Anti-Pakistan Rant. Like the phoney Iraq War Propaganda?

I'm not worried that the Taliban is going to rout the Pakistani army and send them running into Kashmir to hide, and the entire country will be declared "The United States of Taliban" - that's not necessary though.

but they and their Al Qaeda affiliates, are capable of destabilizing the nuclear-armed country to a dagnerous degree . . . they killed Bhutto, which is the essentially the same as them, say killing HIlary Clinton, they nearly killed Musharraf a few times. Pakistan doesn't need to fall, just to fail badly enough for some very bad things to happen.

 

I'm concerned about a popular uprising, ala Iran, where leadership fails. That those in leadership, or those who would be logical replacements for the incompetent government, take my signature to heart. That the Army is rudderless and confused, and the general population, the majority of whom are moderate by Islamic standards, heck, by Western standards to a surprising degreee, for those who don't know the Pakistani people, are helpless to control the uneducated mob buying into the Taliban/Islamic extremist propaganda due to lack of a perceived alternative, and the grunts in the Army, with the NCOs and the lower echelon of the officer corps, simply stay in the barracks, refusing to act against there own people. It could happen.

It surprises me that so many think that scenario isn't a real possibilty. Revolutions, while most fail, have many examples from history showing the far superior power of the state, when confronted by chaos engendered by an "extremist" minority (extremist in quotes, extreme being in the eye of the beholder... see Revolution, United States, for an obvious example) failing to prevent disaster.

So while I agree with you, Sam, that the possibilty of atomics falling into the hands of the Taliban and AQ is not an impossible scenario, neither is an even worse, if more unlikely possibility, that of the entire state being captured by same. Think Iran, already having 100-200 nukes parked around the country, except with a debt to our most mortal enemies, AQ. And we know what they would want. Anything we can do to prevent that is cheap in comparison to the alternatives. This isn't a fantasy concocted by Bush and company, easy to dismiss. Not in my opinion, at any rate.

 

You really don't know the political/social environment in Pakistan if you worry about a revolution (especially from a Taliban/extremist front). The ingredients just arn't there for this to happen. Most importantly you have a united army, general Kayani is ready to step in if anything were to happen. As far as the nuclear weapons are concerned, I read they have about 10,000 soldiers guarding each facility... The Taliban might be a thorn, but they pose no real threat to the existence of any nation other than Afghanistan. Personally I think this is mostly about Bolochistan, the Taliban threat is just a sideshow.

 

A couple of things:

The following explains why the Taliban will never control all of Pakistan. It's long, so I've bolded bits. If it's still too long, the essence is that the Punjabi parts of Pakistan are such a different culture from the Pashtun that they are incompatible with some of the core inflexible ideology of the Taliban. The idea that the Taliban would subsume the Punjabis is akin to the neocon fantasy that the Shia, Sunni, and Kurds in Iraq would somehow unite and become one big, happy, homogenous family:

[rquoter]
COMMENT: Punjab and the Taliban —Chaudhry Fawad Hussain

The Taliban philosophy is based on the strict Deobandi school of Islam, which has no room for saints and shrines. The majority of Punjabi Muslims are followers of the Barelvi school; which revolves around the saint and his shrine.

The New York Times reports that Taliban insurgents are teaming up with local militant groups to make inroads in Punjab, and that in at least five towns in southern and western Punjab, including Multan, barber shops, music centres and internet cafes offensive to the militants’ strict interpretation of Islam have received threats.

The report has instigated a blistering debate here in Punjab on whether, in the days to come, the Taliban can really take over Pakistan’s largest province. Some recent incidents, including attacks on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore and the Manawan Police Training School, raised fears to new heights and many believe that the Taliban, known to have their roots in the tribal culture of frontier region and Afghanistan, have the capacity to expand their control to other parts of Pakistan, most importantly to Punjab.

The Taliban school of thought simply cannot win support in Punjab. I rest my opinion on three fundamentals because of which the Taliban cannot win in Punjab.

First, the Taliban philosophy is based on the strict Deobandi school of Islam, which has no room for saints and shrines. The majority of Punjabi Muslims are followers of the Barelvi school; which revolves around the saint and his shrine. Punjabi Muslims have always been emotionality attached with shrines and sufis. When the Taliban locked the mausoleum of Pir Baba in Buner, Punjabi Muslims felt offended, despite the fact that Pir Baba is not a well-known saintly figure in Punjab.

