Retrospective: Gen. Anthony Zinni on Iraq War 10/31/02

Whoa!

The dude says all this so much better than I could think of doing. And he has immense credibility. Wow.

 

Murdock,

Thanks for the link, but General Zinni had an interview on ABC's Nightline (I think it was Thursday night).

That interview has even more information. There were a few questions that bugged me regarding this war, that interview answered those questions for me.

Unfortunately, I don't know how to get the transcript of that interview.

If you can somehow get a transcript of that interview, I am sure you can get a lot out of it.

 

This article is from October 2002... like with Powell and Rice's comments, the foundation of the rush to war is beginning to crack.

 

A job of a General is to take the orders and obtain a victory if that is what the administration wants. Not to decide on global politics and economics and what will benefit the country.

How will a free and US supporting Iraq help our country and our economy? I think many others can answer this before a General. A general and someone such as Zinni would be able to decide on how difficult the war would be and what would be the reaction on the surrounding areas.

I do agree with his statements about helping the people in Iran on their course for a more democratic state and pushing to peace plan in Israel/Palestine.

 

(from LexisNexis Academic)

HEADLINE: NIGHTLINE THE GENERAL

BODY:
graphics: September 25 2003

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI,

FORMER HEAD OF US CENTRAL COMMAND

I'm worried about a lack of planning, how we've gotten into this war.

TED KOPPEL, ABC NEWS

A voice, critical of the Administration he once served.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Any strategy, any plan, has three elements. It's ends, ways, and means. $87 million is means. Show me the ends and the ways.

TED KOPPEL

On pre-war intelligence.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Either the intelligence was so bad and flawed. And if that's the case, then somebody's head ought to roll for that. Or the intelligence was exaggerated or twisted in a way to make a more convenient case to the American people.

TED KOPPEL

On post-war management.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

He's the backup quarterback thrown in in the third quarter. And now asked to, while in the middle of the game, create the game plan.

TED KOPPEL

On the future of Iraq.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Unless we take all these approaches and solve the security problem first, we'll never get to the political and economic issues.

graphics: The General

TED KOPPEL

Tonight, "The General," a conversation with Anthony Zinni.

graphics: ABC NEWS: Nightline

ANNOUNCER

From ABC News, this is "Nightline." Reporting from Washington, Ted Koppel.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) In his interview with Brit Hume the other evening, President Bush made it abundantly clear that he doesn't read newspapers or watch the news on television. His point was, he doesn't need to. He has immediate access to the Colin Powells, the Donald Rumsfelds, the Condoleezza Rices of this world. Why would he need to read or hear what they or their subordinates are leaking to us in the media? And that's a fair point, as far as it goes. What they and the President's top domestic advisers are less likely to be passing on to him, of course, is the negative stuff. They may give him some of the flavor of what's in the press. But, having a friend or a staffer tell you what your critics are saying doesn't have quite the same impact as seeing it on the front page of "The Washington Post," or hearing it, for that matter, on "Nightline." But in a moment, you'll be able to judge that point for yourselves. My guest tonight is a retired, if not always retiring, four-star Marine Corps general. He's the former Commander in Chief of CentCom, which gave him military responsibility for an area which includes Iraq and most of the Middle East. Earlier on in his military career, he was the commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. After he left the Marine Corps, General Anthony Zinni served as the Bush Administration's peace envoy in the Middle East. He doesn't speak in public often. But when he gives his occasional speeches, he tends to make waves. Three weeks ago, for example, speaking to the US Naval Institute and the Marine Corps Association, General Zinni recalled what happened in Vietnam. "We heard the garbage and the lies and we saw the sacrifice," he said, "and he swore never again would we allow it to happen. And I ask you, is it happening again?"

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) It sounds like a rhetorical question, to which I must say, no, I don't think it is. I can see a lot of differences between Iraq and Vietnam. But you wouldn't have posed it if you didn't think there were some similarities. What do you think they are?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, I'm worried about the lack of planning. I'm worried about how we've gotten into this war. There's similarities with the Gulf of Tonkin incident and maybe the credibility behind the weapons of mass destruction, association with terrorism.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) Let me stop you on that point for a moment. 'Cause there are a lot of young people watching who may not remember Gulf of Tonkin. Gulf of Tonkin was a resolution that was passed after an alleged attack by North Vietnamese gun boats on what, US Navy destroyers?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

