Taliban claims victory near Islamabad

Pakistan's military is not as feeble or weak as people make it out to be. Heck, they have a larger standing army then we do! No way in hell those Islamists get anywhere near the capital. The Pakistani military will always have control over the major cities. The countryside is a different story altogether, that is where the hardcore of the hardcore resides. And even then it is mostly limited to the northwest side of the country.

And no, the Taliban is not Hitler and will never ever be able to achieve that kind of presence or strength. There is a reason as to why they mostly hide in caves and live in mountainous regions. Germany was a first world industrial power and that is why they were able to inflict as much destruction as they did. So it is silly to draw any parallel between the two unless you are talking about their level of 'evilness' (even then I gotta give Hitler the edge)

 

A structured community like that is not necessarily a bad thing. It is far from being the level of danger when Hitler took over a industry giant Germany after WWI. I have never been to Swat valley, but I can imagine probably nothing to be feared of there. If the concern is that it will house terrorists, I don't see how it can be any worse than the current situation. At least there, you can identify the head of snake. If Bin Laden wanted to live there, CIA operatives are ready for him.
I think at some point there has to be some sort of dialogue. Violence is not the cure. They can believe what they want to believe, be it backwards or not. It's up to their civilization to resolve it. We have to show some tolerance.

 

It is great to see such a sensible reply to the intial post.

 

Its not feeble or weak, but it doesn't mean Pakistan's military is suited to combat the Taliban. Their army is trained to fight a conventional war with India, not a counter-insurgency against an enemy in their own backyards. The US also controlled the cities during the vietnam war, while the viet cong held sway in the country side. That didn't too well for the US either. I hope the Pakistani's find a way to deal wit the Taliban, but things aren't looking too good.

 

The area is falling under the control of Islamic extremists and you can't imagine that there is anything to be feared there? I guess you just haven't read up on the subject. There is plenty to be feared and Pakistan has been, and remains, teetering on the edge of anarchy and chaos. There is no room for a secular society or holding moderate religious and political beliefs in the areas taken over by the Taliban and their allies. Yet the majority of Pakistanis are moderate and secular. I'm sure they think all of this is groovy.

 

Reading up on a subject means little if what you read is biased. Pakistan is nowhere near the teetering edge the media (mostly western) is making it out to be. Taliban in their wildest dreams can't take on Islamabad, and Pakistanis at this point are content with blaming India for the insurgency, ridiculous as it sounds. One well placed "smack in the mouth" by the Taliban and Pakistanis will stop making excuses, dispense with niceties like the Geneva convention and entertain Taliban the way Egypt did decades ago.

 

I have a long standing friend who is from Islaamabad and who was complaining to me about the religious fundamentalists in Pakistan even before 911.

Ugly American US policies that see Pakistan only through the narrrow lense of US politics, and often just US electoral politics, are making things worse. The Pakistanis, who are not foreign interlopers like we are, know how to combat this problem better than our best and brightest think tankers who think military solutions first, second and third.

The politics of Obama are starting to remind me of the failed hubris of McNamara and the other smart guys who thought they could manage Veitnam militarily.

 

60 km from the CAPITOL......60....six zero SIXTY....kilometers...not miles...klicks

That's like saying Bastrop is under the control of TX separatists.

I understand that Taliban is not really strong enough militarily to take Pakistan but battles or even a war can be won on another front. This is a huge slap in the face in front of the world, especially India.

Pakistan has potential to be a great country (see Ireland) but the citizens need to wake up and smell the coffee (or chai). Extremism doesn't work. Base your votes on economic and social policies and not on religious. Pakistan is the only country in my book that can show the world that Islam is not backwards and inherently embraces violence/fundamentalism.

Frakkin disappointing really.