No one can dare think of closing down the shrines of Data Ganj Bakhsh, Hazrat Mian Mir or Bahauddin Zakaria. Almost every village in Punjab has a shrine, and for Barelvis, shrines are nearly as sacred as mosques. This is not in conformity with the orthodox Ahle Hadith or Deobandi traditions, which do not recognise the shrine or mazar as a religious symbol. In fact, they consider reverence of shrines as apostasy (shirk).

Second, there is no doubt that Punjabi rural society is caste-based and people care for castes in inter se relationships. However, by no means does this make it a tribal society. The customs even in remote Punjabi villages are far more liberal than tribal customs. The position of women in this society is more elevated than in tribal society; they enjoy more liberties, and in many cases are the sole decision makers.

In an agricultural economy like Punjab, women are as important as men. In rural Punjab, women working in the fields is a common sight; subjecting them to strict veil and domestic confinement as is the case in the tribal areas of Afghanistan is unimaginable in Punjab.

In urban centres like Lahore, Multan, Rawalpindi and Faisalabad, women are enjoying an even higher status than in the rural areas. Therefore, it will not be possible for anyone to subject women in Punjab to the kind of restrictions that the Taliban have imposed in the areas under their control. The same applies for harsh punishments: the death penalty was abolished in the area between Delhi and Lahore much before its abolition in the United Kingdom. The reaction to public hanging during the Zia era was so severe that the government was forced to review its policy after only one execution.

The third reason is the strong emphasis in the Punjabi lower and middle class on education. Even families with income levels as low as Rs 4000 to Rs 6000 per month take pains to send their children, including females, to school. Hence, this very strong societal force will deeply resist any ideology that restricts people from educating their children. Further, proliferation of the free media and a strong cultural base are two other factors that will make it extremely difficult for the Taliban to establish themselves in Punjab.

One of the arguments made by several commentators in Pakistan and abroad is that the Taliban are a modern Robin Hood-type organisation that appeals to the masses. Some have used class analysis to support this view, arguing that the Taliban are essentially sparking a ‘revolution’. However, history tells us that it is not enough to just be poor for someone to join a revolution; many more factors are at play. Often, political and religious philosophies take precedence over class identity; which is the case in Punjab. The Taliban movement does not appeal to the people of Punjab because of the reasons outlined above and will therefore find it extremely difficult to achieve any success in the province.

The author is a Lahore-based lawyer and columnist and can be reached at fawadch@hotmail.com

[/rquoter]

Just FYI, the entire elite power structure of Pakistan is Punjabi. That includes education, lawyers and the judiciary, the military, the engines of the economy, etc. They are all Punjabi.

The following is a good explanation of the average elite Punjabi's view of what is going on.

[rquoter]
Getting on the same page in Pakistan

We all know that Pakistan is key to Afghanistan. And it's clear that Pakistan is in trouble. How comes, everyone wonders, is that the people that rule Pakistan don't get it?

This article in the Daily, a Pakistani national newspaper, gives you a very good idea of how the movers and shakers see Pakistan's present predicament.

The basic ideas are that:

1. All of Pakistan's internal problems come from Indian activities run out of Afghanistan.
2. Pakistan's present "democratic" rulers are useless and owe their positions to America.
3. The real story is that the U.S. has failed in Afghanistan
4. London and Washington have a hidden agenda in cosying up to India.
5. The US wants to invade and dismember Pakistan

In a normal Middle Eastern military dictatorship (let's say Egypt), newspaper columnists compete to outdo each other in parroting the ruler's view in the most sycophantic manner. Pakistan is a little different and a lot less straight forward.

Pakistani's have a long history of saying what they think in the press. And more often than not, the things said in the press reflect the views of upper middle class Pakistanis, who the government needs to keep onside.

In Londonstani's view, Washington and London will never get the Pakistani government to fully realise and act on the dangers the neo-Taliban insurgency poses until it gets this demographic on side, which considering the deep memory of colonial history and the Afghan-Soviet war (and its aftermath) will not be easy.

But this is vital. Ultimately, at present, the opinion that matters in Pakistan does not see the Taliban as a threat to the state in its own right. Instead it blames the U.S. presence in Afghanistan for inflaming the passions of a "bunch of villagers" that the movers and grovers casually dismiss.

