Anti-Pakistan Rant. Like the phoney Iraq War Propaganda?

Phew! Glad you went on record as not knowing what you're talking about! Makes things a lot easier. The simple fact is that realists OFTEN are against military action/war. Realists would support intervention where US national interests are at stake. But always vote for war? Hell, realists CAME UP WITH CONTAINMENT (ironic, since that's what you advocate below, lol). Realists were against intervention in Somalia and Bosnia where there weren't clearly defined US interests at stake, while neoconservatives were angry that we didn't intervene sooner. Many conservatives lean toward isolationist policies (remember even Bush was against becoming entangled in outside conflicts before 9/11). It really proves my point when you mix all these labels together as if they were the same thing when they clearly are not. Thanks, G.

Personally, I think you are purposely being dense. Try this next time you talk to him:

1. Tell him to use the google machine to search for 9/11.
2. Tell him the Afghani government was providing a safe haven for the perpetrators of 9/11.
3. Tell him we went to remove them and fight AQ.

Not that hard to understand.

Yes, if there is a safe haven being provided for someone who attacks us then we 100% have the right to intervene. It's just silly to suggest otherwise. That's almost a universal opinion as illustrated by the support for our intervention in Afghanistan.

Over exaggerate their capabilities? If your aim is to really piss me off, then you've accomplished that goal. The blew up buildings in downtown freakin' NYC, glynch. They blew up a US warship. They blew up several US embassies and they blew up Army barracks. They blew up train stations in Europe, nightclubs in Southeast Asia. All in different locations. All suprises. All undetected. That isn't an exaggeration.

Well, I'll give you credit for trying! Yeah, yeah...let's just SURROUND THEM, lol. You mean like a big fence around Afghanistan and Pakistan or what?

 

Interesting Ed:

Enough!

The on-going war is a full-spectrum war, including the imperative of an ideological, political, military, socio-economic and humanitarian effort to counter the menace of the hordes ready to steal our inclusive way of life

...

This will also not be America’s war, since those that the army will take on are threatening to take over the country and convert it into something entirely alien to the social, cultural and religious sensibilities of the nation. This will be the war for Pakistan, for its soul and spirit.

...

As soon as Sufi Muhammad declared his intentions in his April 19 speech, the political leadership lost that final veil that still held any dignity. Those on the right, who had been the most abominable apologists for the Taliban and their ways, and couldn’t help but lecture the entire nation from the holy pedestal of one TV channel or another suitably assisted by their cohort anchors, had to move; and move they did to sit on the fence. So much for principled politics.

Some had their philosophical underpinnings holding them hostage to a quiet acquiescence, while others considered it a suitable political ploy to avoid muck and to let the party in power dirty itself in a fight that, in their estimates, could only deliver losers when the larger populace was as quiescent and passive.

But then two things happened. The larger civil society, and in that include the mass populace of the less vocal and less seen, came out in a vociferous way against the effort to impose a particular brand of sharia on Pakistani society. They were aided by an initially recalcitrant media, which too had to now change tack and ever so reluctantly give in to the groundswell against the extremists.

....

This spurred activity within the political parties too; some had already taken cudgels in defiance to the Taliban and spoken against any attempt to appease their virile sensibility, while others were now forced to offer their shoulder or at least be seen to offer their shoulder to the larger popular sentiment against extremist forces.

...

 

Very nice. Unfortunately, the polling data proves this narrative of the country united against the imminent threat of the Taliban to be a total and complete fantasy. But I’m sure the editorial is being eagerly passed around the halls of the Heritage Foundation.

 

Can you provide a link/info on this polling data? My family, friends, and colleagues back in karachi and Islamabad as well as what I read in the newspapers (Dawn/Jang etc.) seem to counter what you're saying.

 

This one comes to mind:

http://www.iri.org/newsreleases/2009-05-11-Pakistan.asp

It was just released yesterday.

Some highlights:

[rquoter]
As seen over the course of IRI’s polling, economic issues remain the top concern of Pakistanis. When asked what the most important issue facing the country was, 46 percent cited inflation, 22 percent chose unemployment, and nine percent selected poverty. This represents a total of 77 percent of the population citing an economic issue as their top priority, which is consistent with previous polls.

