Proposal to negotiate the end of the US occupation of Iraq with the resistance.

In Iraq, try talking with the insurgents

Amin Saikal IHT

Tuesday, September 28, 2004
CANBERRA Iraq is burning, drowning in chaos. As Iraqi civilians bury their dead in increasing numbers, the political leaders of the occupying powers urge more and more of their uniformed young men and women to sacrifice their lives for the sake of "success" in Iraq. In doing so, they are ignoring all the realistic assessments, including some from within their own governments, which predict a bleak future for Iraq and the war on terrorism if the present course of policy behavior is maintained.
.
Both the occupiers and the resistance have dug in their heels in a battle for total supremacy that may well prove to be elusive. They are bent on military victory with no peace-making cards on the table.
.
What is there to be done now? It is too late for the United Nations to take over Iraq's transition. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's recent declaration of the invasion of Iraq as "illegal" preclude that. However, this does not mean that the United Nations is not in a position to facilitate direct negotiations between the United States as the leading occupying power and the Iraqi opposition.
.
This may sound far-fetched and arduous to achieve, but this is the way that many conflicts arising from occupations have ended.
.
A recent example of that was Afghanistan, where the UN launched a mission shortly after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in late December 1979 to mediate between the Soviets and their surrogate government in Kabul, and the Afghan Islamic resistance forces and their international backers - most importantly the United States and Pakistan.
.
When the conditions finally became conducive, the UN efforts paid off: Peace accords on Afghanistan were signed in Geneva in April 1988. Although the mujahedeen were not direct participants at the Geneva peace talks, they were consulted and their interests were supposedly protected by their international backers, especially the United States, which, together with the Soviet Union, acted as the guarantors of the agreement.
.
Under the accords, the Kremlin of Mikhail Gorbachev undertook to withdraw its forces by early 1989 and secured the degree of face-saving that it needed to achieve this objective. The fact that Afghanistan sank into a civil war after the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the Soviet-installed government in Kabul in April 1992 were more a function of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the U.S. abandonment of post-Soviet management of Afghanistan than any other factor.
.
In Iraq, the UN secretary general needs to appoint a special envoy - someone of the stature of the veteran Algerian negotiator, Lakhdar Brahimi - to engage in mediation with all sides in the conflict. Such a mission would only work if 1) the envoy had the full support of the international community, especially the United States, and 2) the United States and its allies recognized the Iraqi resistance as a force with a popular base, not just "terrorists" and "criminals," as Washington and its supporters have branded them.
.
While there is no denying that such elements exist within the resistance, it must have popular support to function as effectively as it has. And whatever the description of the resistance by Washington and its allies, since the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, more than 80 percent of the Iraqi people have repeatedly indicated their opposition to the occupying forces.
.
The most challenging task of the UN envoy would be to identify the opposition leaders with whom negotiation could take place.
.
In the first instance he could incorporate the leaders of the mainstream groups, like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani from the Shia side and his Sunni and Kurdish counterparts, as the best way not only to get the peace talks going but also to weaken popular support for those extremist groups which uphold violence as the only means to achieve their objectives.
.
Once the extreme elements face a degree of popular delegitimization, some of their leaders may also come forward to participate in the negotiations, provided the peace talks take place on neutral ground and the United States and its allies guarantee the safety of such leaders and negotiate with them in good faith.
.
The process cannot be expected to be quick or easy. But it may be the only alternative through which the United States and its allies can end their occupation of Iraq with a degree of respectability, and can repair their image in the region and beyond.
.
This could also prove to be a potent step in helping to delegitimize Al Qaeda and its associates and diminish the grounds for their moral and political nourishment and recruitment.
.
If this is accompanied by a more robust approach to rebuilding Afghanistan and securing a viable resolution of the Palestinian problem, it could seriously help a safer and more stable world to emerge.
.
Amin Saikal is professor of political science and director of the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University.