 

Vietnam is a really bad analogy. We are talking Pakistanis fighting extremists in their own backyard, not a foreign military power fighting an unpopular war half a world away. The government is not that important, Pakistani governments have come and gone, in elections and at times in coups. At the end of day, the Pakistani military is the last guarantor of Pakistani sovereignty and independence. If the military truly feels that the country is slipping away (which they don't, and they mock us for judging it to be so in such dire terms from afar, with all these silly dooms day scenarios) then the gloves will come off. It will be ugly, it will be bloody and there will probably be a few villages wiped off the map (think Syrian and Egyptian counterterrorism and counter insurgency tactics here), but in the end it is very doable and the Pakistani military is more than capable of doing it. What is pissing off U.S. policymakers at the moment is that Pakistan has yet to see things our way, for they still think it is not worth it to upset the balance too much by upsetting the hornet's nest more than necessary. In fact, they believe we have already pushed them too far for the sake of Afghanistan, and they never wanted to or cared to go after the tribal areas that have always had a semi autonomous existence anyways. The mood in Pakistan now is to fend off U.S. pressure as much as possible, while trying to glue back their internal security situation. The 'choas' in Pakistan now is more or less of our own doing, and for our own sake. Musharraf heeded our pressures and upset the delicate internal political and social balance in his diverse country, and now Pakistanis are all left carrying that purse.

Not to blame any side, but that is the general context here from what I read.

I agree, good post. Anyone remember what those so called experts in American think tanks, government and the media were saying about the Saudis and Egyptians back in the day? They made it sound like the Saudi government and security apparatus was tantamount to a sand castle that would blow in the wind under Al-Qaeda pressure. Well, the Saudis have kicked some serious butt over the past few years. And we all know what the Egyptian regime did back in the 80s when they thought enough was enough, and essentially crushed a large and popular Muslim Brotherhood into submission.

All it takes is reaching a certain threshold, and all these countries are more than capable of handling their internal matters. I am not sure why we, in the U.S., are often hellbent on believing that no one else is capable of handling delicate security matters, and that we need to swoop in and save the day. If this was Lebanon then forget everything I said, because they have a week and impotent central government, and a major and powerful sectarian militia that controls nearly half of the territory. But the Pakistanis, much like the Egyptians, Syrians and Saudis have a strong and sizable military with advanced weapons systems.

 

So you think I am biased? Why would you think that? What reason do I have to be biased one way or another? I am simply looking at the facts and the history of other extremist movements, those who also faced a military that, on paper, should have handled them easily. Yet that isn't always the case. Want an example? Just look to Iran, where a large, modern military, one of the strongest in the region, was helpless against the revolution that overtook the country, a revolution the consequences of which we are still dealing with today.

With all due respect, I think you are being naive. Do you seriously consider the Egyptian government to be stable? That the Saudi monarchy doesn't sweat everyday over the possibility that there could be an explosion of resentment among the population, with the result being their possible overthrow?

I'll add this... neither one of those countries is a democracy. Egypt pretends to be and Saudi Arabia doesn't even pretend. Pakistan actually is a democracy, at least today. They need and deserve our help. Like Mexico, they are afraid to be too forward about it, because outside assistance isn't viewed favorably by the general population, especially if it involves troops within their borders and attacks across the border.

Those are my thoughts on the subject at the moment. Take them however you want, but anyone believing that Pakistan isn't in danger from the Taliban/AQ/Islamic extremists is living in a fool's paradise, and not the one mentioned in the Koran.

 

Everybody who has a beef with the government in either Pakistan or Afghanistan gets labeled 'The Taliban'. From what I understand, there isn't some monolithic entity, especially in Pakistan. Labeling them all as members of this umbrella group attributes to them more power than they actually have. And I would be much more worried if this was happening 60 miles from Lahore instead of Islamabad. Islamabad has always pretty much been right on the border of the NWFP.

 

One example in Iran with special circumstances (like a large grassroots support for the overthrow of the Shah regime, which was more akin to Saddam's regime in that it was only propped up by the elites in Tehran and had little or no support elsewhere) does not make a rule. I did not claim there were no exceptions. There are always statistical anomalies. But even a 10% chance of a full blown revolution in a given state does not merit constant warnings of an "imminent" collapse and surrender to extremist elements (pretty much what our media and some politicians have been warning about). In this case, much like in Mexico, it is hogwash and alarmist rhetoric. But yes, you are right, there is a statistical probability that it could happen anywhere, including right here in the U.S.

