Not even close, but the administration will force a roll out just in time for the election. On the other hand will it ever truly be operational? Missile defense system called far from ready By David Ruppe, Global Security Newswire The long-range ballistic missile defense system President Bush has ordered operational by October will be less than adequate for effective operation, a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee said recently. In a phone interview with Global Security Newswire last month, Rep. John Spratt, D-S.C., said several crucial elements of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system would not be fielded on time because they have not achieved sufficient technological development. "We don't have the essential components yet in hand of a ground-based system," he said. In December 2002 Bush directed the military to deploy an initial missile defense capability by October 2004, which would include six missile interceptors in Alaska and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. While it appears that the interceptors are on track to be fielded by the deadline, the Missile Defense Agency has indicated that other system components will not be ready and that alternatives will be used. "They'll deploy something in Alaska and claim it's a protective system, but where's the X-band radar? Where are those crucial systems for detection, tracking, and discrimination" of enemy missiles and warheads, Spratt asked. "You can put something out there and you can claim we can do it with [existing missile detection sensors] and you can claim its adequate for the threat that we're facing, but it's a long way from what everybody thought was necessary for a minimal system," he said. Spratt said that U.S. efforts to develop new space-based infrared systems (SBIRS) for target detecting and tracking have "got lots of problems to work out." "We aren't there yet, I don't think, with the adequacy of detection and the tracking that we need," he said. For the scheduled initial operations, the system is expected to use Defense Support Program satellites already operating for early warning missions. The agency plans to put the first two Space Tracking and Surveillance Systems, formerly known as SBIRS-Low, into space around 2007 to participate in testing. The difference between the Defense Support Program satellites and STSS satellites is "orders of magnitude," said John Pike of Globalsecurity.org. Defense Support Program satellites "basically lose the target after burnout," he said. Spratt also said he was aware of "real problems" with a missile interceptor booster rocket under development by Lockheed Martin to replace a temporary booster that has been used in testing. Two boosters are being developed, the other by Orbital Sciences. The Orbital booster, expected to be used in the initial fielding, is scheduled for its first integrated flight test early this year, while the Lockheed booster is scheduled for that testing in fiscal 2005, Aerospace Daily reported Thursday. Spratt also expressed concern that added thrust provided by the new boosters might challenge the mechanism that joins the booster to the interceptor's kill vehicle. Spratt called the existing Cobra Dane radar that will be used for closely tracking enemy warheads in space a "poor substitute" for the X-band radar under development, adding, "it faces the wrong way." A General Accounting Office report in September said the Cobra Dane radar, operating for other missions, had not been tested in a "relevant flight environment" and that there are no plans for using it in an integrated flight test through fiscal 2007. The Missile Defense Agency also faces challenges from its decision to base the X-Band radar at sea, on a platform possibly stationed on the North Pacific, according to Spratt. GAO said the radar is scheduled for completion in 2005 but lacks realistic testing in a sea-based environment. It said severe wind and sea conditions "may affect the radar's functionality" and said the radar might be so tested by October 2006. "I think we're a long way from having a truly up-and-ready ballistic missile defense system," Spratt said. Spratt said development of the sea-based boost-phase missile system the administration also plans to field in 2005 is in its early stages and could prove an extremely difficult task. A fundamental challenge to the concept, he said, is posed by the possibility of an enemy firing an ICBM away from the sea-based interceptor. For example, North Korea could choose to launch a missile over China instead of the Sea of Japan. "A boost-phase system requires that you be able to locate your missile intercept system very close to its intended target. However, if this system is coming out of China and much of its trajectory is coming over land, a boost-phase system simply cannot get there in time," he said. Spratt dismissed efforts to develop a space-based interception capability, saying an adversary could disable it too easily. "The problem you've got for space-based systems is any country that can build a ballistic missile can build an [antisatellite system]," he said. Despite Spratt's concerns, he praised Missile Defense Agency Director Gen. Ronald Kadish for managing the pressures of the job. "Kadish has got a tough job and I respect the job he's done of trying to keep it on a level track," he said. http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0104/010804gsn1.htm
Well this is a huge waste of money that does absolutely zero to fight terrorism. It's really disgusting that while we are in a 'war' against terrorism such a huge chunk of money goes toward this stupid program, which doesn't work now, and will be rendered obsolete almost immediately should it ever work. This idea is one that wasn't effective but attempted to address the needs of our country back during the cold war. For some reason GWB brought the idea back, even after being told that OBL was the greatest threat to the U.S. Spending that money on going after OBL may or may not have prevented 9/11 but it would have been a responsible use of defense spending and addressed actual needs this country has. Instead the money was spent on this and we are all worse off because of it. Well maybe not all of us, but all of us who aren't big named defense contractors.
