China, and the competitive edge of having no moral culpability

Frogs in a boiling pot...Frogs in a well...

 

NYT is three to ten years too late reporting this. So many lies from the MSM and they continue not to even acknowledge being "asleep" at the wheel while everyone is forced to confront the truth. Good ol futurist Tommy Friedman pulling a Paul Revere after the **** hits the fan.

Hell, making a campaign isssue in their papers about it might've given enough clout to have Americans demand "experts" who have have lived there in the past 5 years and could at least read and speak Chinese at high enough levels to influence policy...Until Looney Loomer fires them for being hidden agents or something.



We have less than 3 months to cram for an exam China spent 20 years to prepare for.

 

That has to be the most blatantly racist thing I've read on this board. Ignorance is a hell of a drug.

 

The problem is no one will listen or care about this.

 

Do you agree with this Chinese young man.

 

I'll address your viewpoints on technology transfer in my next few posts, then examine the labor issues later after conducting more investigation.

China's Industrialization History

China's industrial development can be divided into the following stages.

1. Pre-Reform (1949-1978): China followed a Soviet-style centrally planned economy with an emphasis on heavy industry like steel, machinery, and chemical production under state ownership.
2. Initial Reform (1978-1992): The "Reform and Opening Up" policy was put forward and market-oriented mechanism was introduced. China's economic system gradually shifted from a state-owned system to a mixed ownership system. The focus on light industry was growing. Foreign investments began flowing into manufacturing sectors.
3. Consolidation of Reform and Globalization (1992-2012): China established and refined its "socialist market economy" system, prioritizing state-owned enterprise reform and private sector expansion. Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 integrated China into global supply chains, propelled exports and made China the world's largest manufacturer by 2012. Low labor costs provided significant competitive advantage in the growth of labor-intensive industries.
4. Industrial Upgrading and High-Quality Development (2012-present): Rising labor costs drove industrial upgrading through automation and digitalization to boost productivity. Environmental degradation raised concerns and led to stricter pollution controls and sustainability measures. Strategic initiatives like "Made in China 2025" relocated social resources toward high-value sectors (robotics, aerospace, etc.), while policies incentivized domestic research and development (R&D) and indigenous innovation.

China’s industrialization operates through a dual-track system that evolved from rigid central planning to a hybrid model blending central planning with local experimentation and implementation. The central government sets strategic directions through five-year plans and industrial policies, while local governments exercise flexibility in execution. This has fostered regional competition where local officials — incentivized by economic performance metrics tied to promotions — vie for resources by creating distinctive advantages, such as fiscal incentives, infrastructure development, and regulatory flexibility.

Market Access for Technology

The "Market Access for Technology" strategy was a cornerstone of China's industrial development from the 1980s through the 2010s. The approach explicitly leveraged China's enormous consumer market in exchange for foreign technology via structured joint ventures and localization mandates. Foreign firms entering strategic sectors (e.g., automotive, energy) were required to partner with domestic enterprises. Sectoral policies enforced progressive localization targets -- e.g., 40% domestic components within three years of market entry -- compelling foreign firms to build local supply chains and transfer operational expertise. In 2000, China revised its foreign investment law to meet WTO accession criterion, where localization requirements were weakened. In 2019, China eventually banned forced technology transfer as international pushback grew. Case studies will be attached in the appendix later.

Commercial collaborations under China's "Market Access for Technology" framework were voluntary and created mutual benefits: foreign companies gained market access and production efficiency, while Chinese partners acquired technological capabilities and management expertise. For foreign companies, these were fundamentally business decisions based on strategic calculations. For them, China represented an essential market too large to abandon to competitors, making technology transfer requirements an acceptable trade-off for market entry. These arrangements significantly boosted foreign firms' revenues. The partnerships evolved beyond simple manufacturing transfers. Many firms established R&D centers in China that leveraged China's expanding pool of engineering talent at competitive prices.