Although only 10 percent of respondents cited terrorism as the most important issue, the March 2009 poll registered rising concern over terrorism in general. When asked if they felt that religious extremism was a serious problem in Pakistan, 74 percent replied yes, the highest percentage since September 2007. The highest percentage yet, 69 percent, agreed that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda operating in Pakistan was a serious problem, while 45 percent said that they supported the Pakistani Army fighting the extremists in the North West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, another alltime high.

Overall the sense of security in Pakistan has improved dramatically since the October 2008 poll. The number of people saying that they felt less secure fell from 78 percent to 60 percent in the March 2009 poll, while the number saying that they felt more secure rose from 19 to 38 percent. Again, while more people still feel less secure than not, this represents a significant change over the results of the last poll.

The March 2009 poll also revealed strong support for the recent Swat peace deal betweenthe Pakistani government and local elements of the Taliban. Previous IRI polling has shown that Pakistanis favor negotiation, with majorities saying that they would support a peace deal with the extremists. In the March 2009 poll, the number supporting a generic peace deal rose from 54 percent in October 2008 to 72 percent, an increase of 18 points. In regards to the specific deal recently passed, 80 percent said that they supported the pact with the Taliban in which Sharia Law would be enforced in Swat, and 82 percent said that President Asif Zardari should sign it. A strong majority, 74 percent, felt that it would bring peace to the region, and 56 percent said they would support similar deals with the Taliban in areas such as Karachi, Multan, Quetta or Lahore.

[/rquoter]

Certainly, there is concern about security (when was the last time Pakistanis weren't concerned about security), but nothing even approaching universal panic at the impending Sharia state, or steely resolve to duke it out with the Taliban to the last man. As many people view the USA or India as the real problem or the force behind inciting the Taliban.

I suggest that you read the first two articles from my previous post, both written by Pakistani residents:

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2009\05\08\story_8-5-2009_pg3_5

http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2009/05/getting-on-same-page-in-pakistan.html

 

If I'm understanding correctly, this war (to put it in simple terms) is focused on attacking the Taliban for shielding Al Qaeda?

I don't buy that. The U.S. knows full well that erasing every member of the Taliban from Afghanistan won't allow them to crush the heart of Al Qaeda. Those days are over because this war took way way too long and dragged and unfortunately for everyone, Al Qaeda has shown that it was more flexible, dynamic, quick and sneaky to be stopped this way.

(Side note: Please always keep in mind that the Taliban are claiming to be Shariah compliant. I can't remember who in the thread said that most Pakistanis are against the Taliban ideology but I must affirm and re-affirm that almost all 1 billion Muslims in the world don't agree with the Taliban ideology.)

 

"the polling data proves this narrative of the country united against the imminent threat of the Taliban to be a total and complete fantasy"

"nothing even approaching universal panic at the impending Sharia state"

The two statements say different things. I referred to the first one where pakistanis are not "united" against the encroaching Taliban when I asked for your source; whereas in the second, you clarify this notion by saying there is no "universal panic".

I agree. There is no panic yet we are for the majority against the Taliban and what they represent: the country is not on the verge of collapse. '71 was considerably worse for us Pakistanis but we weathered through that crisis too.

 

The premise of this thread was that Pakistan doesn't see the same amount of threat from the Taliban as the US do and you posted a piece that stated that the US wasn't convincing the Pakistanis to change their priorities. A day after you post that piece the Pakistan military launches an offensive against the Taliban. That tells me that the basis of this thread and the original piece you cited has been undermined since Pakistan actually does see the Taliban as a major threat and one that requires them to take major military action.

Now I haven't seen information stating they are launching this on the US behest so I don't know if it is due to US pressure but the result is that Pakistan is doing what the US has asked for them to do.

 

From a 520,000 man army they sent 5,000 soldiers for that "major offensive".

It is theater.

Considering 72% of the population likes the idea of a peace deal with the Taliban, I think both statements are true.