60 billion and counting - this could cover a great deal of our new space program or it could take care of a domestic issue or two... Is Missile Defense on Target? Philip Coyle The clock is ticking. Last December, President George W. Bush announced plans to begin deployment of a strategic nationwide missile defense system at Fort Greely, Alaska, by September 30, 2004. With less than a year left before that deadline, it is clear that the president’s decision has drastically changed the priorities in the missile defense program and lowered the bar on the acceptable standards for an effective military system. If the Bush administration’s now anemic testing schedule continues on track, the United States is set to deploy a missile defense system that is simply not up to the job. The ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system, as it is now called, has not shown that it can hit anything other than missiles whose trajectory and targets have been preprogrammed by missile defense contractors to eliminate the surprise or uncertainty of battle. Nor has it proven that it can hit a tumbling target, perform at night, or find ways to counter the decoys and countermeasures that a real enemy would use to throw a defense off track. Tests so far have all been conducted at unrealistically low speeds and altitudes, and it is not clear that the system will be able to track and identify the warhead it is supposed to destroy. Such criticism is not partisan in nature. Bush’s new testing schedule lags not only the comprehensive tests planned by the Clinton administration, but even the testing objectives of Bush’s first two years. Indeed, the Pentagon’s current missile defense plan marks a radical shift from a half-century of military testing carried out under Republican and Democratic administrations alike. After Bush’s announcement, the missile defense program’s priorities immediately switched from challenging and necessary testing to building facilities at Fort Greely and hauling hardware and equipment to Alaska. Since construction began on June 15, 2002, 550 acres have been cleared, at least 620,000 cubic yards of dirt have been removed, 11 buildings have been built, and 25 others refurbished. Six missile silos are to be completed by next February, 10 more by the end of 2005, and as many as 40 in the years to come. Yet, the ability of the missile defense system to carry out its required tasks has barely inched forward. During the first two years of the Bush administration, the Pentagon carried out a testing program that did not depart radically from its predecessor. To be sure, there were some changes. The Bush administration has conducted five flight intercept tests of the GMD system as opposed to three flight intercept tests of the NMD system in the final two years of the Clinton administration. On the other hand, all of the flight intercept tests attempted in the first two years of the Bush administration were quite similar to tests during the Clinton years and did not push the state of the art as strongly as tests either planned or accomplished during the Clinton administration. Yet, intent on deploying the system in time for the 2004 presidential elections, the Bush administration has sought to act as if the necessary milestones were unnecessary obstacles. Just look at how the Pentagon dealt with problems caused by the unreliable surrogate booster rocket used in the first eight flight intercept tests, as well as delays in the operational, production version needed to launch the “kill vehicle” to collide with incoming missiles in space: it simply cancelled nearly half of the intercept flight tests it had initially outlined. Unable to make the system square with the usual Pentagon definitions of military capable programs, the Department of Defense has dumbed down the requirements for a militarily effective program. Incapable of having key components such as an eagle-eyed X-band radar and flight sensors in place for the “deployment date,” the Pentagon is ready to place the system on operational status even without the parts needed for it to be effective. Full article: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_10/Coyle_10.asp
see if you still feel that way when unstable governments like pakistan develop the technology to deploy missiles capable of hitting los angeles.
word on the international street is that WE are the unstable government. I mean, we do have the tendency to pick on unarmed countries. and we can hit whichever one we like, what are they going to do to defend themselves?
