I didn't see this posted but . . . . . Cue the people telling me this has already been posted in 3 . . . 2 . . . 1 . . . http://sports.espn.go.com/espnmag/story?section=magazine&id=3658571 HOW DO YOU KNOW ... THIS GAME ISN'T ROCKET SCIENCE? Rockets GM Daryl Morey puts his faith in numbers. Now he just needs to get them to add up to a title. by Eric Neel Bill Baptist/Getty Images The clammy desk jockey on the TV is describing a disaster: the worst single-day point drop in the stock market's history. As he watches, Rockets general manager Daryl Morey shakes his head and says dryly, "Sounds like a buy-low opportunity." Spoken like a man who recently invested in some discounted Ron Artest. The 36-year-old MIT MBA often sees opportunity where others see alarm. Conventional wisdom says Artest is toxic. Morey has the numbers to show that the talented head case can reinforce an already vicious defense (Houston was second in efficiency in 2007-08) while boosting a middle-of-the-pack offense. And that makes him worth the risk. Several teams, including the Nets, Nuggets and Cavaliers, consult a statistical analyst on personnel decisions, but the Rockets are the first to have built a division of numberjacks, and Morey is the league's first GM who is committed to the new science. His group's research is geared toward not only draft night and player acquisitions but also on-court combinations and coaching strategies. Morey grew up reading Bill James' Baseball Abstract and later worked for the stats guru, but his geekier tendencies might actually have more to do with his boyhood love of comic book antiheroes who cut against the grain, figures like Frank Miller's Dark Knight. "In a league in which 30 teams are competing for one prize, you have to differentiate yourself somehow," Morey says. "We chose analytics." MOREY GUARDS HIS SECRETS CLOSELY BUT OFFERS A GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE: "IMAGINE WHAT YOU'D WANT TO KNOW IF YOU COULD. THAT'S WHAT WE'RE WORKING ON. That choice stems from the understanding that a traditional box score reveals only a fraction of what happens in a given game and that the information therein is often misleading. "Your eye is drawn to dramatic events, to scoring and getting scored on," says David Berri, an economics professor at Southern Utah and the lead author of The Wages of Wins: Taking Measure of the Many Myths in Modern Sport. "So it looks like the scorers are the best players." Real fans know that's not necessarily the case. Quantitative analysts can prove it. They treat a basketball game as a fluid event in which pace of play, lineup combinations and interactions among players all contribute to how points are scored and prevented. "On a typical scoring play, you can divvy up the credit much more precisely than we've done in the past," says Dan Rosenbaum, a part-time adviser to the Cavaliers who is also a senior economist in the White House Office of Management and Budget. "You need to account for the guy who set the pick, the guy who made the pass, the guy who set up in the corner to spread the floor, the guy who cleared space by moving down the lane—and that's just the offense." Morey grabs some scrap paper from his office table and begins to diagram a halfcourt. He plots an x, representing point guard Rafer Alston, outside the top of the key, then draws an arrow to a spot deep in the lane. From the arrow's tip, he draws three or four sharp lines in a burst of directions. One is a shot, another a pass under the basket, another a kickout. "We want to measure something closer to a whole play, the true impact of an action like getting to the paint," he says. Stabbing the arrow tip with his pen, he asks, "What happens here?" The possibilities fly. How often does Alston shoot, and what is the result? What about passing? Drawing fouls? Turnovers? And how does the formula change if that x is Tracy McGrady? "Imagine what you'd want to know if you could," Morey says, leaning back from the table. "That's what we're working on." -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In 2005-06, the Rockets won just 34 games. This season, many expect them to contend for the championship. Morey's ascent hews to that abrupt trajectory. He spent three years running numbers as senior VP of operations and information under Danny Ainge in Boston before the Rockets hired him to be their assistant GM, in 2006. By May 2007, he had the corner office. "I was a complete unknown when I started here," he says with a laugh. "Now I'm just a relative unknown." If at times Morey sounds as if he is protecting a secret, it's because he is. His group closely guards its complex methods in an attempt to maintain an advantage in what Roland Beech, founder of the website 82games.com, calls "a young field with a wide range of what people are trying to understand." But you can reverse-engineer some of what the Rockets' quantitative analysis reveals by studying their roster. Morey inherited T-Mac and Yao Ming; his priority has been to surround them with championship-level support. The current crew includes several guys whom their boss affectionately calls "basketball players": Shane Battier, Carl Landry, Chuck Hayes. Back when he was assistant GM, Morey helped to direct the draft day deal that sent Stromile Swift and the rights to Rudy Gay to the Grizzlies for Battier because Morey's numbers showed that when the fundamentally sound forward is on the court, his team is better at scoring, rebounding, shooting, limiting fouls and stopping opponents from scoring. "Everyone wants Kevin Garnett—he's got the perfect height, body, mentality—but most times, you're going to have to do with less," Morey says. "Behind Yao and