(To be continued)

 

(Continued)

China's IP Practices

On IP practices, China's trajectory mirrors the historical pattern seen in many industrialized nations from the 18th to 20th centuries. Developing countries typically maintained weaker IP protections while building their industrial base and acquiring external technologies, later transitioning to stronger protections as they develop indigenous innovation capabilities. The US, South Korea, Japan, and various European countries all exhibited aspects of this pattern during their industrialization phases. China’s key differentiator is its immense size: even a minuscule rate of IP violations can translate to a significant number of incidents in absolute terms.

While legitimate concerns exist regarding specific Chinese IP practices, the accusations may be exaggerated and leveraged to serve broader political objectives. Here are some facts that are often overlooked.

• China's payments to the legal right of using global IPs have grown exponentially from $1.3 billion in 2001 to $42.7 billion by 2023, outpacing its GDP growth (from $1.34 trillion in 2001 to $17.79 trillion in 2023).
• The US has experienced substantial growth in net income from global IP right payments. The US net IP payment balance grew from around $41 billion in 2001 to $134.4 billion in 2023.
  
• US companies have realized substantial profits from market access and supply chain integration with China. According to data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, in 2022, majority-owned affiliates of US companies in China reported total sales of $490 billion and net income of $37.1 billion.
• Chinese media regularly reports security breaches where foreign entities target sensitive information and key technologies through illicit means such as cyber intrusions and insider recruitment. These cases receive minimal Western coverage, creating a significant reporting asymmetry that obscures the multidirectional nature of global technological and industrial espionage activities across borders.
• In strategic sectors with most IP concerns, especially in semiconductors, many companies have been opposing the US government's policies to restrict China's access to their products.

As a side remark, US policymakers who believed that export control of high-tech products could halt China's technological advancement underestimated the consequences. These restrictions have forced Chinese companies (and some foreign suppliers in non-US countries) to invest heavily in developing an entire ecosystem independent of US technology. The alternative technologies may not match US capabilities in every area, but sufficient for major Chinese organizations to operate independently of US suppliers. This effort is still ongoing and has achieved substantial progress in several areas. Had these restrictions never been imposed, China would likely continue relying on advanced technologies from the US, reducing the urgency for developing domestic alternatives – a market-driven decision that would have generated substantial revenue for US companies to retain their technological edge.

WTO Rule Compliance

On the topic of China's WTO rule compliance, official statements from the US and China present fundamentally contradictory perspectives. Rather than relying on these competing claims, I analyzed objective data from the WTO dispute webpage and the comprehensive WTO disputes database since the dispute settlement mechanism serves as the cornerstone for effective implementation of WTO rules. The statistics are summarized in the following table.

Statistics of WTO Disputes

WTO Member	US	EU	China	Non-US Members
Total cases as complaint	124	114	30	514
Total cases as respondent	164	97	53	474
Total cases as respondent (pre-Dec. 2019)	155	86	44	438
Respondent cases advancing to CR & arbitration	32	11	4	56
% of pre-Dec. 2019 respondent cases requiring CR & arbitration	20.6	12.8	9.1	12.8

The data reveals that the US has been both the most active complainant (124 cases) and the most frequent respondent (164 cases) in WTO disputes. Following multiple adverse rulings from WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), the US decided to paralyze the WTO’s Appellate Body by blocking new judge appointments since 2016. By Dec. 2019, this tactical obstruction had reduced the Appellate Body to a single judge — below the minimum three required for operation.

The last row of the data is particularly revealing. When a DSB ruling is adopted and disagreements arise during the implementation phase, the original complainant may request a Compliance Review (CR) or arbitration; however, this mechanism has become dysfunctional due to the paralysis of the Appellate Body. China has the lowest percentage of cases (9.1%) progressing to these enforcement mechanisms, compared to the EU (12.8%) and US (20.6%). This suggests China has demonstrated more consistent implementation of initial WTO rulings than either western economic power.

