Absolutely not. Although there are some religous overtones and muslims tend to have symphathy for the palestinians, it is at its core a nationalist struggle. The fight for a palestinian homeland (not a muslim homeland) had always been fought by groups such as the PFLP and PLO. Only around the 80's or so were groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad coming into the picture when it seemed clear that the secular groups had failed at their objectives. One of my best friends is greek orthodox so i have come into contact with a good number of palestinian christians who attend the same church. They seem to have alot of animosity towards israel and are supportive of the palestinian movement for a homeland. So to conclude Palestinian and Muslim are not interchangeable terms and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the Jewish-Muslim conflict.
They are human beings, just like you. How would you feel about acquiring land at the cost of universal hatred and being suicide bombed? They believe that they can not trust the Arab states. This is not a position without some historical precedent. Promising peace and actually being able to deliver it are two different things. Of course the same concerns apply in reverse. But the picture of a peace loving live-and-let-live Arab community that only seek to live side by side in harmony contrasted with the bloodthirsty Jews who froth at the mouth at the idea of gobbling up the world and cleaning their teeth with toothpicks made from the bones of Arab babies is not an honest picture. Instead perhaps the Israelis don't believe that the plan offered will lead to a spectrum of outcomes resulting in greater security than now exists? The key to the prisoners dilemma is being able to trust in the altruism of the other prisoner. Can you say that the Arab league has built that kind of trust with Israel? I can think of very few states with that degree of faith in each other, much less Israel and the Arab States.
I agree. What's with the "they're human beings" part? Where are you getting all this? The Arabs are not any more 'peace-loving' than the Israelis, I don't think either side has done much to build trust and pave the road for peace. It's a mess of their own making, I am placing the blame on both parties, not one or the other. It's obvious you've read into my post waaaaaaaaaaaay more than what was actually there. That was PRECISELY my point: may be the Israelis thought it over and came to the conclusion that the 'status quo' (i.e. unilateral disengagement) is the most advantageous of all other options available to them? I wasn't being sarcastic at all or trying to make a point. The Israelis have every right to do what rational states normally do: pursue what they believe to be in their best interest. Remember? I am the resident 'realist' on this board... I understand, I studied IR... No... Again, I don't disagree. Still, I do believe the 'will' is there, it's how to go about it without ending up in a less favorable position that's the key for both sides. The Arabs put forth their 'vision', and I am sure the Israelis will have theirs. At the end of the day, both sides must make concessions or they will continue to fall short. So again, both sides want 'peace' as a long-term solution, but they don't know how to get there and they lack the necessary foundation to build upon, which is 'trust' that the other side will uphold their end of the bargain. The good news? The Israelis and Egyptians proved that 'peace' can be had under less than ideal circumstances. I am not saying the same can happen with the Palestinians or that the circumstances were the same, but there's some regional precedence.
I think this is a testament to the staying power of Israel. I have spoken with muslims who can't believe Israel has fought off and defeated multiple muslim countries at once...They find the Iraq nuclear reactor bombing from F16's so incredulous and worry the same may happen to Iran...They can't understand how a country so small has survived, I have heard the principle anger among the large dominance of muslim people is why Israel has flourished after all these years... It has been said that pound for pound Israel is the best military power in the world, and I want to wish a happy anniversary!
Those voices will always be there, but the 'powers to be' -- thankfully -- know better for the most part. Anyways, some of the Arab states are far more concerned about Iran having nukes than anything having to do with Israel at the moment. I heard a political analyst on Al-Jazeera saying that he would rather have the Israelis maintain their "nuclear monopoly" in the region than see Iran acting as a counterbalance. Probably the most effective and experienced military force in the world, so I wouldn't question that.