Tracy, we've been willing to give up an inch of height, let's say, for more skill, a person who plays harder and creates for others, who defends and rebounds well." Morey's "basketball players" don't pop off a stat sheet, but they give coach Rick Adelman interchangeable and versatile parts that are capable of creating offensive and defensive advantages. "Chuck can guard anyone from 1 to 5; Shane can play 2, 3 or 4; Luis Scola can play 3, 4 or 5; and Brent Barry can go 1, 2 or 3," Morey says. "We're limited only by our strategic insight." There's a framed sheet of uncut ABA basketball cards leaning against Morey's office wall, a tangible reminder that before he was an analyst, he was a fan. He chats casually about one wild uniform, then an even wilder hairdo. While Morey's playing career peaked in high school and much of his view comes through a statistical prism, he has an intuitive feel for the game. "Daryl loves basketball," says Battier. "That's what comes across when you talk to him. He wants to talk about the game, about what we're doing on the floor." Statistical analysis has instigated a culture war in baseball, with math whizzes positioning themselves against the status quo, hell-bent on puncturing long-held theories. But the hoops version of Moneyball is far more complementary. In fact, the analytics of the NBA often reinforce old-school concepts such as the "glue guy." The Battiers of the hoops world can be praised for more than their intangibles. In fact, their value can be concretely expressed. And that value often argues for a share-the-ball game that Norman Dale would adore. "Often, what Daryl presents us supports things we already feel are working or could work," says Adelman. As Morey himself stresses constantly, his metrics are a tool—rather than the tool—for evaluation, one of many he and his coaches use. He is no robot churning out streams of data, nor is he a slave to his numbers. "There is more than one way to win, more than one way to see things," he says. "Through analysis, we're trying to give ourselves one more way to answer questions. But we combine those answers with what our coaches, players and scouts tell us." Now is as good a time as any in Houston to put those answers to work. The injury-plagued Yao has gone three straight years without playing 60 games. Despite McGrady's being only 29 years old, his back, knee, and shoulder ailments make him feel much older. Last season, the Rockets won 22 straight games from late January through mid-March and still couldn't get out of the first round. With Artest stepping in to round out a Celtics-esque big three, these are critical days for the great analytics experiment. And Morey knows it. "Don't think we've hung the moon," he cautions. "There's a lot of work to be done. We haven't won anything yet." Of course, even the best-computed plans can go awry; sports is inherently unpredictable. Injuries, unforeseen improvement by opponents (see last season's Hornets), a game-changing trade (Pau Gasol, anyone?) a blown call or pure luck can separate genius from duncehood. Still, a Houston championship is no reach, so if the team falls short again, someone—or something—will have to be held accountable. Then again, should the Rockets succeed, it would be a watershed moment for analytics. In a copycat league, other teams would surely follow Morey's winning model. "The commitment Houston has made makes them a test case," says Ken Catanella, the Nets' coordinator of statistical analysis. "How well they do could say a lot about how this field develops." -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Biting into a Caprese at a lunch joint across the street from the Toyota Center, Morey shrugs off the suggestion that he is a standard-bearer. But he does feels the gravity of the moment. "There's a palpable sense … ," he says, then waits a beat, trying not to get too far in front of his skis. "We feel like we're working on something unique and hopefully special. Time will tell if that's the case." Time and the moods of Ron Artest. No numbers can project if the much-traveled star will keep his cool or stay on task or be content to play third banana. That data can be collected only fresh each day. Morey knows he's given up potential (Donté Greene and a 2009 first-rounder) and taken on a potential headache. He also knows it's the kind of chance he has to take. "A Wall Street fund manager needs to stay ahead of the S&P, and he has about a 50% chance of doing that," he says. "As an NBA franchise, you're trying to be the one team that wins. To do that you have to be more risk-seeking." Morey is confident that he's made as educated a bet as is possible. He has a good feeling about how Artest will take to Adelman, his former coach in Sacramento, and about the way he'll mesh with McGrady, Yao and the other "basketball players." The GM absolutely thinks this is the right call at the right time. In the end, part of this moment goes beyond numbers. It's also about a leap of faith. Morey is good with that, too. "We have to keep pushing the envelope," he says. "There is an opportunity here."
Excellent article and props to Wizard Morey however one small correction. Morey isn't the one who got us out of the 34 win season to now, that credit goes to coach Van Gundy and his preaching disciplined defense something the Rocket still hold close to heart even to this day. MOREY FOR PREZ!!!
So for those who think Morey has done an excellent job as GM thus far, what do you attribute it to? Is it his use of stats for player evaluation? Is it his willingness to surround himself with good basketball people and listen to them? It is his understanding of risk management? Is it largely dumb luck?