 

The threat might not call for a much larger engagement but judging from how many people have beend displaced by the fierceness of the fighting the offensive doesn't sound like a minor sortie.

 

Why are they launching an offensive against the Taliban then? For that matter do you have any evidence to support your contention that most patriotic Pakistanis will have more admiration for the Taliban?

 

Whereas you are emotionally honest at the expense of intellectual honesty.

 

I hate to keep repeating myself, but...

[rquoter]
'Same coin'

I interviewed a large number of refugees in Swabi, but I did not meet a single person who actually saw the army and the Taleban as members of opposing camps.

Instead, I heard, they were "two sides of the same coin".

"The Pakistani army has hurt us badly - but while they have killed civilians, I swear I haven't seen a single shell directed at the Taleban," says Shahdad Khan, a refugee sheltering at a camp in Swabi's Shave Ada area.

Others question the Pakistani military's stated commitment to "eliminating" the Taleban.

"No way," Siraj tells me.

"The army brought the Taleban to our area! It's politics. The Taleban and the army are brothers."

[/rquoter]

If you add lots of lights, a fog machine, and pyrotechnics to any stage show, it always makes it appear like a bigger deal than it really is.

 

The following was written by Brigadier F.B. Ali, who was involved in the overthrow of Yahya Khan in 1971. He certainly knows more about Pakistan than anybody I personally know.

It's long as hell, and I think a little bit slanted towards being Pakistan-centric but worth the read.

[rquoter]
"MARCHING TO THE EDGE – EYES WIDE SHUT"

FB Ali


The United States is pursuing a policy in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre that risks an outcome that would combine the fiascos of Vietnam and the Shah’s Iran. It could lead not only to the loss of Afghanistan but also that of Pakistan, with consequences that are frightening to contemplate. What underlies this disaster in the making is a failure to comprehend the real problem the US faces in the region, and the resulting pursuit of solutions that not only do no good but instead make matters worse.

Understanding the Enemy

The first failure lies in misunderstanding the nature of the enemy confronting the US, and the goals that enemy is pursuing. The enemy is not al-Qaeda “terrorists” hiding in the mountains, plotting terror attacks on the US and the West. The Bush administration propagated this notion (of a worldwide Islamist terror network, led by al-Qaeda, forever planning attacks on the US and the West) in order to win support for its scheme to wage unending war, at home and abroad, on whomever it chose to designate as an enemy. Even though the new administration has dropped the use of the GWOT term, the false concepts underlying it continue to seriously contaminate US policy discourse and thinking.

The enemy the US faces in the ‘Af-Pak’ theatre is a grouping of Islamists with different agendas that happen to coincide for the time being. Al-Qaeda and its associates (including the Haqqanis and Hikmatyar) are political Islamists, whose aim is to establish the political, economic and military power of Islam – by repelling Western encroachments on Muslim countries and ultimately taking them over. Political Islamists also exist in Pakistani society and state structures (as they do in every Muslim country). The majority of the groups that are collectively known as the Taliban are religious Islamists, whose primary aim is to establish their brand of orthodoxy among Muslim populations; they are not too concerned about political and economic issues. (“Terrorists”, who blow themselves and others up, are brainwashed unfortunates used by both the other groups; they are low-rent cannon fodder, not the enemy).

The principal foe the US faces is the political Islamists, because it is their goals (not the Taliban’s) that clash with vital US interests. The Western military presence and operations in the area have led to the goals of both types of Islamists converging, and this has enabled the political Islamists to use the Taliban as foot soldiers in their campaign to defeat the West in Afghanistan. But the missteps of US foreign and military policy have suddenly opened up for them the prospect of a takeover in Pakistan. The strategy they are now pursuing is to use the Pakistani Taliban to exert sufficient pressure on Pakistan to fracture the state structure and provide an opportunity for the internal political Islamists to take over the country. Most of the Pakistani Taliban are mainly interested in imposing religious orthodoxy, not achieving political power (their Afghani counterparts share this aim, but are also interested in regaining the political power that they lost due to the US invasion).

Though the military objectives of both religious and political Islamists happen to coincide at the moment, their long-term aims are different and could diverge under appropriate circumstances. If the Taliban could achieve their goal of establishing their religious system in some areas, they may well lose their appetite for protracted warfare against superior military forces.

