If you are a Poli Sci geek like myself, you really dig papers like this one. I will save the bandwidth and let everybody just follow the link. It is a couple of years old, but it if you hit the high points, it breaks down the stuff that could come to pass in the region. P.S. No, I did not write it, although I did do similiar, more theoretical work on strategy. North Korea's Strategy This paper was presented at the third NPEC/Institute for National Security Studies/Army War College sponsored workshop on Competitive Strategies, held June 12-14, 2000 at the Hyatt, Arlington, VA.
Thanks for the link Muldar. The North Korean conundrum is so much more complex than Iraq due to the regime's WMD's and their threat to millions of innocents. More good reasons to confront Saddam now before he can do the same.
Mulder, That was a nice read. Here are a few links in return. An older article with more of a South Korea economic viewpoint: <a href="http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/vol10no5/essay1.html">THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE IN KOREAN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNIFICATION</a> A short article: <a HREF="http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/EB26Dh02.html">Japan: Hawks coming out of the woodwork</a> A longer article about missiles in Asia: <a HREF="http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/vol13no3/SwaineRunyon.htm">Ballistic Missiles and Missile Defense in Asia</a> Also: <a HREF="http://strategicasia.nbr.org/Report/pdf/ShowReportPDF.aspx?ID=19&f=0">STRATEGIC ASIA BY THE NUMBERS</a> <b>Now on to the article you provided.</b> There was a noticeable change over the decades in the leadership of the USSR compared to the situation in the DPRK. Lenin, Stalin, Krushchev etc didn't have the direct lineage chain which made it far easier to question and modify course after a leadership change. Until that lineage chain is broken in the DPKR, it will be very difficult for them to alter course. I did find it interesting for the author to point out that the DPRK lacks the trained business leaders to effectively carry out a significant change in the economic system. As he noted, trying to significantly engage the DPRK on an increased economic level will be a struggle because of their lack of ability to accomodate that change and also a refutation of everything that the leadership has preached for over five decades. Isn't there a general feeling that a <i>New Korea</i> (ROK assimilates DPRK) would be a huge worry to Japan if the <i>New Korea</i> was able to retain the DPRK missile tech and WMD programs? From your article: <i><b>IV. Strategic Options</b> Currently, North Korea would seem to have four broad strategic options. Two offer the prospect of long-term survival, but they are difficult and dangerous. Two others would seem to offer the means of temporary survival only. The first obviously is to attack and win. The upside is the possibility of absolute victory. If the KFR gains control of the entire peninsula, economic failure becomes politically irrelevant, or at least much less relevant. Peninsular polarity would end, as would the economic and political challenge from Seoul. The downside is, of course, that this is the most dangerous option, as it risks total defeat and the prospect of death, delivery into the hands of the enemy, or ignominious flight. The second is the campaign of subversion and revolution, the strategy envisioned in their "peaceful unification" slogan adopted in 1954. The upside is that it offers the possibility of total victory with minimal risk. The problem, of course, is that since it is extremely hard to do, the possibility of success is extremely small. The would-be guerrilla operations of the mid- to late 1960s failed and there have been no attempts to revive them. As for subversion, the record seems to show that while individuals can be recruited and anti-state groups formed, the ROK society as a whole is too big and various to take down. Basic to the likely failure of this option, of course, are four factors which decrease the appeal of the KFR message: (1) the evident failure of North Korea's economic model, (2) the long and continuing track record of violence against the south, (3) the dynastic succession, which is viewed in the south as ludicrous and anachronistic, and (4) political democratization in the south, which over time has deprived radical students of their political cover as fighters for democracy. The third option is the so-called "soft landing," or "rational choice," option of reconciliation and economic cooperation, reform, and opening. The upside is that over time all of these might help to bring about economic and social recovery in the north. The downside is that, as already discussed, they would inevitably undermine regime foundations and lead inexorably to the collapse and end of the Kim family system. Moreover, in the interim, this option does nothing to fend off the threat from the south, as the ROK is still there and still obviously superior economically. Finally, of course, sustained pursuit of this option would tend to foreclose the first two options above. The fourth option is what we may call an aid-based survival approach with minimal or no reform. This appears in the main to be the strategic option the KFR has currently adopted. The advantages of this option are significant. It avoids the pitfalls of internal change. It avoids the danger of broad engagement with the ROK but allows for selective ROK business activity in the north. And it preserves the possibility of continued priority to the military and of options one and two above. The disadvantages are also considerable. There is a potential sustainability problem. Will the outside world give enough for a long enough period of time? The ROK is still there and still superior. Collapse is still possible, and there is rampant corruption, just as when the ROK pursued a similar strategy in the early to mid–1950s...... </i> I don't see them changing from the currently chosen <i>fourth</i> option and that means the standoff/stalemate will continue well into the future.