Well terrorists have already attacked our largest city and killed three thousand folks, and the way I feel is that we should be spending money on stopping that kind of thing, but obviously our president and some others don't. So why would others feel differently just because Pakistan developed the technology to have that kind of range on their missles. Should Pakistan develop that technology, this shield still will be of no use. I don't just hate it because we aren't in danger from flying missles, I hate it mostly because it's expensive and it doesn't work. It can't stop anything at night, that tumbles, etc. It's very easy to get around the missle defense. Even if it worked flawlessly, it's still a matter of priority. Should the priority be on trying to stop something that a country might happen to develop at some supposed future date, and the once they developed it they might then decide to use it against us? Should these kind of purely hypothetical situations be how a govt. that's deep in debt, and already spending in the deficit be managing it's money? Another point to look at is if Pakistan is ever able to develop that kind of technology why would they use it against it? It would be the end for them. They are also much more concerned with India right now. I don't they are going to waste the few nukes they have on us when India has nukes they can use on Pakistan. I do see the need to protect against nukes, but a missle defense system isn't the way to do it. Solid diplomacy and our existing deterrence is the most effective way we have of stopping a nuclear attack on the U.S.
Ahh yes, the shield that doesn't work, against the threat that doesn't exist, and that could be easily circumvented regardless. Yup, what's a few hundred billion down the drain (of course some of it is recycled in the form of campaing contributions).
Let's see: If I'm a poor country/terrorist who wants to destroy Los Angeles, do I build a multibillion dollar ICBM system that will require years of unconcealable testing and development as will as the import/invention/refinement of various technologies that I don't yet possess....or do I put a bomb on a ship flagged to Liberia,registered to some nonexistent company take my chances that that ship is one of the 99.99999% of all international shipping that is not inspected or investigated and sail it into the port of Los Angeles. That's a pretty easy answer in my opinion, and one of hte reasons why the GOP's national security strategy is so dangerious: obscure/ignore threats in order to concentrate on useless sacred cows like missile defense. It's frightening.
Come on, Max. No state is going to nuke us for the same reason the Russians didn't during the cold war. They know it would be madness that would lead to the destruction of their country. At this point, nukes are the leverage that allow a country to truly defend themselves against the likes of us. We won't attack Pakistan because they have nukes and everyone knows it. The race is to HAVE nukes, not to use them. I would prefer spending those resources completing the job in Afghanistan properly as well as to try to shore up the mess we have created in Iraq.
Additionally, if I launch an ICBM, blame assesment and retaliation will be pretty clear and assured, whereas if I use terrorist methods, rather than retaliate against me, the US might just decide to instead invade Iraq.
Total cost for a layered missile defense system $1.2 trillion. I wonder how much we are spending to protect our ports? Study: Missile Defense System Could Cost $1.2 Trillion By: Randy Barrett Space News Staff Writer A newly released study prepared jointly by a pair of arms control advocacy groups puts the total life-cycle cost for a layered missile defense system at nearly $1.2 trillion through 2035. The report, titled The Full Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense, was prepared by the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, and Economists Allied for Arms Reduction in Pearl River, N.Y. It argues that the total cost of developing, producing and supporting a full missile defense architecture is higher than supporters in the White House and on Capitol Hill may realize. The study includes cost estimates for a variety of systems based on the ground, at sea, in the air and in space. Between them, these systems address the three phases of flight during which a ballistic missile might be engaged and destroyed: boost, midcourse and terminal. http://www.space.com/spacenews/spacenews_businessmonday_030113.html