Now, this is where public diplomacy as a role to play. London and Washington need, in Londonstani's opinion, to convince Pakistani public opinion that they are on the same page, that they all share a common threat and that the Western powers aren't about to use and abandon Pakistan.

What won't work is encouraging another military guy to take over and then convince him, hoping that he takes the nation with him. Public opinion (of the right sort of public) matters in Pakistan, and there's no getting around that.
[/rquoter]


In other words, they are much more concerned about the threat from India, and they don't particularly view the USA as a stable (or even necessarily friendly) partner. From this view, the Taliban starting a ruckus in a remote rural Pashtu area is about like the KKK holding a rally in Assbackwards, Alabama - not something you endorse or like, but something you tolerate and manage. That leads into the following, which is probably most important.

The more I pay attention, the more it becomes clear that this whole thing in Buner is kabuki theater for the West, the Taliban is essentially still affiliated with a significant element of the Pakistani military, and they are using each other as tools.

For instance, the following is from direct interviews by the BBC's Urdu Service reporter talking with Buner refugees.

[rquoter]
'Same coin'

I interviewed a large number of refugees in Swabi, but I did not meet a single person who actually saw the army and the Taleban as members of opposing camps.

Instead, I heard, they were "two sides of the same coin".

"The Pakistani army has hurt us badly - but while they have killed civilians, I swear I haven't seen a single shell directed at the Taleban," says Shahdad Khan, a refugee sheltering at a camp in Swabi's Shave Ada area.

Others question the Pakistani military's stated commitment to "eliminating" the Taleban.

"No way," Siraj tells me.

"The army brought the Taleban to our area! It's politics. The Taleban and the army are brothers."
[/rquoter]

(In support of the above, see also Oh, the Glories of the Pakistani Army

 

My parents are both Punjabi Pakistani (mom is from Lahore and dad is from a village in Punjab about 100 miles north of Lahore), and the article above pretty much sums up their thoughts on the issue. I've only been to Pakistan twice (only Punjab) and I was surprised by how liberal Lahore was, especially compared to all the preconceptions I had before my first visit.

Then again, I hear Iran (under the Shah) was a pretty liberal place as well. So I don't know what to think at this point...

 

Here's an interesting article I came across on a blog:

LINK

Pakistan must be a secular state or it will perish

By Yasser Latif Hamdani

The events as they have unfolded in Swat over the past few months have once again underscored the need for Pakistan to be a constitutionally secular state.

Instead of getting into the debate as to whether Pakistan was meant to be a secular state (which I believe it was but that is not the point here) or a modern Islamic state (whatever that means), let us be very clear- it was NOT meant to be a state where rogue raggle taggle groups like the Taliban would challenge the writ of the state and then establish its own system of “justice” based on a misinterpretation of Islam. Islam is not the problem here. I tend to agree with the interpretation of Islam that is favored by Allama Ghamidi but the question that comes up is “which Islam?” Ghamidi’s? Or Israr Ahmad’s? Rahman Baba’s ? or the Taliban’s? Iqbal’s? or Maududi’s?

In a revealing interview yesterday, Ghulam Mustafa Khar revealed that he played a pivotal role in bringing Maulana Maududi on board with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s constitution. Bhutto was ready to go to any length to secure consensus and the “welding in” of Islam into a democratic popular constitution was one such compromise. Like Liaqat Ali Khan before him, Bhutto was being clever by half with the Mullahs. It was, however, Maududi who was to have the last laugh for Islam – as it was inserted in the 1973 constitution- was akin to leaving the door wide open. Since 1973 we’ve seen a steady erosion of fundamental rights in this country, all justified by the Islamic provisions of the constitution.

Now therefore we must learn a lesson from this. Islam is a rational and pragmatic religion which aims to create a just and egalitarian society. It does not favor any exclusivism of any kind and treats faith as a matter between man and god. Islam also does not favor form over substance. A state does not become Islamic simply because it is called Islamic. Similarly a state meets certain criteria of social justice, equality and human solidarity, it is perfectly Islamic, even if there isn’t a single Muslim living there. This is what prompted Iqbal to call the British Empire the “greatest Mohammadan Empire on Earth”. The issue of what constitutes an Islamic state has no consensus and therefore it much more advisable to strive for a just society that Islam claims it seeks to create.