I think you just enjoy living in the land of Oz, or really take to a "worst case scenario" apocalyptic vision of the world. There is a 10% chance I might be right.

Affirmative, judging by any reasonable standard they are one of the most stable regimes on earth, and some of the most durable. When you say "stable" you mean compared to what? How many states have had the same regime in power for over half a century, and have faced little to no popular opposition to their rule? Answer that and you will catch my drift.

Now, does it mean there is absolutely no chance in hell that they could be overthrown? Of course not! Not a single government on earth can claim that (Yes, including ours. Remember Tommy Franks saying we could do away with democracy in the U.S. if there was ever a catastrophic attack on our territory?) But, again, the evidence strongly supports my thesis. It is not like there has been a lack of opposition (even armed opposition) in those states. There was, and they were addressed with relative ease, in many cases even cementing those government's rule and sovereignty over their own territories, not weakening it. In Egypt, it has allowed the government to expand and entrench its security apparatus, effectively making it one of the world's leading national security states.

Also, let's not forget the neighborhood in which those countries exist. Pakistan has a difficult time with its own terrain and constant threats (physical or otherwise) from its neighbors, north and south. It is a unique case here, and yet they will survive.

and?! Oh, you buy into the democracy = stability argument. At least I understand what your argument is really about. Ethnocentric much?

And guess which one is the least stable of the bunch? You know, Iraq and Lebanon are democracies too. Look how stable they are!

It is in danger, sure. It is in danger of further violence and more CIA sponsored aerial bombardments of their territory. But it is not in danger of complete and utter collapse. The military will have long taken over the mantle before that ever happens. So yes, the democratically elected government in power now could collapse, and the military will take over like it always does. The Pakistani military does not equal Talivan/AQ/Islamic extremists rule. We can reference Pakistan's own history to see this. They are just trying to be respectful of the civilian government in place, yet they will certainly act if all else fails.

 

Excellent point. I just looked at the map and Islamabad is within proximity of the Swat Valley and the NW frontier, where much of the Taliban and their supporters are.

And yet, they would not dare march towards Islamabad. OK, I take that back, they have proven foolish enough to want to martyr themselves by taking on suicidal missions. So I will say they might try it, and they will be swiftly crushed in response.

Those groups are limited to sporadic acts of terror for a very good reason: they are weak. When you are weak, terrorism becomes the weapon of choice, for the only thing they are capable of is acting as a disruptive force. They might bomb a mosque or an hotel, and cause casualties, but that won't force the government to collapse and hand it over to them. Not now, not likely ever.

 

As some poster already pointed out, have we already seen this line of logic in the Vietnam situation?
Reading up a little more on the subject doesn't mean you fully grasp the extent of situation over there. But I will stipulate that your concern is not illegitimate, given extremist hate US to death. My point is that we need to be really really careful before get involved in Swat valley. The Pakistan's gov't is better positioned than US to deal with the problem and I don't disagree should there be any sign that they are going to take over Islamabad, US should step in to prevent another Afghanistan.

 

Either you don't care for democracy and have a real admiration for oligarchies, monarchies, and totalitarian states, or you are doing an excellent imitation of it. You aren't the least bit afraid of Pakistan falling into chaos? Good for you. I don't share your optimism. You consider Egypt and Saudi Arabia stable? Only as long as the ruling cliques keep a boot on the necks of the people. I don't consider that a stable situation.

Honestly, I think you either have a view of the world and its various governments completely at odds with my own, or you are attempting to have a laugh.

 

The problem with Pakistan is the same problem that Afghanistan has. Basically the British drew the Durand Line right through the middle of the Pashtun homeland because it was convenient for the little game they were playing with the Russians. They then took these two half of 'Pashtunistan' and married them to homelands for Punjabis, Tajiks, Baluchis, etc and created two states that were basically made like particle board out of all these sliced up ethnic homelands.