Coping with Security Costs of Terrorist Threats to Supply Chain Management by Bill Snyder January, 2004 STANFORD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS — Every business day, 17,000 truck-sized containers, each loaded with as much as 30 tons of cargo, flood into American ports. Carrying everything from rebuilt automobile transmissions to electronic components and perfume, they are at the very heart of global commerce. But since September 11, 2001, national security officials and shipping industry leaders have been wrestling with the enormous threat to security those containers could pose. "Every container destined to enter or pass through the United States should be treated as a weapon of mass destruction," Rob Quartel, CEO of FreightDesk Technologies said last year at a meeting of the Senate subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information. Because only a small fraction of incoming containers are inspected—the Brookings Institution estimated recently that customs officials inspect only about 2 percent of all containers arriving in the U.S.—there have been calls to double or even triple that number. But researchers at Stanford's Graduate School of Business say that simply ratcheting up traditional security measures at American ports would be expensive, harmful to the economy, and worst of all, not very effective. What makes increased container-by-container inspections so expensive? Not only would the additional labor add cost to the final product, increased inspections likely would cause delays, thus lengthening the time it takes goods to get to market. Since the length of the delays would be hard to estimate, companies dependant upon just-in-time manufacturing practices would have to carry more inventory (itself an expense) to be certain that products or materials are on hand when needed. Instead, professors Hau L. Lee and Seungjin Whang suggest a radically different model, patterned after the Six Sigma quality improvement program pioneered by Motorola and later adopted by thousands of corporations around the world. Six Sigma programs changed the quality control process that had focused on finding defective goods via inspection after they were manufactured. The new process concentrated on modifying product design and adopting new procedures to catch sub-quality goods much sooner and ultimately reduce the overall number of defects. Rather than attempting to find dangerous cargo via inspections at the point of entry into the United States, Lee and Whang call for shifting the emphasis to the foreign ports where containers are loaded onto ships and even to factories and distribution centers where containers are filled with goods. The result, they say, is greater security and a more efficient supply chain. "In manufacturing, the way to eliminate inspections is to design and build in quality from the start. For supply security, the analogy is to design and apply processes that prevent tampering with a container before and during the transportation process," the researchers wrote in a Stanford research paper called Higher Supply Chain Security with Lower Cost: Lessons from Total Quality Management. In that paper, Lee and Whang present a mathematical model that demonstrates the value of proactive port security. They compared the costs to a major Silicon Valley electronics manufacturer if the government decides to inspect twice as many of the company's containers to the cost of proactive inspection. They found that the company, which asked not to be identified, could save approximately $1000 on each of the 4300 containers it ships each year (a total of $4.3 million), while making its supply chain significantly more secure. Indeed, the government is already experimenting with a number of methods to reduce what the researchers call "brute force" inspections. They include: The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-PTAT. The process involves multiple countries and rewards shippers and carriers that certify the use of best security practices with expedited processing at U.S. ports of entry. The Customs Service, of course, will conduct periodic audits to be sure the practices are actually being carried out. The Container Security Initiative. Under CSI, the United States and governments of some trading partners are working towards a series of bilateral agreements to permit exchange of customs officers and more screening of shipments at outbound ports. There would be better monitoring and documentation of all workers who help load international cargo, and of the process used to seal the containers. The Smart and Secure Tradelane Initiative, or SST. Under SST, three large seaport operators, representing over 70 percent of the world's container traffic, will collaborate to develop automated tracking, detection and security technology for containers entering U.S. ports. Eventually, containers leaving the participating ports will be equipped with special seals to detect tampering during transit. People in the industry are now talking about "smart containers," fitted with electronic gear capable of detecting changes in temperature or air pressure, would indicate if a hole had been drilled in a container. That's important because sophisticated smugglers, and perhaps terrorists, sometimes cut open a container, carefully avoiding the seal, and remove (or add) to the contents, Lee explained during an interview. Other gear would detect the presence of certain chemicals, biological elements, or radioactivity Existing containers can't be refitted with enough gear to make them "smart," but seals can be added to detect tampering and then pass that information on when scanned by electronic readers in much the same way fees are deducted from commuters' EZ Pass accounts when they cross a toll bridge. Lee, a