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CANBERRA Iraq is burning, drowning in chaos. As Iraqi civilians bury their dead in increasing numbers, the political leaders of the occupying powers urge more and more of their uniformed young men and women to sacrifice their lives for the sake of "success" in Iraq. In doing so, they are ignoring all the realistic assessments, including some from within their own governments, which predict a bleak future for Iraq and the war on terrorism if the present course of policy behavior is maintained.
.
Both the occupiers and the resistance have dug in their heels in a battle for total supremacy that may well prove to be elusive. They are bent on military victory with no peace-making cards on the table.
.
What is there to be done now? It is too late for the United Nations to take over Iraq's transition. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's recent declaration of the invasion of Iraq as "illegal" preclude that. However, this does not mean that the United Nations is not in a position to facilitate direct negotiations between the United States as the leading occupying power and the Iraqi opposition.
.
This may sound far-fetched and arduous to achieve, but this is the way that many conflicts arising from occupations have ended.
.
A recent example of that was Afghanistan, where the UN launched a mission shortly after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in late December 1979 to mediate between the Soviets and their surrogate government in Kabul, and the Afghan Islamic resistance forces and their international backers - most importantly the United States and Pakistan.
.
When the conditions finally became conducive, the UN efforts paid off: Peace accords on Afghanistan were signed in Geneva in April 1988. Although the mujahedeen were not direct participants at the Geneva peace talks, they were consulted and their interests were supposedly protected by their international backers, especially the United States, which, together with the Soviet Union, acted as the guarantors of the agreement.
.
Under the accords, the Kremlin of Mikhail Gorbachev undertook to withdraw its forces by early 1989 and secured the degree of face-saving that it needed to achieve this objective. The fact that Afghanistan sank into a civil war after the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the Soviet-installed government in Kabul in April 1992 were more a function of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the U.S. abandonment of post-Soviet management of Afghanistan than any other factor.
.
In Iraq, the UN secretary general needs to appoint a special envoy - someone of the stature of the veteran Algerian negotiator, Lakhdar Brahimi - to engage in mediation with all sides in the conflict. Such a mission would only work if 1) the envoy had the full support of the international community, especially the United States, and 2) the United States and its allies recognized the Iraqi resistance as a force with a popular base, not just "terrorists" and "criminals," as Washington and its supporters have branded them.
.
While there is no denying that such elements exist within the resistance, it must have popular support to function as effectively as it has. And whatever the description of the resistance by Washington and its allies, since the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, more than 80 percent of the Iraqi people have repeatedly indicated their opposition to the occupying forces.
.
The most challenging task of the UN envoy would be to identify the opposition leaders with whom negotiation could take place.
.
In the first instance he could incorporate the leaders of the mainstream groups, like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani from the Shia side and his Sunni and Kurdish counterparts, as the best way not only to get the peace talks going but also to weaken popular support for those extremist groups which uphold violence as the only means to achieve their objectives.
.
Once the extreme elements face a degree of popular delegitimization, some of their leaders may also come forward to participate in the negotiations, provided the peace talks take place on neutral ground and the United States and its allies guarantee the safety of such leaders and negotiate with them in good faith.
.
The process cannot be expected to be quick or easy. But it may be the only alternative through which the United States and its allies can end their occupation of Iraq with a degree of respectability, and can repair their image in the region and beyond.
.
This could also prove to be a potent step in helping to delegitimize Al Qaeda and its associates and diminish the grounds for their moral and political nourishment and recruitment.
.
If this is accompanied by a more robust approach to rebuilding Afghanistan and securing a viable resolution of the Palestinian problem, it could seriously help a safer and more stable world to emerge.
.
Amin Saikal is professor of political science and director of the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University.
CANBERRA Iraq is burning, drowning in chaos. As Iraqi civilians bury their dead in increasing numbers, the political leaders of the occupying powers urge more and more of their uniformed young men and women to sacrifice their lives for the sake of "success" in Iraq. In doing so, they are ignoring all the realistic assessments, including some from within their own governments, which predict a bleak future for Iraq and the war on terrorism if the present course of policy behavior is maintained.
.
Both the occupiers and the resistance have dug in their heels in a battle for total supremacy that may well prove to be elusive. They are bent on military victory with no peace-making cards on the table.
.
What is there to be done now? It is too late for the United Nations to take over Iraq's transition. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's recent declaration of the invasion of Iraq as "illegal" preclude that. However, this does not mean that the United Nations is not in a position to facilitate direct negotiations between the United States as the leading occupying power and the Iraqi opposition.
.
This may sound far-fetched and arduous to achieve, but this is the way that many conflicts arising from occupations have ended.
.
A recent example of that was Afghanistan, where the UN launched a mission shortly after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in late December 1979 to mediate between the Soviets and their surrogate government in Kabul, and the Afghan Islamic resistance forces and their international backers - most importantly the United States and Pakistan.
.
When the conditions finally became conducive, the UN efforts paid off: Peace accords on Afghanistan were signed in Geneva in April 1988. Although the mujahedeen were not direct participants at the Geneva peace talks, they were consulted and their interests were supposedly protected by their international backers, especially the United States, which, together with the Soviet Union, acted as the guarantors of the agreement.
.
Under the accords, the Kremlin of Mikhail Gorbachev undertook to withdraw its forces by early 1989 and secured the degree of face-saving that it needed to achieve this objective. The fact that Afghanistan sank into a civil war after the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the Soviet-installed government in Kabul in April 1992 were more a function of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the U.S. abandonment of post-Soviet management of Afghanistan than any other factor.
.
In Iraq, the UN secretary general needs to appoint a special envoy - someone of the stature of the veteran Algerian negotiator, Lakhdar Brahimi - to engage in mediation with all sides in the conflict. Such a mission would only work if 1) the envoy had the full support of the international community, especially the United States, and 2) the United States and its allies recognized the Iraqi resistance as a force with a popular base, not just "terrorists" and "criminals," as Washington and its supporters have branded them.