There is no such thing as Afghanistan, really. There is no Pakistan. With the exception of seats at the UN and embassies in Washington, these places really don't exist. They are constructs of the European mind. That is fundamentally the problem. Fixing it would bankrupt us, and make the time, death and destruction in Iraq seem quaint. It would be 'nationbuilding' from scratch.

The best outcome for the USA is something like controlled chaos where a central government is strong enough to prevent al Qaeda types from setting up camps, but not so powerful that it controls all the people's lives and pisses them all off.

The more the USA tries to grab hold of Pakistan to try and fix it, the more we break it. The best bet is to back away and sort of nudge it in the general direction we want it to go every now and then.

 

Irrelevant. I only took exception to your insinuation that only democratic regimes are 'stable' regimes, which is silly to say the least.

I am worried about violent within and originating from Pakistan and spreading elsewhere in the region, but no I am not worried that Pakistan will turn into Somalia any time soon, if that is your contention.

History says so, yes. Perhaps a better question would be what you would consider to be "stable"? I have an inkling, but I will let you answer that on your own.

Whatever works for them, I am not arguing with the methods. I am curious as to how you would define 60+ years of durability in any political system. If not "stable", then is it "unstable"?

I am not sure what your point is.

I think you view the world from your own prism, you seemingly define stability based on your own value system, not what is there or based on facts. This is not a philosophy class. If you want to redefine what regime stability is, then take it up with the political scientists. Whatever suits you.

And no, I am not attempting to have a laugh at your expense, I think we just have a radically different view of what regime stability means.

 

Here is an article addressing rising tensions between Pakistan and the U.S. mainly due to U.S. pressures on the Pakistani government. Majority of Pakistanis are blaming the U.S. for the violence within their own borders.


http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103309338

Tensions Rise Between United States, Pakistan

Morning Edition, April 21, 2009 · A lot of bad blood currently exists between Washington and Islamabad, according to U.S. and Pakistani officials. President Obama has made it clear that success for U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan depends in large part on what happens in Pakistan. But analysts say his new strategy for the region places huge demand on Pakistan and creates tension between the two countries — something that became evident during a recent visit by U.S. officials.

In public, the United States and Pakistan are allies with a parallel interest in eradicating Islamist extremism. But behind the scenes, it's a complicated relationship — one that Pakistani and American analysts say is increasingly fraught with resentment, miscommunication and mistrust.

There have been a series of incidents and issues recently that have contributed to the friction. One of them has to do with a bill introduced by Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that calls for about $10 billion in military aid and development assistance over the next five years.

Shuja Nawaz with the Atlantic Council says the bill is loaded with conditions that even the most stable government would find difficult to fulfill. "It's created a very powerful backlash in Pakistan — among the public for one, who think the United States is dictating, and among the government."

Nawaz says every condition in the bill is so specific, it almost precludes discussion. He points to terrorism: "Pakistan has to certify that there is no activity taking place against India." Nawaz says even if Pakistan were to certify that, "does it actually have enough control to prevent another Mumbai type of attacks?"

The bill would authorize funds for training Pakistan's military in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. It would be conditioned on a presidential certification that the Pakistani government is making a sustained commitment to battling terrorism and closing down Taliban camps in the tribal areas and other parts of the country.

The bill sponsored by Berman has a long road to travel and will likely be amended many times before — even if — it's passed. The sheer number of conditions saturating the 59-page bill helps illustrate Congress's frustration with Pakistan.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has given Pakistan $11 billion to help fight terrorism. The Bush administration did not demand any accounting of the funds, and the United States arguably got little for its investment.

Vali Nasr, a professor at Tufts University's Fletcher School of International Affairs, has been tapped to be a senior adviser to Richard Holbrooke, the administration's special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Nasr says this time Pakistan will need to be held accountable for the U.S. aid it receives.

"For those in Pakistan who are used to receiving money with no questions asked — the military, by and large, but also certain parts of bureaucracy, etc. — this is obviously a glass half-full compared to what they had," Nasr says.

The aid issue hung over a visit to Pakistan earlier this month by Holbrooke and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. So too did the question of drones — unmanned airplanes that the United States has been using to attack suspected militants in the tribal areas of Pakistan, along the Afghanistan border.

