http://www.popularmechanics.com/blog/science/2315386.html -- Congressional Report On Katrina: First Look Illustration by Flying-Chilli.com At*2:00*this afternoon, the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina will release its final report after more than five months of investigation.*POPULAR MECHANICS*obtained excerpts of a draft copy of the report last night. We've given the report an initial read and found it riddled with poor logic, internal contradictions and exaggerations. This is no 9/11 Commission Report. We’ll have a fuller review once we get our hands on the official copy. Also, here's our March cover story, "Now What? The Lessons of Katrina," an investigative analysis and myth-debunking of this natural disaster. While the 9/11 effort pinpointed large institutional problems and focused on solutions, this report seems designed to narrow attention onto a few individuals, ignoring larger, and frankly more important, issues—such as what role FEMA should actually take in large-scale emergencies. For now, though, here’s a quick overview of what seems to be the report’s most troubling shortfall: consistently blaming individuals for failing to foresee circumstances that only became clear with the laser-sharp vision of hindsight. For example, the report states: "Fifty-six hours prior to landfall, Hurricane Katrina presented an extremely high probability threat that 75 percent of New Orleans would be flooded, tens of thousands of residents may be killed, hundreds of thousands trapped in flood waters up to 20 feet, hundreds of thousands of homes and other structures destroyed, a million people evacuated from their homes, and the greater New Orleans area would be rendered uninhabitable for several months or years." This statistic is referred to often, and refers to computer modeling of a direct Category 5 hurricane landfall in New Orleans. However, it's also a distortion. According to the data the Committee itself examined, 56 hours prior to landfall, Katrina was a relatively weak Category 3 storm, heading west in the Gulf of Mexico. Over the next few hours, it began its turn north, but where the storm was going to make landfall along the Gulf Coast was any weatherman's bet (the average 48-hour margin of error is 160 miles). In fact, it was not until the next day, Saturday, that it became more of a certainty that the hurricane was heading toward New Orleans. Furthermore, hurricane forecasters and emergency managers tell PM that until about 24 hours before landfall, hurricanes are too unpredictable to warrant the sort of blanket evacuation orders the report describes. And according to transcripts obtained by*POPULAR MECHANICS*of the Sunday, August 28, videoconference between FEMA, DHS, Gulf State authorities, the National Weather Service and the White House, as late as Sunday—only 24 hours before landfall—National Hurricane Center storm tracks predicted: "There will be minimal flooding in the city of New Orleans itself." The death tolls listed in the congressional report presuppose: A) certainty that the storm would hit New Orleans directly, and B) certainty the storm would strengthen to a Category*4 or 5. Neither of these propositions was certain 56 hours prior to landfall. And, in fact, the hurricane was a Category 3 storm when it did hit. The Committee report also criticizes the DHS and FEMA for not including the Department of Defense in their pre-storm and immediate post-storm planning. However, the same August 28 transcript shows that DoD was included from the beginning. In reality, despite organizational shortcomings, the rescue spearheaded by the National Guard and the Coast Guard turned out to be the largest and fastest in U.S. history, mobilizing nearly 100,000 responders within three days of the hurricane’s landfall. While each of the 1072 deaths in Louisiana was a tragedy, the worst-case scenario death toll would have been 60,000. Here's an excerpt from the August 28 transcript: SECRETARY CHERTOFF: (Inaudible.) Yes. Hi, this is Secretary Chertoff. And, again, as it relates to the entire department, if there's anything that you need from Coast Guard or any other components that you're not getting, please let us know. We'll do that for you, OK. MIKE BROWN: I appreciate it. (Missing.) Having been through many of these, the Coast Guard and ICE and all of the others have been incredibly good to us. And I hope we never have to call you and tell you that I can’t get help from the Coast Guard or somebody. Thank you for those comments. SECRETARY CHERTOFF: Secondly, are there any DOD assets that might be available. Have we reached out to them, and have we, I guess, made any kind of arrangement in case we need some additional help from them? MIKE BROWN: We have DOD assets over here at the EOC. They are fully engaged, and we are having those discussions with them now." PM’s quick read also shows that the Committee report relies on testimony from witnesses who share the habit of using post-Katrina knowledge of what actually happened to criticize what seemed like reasonable decisions taken before the storm. From the report: "According to Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness with the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), the 'single biggest failure' of the federal response was that it failed to recognize the likely consequences of the approaching storm and mobilize federal assets for a post-storm evacuation of the flooded city. If it had, then federal assistance would have arrived several days earlier." This is the same Col Smith who, when asked by Mike Brown on Aug. 28 if there were any needs going unmet, replied: COLONEL SMITH: Mike, no. (Inaudible) resources that are en route, and it looks like those resources that are en route are going to ...*to be a good first shot. Naturally, once we get into this thing, you know, neck deep here, unfortunately, or deeper, I'm sure that things are going to come up that maybe some of even our best planners hadn't even thought about. So I think flexibility is going to be the key. And just as quickly as we can cut through any potential red tape when those things do arise, you know, we just need to look at it. We appreciate your comments. I think they were to lean as far, far as you possibly can, you know, without falling, and your people here are doing that. And that's the type of attitude that we need in an event like this. So, again, thank you very much. We’ll have a fuller analysis once we get our hands on the complete report.--The Editors