Understanding the Threat

The combined Islamist militants that the US and the West face in the Af-Pak theatre are now threatening both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The focus of US-NATO policy is Afghanistan; because this is where the militant threat existed at the time the policy was originally fashioned. The second grave conceptual error has been the failure to recognize that the nature of the threat in the theatre has significantly changed. This has happened because of a flawed planning process that the present administration inherited, and which it has allowed to continue.

The Bush administration allowed the Pentagon to fashion both policy and strategy in its war theatres. The Pentagon and the generals have been and still are fighting a war in Afghanistan; this is their main focus. In this view, Pakistan was merely a problem that was making victory in Afghanistan more difficult. That is why the US compelled Pakistan to conduct military operations against the Taliban in its border areas, while also subjecting the area to drone attacks. This caused (and continues to cause) significant strains within Pakistan, including on its government and military, and has resulted in the creation of an indigenous Taliban movement that is now attacking parts of the country. There is now a tangible risk of a takeover of Pakistan by political Islamists.

The Obama administration’s new policy talks a lot about the critical importance of Pakistan – but it is still with reference to winning the war in Afghanistan. Thus, the policy and resulting strategy concentrate on the battle in Afghanistan, with Pakistan continuing in its role of the necessary adjunct, subject to the same extreme US pressure (ostensibly sweetened with promises of financial largesse soon to come) and drone attacks (with their inevitable civilian casualties). This is the military tail wagging the policy dog; this is generals choosing not only how they will fight, but also whom. This is the military marching to the edge of the cliff, eyes wide shut, with no control or guidance by the nation’s policy makers and leaders.

The recent scare in Washington caused by the Taliban incursions into areas adjoining Swat has led to concern over the vulnerability of Pakistan, and also emphasized its criticality. However, the Pakistan military response is allaying these fears, and soon Pakistan is likely to be seen again as merely a supporting player in the Afghan campaign, important but secondary. What will not be understood is that what the Pakistan military has been compelled by US pressure to do in Malakand is a repeat of their Bajaur operation – treating the area as a free fire zone and subjecting it to intense air and artillery bombardment, the brunt of which is borne by the local population, causing significant casualties and large-scale displacements, while most of the Taliban slip away into surrounding areas without suffering much loss. Such operations may satisfy the US, but add to the unpopularity of the government and the military while driving more recruits into the ranks of the insurgents. They don’t make Pakistan more secure, they make it much more vulnerable.

The United States needs to recognize that the main threat it faces in this region is a takeover in Pakistan by political Islamists (the Taliban cannot do so), as a result of the internal and external strains to which the country is being subjected. That Pakistan is the main battleground, not Afghanistan. That if Pakistan goes, it does not matter what happens in Afghanistan (what is most likely, of course, is the same outcome there soon after). To develop a rational policy and strategy to counter this danger to Pakistan (and its own vital interests), the US must understand the situation that actually exists in Pakistan today, not what its clients and other vested interests feed it.

Understanding the Battleground

Pakistan is a dysfunctional country. The economy is in dire straits, outside assistance alone prevents the country from going bankrupt, government is not functioning, politicians are lining their own pockets when they are not undermining each other, the bureaucracy is paralysed due to political meddling, corruption is massive and all-pervasive, civil society is in disarray, the military is under considerable stress, while ordinary people are facing severe hardships in their daily lives.

Beset by these numerous problems, Pakistanis have watched their government and military, pressured by the US, wage war on their own people in the tribal areas and Malakand. Neither equipped nor trained to deal with an insurgency, the military’s heavy-handed tactics have added to the strains already existing within the country, deepening the alienation of the people from the ruling elites, and increasing the hostility that they feel towards the US and its policies (which, it is widely believed, serve US geopolitical aims in the region, and are inimical to Pakistan’s own national interests).

