lebanese politics inside-out and know how to control/manipulate that arena. All Syria wants is its territory back, then I fully expect them to capitulate to 'peace' much like the Egyptians and Jordanians have. Moreover, I consider Hezbollah's leader Nasrallah to be a pragmatic guy, and I think Hezbollah is more of a 'professional' organization that is far more calculative than -- say -- Hamas is. They realize the need to maintain a tough balance at home, for no one will tolerate another 'provocation' of Israel -- however small -- that all of Lebanon will end up having to pay for. I think the Israelis made their point the last time around, and Hezbollah will be more 'careful' proceeding forward.

I think universal Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist -- however symbolic it may be -- is a major thing in and of itself. I think having Israeli embassies in all Arab capitals is a big step. I think there are economic gains to be made by all sides involved, and not just on a regional level (for instance, more foreign investment, etc). Regional instability, in general, affects everyone's pocket book. So there are some gains to be made. Now whether or not it's "worth" giving up land for is something that only the Israelis can decide for themselves, but even on that front their rhetoric seems to indicate a sense of 'urgency' to settle the conflict with the Palestinians once and for all.

Oh, and did I mention Iran?

And there is at least one more reason for 'peace', some Israelis refer to it as the 'demographic time bomb':

In short, I think there are a handful of compelling reasons for the Israelis to pursue peace, and again I think it's worth repeating that a good chunk of their moderate leadership and even the Israeli public at large have made a conscious decision to pursue a settlement, even Sharon came to that realization in his latter days. I realize some will disagree with this assessment, but that's how the majority of the actors in question have come to view the situation.

That and the general sensitive nature of Jerusalem; that's a tough one but it will have to eventually be dealt with. Some Israelis/Palestinians have recently proposed having Jerusalem being under international 'oversight' or a neutral territory of sorts, although I am not sure how practical or realistic that is.

Forget what's "right", because each side will define that differently and it will get us nowhere fast...

This is a good point and a legitimate concern for the Israelis, but how do you propose they deal with it? Should they work to strengthen the PA forces and -- for all intents and purposes -- help build a PA force that can effectively repress any internal forces that would challenge their authority (e.g. Hamas, Islamic Jihad)? Basically, should the Israelis promote a non-democratic Palestine? I bring this up because it seems like that's what the U.S./Israelis decided was the best thing to do in Gaza, before Hamas got a whiff of it and preempted the Bush administration's plans (doctrine of preemption is a b****!).

Yes, the internal Palestinian split makes it that much worse, and U.S.'/Israel's insistence on not talking to Hamas means status quo for everyone involved. Like it or not, Hamas can't be ignored.

Look, there is no guarantee of peace for anyone, and the Israelis are no exception. But it's not an either/or situation, they can pursue a comprehensive peace agreement with the Arab states and maintain a military deterrence to any potential threat. The problem is if they do nothing because there are "no guarantees", then they will risk everything.

Again, I am not saying they should 'trust' the tiger to act in kind, I am saying they can explore their options, and prepare for the worst. One thing is for sure: the status quo ain't working. It's an alternative route worth exploring, that's all.

The problem with that approach is that it hasn't worked thus far, and there is good reason to believe that the status quo isn't sustainable nor desirable. The problem is limiting the conflict to the "Palestinian theater" doesn't address Israel's security concerns, not even close. This is still -- for better or worse -- an Arab-Israeli conflict, and the fact that most Arab armies are no longer marching to war with the Israelis doesn't mean that the conflict is localized, it clearly isn't.

I fully acknowledge that there isn't an easy solution here, but difficult decisions do have to be made...sooner or later.