.
While there is no denying that such elements exist within the resistance, it must have popular support to function as effectively as it has. And whatever the description of the resistance by Washington and its allies, since the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, more than 80 percent of the Iraqi people have repeatedly indicated their opposition to the occupying forces.
.
The most challenging task of the UN envoy would be to identify the opposition leaders with whom negotiation could take place.
.
In the first instance he could incorporate the leaders of the mainstream groups, like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani from the Shia side and his Sunni and Kurdish counterparts, as the best way not only to get the peace talks going but also to weaken popular support for those extremist groups which uphold violence as the only means to achieve their objectives.
.
Once the extreme elements face a degree of popular delegitimization, some of their leaders may also come forward to participate in the negotiations, provided the peace talks take place on neutral ground and the United States and its allies guarantee the safety of such leaders and negotiate with them in good faith.
.
The process cannot be expected to be quick or easy. But it may be the only alternative through which the United States and its allies can end their occupation of Iraq with a degree of respectability, and can repair their image in the region and beyond.
.
This could also prove to be a potent step in helping to delegitimize Al Qaeda and its associates and diminish the grounds for their moral and political nourishment and recruitment.
.
If this is accompanied by a more robust approach to rebuilding Afghanistan and securing a viable resolution of the Palestinian problem, it could seriously help a safer and more stable world to emerge.
.
Amin Saikal is professor of political science and director of the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University.
CANBERRA Iraq is burning, drowning in chaos. As Iraqi civilians bury their dead in increasing numbers, the political leaders of the occupying powers urge more and more of their uniformed young men and women to sacrifice their lives for the sake of "success" in Iraq. In doing so, they are ignoring all the realistic assessments, including some from within their own governments, which predict a bleak future for Iraq and the war on terrorism if the present course of policy behavior is maintained.
.
Both the occupiers and the resistance have dug in their heels in a battle for total supremacy that may well prove to be elusive. They are bent on military victory with no peace-making cards on the table.
.
What is there to be done now? It is too late for the United Nations to take over Iraq's transition. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's recent declaration of the invasion of Iraq as "illegal" preclude that. However, this does not mean that the United Nations is not in a position to facilitate direct negotiations between the United States as the leading occupying power and the Iraqi opposition.
.
This may sound far-fetched and arduous to achieve, but this is the way that many conflicts arising from occupations have ended.
.
A recent example of that was Afghanistan, where the UN launched a mission shortly after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in late December 1979 to mediate between the Soviets and their surrogate government in Kabul, and the Afghan Islamic resistance forces and their international backers - most importantly the United States and Pakistan.
.
When the conditions finally became conducive, the UN efforts paid off: Peace accords on Afghanistan were signed in Geneva in April 1988. Although the mujahedeen were not direct participants at the Geneva peace talks, they were consulted and their interests were supposedly protected by their international backers, especially the United States, which, together with the Soviet Union, acted as the guarantors of the agreement.
.
Under the accords, the Kremlin of Mikhail Gorbachev undertook to withdraw its forces by early 1989 and secured the degree of face-saving that it needed to achieve this objective. The fact that Afghanistan sank into a civil war after the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the Soviet-installed government in Kabul in April 1992 were more a function of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the U.S. abandonment of post-Soviet management of Afghanistan than any other factor.
.
In Iraq, the UN secretary general needs to appoint a special envoy - someone of the stature of the veteran Algerian negotiator, Lakhdar Brahimi - to engage in mediation with all sides in the conflict. Such a mission would only work if 1) the envoy had the full support of the international community, especially the United States, and 2) the United States and its allies recognized the Iraqi resistance as a force with a popular base, not just "terrorists" and "criminals," as Washington and its supporters have branded them.
.
While there is no denying that such elements exist within the resistance, it must have popular support to function as effectively as it has. And whatever the description of the resistance by Washington and its allies, since the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, more than 80 percent of the Iraqi people have repeatedly indicated their opposition to the occupying forces.
.
The most challenging task of the UN envoy would be to identify the opposition leaders with whom negotiation could take place.
.
In the first instance he could incorporate the leaders of the mainstream groups, like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani from the Shia side and his Sunni and Kurdish counterparts, as the best way not only to get the peace talks going but also to weaken popular support for those extremist groups which uphold violence as the only means to achieve their objectives.
.
Once the extreme elements face a degree of popular delegitimization, some of their leaders may also come forward to participate in the negotiations, provided the peace talks take place on neutral ground and the United States and its allies guarantee the safety of such leaders and negotiate with them in good faith.
.
The process cannot be expected to be quick or easy. But it may be the only alternative through which the United States and its allies can end their occupation of Iraq with a degree of respectability, and can repair their image in the region and beyond.
.
This could also prove to be a potent step in helping to delegitimize Al Qaeda and its associates and diminish the grounds for their moral and political nourishment and recruitment.
.
If this is accompanied by a more robust approach to rebuilding Afghanistan and securing a viable resolution of the Palestinian problem, it could seriously help a safer and more stable world to emerge.
.
Amin Saikal is professor of political science and director of the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies (the Middle East and Central Asia) at the Australian National University.
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Well assuming we don't exteminate the resistance, how else do you all see the occupation ending except for a negotiated end?

As we saw in another post with coerced reupping among the troops, the volunteer army can't hold out indfintely. Yesterday in what might have been just a reelection ploy the Pentgagon was talking about having shorter rotations to Iraq. Things are unraveling.

I suppose it is still possible to get enough of "our" Iraqis to kill their countrymen, but so far that hasn't been going to well.