On two Navy destroyers.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) Turned out later, that never happened.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, it turned out later that they weren't in international waters and they weren't attacked for no reason. They were actually supporting, in territorial waters, an operation that was being conducted against the North Vietnamese.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) But the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which was passed by the US Senate by an overwhelming majority was then used by President Johnson as a justification for what ultimately became a huge involvement in Vietnam.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Yes.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) So, having now spent a couple of minutes on that, what you're suggesting is what, that the whole notion of the weapons of mass destruction, the connection with al-Qaeda, that that was as phony as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, I'm suggesting that either the intelligence was so bad and flawed. And if that's the case, then somebody's head ought to roll for that. Or the intelligence was exaggerated or twisted in a way to make a more convenient case to the American people. I think in the case of Vietnam, there was a strategic decision to get more involved in Vietnam because a belief in the domino theory, that all the countries in Southeast Asia would begin to fall to Communism if you didn't stem the tide in Vietnam. If there's a strategic decision for taking down Iraq, if it's the so-called neo-conservative idea that taking apart Iraq and creating a model democracy, or whatever it is, will change the equation in the Middle East, then make the case based on that strategic decision.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) That, indeed, is what the Administration is starting to argue. Now, more and more as the weapons of mass destruction argument and the terrorism argument seems to fade away. You don't buy the argument?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, I think it's a flawed -like the domino theory, it's a flawed strategic thought or concept in dealing with it. But if that's the reason for going in, that's the case the American people ought to hear. They ought to make their judgment and determine their support based on what the motivation is for the attack.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) Let me give you another theory, if I may. And you would know one whole Hell of a lot about this because you were CentCom commander at the time. My theory is that, after 9/11, after the attack on the World Trade Centers and the -Pentagon, what had not been possible back in 1998, when you might have wanted to conduct just that kind of an attack against Iraq, suddenly became politically feasible.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, that's fine. But then, I think, we should have looked at the timing. After 9/11, when we took on the war against the extremists, the war on terrorism, we were involved in Afghanistan. We had problems with the Middle East peace process. We had relationships in the region that were coming apart, that were strained and needed to be repaired. We had other issues like North Korea and the economy. You have to look at Iraq and say, is the timing right? Is the threat imminent? I did not believe, and I still do not believe, that Saddam was an imminent threat, that he posed an imminent case of threatening our forces or our nation and couldn't be dealt with later. So, there's a question of timing. Then, there's a question of, if you still elected to do it at that time, why not wait for the UN? Why not give the inspectors a chance to play out? The history of the inspectors in the UN has always been that, eventually the inspectors, Richard Butler, Rolph, had done their thing and had came out and said that we no longer have any cooperation, we can't continue. And then, there was a UN support in resolution for taking action. It happened in the bombing in '98 when we conducted Operation Desert Fox and it happened before in the early '90s.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) You were telling me before, when you and I were sitting in my office, that there actually was a plan for a ground invasion, kind of similar to the one that was carried out just this past spring, back in late '98, early 1999. What was it about that plan that you think was actually a little bit superior, perhaps, to the plan that has now been implemented?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, of course, ever since the Gulf War, the first Gulf War, we've had a plan. I mean, military commanders, the unified commands, formally called the syncs, always have a set of war plans. One of the war plans that existed and was required for CentCom to maintain was the possible takedown of the regime in Iraq. That plan has existed and has been modified ever since General Schwarzkopf's conduct of Desert Storm, about every couple of years. In 1998, after we conducted the bombing, Desert Fox, of some of the facilities inside Iraq as a result of Richard Butler and the inspectors being unable to accomplish their mission, we began to receive reports from inside Iraq that the government was shaken, the regime was shaken. They were not coming across with the same rhetoric. They didn't have the same sort of activity. They seemed to go lethargic and seemed to be shaken by the attacks on the intelligence headquarters and the Baath party headquarters. And -I began to think that if Iraq imploded, if actually the government was fragile enough that something could happen inside or, if for some reason Saddam struck out, say against Kuwait again or did something that was unacceptable that required us to execute that war plan, that we would have to deal with this post-Saddam Iraq. I began to hear from -friends in the region, from the Kuwaitis, the Jordanians and others, that they were deeply concerned about what would happen inside of Iraq. Some of their concerns had to do with refugees, humanitarian problems, but also about the turmoil, the revenge, the potential for civil war. If you pull the plug on a sort of a centrally controlled authoritarian regime like that, what might happen to the people, to the infrastructure, to the institutions?