Locked in these oppressive circumstances, the people of Pakistan do not see Islamists as their enemy (even though many feel disdain for the Taliban, and revulsion at their tactics). Vested interests have sold to the US the idea that the way to win the friendship and support of the people is to provide massive amounts of financial aid. The administrative structure that can ensure that these funds serve the purpose for which they are meant – improving the lot of ordinary Pakistanis and strengthening the institutions that serve the people – does not exist, nor are there any effective mechanisms for oversight or audit. These funds will line the pockets of those who will handle them: politicians, officials, and their cronies. Very little of the aid will benefit the people, and, instead of it winning their goodwill, the result will be the exact opposite: it will be seen as the US bribing the ruling elite to carry out its wishes, even at the cost of Pakistan’s own interests.

The people of Pakistan will not fight to protect, or even stand up for, a system in which they have no stake, a system that only oppresses and loots them. A significant proportion of them see the Islamist ideology propagated by al-Qaeda and the Taliban as providing a solution to their problems rather than a threat to their non-existent well-being. Only when a reasonable level of governance prevails in Pakistan is it likely that people will feel that they have a stake in the system, and thus some incentive to stand up in its defence.

Pakistan is dysfunctional, but it is not a primitive state or society. It possesses all the structures and systems needed by a modern country to function, but they are unable to work as they should. Years of misrule by both politicians and generals, massive and pervasive corruption, the sabotage of institutions that might resist corrupt rulers and their minions, the breakdown of civic responsibility, have all led to these structures and systems becoming broken, rusted, misaligned, dysfunctional.

Selecting a Rational Aim and Policies

A realistic assessment and understanding of the enemy the US faces in the Af-Pak theatre, and the most dangerous threat that this enemy poses to US vital interests, as well as of the battleground the US is engaged in, should lead to the conclusion that the only rational aim for the US in that theatre is to ensure, as its first priority, that Pakistan is not taken over by Islamists. All else, including the war in Afghanistan, is secondary (and subordinate) to achieving this aim.

This aim cannot be achieved by forcing the Pakistan government and military to wage brutal military operations against its own people. It requires the US to follow a policy that assists Pakistan in immediately making the necessary structural changes that would enable it to become functional enough to stop further Islamist encroachments, and utilise effectively the nation-building aid that the US and the international community are prepared to provide it.

This aim also requires the US to revise its goals in Afghanistan. It cannot pursue there a military campaign that is dependent on Pakistan carrying out major operations in its tribal areas against the Afghan Taliban and their allies (which impose considerable strain on Pakistan’s stability).

Shoring up Pakistan

As an immediate measure, the US should concentrate on helping Pakistan deal effectively with the serious problem posed by the large-scale displacement of people from Swat and surrounding areas. This should include bringing in US disaster-relief resources and expertise (the US won a lot of goodwill when it came to the aid of earthquake survivors in 2005). The negative impact on public opinion of the effects of the military operations in these areas could be blunted if the refugees are well looked after.

The structural changes that need to be made in Pakistan will have to be carried out by Pakistanis. There is a wide constituency for them in the country; powerful elements of state and society would be ready to support and advance them. However, what has prevented them from being instituted are equally powerful vested interests, as well as the inertia of a complex but broken-down system. What is required to get the process moving is for the United States to put its weight behind such change. Such a move would mobilize the many forces in the country that favour them, and also effectively neutralize the opposition.

A package of measures needs to be implemented immediately to stabilize Pakistan and enable it to resist and overcome the threat it faces of an Islamist takeover. Apart from repairing the broken and paralysed governmental machinery, they would provide hope to ordinary people and give them a stake in the future of the country. These measures are:

• Administration: To ensure the provision of services and protection to the people by an administrative machinery that is efficient, not corrupt, and which is not manipulated by politicians or other special interests, the civil service and the police should be placed under the control of independent Public Service Commissions, comprising retired senior administrators and judges. These commissions should control and manage the hiring, appointments and promotions of all managerial and executive level public servants. The government Rules of Business should clearly prescribe and require that ministers lay down policies but cannot interfere in their detailed implementation by public servants. Government fiscal auditors should be made independent, and should carry out their duties on a real-time basis.