Remembering The Six-Day War By David Meir-Levi FrontPageMagazine.com | June 5, 2007 By late 1949, Israel’s willingness to accept the UN partition plan, to establish peace with its neighbors, and to repatriate refugees were all for naught. The Arab world, and especially the five confrontation states -- Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq -- insisted that although they had lost ‘round one,’ there would be another, and if need be, another, and another, until the Zionist entity was destroyed. So Israel set about building itself into a 20th century, democratic, technologically advanced Western state with a strong army. It absorbed more than 800,000 Jewish refugees who were forcibly expelled, penniless, from their ancestral habitations in Arab countries. It focused on developing its economy, creating an infrastructure that rivaled western states, establishing 5 world-class universities, and extending a broad network of social services to all of its citizenry, Jewish, Christian, and Moslem. As the population swelled, settlements in the Negev and Galilee grew in size and number. The port of Eilat at Israel’s southernmost tip opened trade via the Red Sea with the Far East. But the Arab states were not joking when they promised “round 2.” Unable as yet to mount another hot war, Egypt perpetrated a legal act of war (casus beli) by closing the Straits of Tiran, thus denying Israel any access to the Far East from Eilat. Egypt also supported the fedayyin (‘redeemers’, ‘freedom fighters’), a terrorist movement in the Arab refugee camps of the Gaza strip. These terrorists perpetrated almost 9,000 attacks against Israel between 1949 and 1956, concentrating primarily on civilian targets. Hundreds of Israelis died, and thousands were injured. Israel’s policy was to retaliate by mounting ‘pin point’ attacks against Egypt’s military emplacements, rather than against the refugee camps in which the terrorists hid. Without actually adumbrating it, Israel presaged President Bush’s doctrine of 9/11/01: any country that harbors and abets terrorism is itself a terrorist country and, thus, a legitimate target in the war against terrorism. By attacking military targets (and avoiding countless civilian deaths), Israel tried to force the Egyptian government to dismantle the terrorist fedayyin. It didn’t work. In 1956, France and England induced Israel to join them in a war against Egypt. These two European powers wanted control of the Suez canal; and they had their own foreign policy reasons for desiring the overthrow of Egyptian President Nasser. Israel was to handle the ground war, and thus end the fedayyen threat, while England and France would offer air support. Israel’s Suez war was a brilliant military success. The whole of the Sinai was captured in a few days. But under pressure from US President Eisenhower, France and England withdrew their air support. Due to foreign policy and Cold War considerations, Eisenhower and the USSR threatened Israel with an invasion unless it withdrew from the Sinai. Within a few weeks, Israel had retreated, and the Sinai was unilaterally returned to Egypt, without any negotiations or peace agreements. But Nasser did agree to have a UN peacekeeping force in the Sinai, to keep the Straits of Tiran open and to refrain from any military build-up at Israel’s western border. It took less than ten years for this arrangement to unravel. Inter-Arab rivalries during these ten years pitted Egypt against Syria, and Egyptian military interference with domestic troubles in Yemen (including the use of poison gas against civilians) had Egypt at odds with Saudi Arabia. Soon, in the context of these tensions, a number of Arab states accused Egypt of “hiding behind the skirts of the UN” instead of preparing for ‘round 3’ against Israel. As a result, Nasser began a major military build-up, with the assistance of the USSR, including the illegal construction of ground-to-ground missiles in the Sinai. n April, 1967, the Soviets in the UN accused Israel of mounting a massive military build-up on the Syrian border. Israel denied the accusation and invited the USSR to send observers to verify the truth. The USSR refused. But the UN, under Secretary General U-Thant of Burma, sent a commission to investigate. It quickly ascertained that the Soviets were lying. There was no Israeli military massing at Syria’s gates. The reason for the Soviet deception is a matter of speculation. Most historians assume that the USSR wanted to spark a war that they were sure the Arabs would win, thanks to the armaments that the USSR had provided them. Such an outcome would cement Soviet relationships with the Arab world and push the US onto the sidelines in the Middle East. The Arab states used the Soviet ploy as an opportunity to regroup for ‘round 3’. First, in mid-May, Egypt, Syria and Jordan formed a mutual defense pact against Israel. Then Egypt closed the straits of Tiran and expelled the UN peacekeeping forces. U-Thant very surprisingly removed the UN troops within a few days, leaving the field open to Nasser and his war machine. For that, U-Thant earned the sobriquet "bungling Burmese." Then Egypt engaged in illegal violation of Israel’s air space with aerial spying by means of fly-overs in the area of Dimona where Israel had its nuclear reactor. Finally, Egypt mobilized its troops and massed armored brigades on the Israeli border. By June 1, the stage was set for war; and Nasser began announcing to the world that it was finally time for the Zionist stain on Arab honor to be expunged with Jewish blood. With missiles only minutes away from major Israeli cities, troops and armor and air force of hostile nations primed for attack on three separate fronts; the Straits of Tiran closed; the Arab world clamored for the destruction of Israel and the butchery of its Jewish inhabitants, while Israel approached the UN, USA, France and UK in search of diplomatic solutions. Israel’s President made a groveling speech at the UN in which he implored the Arab states, especially Egypt, to pull back from the brink of war. It is important to understand that at this point Egypt had perpetrated six specific actions which, in international