The US' below-average record of implementing DSB rulings, coupled with its deliberate actions to undermine the WTO's appellate function, clearly demonstrates its unwillingness to uphold the rules-based international trading system that the US itself was instrumental in designing. This reveals a stark double standard as US politicians selectively neglect their own obligations while criticizing China's WTO compliance. In reality, many US objections seem to stem not primarily from technical violations of trade agreements, but from discomfort with China's distinctive economic development model -- one that has successfully diverged from Western expectations, while challenging long-held assumptions of ideological and institutional convergence.


Appendix - China's Market Access for Technology Strategy: Case Studies from Strategic Sectors

The following verified case studies exemplify China's "market access strategy for technology" in several technology-related sectors.

Automotive Industry

General Motors (GM) and Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC) (Since 1997)
https://carnewschina.com/2022/03/06...erican-friendship-of-saic-and-general-motors/
https://www.aronline.co.uk/news/china-watch/china-watch-gm-and-saic-motor-deepen-ties/​

• GM formed two 50/50 joint ventures with SAIC -- SAIC-GM for vehicle production and Pan-Asian Technical Automotive Center (PATAC) for joint R&D -- with a joint initial investment of $1.5 billion
• GM transferred production technology for Buick models, including vehicle designs, manufacturing processes, and management systems; Chinese engineers were sent to GM facilities in the US for comprehensive training
• GM gained access to China's rapidly growing automotive market -- which has since become the world's largest -- with over 1 million SAIC-GM vehicles sold annually by 2010
• The cooperation enabled SAIC to develop technical knowledge that led to creating their own car models

High-Speed Rail

Siemens and China National Railway Corporation (CNR) (2005)
https://www.gov1.com/economic-devel...e-strong-in-high-speed-rail-MvZhPYgfL9d6eDX6/
https://www.china-briefing.com/news/on-the-fast-track-technology-transfer-in-china/​

• Siemens formed a joint venture with CNR to win the contract -- estimated to be worth $919 million -- that supplied 60 units of high-speed trains to the Chinese Ministry of Railways
• Siemens transferred key train technologies and manufacturing processes for high-speed rail equipment
• Transfer was implemented in a three-phase approach: imported trains, followed by local assembly, then full local production
• Siemens provided technical training for more than 1,000 of CNR’s technical staff at its German facilities
• Local content requirements increased from 30% to 70% over five years
• Siemens gained immediate revenue and access to China's massive high-speed rail expansion, which planned to build the world's largest high-speed network
• CNR gained capabilities to independently manufacture and later develop their own high-speed trainsets; by 2015, China had built over 16,000 km of high-speed rail lines, more than the rest of the world combined

(To be continued)

 

(Continued) Appendix - China's Market Access for Technology Strategy: Case Studies from Strategic Sectors

Telecommunications

Ericsson (Since 1980s)​

• Ericsson formed multiple joint ventures with different Chinese partners in order to secure contracts for China's expanding mobile network infrastructure that worth billions of dollars
• Ericsson licensed key telecommunications patents to Chinese partners and shared technical expertise in manufacturing network equipment to meet local production requirements.
• Ericsson established multiple R&D centers in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. It also operated several joint innovation centers with Chinese partners.
• Ericsson gained significant market share in what became the world's largest telecommunications market, with China becoming Ericsson's second-largest market globally by 2008
• Experiences and techniques Ericsson gained and developed in China help them become the largest 5G provider in global markets outside China
• These deals indirectly contributed to the rise of Chinese telecommunications giants Huawei and ZTE, who gained significant knowledge through this ecosystem and eventually became Ericsson's global competitors

Aviation

Boeing (Since 2009)
https://www.boeing.com/content/dam/...ternational/pdf/chinabackgrounder_english.pdf
https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2012-0...ng-Open-Energy-Conservation-Technology-Center​