Analysts say relations between the two sides soured after Mullen, Holbrooke and other senior U.S. officials publicly suggested that elements in Pakistan's powerful intelligence service, the ISI, retain close links with the Taliban.

"That has become a very sensitive issue," says Shahid Javed Burki, a former finance minister in Pakistan who meets with senior Pakistani officials during regular visits to the country. Burki says the issue was raised unnecessarily by the senior U.S. officials.

"What is their compulsion; what's their motive? I really don't know," he says.

Pakistan's intelligence chief, Ahmed Shuja Pasha, refused to hold separate meetings with the U.S. team. The tension between the U.S. and Pakistani officials was almost palpable during a joint news conference at the end of the visit.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi says the bottom line is a question of trust. "We are partners, and we want to be partners," he says.

Qureshi says the United States and Pakistan can only work together "if we respect each other and we trust each other. There is no other way. Nothing else will work."

U.S. officials say Mullen and Holbrooke's comments stem from impatience with Pakistan's efforts to crack down on the growth of the Taliban.

Still, the Atlantic Council's Nawaz says those comments — along with the other issues — did not produce a positive outcome.

"This is probably the worst-ever visit by an American team to South Asia in history. ... It was a complete disaster," he says. "And if this is how you want to win friends, I just wonder how you want to create enemies."

But the Fletcher School's Nasr says the Obama administration is trying to make Pakistan a strategic partner: a process that he says can often provoke tension.

"You're trying to recalibrate a decades-old relationship in the middle of a war and in a new direction, and there's going to be hiccups, there's going to be resistance, there's going to be pushback, there's going to be disappointment," he says.

Despite this, Nasr says he thinks the Obama administration is doing the right thing. But analysts say it's also asking a lot of a Pakistani government that's extremely fragile and has only been in power for about a year.

 

Another viewpoint:


April 17, 2009

Taliban Exploit Class Rifts in Pakistan

By JANE PERLEZ and PIR ZUBAIR SHAH
PESHAWAR, Pakistan — The Taliban have advanced deeper into Pakistan by engineering a class revolt that exploits profound fissures between a small group of wealthy landlords and their landless tenants, according to government officials and analysts here.

The strategy cleared a path to power for the Taliban in the Swat Valley, where the government allowed Islamic law to be imposed this week, and it carries broad dangers for the rest of Pakistan, particularly the militants’ main goal, the populous heartland of Punjab Province.

In Swat, accounts from those who have fled now make clear that the Taliban seized control by pushing out about four dozen landlords who held the most power.

To do so, the militants organized peasants into armed gangs that became their shock troops, the residents, government officials and analysts said.

The approach allowed the Taliban to offer economic spoils to people frustrated with lax and corrupt government even as the militants imposed a strict form of Islam through terror and intimidation.

“This was a bloody revolution in Swat,” said a senior Pakistani official who oversees Swat, speaking on the condition of anonymity for fear of retaliation by the Taliban. “I wouldn’t be surprised if it sweeps the established order of Pakistan.”

The Taliban’s ability to exploit class divisions adds a new dimension to the insurgency and is raising alarm about the risks to Pakistan, which remains largely feudal.

Unlike India after independence in 1947, Pakistan maintained a narrow landed upper class that kept its vast holdings while its workers remained subservient, the officials and analysts said. Successive Pakistani governments have since failed to provide land reform and even the most basic forms of education and health care. Avenues to advancement for the vast majority of rural poor do not exist.

Analysts and other government officials warn that the strategy executed in Swat is easily transferable to Punjab, saying that the province, where militant groups are already showing strength, is ripe for the same social upheavals that have convulsed Swat and the tribal areas.

Mahboob Mahmood, a Pakistani-American lawyer and former classmate of President Obama’s, said, “The people of Pakistan are psychologically ready for a revolution.”

Sunni militancy is taking advantage of deep class divisions that have long festered in Pakistan, he said. “The militants, for their part, are promising more than just proscriptions on music and schooling,” he said. “They are also promising Islamic justice, effective government and economic redistribution.”