So let us not forsake the substance for form. Only a secular state which saves Islam from manipulation by various contending groups in this country can truly fulfill the aims and objectives of Pakistan as a prosperous and egalitarian state. This is no paradox. It was no paradox that the Muslims of South Asia chose as its leader someone like Jinnah who was so obviously disdainful of religiousity for anyone else would be too partisan or sectarian. The same principle applies on a state level.

Let us say this openly: Pakistan needs to be a secular state to survive. There is no other way. True Islamic principles of equality, fraternity and justice dictate it.

 

Haven't really followed this development. But I have a couple of Pakistani friends at my school going for their doctorates. I remember them bringing it up a bit last week, but pretty much dismissed the threat in general.

I think I'll bring up the topic when I see them again. But from their mannerisms. I really doubt it's as big of a deal as these articles are making things out to be.

 

Gracious, glynch - what "neocons" exactly are you talking about? The sad thing is that people like you just slap that term around and aside from being really annoying, it also distorts any chance of analyzing who made the decisions you don't agree with and why they did so.

People - keep in mind that glynch was against going into afghanistan to begin with and it really shows how confused he is about foreign policy. I'd be real interested to see him explain how the intervention in Afghanistan is anymore "neoconservative" than any other ideology since just about every one includes a right to self defense. Plenty of people have valid kritiks of US foreign policy, but don't start thinking there isn't a lunatic fringe out there. Glynch is proof of that.

As far as the situation in Pakistan goes, I don't think we'll see that United States of Taliban there, as someone said earlier. However, a strengthening presence by the Taliban certainly increases the probability that they will move to destabilize the Pakistani government, whether that is by sowing discontent among the general population, assassinating local and national leaders etc. While Pakistanis in general may be more concerned with India, it really isn't outlandish to be concerned about the stability in Pakistan, especially when you consider the tight networking between the Taliban and rogue elements of the ISI. Sam is right. He's not claiming the sky is falling.

That doesn't even start the conversation about how dangerous the Taliban can be if they get to keep their safe havens in NW Pakistan.

 

No, I really don't think you know what a neocon is. You clearly post as if Bush, Cheney, Rice et al are neocons when they clearly aren't. Yes, the neoconservatives loudly supported the intervention in Iraq, and that was consistent with the realists (Cheney, Rice) views. That doesn't make them synonymous. Just say 'the Bush administration' so you will stop sounding so confused. As I've said many times, the sad part is that you are preventing sound analysis of some of these decisions when you refuse to distinguish between these two camps. Realists and neoconservatives are NOT the same thing, although their advocacy might cross over at times. That you can't comprehend this is somewhat frustrating and disappointing.

You've admitted to being against the intervention in Afghanistan before without qualification. I guess backtracking a little bit isn't out of character for you.

I bet you do. I disagree. The last thing you want to do is allow a nation state that is providing safe haven to the 9/11 terrorists any leeway.

Dude, seriously. The intervention in Afghanistan WAS IN SELF DEFENSE, recognized as such by every power on earth. If you want to try argue otherwise, please do.

 

India should just take over that ****hole of a country. On second thought, who would want that garbage?

 

Yes, I do prefer discussions devoid of mislabels, gross mischaracterizations, and over generalizations. I think it's more insightful and productive than grabbing a label from the media and then attributing everything to that mistaken assumption. It's poor logic and just clouds the issues. Again you ignore the effects of doing so with bravado. I'll spell it out for you since you don't see the significance. If we lay all the mistakes of the Bush Administration on neoconservatism, the realists get a free pass even though it was predominantly realists making the decisions. So you seek to discredit the school of thought that was in a supporting role and miss the boat completely on the SOT that actually held the power. You don't see anything significant in discussing the different schools of thought while I can't think of anything MORE relevant to discuss. It has to be the start of the discussion UNLESS you just want to make crappy misinformed claims without any supporting warrants.

If you said you'd have preferred a police action (whatever the hell that would have been since you're dumber than I thought if you believe the Taliban was going to give up Bin Laden), I can understand that. But ONLY you can seriously maintain that a nation state does not have the right to militarily respond to an attack planned, trained for, and implemented from another nation state. That's pretty much the underpinning of the whole nation state system. It's simply ridiculous and isn't consistent with 99% of the opinion out there, including from many many different camps that don't normally agree with US action.

As far as 'containing Al Qaeda"... HELLO? They blew up the freakin WTC.

An extreme overreaction? Is that why we got near universal support for the intervention? YOU think it was but you're pretty damn alone in that opinion. Of course, whether or not it was an overreaction begs the question of whether or not we had the 'right' to intervene in Afghanistan. You're like a walking billboard for logical fallacies in argument.