member of the Council on Strategic Security, whose members are drawn from the military and private industry, believes the current initiatives are moving in the right direction, but he cautions that the effort will be difficult. One hurdle: Evaluating the oceans of data that better monitoring produces will require the use of sophisticated data mining technologies. And because the research collected by Lee and Whang is based on a limited sample, Lee is now working on a much larger study at the Port of Seattle, which should provide a larger and more varied data set. As he learns more, Lee, who is now on sabbatical, expects to make security a larger part of the curriculum in his MBA classes at Stanford. "The links between security and the supply chain are becoming increasingly important. The subject deserves much more attention." http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/supplychain_security_costs.shtml
since everyone jumped on my post i'll just respond universally. when i say "unstable"...i don't mean who the rest of the world is wary of. i mean, like an assassination away from putting nuclear weapons in the hands of people who WILL use them. who could care less that we would retaliate. when people are willing to die, they don't care what happens AFTER they kill you. if you can eliminate the threat of ICBMs, why wouldn't you? i don't know if they can or not, but geez...i'm thinking if they can, that helps make the world just a tad bit safer. it doesn't work right now...of course, before we went there we didn't know if we could actually get men to the moon...we weren't real sure if we could cure polio...etc, etc. just because it hasn't been done, doesn't mean it's impossible. i suppose the critics of this fall along two lines: 1. they don't perceive an ICBM threat right now, and choose to ignore the fact it could be someday; 2. they see the system as one that can never work...just can't be done, etc.
i suppose the critics of this fall along two lines: 1. they don't perceive an ICBM threat right now, and choose to ignore the fact it could be someday; 2. they see the system as one that can never work...just can't be done, etc. I think there's a 3rd type of critic as well. The financial critic. Could it work? Maybe. Could it stop a missile somewhere down the road, maybe? But how much are we willing to spend on it? I mean, if it costs $1 trillion, is it worth it? $10 trillion? $50 trillion? It's a cost-benefit thing. If you're going to spend $1.2 trillion, there are probably far more useful things to spend it on that would provide far better security against even more likely threats. If we had unlimited resources then hell yeah, go for it. But we're spending massive amounts of money on a system that may or may not work for a threat that may or may not exist, when there are real threats and real solutions that won't be pursued because of cost. I think it's more an issue of misplaced priorities than anything else. Missile defense sounds good, compared to resources to better scan seaports, etc.
Excellent points, Major. I'm thinking I would be more willing to spend money on preventing the threat of ICBMs because they could be launched so easily on so many different targets. IF they could get it to work...and I'll grant, that's a big IF...it seems to me it would literally make the development of missile systems obsolete. I'm thinking that would be a good thing.
Priorities...why spend massive sums of money on techonolgies that don't work against threats that may or may not exist at the cost of ignoring threats that do exist. (port security, etc) That's doubly irresponsible in that it provides a false sense of security as well as not making us any safer. Do you know how much a trillion dollars buys in counterterrorism measures? It's dangerous, and dishonest. All throughout the cold war, we heard about the strategic value of the missile shield agaisnt the Soviet Union; now all of a sudden, it's salesman, and their GOP lackeys, have decided that this Missile shield is necessary to defend against nonconventional threats too. That is the epitome of stupid; having tanks and stealth fighers doesn't stop terrorissts from flying planes into buildings, and having a missile shield isn't going to stop a terrorist from putting a bomb on a boat, a truck, or even a plane. And given the performance of the technologoy so far, it's not going to stop a missile either. This is like spending trillions on asteroid defense. It's a threat, but it would be so difficult and expensive, and the possibility is so remote, that it's not worth going after at the moment. Actually, it's worse then that, because an asteroid isn't smart enough to change its plans if necessary.
Imagine if the new F 22 fighter was placed into service before it was flight ready or a new satellite system was placed in orbit before all the software was ready on the ground. That's exactly what is happening with this missile defense system except the costs are much greater. This is the only major system in which the 'fly before buy' motto is not being used; it's also the only major system that will be put into operation even though it may never work.