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) So, you began to plan back then for what would happen in the wake of the Saddam era. The reason I'm interrupting you is because you and I have to take a quick break and then we'll come back with what was in that plan. And why what was in that plan seems to have been lost.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Yes.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) Back in a moment with General Anthony Zinni.

commercial break

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) And we're back, once again, with General Anthony Zinni. So here we are, late '98, early 1999. And you are contemplating two possibilities. One, an invasion, a ground invasion into Iraq. Two, the possibility that Saddam Hussein's regime might implode. But either way you're saying, we've gotta plan for what happens after Saddam goes, right? And what did you do?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, first of all, the actual part of the plan that dealt with the military operation to defeat the Republican Guard and the military structure inside Iraq had more forces in it then. We had more divisions. Not so much that we needed it for the defeat. But we needed those troops on the ground to immediately freeze the situation, worry about the aftermath of security.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) How many more troops? Now we have about 140,000.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

We had considerably more. We had at least two more divisions in there.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) So, about another 40,000 troops?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

And the plan was criticized, later on by this Pentagon, as overestimating the amount of troops, it was far too large. But actually, the plan had those troops built into it because we looked at the security requirements immediately afterward.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) As you think back on that plan now, did it address some of the issues that seem to be a big problem in Iraq today? Did it address the no power, no water, lots of looting, stealing of national treasures, that kind of thing?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

It listed the potential for these kinds of things to happen. And it talked about some things that had to be understood about this government, that half the paychecks are coming from Saddam. So, immediately when you take the regime out, you have 50 percent of the population out of work.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) Let me ask you, this Administration, shortly after coming in, first thing it did was take the 400,000-man army and say, you guys are out of work, you're gone.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Big mistake.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) What about your plan?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, we had conducted a series of psychological operations in my time, and going back before my time, when we would -bomb Iraq for whatever reason, we would put leaflets down or we would communicate to the regular army that they were not the problem. We saw the Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard ...

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) We did the same thing this time. When I say we, the US Army did the same thing.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

For maybe ten years, sending messages to them, that they would not be -if they did not fight, they were not the enemy. That we saw them as innocent conscripts. I gave several interviews on television out in the region, al-Jazeera and several other stations. And we always subtly made sure that message got out. The regular army was not our enemy. And we looked at needing these regular Army formations. If they stayed in garrison, if they didn't fight, not taking them apart. Decapitating them, possibly, taking the leadership out, the general officers or the senior officers that might have supported Saddam or been Baathists. But to keep the unit cohesion together and then use it as a base for retraining and for local security.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) One of your former Marine Corps colleagues, a Marine Corps general, said yesterday, if we do not get foreign troops to go in there, we're going to have to bring a lot more US reservists. I want to raise that issue with you in a moment. But we have to take another break. Back in a moment.

commercial break

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) I'm back once again with General Anthony Zinni. General Pace said yesterday, if we don't get some foreign troops in there and get them in there pretty fast, I think he said within the next four to six weeks, we're going to have to bring a lot of US reservists in. It doesn't look, from what happened at the United Nations yesterday, as though we're going to get those troops. Certainly not in the next four to six weeks. What is that going to do to the US military?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, I think we're going to end up with a period of time that we're going to be in there that's going to be considerable. We're gonna require to have units rotate in and out of there. Brigades, or regimental level at least. That's gonna put a big strain on our active duty forces because they're committed so many places around the world. It will require reserve and Guard call up. That's a well you can't go to too many times.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) How long do you think US troops, in large numbers are gonna have to be in Iraq? Is that even predictable at this point?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

I don't think it's predictable. But I think we ought to think in terms of three to five years. Now, I would -hope that maybe we could get Iraqi units in the field faster. I would hope that we could get international participation that would lower that, that it wouldn't be that many troops for that period of time. But I think we're gonna have to be in charge for at least that period of time on the security side and the military side.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) Lead story in "The New York Times" today, sourcing that David Kay, who was the chief weapons inspector for a long time, was sent back by President Bush to check for those weapons of mass destruction. That when he comes back, he's essentially coming back with little or nothing. How bad is that?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, it is bad for credibility. I mean, we -made the case to the American people. We made to the case to the UN that we couldn't wait for them and the inspectors because this threat was imminent. We've seen the effects of this in the United Kingdom. And I think it becomes a credibility issue. It's really a moot point in regards to Iraq. We still have to fulfill our commitment there. Saddam being gone is a good thing. But I think it's a credibility issue with the leadership here and with the American public and with our soldiers.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) I raised this question the other day with Condoleezza Rice. She wasn't altogether forthcoming in her response. Let me raise it with you. Either those weapons didn't exist at the time that we thought that they did, in which case as you suggested earlier on, very bad intelligence and we need to consider the consequences of that. Or they did exist, but they're not to be found now. In which case, it seems to me, that one of the options is that Saddam distributed them to the very people that we were most concerned would get them in the fist place. People, possible terrorists in Syria, in Jordan, in Saudi Arabia, in Turkey. In other words, in any of the neighboring, the contiguous countries to Iraq. Is that a possibility in your mind? Or do you just think the weapons simply weren't there?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