• Controlling Corruption: This cancer that is eating away at every organ of the state, and polluting every aspect of life in the country, has to be checked and beaten back. There are a sufficient number of honest and able persons available in the country to staff an organization to begin this task. This cleansing operation has to start from the top; no one should have immunity from scrutiny and accountability, neither politicians nor generals, nor judges or high officials.

• Security: Until the military has developed an effective counter-insurgency capability (and the country is sufficiently stabilized) it should block any organized insurgent threats in the border areas (instead of waging Bajaur and Swat type operations). Public security should be established by rapidly increasing the anti-terrorist capabilities of the various police forces. A concerted effort should be made to root out groups known to have insurgent affiliations, including shutting down madrassahs with such links or sponsorship.

• Rule of Law: To re-establish the rule of law the superior judiciary should be purged of the corrupt, inefficient and partial judges with whom it has been packed over the years. There exist a number of capable and upright former judges who gave up their posts rather than violate their oath of office to uphold the constitution. A commission comprising some of these judges should be set up to scrutinize the qualifications and performance record of all sitting judges of the Supreme and High Courts, and those who are found to be unfit should be removed. This commission should also fill the resulting vacancies. Future appointments to these courts should be made through a process in which the judiciary and the legal profession have a major voice, not politicians.

• The Constitution: There exists a political consensus that the 1973 constitution be restored, purged of all later amendments. It should be so restored, followed by a process of mature examination of the issue of appropriate checks and balances between the various state and territorial entities of the country, so as to avoid some of the problems that have arisen since its promulgation.

• Free Media: The media in Pakistan is fairly free, though off and on it is subjected to pressure by powerful people. This freedom should be ensured for the future so that it can monitor and report lapses before they become major problems.

• Bolstering the Economy: As soon as these basic measures are starting to become effective, the economic aid that the US and other donors have promised should begin to flow in a planned and controlled manner.

• Elections: Mid-term elections should be held in early 2010 under a reconstituted, impartial Election Commission, which should be able to call upon the military to provide whatever assistance is needed to ensure that the elections are free and fair. This will restore legitimate political leadership to the country.

To someone who does not know much about Pakistan this will seem a formidable list of tasks, requiring years to implement. But the necessary pre-requisites are all there – a strong desire for such change prevails among influential groups; an elaborate, sophisticated administrative structure exists (even though it doesn’t function properly at present), with many conscientious and capable civil servants; the Chief Justice wants to clean up the judiciary; the media is free and vibrant; files exist on high level corruption. All that is required is a catalyst to start the process and release the potential synergy, and within one year most of these measures should be well-advanced and producing results.

The United States carries tremendous clout with the key players in Pakistan; the country is dependent on US aid and international support to remain viable. Once the United States indicates that the institution of such an immediate reform program is a pre-requisite for it to prop up, and later rebuild, the country, it will immediately mobilize and energize a strong internal coalition of forces to carry it out. These allies are likely to include the military, the Supreme Court, the PML-N (which rules in the Punjab) and some other political parties, large sections of the bureaucracy, civil society, and the mass of ordinary people, who will see the prospect of a better life opening up. Those vested interests that have a stake in the continuation of the present state of affairs will not be able to resist this coalition.

A Pakistan so reformed will prove to be impregnable to the blandishments, inroads and assaults of the Islamists. The goodwill that the US will gain in backing and supporting such a program would be of far greater significance and permanence than the influence it now wields through its clients among the ruling elite. Pakistan would become a stable friend and ally in this volatile region.

Neutralizing Afghanistan

In recognizing Pakistan as the main focus of its strategy in the Af-Pak theatre the United States will need to change its strategy in Afghanistan. It can no longer afford to call upon Pakistan to conduct large-scale military operations in its tribal areas in order to neutralize the Afghan Taliban and prevent them from attacking its forces in Afghanistan. Nor can it afford to continue drone attacks in these areas. With such operations off the table, the US and NATO cannot hope to achieve a solution in Afghanistan based on their present military strategy.