And I don't think we've been firebombing anyone, we aren't talking about cities but nation-states, and that IS the reaction that our system allows. You don't have one shred of logical argument as to why the US didn't have the right for that intervention. Keep repeating your claim, as usual, without any substance. OR suprise everyone and actually make a coherent argument.

Sure, happy to. An argument has two basic parts: a claim and a warrant (proof) for the claim. All I ask is that you start including warrants with your claims, instead of repeating or rewording your claims. Otherwise its just a waste of my time.

Afghanistan's a no brainer. Afghanistan gives Al Qaeda safe haven to plan their attacks, Afghanistan must pay the piper. That helps deter other states from supplying safe havens for these kind of groups, it also removes the current government supporting this group.

Iraq - I have always said the same thing: Iraq provided a unique confluence of interests. Intervention there removed a despot (despots bad - neoconservatism), a state sponsor of terror (realism), a threat to stability in the region (realism), and an inevitable WMD threat (as you can easily confirm I always said it was inevitable rather than imminent). We removed US troops from Saudi which was a cause of 9/11 (realist) and potentially opened the ball for all of the middle east to join in the democratic transition most of the rest of the world has already moved toward (neoconservative).

The intervention in Iraq was poorly justified to the people, as distinguished from 'the intervention in Iraq was unjustified.' The intervention was poorly planned (personally I think the largest single mistake was disbanning the Iraqi Army, which we could have used for security).

Pakistan - we can't let AQ just switch their safe haven to Pakistan. Whether that means putting pressure on the Pakistani government to take care of the problem, or us taking care of it, it has to be done. I don't really give a damn if Pakistan would rather just ignore the NW part of their country. If a bunch of warlords were running nutcase training camps in Alaska I would certainly be all for the Department of Defense clearing them out by force if necessary.

Funny thing is that I guess you think Interpol could have just gone and arrested bin laden, lol.

 

The numbers I've seen for COIN to work in AfPak to "drain the swamp" and build real countries from here on out are 10,000-15,000 more dead American soldiers, 10 or so more years, and 2-3 trillion dollars. Basically, AfPak requires 2-4x the cost and effort that we put into Iraq. These numbers are a synthesis of the figures put forth by people who have actually done COIN.

Is that an acceptable price for everyone? My guess that the answer is almost universally going to be no. In which case, doing the job half assed and giving up 2/3 of the way seems decidedly worse than doing nothing. The advocates here are so busy arguing what we "should" do, that nobody is bothering to ask whether we really can do it.

 

The entire Pakistani population is not concerned as much as the people in this thread. Even the people right on the border. They are WAY more aware of the risks and the threats.

Why is this being so exaggerated in the U.S.? I've heard all the conspiracy theories and they unfortunately seem to make sense because I don't understand the LEVEL of emphasis that the U.S. has put on this.

I just find it extremely strange that at a time of crisis, so much thought is being put into a minor issue. A tiny risk. There are SO many bigger problems for America to worry about.

Does the U.S. REALLY think that if they leave Afghanistan/Pakistan that the threat towards them will grow or change? That the Taliban will acquire nuclear weapons? That they will capture a government?

Al Qaeda has effectively eliminated its concentration risk of being in one country. As I understand it, they're spread across around 10 countries now, stretching from the Far East to North Western Africa. After this giant pursuit while everyone thinks Bin Laden is dead, if he shows up ANYWHERE and is able to prove that he is alive and well, it will create a huge uprising and destabilize things again. That's the risk in highlighting one person and one chase. Shooting him won't solve it, but missing repeatedly will motivate his brainwashed subjects. High risk, almost no reward.

Maybe I just don't have my facts straight. Are there things I'm assuming or missing?

 

Sort of like the Lakers, LOL.

 

This undermines your original point in this thread that the Pakistanis weren't willing to fight the Taliban since they didn't see them as a threat and weren't swayed by the US. Now that the Pakistanis have launched an offensive against the Taliban you are saying they are essentially the puppets of the US.

I don't think you can have it both ways and claim in the span of two days that the Pakistanis have different priorities of the US and won't do US bidding versus they are suddenly puppets. Have you considered the possibility that the Pakistanis actually did see the movement towards Islamabad as an actual threat and actually agree with the US that the Taliban need to be taken on?