Rudy Gay, Donte Greene, Kelenna Azubuike. I throw these out as names of three young players who we cast away in favor of building a roster of win now types. While I don't disagree with the strategy, it has to be pointed out that we have made a significant sacrifice of youth and future competitiveness to win now. In reality, there are only 5-6 other teams who we are competing against: the others are either in a downswing due to age and salary cap commitments (e.g. Mavs), or are in rebuilding mode (e.g., Nets) or are building young chips for a run in a year or two (e.g. Blazers). As such, Morey is not really trying to stay ahead of 29 other teams but really 5 or 6 who are in their "window". Due to the age of Yao and T-Mac, we have to win now, otherwise we lose our age and salary "window" and become the Mavs. I like Morey and think he has done well, I just think that some caveats to our his record are 1 - we have to win now due to salary commitments and age; 2 - we have made significant sacrifices in terms of future talent to do so, allowing us to get players like Shane and Artest; 3 - despite all the wizardry, we still haven't gotten out of the first round and 4 - we have two max players/all stars. In my book, Morey won't a genius till he wins it all, or at least gets to the finals. I know everyone will mention the injuries we have had, but surely Morey's Excel models should factor in injury risk and thus the team should be built to mitigate those risks. If we keep losing players and games due to injury, we have not adequately mitigated and therefore the approach must be flawed.
He was still able to find and draft that young talent........then when you throw in players like Brooks and Landry, you kinda get a idea that when it is time to rebuild, Houston is in VERY good hands. Morey always comes away from the draft with solid talent.
But the important players we've been losing to injury have been guys that were brought in before Morey -- Yao, McGrady, Alston. Battier, Scola, and Hayes have been durable as Rockets. Landry, not so much -- but then he wasn't expected to be significant contributor last year. So, the option for Morey is to stick with Yao and McGrady, or trade one of them for more durable players. But there's considerable risk either way, right? Another constraint is I don't think the Rockets are willing to get worse before they get better. I'm not sure if that's Morey's call or Les's call, but that does certainly seem to be a clear bound within which he's working.
Still a rookie much? Ahh, my man jasonmilelieo, I'm just playin with you homeboy. I've just been smokin too much of dat doja, dawg. We needs to rep our city dog.
Yes. He might have given up 1st rounders (Greene, Gay), but he has shown the ability to pluck gems out of high 2nd round picks. He's done it in each of his 2 drafts, so while he is trading young talent for impact players now, he's also picking up young, cheaper talent in the 2nd round. Any GM can pick the right guy high in the first round (except the Clippers). It's picking the guy late 1st or early 2nd and turning it into something good where Morey has excelled.
Agreed. "Throwing away" Gay, Green, and Azubuike is still up in the air. Green hasn't done anything yet. Azubuike is a decent rotation player at best. And Gay is a good player on a bad team. So we don't really know how much Morey "threw away" compared to what we got: Battier and Artest. And was also Landry and Brooks who look to be solid rotation players. And Dorsey and even that Neunan (sp?) guy might turn out to be contributors. Besides, if Morey sticks around after Yao and T-Mac are gone, I am curious to see how he is going to rebuild the team.
Daryl was still assistant GM when Azubuike was cut during the 2006 preseason, I doubt he had much to do with Azubuike being cut.
Who also took over a roster that had bad contracts on it, almost no real talent outside of Yao and Tmac, and has managed to flip that into arguably the deepest roster in the league through crafty trades and moves, but while also keeping us flexible with the cap/contracts for the future. Morey has done his job. It's Adelman's job to put the pieces that Morey supplied him together and coach this team towards a title.
True that. On another note, this is the second article I've seen that came out and said Morey had a hand in the Battier trade. Granted, it wasn't a quote from Morey himself in this article. But I think it can be safely inferred that it is a fact. For posters who have been dogging Morey because of that trade, they are right on that count. But since Morey has been doing so well so far, these critics have been very quiet.
Agreed. Although I have come to love Morey, when I see his mistakes he has made I see just an average GM or a bad GM. Lets take a look at the mistakes he has made: Rudy Gay(!) Kelenna Azubuike Keith Bogans let go for nothing because of Battier's Salary Aaron Brooks hasn't exactly turned out to be anything more than ordinary Honestly, I believe letting go of Rudy Gay was a HUGE mistake. Ask Morey right now and I'm sure he'd rather have Gay rather than Battier. I mean which GM wouldn't, every single team would love Rudy Gay much more than Battier. Kelenna has turned out to be a quality player also. We did not identify that. Instead we kept John Lucas etc...Another Morey mistake. Keith Bogans was lowballed when the Orlando offer was a mere 2-3 million. Had we been on Rudy's rookie salary, I'm sure we'd have been able to offer him a mere 2 million considering he was willing to stay in Houston. While Morey has done some great things like Scola and Artest, he didn't really do it all perfectly. In fact I think he's done more bad things than good in my opinion because of Rudy Gay trade. I'm not a hater by any means, but from an objective point of view I think Morey is just pretty ordinary. Have we done any better than when CD was still GM?
Morey is really fairly average when it comes to drafting those "gems in the rough". Aaron Brooks? I'm not so sure he's a gem. If you think Morey did great, then you clearly hasn't seen what other teams have done. Mavs--- Josh Howard 30th Pick Kings --- Kevin Martin 26th Pick Spurs --- Uh...need I mention anything here? So the only what u can call a "gem in the rough" has really been Landry. And he is a rotational player at best. And how many teams has 2nd rounders playing in their rotation? Countless. Not like if we got a Gilbert Arenas in the second round.