• Boeing established 4 joint ventures with Chinese partners, including one that manufactures high-quality aerospace composite parts and assemblies and one completion & delivery center
• Boeing and Commercial Aircraft Corp. of China (COMAC) established a joint technology center. Research projects included green energy and sustainable aircraft cabin materials.
• Boeing has 35+ suppliers from China. More than 10,000 Boeing airplanes currently fly throughout the world with parts and assemblies built in China.
• Boeing generated approximately $83.7 billion in sales revenue from mainland China between 2012 and 2020
• The deals provided insights that supported the development of COMAC's C919 commercial aircraft, China's first serious attempt to break into the commercial aviation market dominated by Boeing and Airbus

Energy

Westinghouse and State Nuclear Power Technology Corporation (SNPTC) (2007)
https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Westinghouse-chosen-by-China
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-rel...-nuclear-cooperation-agreement-114162644.html
https://www.powermag.com/westinghouse-chinas-snptc-partner-to-develop-global-ap1000-supply-chain/​

• Westinghouse signed a landmark deal worth approximately $8 billion with SNPTC to build four AP1000 nuclear reactors with explicit technology transfer requirements as a core condition
• Contract included terms that China owned IPs for reactors that China further developed and made significant improvements based on the AP1000 technology
• Westinghouse transferred approximately 240,000 technical documents and 320 software programs
• Westinghouse established a joint venture with SNPTC to provide supplier qualification services to the global market
• The deal enabled the development of China's indigenous Hualong One reactor design; by 2019, China had developed sufficient capabilities to design and construct its own advanced nuclear reactors

General Electric (GE) and Harbin Electric (Since 2003)
https://chinaeconomicreview.com/ge-forms-wind-turbine-jv-with-harbin/
https://www.marketscreener.com/quot...erprise-Agreement-with-General-Elec-35166287/
https://www.gevernova.com/news/pres...iver-approximately-2-gigawatts-of-electricity​

• GE formed multiple joint ventures focused on wind turbine technology
• GE transferred turbine manufacturing expertise of 9HA turbines for large-scale production in China
• GE gained access to China's booming wind power market and earned hundreds of millions of revenues in the market
• The deal enabled China to develop domestic supply chain of turbines

Steel Industry

Nippon Steel and Baoshan Iron & Steel (1978 - 1985)
https://japan-forward.com/the-evolution-of-nippon-steel-and-where-its-headed/​

• One of the earliest major technology transfers during China's reform era
• Nippon Steel contracted with China National Technical Import and Export Corporation to build a modern steel factory with Baoshan Iron & Steel
• Nippon Steel provided modern steel manufacturing techniques as well as management expertise
• Nippon Steel and Baoshan Iron & Steel deepened collaboration in the following decades, e.g., established a joint venture in 2003 for automotive steel production, particularly for high-strength steel
• The deal improved diplomatic relations between China and Japan. Japanese companies gained access to China's growing market during its industrialization
• Baoshan Steel grew into one of China's premier steel producers and produced high-quality steel comparable to Japanese standards; by the early 2000s, China became the world's largest steel producer

Semiconductor Manufacturing

Intel (Since 1990s)
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201612/06/WS5a2b6d68a310eefe3e9a00a9.html​

• Intel established several manufacturing and R&D facilities in China over the years, with a total investment of billions of dollars, including two manufacturing facilities (one sold to SK Hylix in 2021)
• Intel brought its “Advanced Test Technology” to its Chinese factory in 2016
• Intel carefully protected its core intellectual property and most advanced technologies
• Intel has generated tens of billions of dollars in annual revenue from China, which overtook the US to become the company’s largest market by 2024
• Intel's facilities have catalyzed the growth of China’s semiconductor industry cluster, fostering a fully integrated supply chain that spans from wafer manufacturing to packaging and testing

Pharmaceutical Industry

GlaxoSmithKline (Since 2000s)
https://www.gsk.com/en-gb/media/pre...-and-manufacture-influenza-vaccines-in-china/
https://www.gsk.com/en-gb/media/pre...-form-a-joint-venture-on-paediatric-vaccines/
https://www.gsk.com/en-gb/media/pre...oint-venture-for-influenza-vaccines-in-china/​

• GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) established 5 regional centers, 1 R&D center and 1 institute of infectious diseases and public health
• GSK formed two joint ventures (GSKNB, GSK-Walvax) with domestic partners to develop and manufacture vaccines for use in China in 2009
• GSK transferred technology for manufacturing and licensed more vaccines in China than any other global manufacturer until 2011
• GSK gained market access for products in China's rapidly growing pharmaceutical market and generated billions of dollars in revenue every year
• China fortified its domestic vaccine supply chain and acquired R&D capabilities for novel pharmaceuticals

Pfizer (Since 1989)
https://www.pfizer.com.cn/en/about-en/pfizer-china-en/china-overview-en
https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-r...ess_to_high_quality_branded_generic_medicines
https://www.biospace.com/business/p...ina-to-boost-innovation-target-chinese-market​

• Pfizer established 1 state-of-the-art manufacturing facility, 3 R&D centers, and 1 Pfizer Innovation Center in China
• Pfizer formed joint venture with Zhejiang Hisun Pharmaceuticals in 2012 (divested in 2017)
• Pfizer signed agreement in 2017 with Hisun to transfer technology for production of 9 drugs
• Pfizer launched more than 80 innovative drugs and vaccines in the Chinese market and generated tens of billions of dollars in revenue over the years
• Pfizer announced a 5-year plan in China in late 2024, committing $1 billion to expand operations in China, supporting local biotech industry development and the government's Healthy China 2030 initiative
• China strengthened its domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing supply chain and enhanced its R&D capabilities for innovative drugs

 

And guess what states those jobs are going to?

it’s not the state where Draymond is at
@Salvy
@Os Trigonum

 

I missed this thread this first time and don't really want to catch up. At the risk of seeming to be an apologist for China, which I definitely am not, I did want to address this first part:

There is credibly some slave labor employed in China. But, there has been an incredible and broad-based enrichment of the working class in China that is reflected in data like we see in this chart. Don't make out like there is a billion suffering and exploited de facto slaves in China. They went from really hard times after the revolution to see very significant gains in quality of life.

 

GDP per capita went up from under $200 1979 to $12500 in 2023. Say what you want about CCP, you cannot deny they made the average Chinese people's life much much better over the last forty years, something we cannot say about this country.

 

I'll agree with the last 30 years. Suppressing protests and Xi becoming president for life doesn't sound like an overall lift even if on the positive side, there are more middle class than the population of the US.

Speaking of GDP, it's becoming more than obvious China's per capita GDP is much higher than 12500. They use way more electricity and buy way more cars than Americans do. Even the deflation that our experts are touting as economic weakness can be beneficial if the people aren't starving and are still buying cheaper stuff. Like defense spending, it should be measured more within how their products cost comparable elsewhere. If they can build 3 destroyers of similar quality at the cost of one of ours, that means a lot.

I guess China still has more than half of their population to elevate, but their Tier 1/2/3(4?) cities are definitely as/more competitive than any comparable city elsewhere. If their trading advantage is world class, then they shouldn't benefit as a Developing Nation under WTO, a loophole where it's up to the country to self-designate.

With their numbers, they can be a developing nation for a long time even after they've overtaken the US in every other metric.

Trump doing Trump things to redo or tear up the WTO doesn't really invalidate the underlying problem that's been brewing for more than 2 decades. Bit of a giant douche and turd sandwich situation we're in...

 

People should read up on the Silk Road and understand why IP is pointless. The fact remains - Chinese are 3x more productive than the fat lazy American type. Whites are now thrown in with the other historical deplorables.

And of course, throw in some Adam Smith and 'Nothing stops this train'.

 

you force-fitting history into a false narrative

if your point is that US should have never trade with China, then these historical events are way more pivotal

• 1972 visit by POTUS Richard Nixon to China
• U.S., during the Carter presidency, officially recognizes communist China, Dec. 15, 1978