The US’s main aim in Afghanistan is that, in the future, it does not again become a haven and launching pad for attacks by al-Qaeda and its allies. This should be achievable through a political solution that exploits the differing aims of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and results in the setting up of a loose federal system that includes the Taliban, but ensures that they cannot create a unitary state in which they achieve dominance, and gives other ethnic groups, and other Pashtun leaders, room to establish their own power centres. Even though such a political solution would require the departure of Western military forces, the US, with the help of the ‘Northern Alliance’ provinces, a revitalized Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and its own proximate military power, can ensure that al-Qaeda does not again establish bases in Afghanistan.

Should a political solution not to be possible immediately, the US will have to conduct a holding operation there until Pakistan has been stabilized sufficiently to re-establish control over its border areas, and is in a position to assist in achieving a satisfactory resolution in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The flawed conceptual legacy left behind by the Bush administration has contaminated the Obama administration’s aims and policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This has been compounded by a continuation of the defective planning process of allowing the military too much say in policy-making, so that they not only decide how to fight but also pick the enemy the US will fight. As a result the United States is pursuing a wrong policy in this theatre: fighting the wrong enemy on the wrong battlefield. Unless it realizes this, and makes the necessary corrections soon, it risks losing both Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Islamists.

© F B Ali (May 2009)

[/rquoter]

 

This article paints a different picture than of a stage show

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hkiMxbHNH0BqgpWA2ZG6VD6wVTmAD985CN1G0

Pakistan fighting kills 15; headless bodies found
By RIAZ KHAN – 2 hours ago

PESHAWAR, Pakistan (AP) — Troops secured footholds Wednesday in a Pakistani valley overrun by the Taliban, killing 11 militants and discovering five headless corpses near the region's main town, the army said.

Elsewhere in the turbulent northwest, police said dozens of assailants stormed a transport depot handling supplies for NATO troops in neighboring Afghanistan and torched eight trucks before escaping.

Rising violence, including a string of attacks on NATO and U.S. supplies, have fed concern that more of Pakistan's border region is slipping from government control and into the hands of the Taliban and al-Qaida.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai warned Wednesday that the threat militants pose to both countries is very real.

"Terrorists and extremists are extending their reach in whole areas of our countries," Karzai told a regional economic conference in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad.

Under strong U.S. pressure, Pakistani authorities abandoned peace talks last month with Taliban militants and launched a military operation to expel them from their stronghold in the Swat Valley.

The army claims to have killed more than 750 militants since the operation began. But the fighting has also driven some 800,000 people from their homes, creating a humanitarian emergency that could undercut support for the pro-Western government.

The army said Wednesday that commandos airlifted into the valley the day before had established a "firm hold" in the remote Piochar area, the rear base of Swat Taliban leader Maulana Fazlullah.

Troops were also consolidating their positions near a strategic bridge and a shrine in the valley, an army statement said. Various clashes in the previous 24 hours left four soldiers and 11 militants dead, it said.

The five headless bodies were found near the valley's main town, Mingora, the army said, giving no details of the victims' identities. Residents have said the Taliban have repeatedly decapitated opponents and dumped their bodies in Mingora.

The army has yet to start operations in Mingora, where witnesses say Taliban insurgents are in control and preparing for what could be bloody house-to-house fighting.

The army says it is proceeding carefully, wary that civilian casualties and massive disruption could sap public support for a sustained operation to undo recent Taliban gains.

It says it has no information to corroborate accounts from refugees of dozens of people killed and injured in the fighting, which has included massive airstrikes on militant targets.

Tens of thousands of refugees have found refuge in camps run by the government and the United Nations. Others are living with relatives and friends.

Lawmakers have raised concern about those so far unable to escape the valley, in part because of a curfew imposed by the army.

Syed Allahuddin, a lawmaker from Swat who represents the main ruling party, said some 700,000 people were stranded in the valley with dwindling supplies of food and water.

"People are facing grave trouble because they couldn't get the foodstuffs to provide for themselves and their children," Allahuddin said.

Copyright © 2009 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

 

Its a good piece and I agre with its general idea that the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot be won militarily.

I will point out that the article acknowledges that the the Pakistani military is undertaking military operations against the Taliban. I think the idea that the Pakistani military doesn't see the Taliban as a threat, which is the basis of this thread, is unsupported by the facts.