law, qualify as casus belli, legal justification for war. Conspiring with other belligerent countries (in this case, Syria and Jordan) for a coordinated attack. Closing Israel’s access to international waterways (the straits of Tiran). Violating the terms of the 1956 armistice by re-militarizing the Sinai. Expelling the UN and USA peace-keeping troops form the Sinai. Perpetrating illegal spy-plane fly-overs to reconnoiter Israeli sensitive areas. Massing troops and tanks on Israel’s borders. Israel could have legally launched a defensive war after any one of these casus belli. It chose, instead, to try diplomacy, which not only failed to resolve the problem, but gave Egypt and Syria time to accelerate their own preparations for invasion. Finally, in the early morning of June 5, when Israeli intelligence indicated that Egypt was about to attack, Israel launched its pre-emptive strike. In doing so, it applied the Kennedy doctrine developed during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962): no state need wait until attacked before taking defensive action. The Soviet missiles in Cuba were adequate provocation for the US blockade. The Arabs’ massive build-up and threats of annihilation were adequate provocation for Israel’s attack. On 6/5/1967, in a pre-dawn raid, Israeli jets destroyed almost all the fighter planes of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq before their pilots could get them off the ground. With most of their air forces a smoldering wreck, the Arabs had lost the war almost as soon as it had begun. Arab armor without air cover was destroyed by Israeli planes; and Arab infantry without armor was no match for the Israeli land forces. In six days, Israel re-gained the Sinai, drove the Jordan Legion from the West Bank, and took control of the Golan Heights within artillery range of Damascus. Suddenly there was a new order in the Middle East. Israel had done much more than is generally acknowledged to avoid this war. It struck only after working for weeks under threat of annihilation to exhaust all reasonable diplomatic channels, and after begging the Arab states to honor their cease-fire agreements. But even more compelling, unnoticed by many but thoroughly documented in diplomatic archives is the communication between the Israeli government and King Hussein of Jordan. On Tuesday, June 5, several hours AFTER the Jordan Legion had begun its bombardment of Jerusalem and Petakh Tikvah, Israel sent a message via the Rumanian Embassy to King Hussein. The message was short and clear: stop the bombardment now and we will not invade the West Bank. But King Hussein had already received a phone call from Nasser. This call was monitored by the Israeli Secret Service. Even though he knew that his air force was in ruins, Nasser told Hussein that Egyptian planes were over Tel Aviv and his armor was advancing on Israeli positions. Hussein believed him, and disregarded Israel’s plea. Had Hussein listened to Israel, the West Bank would still be in Jordanian hands. Instead, he sent his troops into the Israeli section of Jerusalem. Only AFTER its territorial integrity in Jerusalem was violated did Israel mount an assault on the Jordanian West Bank. A few days after the UN cease fire of 6/11/67, Abba Eban, Israel’s representative at the UN, made his famous speech. He held out the olive branch to the Arab world, inviting Arab states to join Israel at the peace table, and informing them in unequivocal language that everything but Jerusalem was negotiable. Territories taken in the war could be returned in exchange for formal recognition, bi-lateral negotiations, and peace. Israel wanted peace. Israel offered land in exchange for peace. As Lord Carendon, the UK representative at the UN, noted with considerable surprise after Abba Eban’s speech, never in the history of warfare did the victor sue for peace -- and the vanquished refuse. Twice within a few weeks of the war’s end, the USSR and the Arab Bloc floated motions in the UN General Assembly declaring that Israel was the aggressor. Both motions were roundly defeated. At that time, the world knew that the Arabs were the aggressors, and that Israel, victim of aggression, had sued for peace both before the war and after their amazing victory. Unable to brand Israel the aggressor, and in disarray following Israel’s public request for peace and reconciliation, The Arab world faced what for it was a difficult choice. Recognize Israel, negotiate for the return of conquered territories, and make peace…or not. Rather than respond to Israel’s invitation, the Arab states met in Khartoum, Sudan, for a conference in August, 1967. They unanimously decided in favor of the now famous three Khartoum “NO’s”: No recognition, No negotiation, No peace. This was only round 3. The Arab world could suffer many more defeats before its ultimate victory. Israel could suffer only one defeat. Better that Israel hold on to the territories taken in the war. Better that the refugees continue languishing in their squalor and misery. Better that the Arab states re-arm for round 4…than to recognize Israel’s right to exist or negotiate toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict. With the Khartoum “NO’s”, the Arab world forced Israel to unwillingly assume control over the approximately million Arabs living in the West Bank, Golan Heights, Sinai and Gaza Strip.
I think the issue of the Palestinians extends far beyond the borders of the area of conflict - all the way to Pakistan on one end and through Africa on the other. Considering the instability that has resulted as a consequence of what's going on in that tiny little area, I do feel that it's the wider Islamic community that wants a settleman that maintains Palestinian dignity - translating to the restoration of land. And as you point out, it is broader then even Muslims, and even Arabs.
Naturally. Any sane person would rather deal with the devil they know (Israel having nukes) then adding to the mix a devil they don't know (Iran having nukes). Iran getting nukes would not lead to a stabalization of the region or the world. It's in no ones interest to see Iran get nukes. Iran is not Pakistan.