Max... Your point would carry more weight were there not other, less theoretical threats out there. In an ideal world we could afford to put this much money into a system which could eventually be developed and used to protect us against the possibility of a rogue nation, unconcerned with retaliation developing the technology to attack us through an ICBM. However in the real world the cost of developing such an intangible comes at the expense of other, more tangible problems, some of which are threat related, some of which are simply domestic issues. Sure, I like the idea of a nuke umbrella, but considering that it is far from a proven commodity, and the threat it might, if it ever works, protect us from is less likely than other threats which are not getting similar budgets seems to make this an unwise decision, to say the least. Take care of what is before tackling what could be. This is like taking a lot of the funding from cancer research to address the bubonic plague, which some have theorized could resurface in the next century.
More wasted big ticket spending from Bush... Bush Seeks Big Jump in Missile Defense Spending By Jeremy Pelofsky WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Bush administration will ask Congress to boost spending on missile defense by $1.2 billion next year and nearly double funding to modernize the Army in the $401.7 billion U.S. military budget for 2005, according to Pentagon (news - web sites) documents released on Friday. The defense plan is part of a proposed $2.3 trillion federal budget President Bush will send to lawmakers on Monday. It includes a 7 percent increase in defense spending over the current level of $375 billion. The Pentagon said the defense budget documents -- scheduled to be formally released on Monday with the president's overall budget -- were inadvertently posted on the Internet on Friday morning. They were later removed. The administration seeks to boost funding for its controversial missile defense program by 13 percent to $10.2 billion next year from $9 billion requested for fiscal 2004. The new figure includes spending by the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency of $9.1 billion in 2005, up from $7.6 billion, as well as the Army's Patriot missile program. The Pentagon's plan to begin deploying the initial parts of a missile defense shield by September has drawn sharp criticism from some U.S. allies and Democrats who say it has not been adequately tested and could spark an arms race in space. The budget also calls for $3.2 billion for the Army's "Future Combat System," a high-tech plan to make soldiers more mobile and lethal in the post-Cold War world. That is up from $1.7 billion in the current year. The military plans to spend $74.9 billion to buy weapons and other equipment in the 2005 fiscal year, starting Oct. 1. For this year, the Pentagon asked Congress for $72.5 billion, but actual spending on weapons systems rose to $81.1 billion due to extra war-related spending approved by lawmakers. The requested $74.9 billion is also expected to increase sharply under a supplemental spending request expected from the administration after the November presidential election. The defense budget does not include up to $40 billion or more in supplemental spending for military operations in Iraq (news - web sites), which congressional sources and analysts say the White House could seek from Congress late this year or early next year. JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER The budget calls for almost $4.6 billion for Lockheed Martin Corp.'s Joint Strike Fighter, or F-35, up from $4.25 billion requested in 2004. The program to develop a stealthy, long-range fighter includes more than a dozen foreign partners including Britain, the Netherlands and Australia. The defense budget made waves on Wall Street, with analysts probing the documents for clues on the futures of key defense contractors like Lockheed, Boeing Co., Northrop Grumman Corp., Raytheon Co. and General Dynamics Corp. . "Boeing appears well served by this budget proposal," Wachovia Securities analyst Robert Spingarn said in a research note. The Chicago-based company is the lead contractor for both the ground-based missile defense program and the Future Combat System. The 2001 attacks on America sparked wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and increased spending on Special Operations forces in addition to the usual increases for high-tech weaponry. The 2005 budget also asks Congress for almost $69 billion in weapons research and development, up from the $64.7 billion it sought last year. The documents showed Bush will seek to buy 24 of Lockheed Martin Corp's F/A-22 Raptor fighter aircraft in fiscal 2005 for a total of $3.6 billion, up from the 22 jets the Pentagon requested a year ago. The Air Force would get three V-22 "Osprey" tilt-rotor aircraft in 2005 for a cost of $305.6 million, up from the two requested in the fiscal year at a cost of $213.7 million, according to the documents. The Osprey, which suffered two high-profile crashes in 2000 killing 23 Marines, is being built by Boeing and Textron Inc.'s Bell Helicopter for the Marine Corps, the Air Force and Special Operations forces. http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=578&e=1&u=/nm/20040130/ts_nm/arms_usa_budget_dc