The Taliban strategy in Swat, an area of 1.3 million people with fertile orchards, vast plots of timber and valuable emerald mines, unfolded in stages over five years, analysts said.

The momentum of the insurgency built in the past two years, when the Taliban, reinforced by seasoned fighters from the tribal areas with links to Al Qaeda, fought the Pakistani Army to a standstill, said a Pakistani intelligence agent who works in the Swat region.

The insurgents struck at any competing point of power: landlords and elected leaders — who were usually the same people — and an underpaid and unmotivated police force, said Khadim Hussain, a linguistics and communications professor at Bahria University in Islamabad, the capital.

At the same time, the Taliban exploited the resentments of the landless tenants, particularly the fact that they had many unresolved cases against their bosses in a slow-moving and corrupt justice system, Mr. Hussain and residents who fled the area said.

Their grievances were stoked by a young militant, Maulana Fazlullah, who set up an FM radio station in 2004 to appeal to the disenfranchised. The broadcasts featured easy-to-understand examples using goats, cows, milk and grass. By 2006, Mr. Fazlullah had formed a ragtag force of landless peasants armed by the Taliban, said Mr. Hussain and former residents of Swat.

At first, the pressure on the landlords was subtle. One landowner was pressed to take his son out of an English-speaking school offensive to the Taliban. Others were forced to make donations to the Taliban.

Then, in late 2007, Shujaat Ali Khan, the richest of the landowners, his brothers and his son, Jamal Nasir, the mayor of Swat, became targets.

After Shujaat Ali Khan, a senior politician in the Pakistan Muslim League-Q, narrowly missed being killed by a roadside bomb, he fled to London. A brother, Fateh Ali Mohammed, a former senator, left, too, and now lives in Islamabad. Mr. Nasir also fled.

Later, the Taliban published a “most wanted” list of 43 prominent names, said Muhammad Sher Khan, a landlord who is a politician with the Pakistan Peoples Party, and whose name was on the list. All those named were ordered to present themselves to the Taliban courts or risk being killed, he said. “When you know that they will hang and kill you, how will you dare go back there?” Mr. Khan, hiding in Punjab, said in a telephone interview. “Being on the list meant ‘Don’t come back to Swat.’ ”

One of the main enforcers of the new order was Ibn-e-Amin, a Taliban commander from the same area as the landowners, called Matta. The fact that Mr. Amin came from Matta, and knew who was who there, put even more pressure on the landowners, Mr. Hussain said.

According to Pakistani news reports, Mr. Amin was arrested in August 2004 on suspicion of having links to Al Qaeda and was released in November 2006. Another Pakistani intelligence agent said Mr. Amin often visited a madrasa in North Waziristan, the stronghold of Al Qaeda in the tribal areas, where he apparently received guidance.

Each time the landlords fled, their tenants were rewarded. They were encouraged to cut down the orchard trees and sell the wood for their own profit, the former residents said. Or they were told to pay the rent to the Taliban instead of their now absentee bosses.

Two dormant emerald mines have reopened under Taliban control. The militants have announced that they will receive one-third of the revenues.

Since the Taliban fought the military to a truce in Swat in February, the militants have deepened their approach and made clear who is in charge.

When provincial bureaucrats visit Mingora, Swat’s capital, they must now follow the Taliban’s orders and sit on the floor, surrounded by Taliban bearing weapons, and in some cases wearing suicide bomber vests, the senior provincial official said.

In many areas of Swat the Taliban have demanded that each family give up one son for training as a Taliban fighter, said Mohammad Amad, executive director of a nongovernmental group, the Initiative for Development and Empowerment Axis.

A landlord who fled with his family last year said he received a chilling message last week. His tenants called him in Peshawar, the capital of North-West Frontier Province, which includes Swat, to tell him his huge house was being demolished, he said in an interview here.

The most crushing news was about his finances. He had sold his fruit crop in advance, though at a quarter of last year’s price. But even that smaller yield would not be his, his tenants said, relaying the Taliban message. The buyer had been ordered to give the money to the Taliban instead.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/asia/17pstan.html?_r=2&hp=&pagewanted=all