I believe that what Saddam had was the framework for a weapons of mass destruction program that could be quickly activated once sanctions were lifted. He had the scientists. He had the documentation. He had the dual use facilities like pesticide plants or pharmaceutical plants that could be rapidly turned over. He had programs that he was allowed to have, like the short-range al-Samoud missiles. But within that program, was doing the experimentation, the research and development, so he could quickly expand range and delivery systems. He was fooling around with unmanned aerial vehicles, with tanks on the bottom of them. They -were very crude and not very effective. But he had this framework. And I think what he did not want to have happen is to get caught with the smoking gun. So, I think somewhere along the line, he made the decision not to have it so that he could be freed from the sanctions by getting the good report card from either Richard Butler or Hans Blix. What I think the inspectors knew though, this is what I think Butler and Blix understood, it wasn't that there was a smoking gun, that there were going to be bunkers full of artillery rounds or rocket shells or something like that. Where they were probing was into this framework that he had cleverly hidden. And that's why they wanted to interview scientists. That's why they wanted to get them out of the country to talk to them.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) When Colin Powell spoke before the UN, he wasn't sketching out that kind of a picture. He was sketching out a picture, as was the President, of real weapons, existing weapons, dangerous poisons, chemical, biological. Were they just terribly misinformed?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

I don't think there was a basis to say -now, I don't doubt that at some point in time somebody might find some leftover artillery rounds or rocket shells. But it seemed to me, this was not the direction Saddam was going. I think that the case for WMD should have been made on this framework program and what the inspectors were saying, that the scientists were there. That the documentation was there. That the capability to restart this program was there. He had all the elements. He needed to tune them up a little bit, maybe. But instead of going after the questionable issue, as to whether he actually had weapons at the ready and positioned. Certainly ones that could threaten or affect us, that were more than just tactical or short range. We didn't even find those yet. I think the case could have been made for WMD. But it was a little bit more complex and maybe harder to sell.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) But the notion, General Zinni, of an imminent threat, as the British government was saying at one point, 45 minutes?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

No. I was asked at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a month before the invasion if I thought Saddam was an imminent threat and I told Senator Lugar and the Committee, no, I did not believe they were an imminent threat.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) We're just about out of time. But the President has asked Congress for $87 billion. You have said what we really need is a Marshal Plan-sized project in Iraq. Isn't $87 billion a Marshal size plan?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, you know, any strategy, any plan has three elements. It's ends, ways, and means. $87 billion is means.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) That's the means.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Show me the ends and the ways, which means planning. Which means a very detailed, exhaustive set of plans.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) You don't think we've got that?

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

I think we're trying to work it out in a huddle right now. I think Bremer is scrambling to get one in place. Ambassador Bremer in Baghdad.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) You described him as a quarterback to me earlier when we were talking earlier.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Well, he's the backup quarterback thrown in in the third quarter. And now asked to, while in the middle of the game, create the game plan. You know, this should have happened before and it should have been more robust. And I do believe that we should support this. I do believe -we can't fail in Iraq. We have to live up to this commitment.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) General Zinni, we could keep going for a long time but we're out of time. I thank you very much for coming in.

GENERAL ANTHONY ZINNI

Thank you, Ted.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) I'll be back with a Closing Thought in a moment.

graphics: Nightline: Closing Thought

ANNOUNCER

The "Nightline" Closing Thought, brought to you by ... Log on with your comments to abcnews.com.

commercial break

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) So, there was a plan for dealing with a post-war Iraq. And if the Bush Administration had referred to it, a lot of the problems now confronting them might have been avoided. Surprising? Not really. We like to believe that we have the best system of government in the world, and we probably do. But one of its great weaknesses is the loss of continuity that occurs every time a new administration comes into power. It's almost axiom in Washington that if a previous Administration favored plan A, the new guys will incline toward plan B. It happens time after time, especially at the White House where no one but the telephone operators and the stewards in the White House mess are carried over from one Administration to the next. Our government is rejuvenated by fresh blood but it depends on institutional memory. Too much of one at the expense of the other can lead to disaster.

TED KOPPEL

(Off Camera) That's our report for tonight. I'm Ted Koppel in Washington. For all of us here at ABC News, good night.

Y'all owe me a steak or something.