But Arab Christians are not strapping bombs on themselves nor are they firing rockets into Palestinain neighborhoods. This is not a Jewish-Muslim conflict, it's a Judeo-Christian / Muslim conflict. We're involved (the U.S.), as is a big chunk of the Islamic world. Whether it's financially, militarily, or moral support, this can not be seen just as a local conflict. The need for peace extends beyond the needs of Jews and Muslims. At this point, the world has been destabilized to a large degree. One of the tools we need to employ in defeating terrorism is an end to this conflict. There's a lot the U.S. could do to bring about the end of this conflict, but our leaders are a bunch of whimps.
No doubt. And there are many Jews who will say the Palestinians already have a home - it's called Jordan. Personally, I think there is a viable solution, which is to give the palestinians all the land back to 1967 borders on the condition that there is 30 years of peace (no suicide attacks). This will get everyone what they want.
I apparently misinterpreted. As I read your post it sounded like you were talking about an irrational, Smiegel-like desire to own land even at the cost of perpetual war - that Israel purposefully rejected the Arab League peace agreements because the additional land was worth more to them than peace. I was trying to point out they were making a rational estimate of the outcomes. When people have trouble understanding the motives for others they often assign them some sort of thought process that makes them irrational. This often crops up, for instance in WWII films, where the Japanese, crave death above all else, to the point that dying is done for fun. The only case off the top of my head that I can think of where 'the crazy foreign leader' is actually crazy is Momar Kadaffi, who probably does belong in a rubber room. But clearly that sort of thing was not what was going on here. Sorry for misreading.
if you don't wish to call it appeasement, please provide my limited vocabulary with a different term. i would agree with your plan until you bring in hamas as a factor. you say "they will have no interest in stock piling weapons or training suicide bombers. The means of terrorism will die out and wounds will heal." i highly disagree. hamas isn't ahmadinejad, but they are extremists and would nothing more than to see the destruction of the israeli state. if i am wrong on this line of thinking, show me where. they provoked the initial attack in the 50s which lead to the seizure of lands, followed by egypt attacking and more seizures. what leads you to believe that by the removal of troops and civilians the attacks would cease? i agree more so with FB. giving the lands back would probably help the situation, but cause these groups to to lose interest? doubtful.
Arabs blame their problems on the 1967 war. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070605/ap_on_re_mi_ea/arabs1967_war
The 'Palestinian cause' is a global issue now, it's not limited to Muslims and Jews. However, it's still at the core an Arab-Israeli land dispute. That is what it comes down to.
That was my point: may be they made a rational estimate of the likely outcome in each scenario and decided that it's not necessarily in their interests to take what they're being offered now? It seems to me that the current leadership decided that the 'unilateral disengagement' plan is the way to go. This could change but for now that seems to be the plan... No biggie...
Appeasement implies you're just giving in to another's demands. What I propose is a fair and just settlement that addresses both sides needs. Big difference. Hamas will let go. If they have to disarm for 30 years, but will get the '67 borders, they will claim victory and disarm to become a political party. Since they are the ones on watch when peace was formed, they will have the incentive to maintain that peace, and in 30 years, will not have any desire to unstablize their control as a political party. In 30 years, the Palestinians will have a developed economy tightly integrated in with Israels. They will have a booming standard of living - and will have little desire for war. Just as violence thens to beget violence - stability and prosperity has the opposite effect. The palestinains are not blood thirsty dogs - and that's what people forget. At the end of the day, Hamas is just a political party seeking power. You have to turn the incentives for them to maintaining peace. If Hamas can claim victory for acquiring back their land - but it's conditional on peace, they will enforce that peace. Palestinians will rejoice that they fought of colonization and kicked the occupiers out, and Israel will have peace. I don't see how anyone could ask for anything more. And....Israel will have 30 years to yield the land - that's quite a nice buffer - hardly appeasement.
1. What you are proposing is appeasement. Israel gives up a bunch of stuff in the hope that the Palestinians will stop attacking them. That is basically the definition of appeasement. 2. You have left out a very critical element of your plan. What happens if there are not 30 years without attacks (as would seem nearly inevitable)? If the handover continues anyway, at that point the plan is what most of the pro-Palestinian people have been suggesting forever, Israel gives up all of the land in dispute and hopes for the best. If they return to the status quo, then Israel is in a worse position than they are now because of whatever actions they have taken toward withdrawing to the '67 borders. The only way that such a plan could work is if the Palestinians agree that a breach of the peace would result in a forfeiture of the disputed territory to Israel, and the deportation of the Palestinians. Good luck getting the anti-Israel peeps to agree to that.
The handover is canceled once there is a Palestinian attack on Israel in the 30 years window. Israel then gets to keep the land forever. That's not appeasement.
LOL. That is a absurdly unenforceable and ultimately meaningless clause you have generated. Do you really believe that there are any set of circumstances where the Palestinains would say, "Oh crap. Guess we broke the terms. Lets give all this land back to the Israelis."
