This might cause the neocons to attack Iran asap before it is too late. Of course once the Iraqi oil fields are controlled by the Shiites of Iran and Iraq China could be getting even more oil. ************* Iran's New Alliance With China Could Cost U.S. Leverage By Robin Wright Washington Post Staff Writer Wednesday, November 17, 2004; Page A21 TEHRAN -- A major new alliance is emerging between Iran and China that threatens to undermine U.S. ability to pressure Tehran on its nuclear program, support for extremist groups and refusal to back Arab-Israeli peace efforts. The relationship has grown out of China's soaring energy needs -- crude oil imports surged nearly 40 percent in the first eight months of this year, according to state media -- and Iran's growing appetite for consumer goods for a population that has doubled since the 1979 revolution, Iranian officials and analysts say. An oil exporter until 1993, China now produces only for domestic use. Its proven oil reserves could be depleted in 14 years, oil analysts say, so the country is aggressively trying to secure future suppliers. Iran is now China's second-largest source of imported oil. The economic ties between two of Asia's oldest civilizations, which were both stops on the ancient Silk Road trade route, have broad political implications. Holding a veto at the U.N. Security Council, China has become the key obstacle to putting international pressure on Iran. During a visit to Tehran this month, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing signaled that China did not want the Bush administration to press the council to debate Iran's nuclear program. U.S. officials have expressed fear that China's veto power could make Iran more stubborn in the face of U.S. pressure. The burgeoning relationship is reflected in two huge new oil and gas deals between the two countries that will deepen the relationship for at least the next 25 years, analysts here say. Last month, the two countries signed a preliminary accord worth $70 billion to $100 billion by which China will purchase Iranian oil and gas and help develop Iran's Yadavaran oil field, near the Iraqi border. Earlier this year, China agreed to buy $20 billion in liquefied natural gas from Iran over a quarter-century. Iran wants trade to grow even further. "Japan is our number one energy importer for historical reasons . . . but we would like to give preference to exports to China," Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh said this month, according to China Business Weekly. In turn, China has become a major exporter of manufactured goods to Iran, including computer systems, household appliances and cars. "We mutually complement each other. They have industry and we have energy resources," said Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's former representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency. China's trade with Iran is weakening the impact on Iranian policy of various U.S. economic embargoes, analysts here say. "Sanctions are not effective nowadays because we have many options in secondary markets, like China," said Hossein Shariatmadari, a leading conservative theorist and editor of the Kayhan newspapers. Accurate trade figures are difficult to get, in part because trade is increasing so rapidly and partly because China's large arms sales to Iran are not included or publicized. But at the second annual Iran-China trade fair here in May, Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng said trade had increased by 50 percent in 2003 over the previous year, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency. Beijing has also provided Iran with advanced military technology, including missile technology, U.S. officials say. In April, the Bush administration imposed sanctions on Chinese manufacturers of equipment that can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. The Iran-China ties may be partly a response to the United States, analysts here say. President Bush's strategy has been to contain both China and the Islamic republic, said Siamak Namazi, a political and economic analyst, "so that's created natural allies." The growing presence of U.S. and other Western troops in Central and South Asia and the Middle East is another joint concern. In the English-language Kayhan International, Ali Sabzevari wrote in an editorial: "Politically, the two countries share a common interest in checking the inroads being made by NATO in Asia. . . . The presence of outsiders does not bode well for peace and security." The countries also share concerns over radical Sunni Muslims. Most Iranians follow the rival Shiite strain of Islam; China has more than 20 million Muslims, and the government has been facing Muslim unrest in some of its western cities. The dissidents receive support from Islamic groups in Afghanistan and the countries of former Soviet Central Asia -- the region that straddles both Iran and China. Islam has historically been a link between the two civilizations. It made its way to China via Persia, the ancient state that was based in present-day Iran, Iranians note. Many Chinese Muslims pray in Persian, not Arabic. Their everyday language is Turkic, but their alphabet is Persian. But in recent times, ties between China and Iran have not always prospered. In the midst of the unrest that led to Iran's revolution, one of the last foreign leaders to visit Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi before he was overthrown in 1979 was Chinese Communist Party chief Hua Kuo-feng. "The visit left a very strong negative feeling about China among Iranians," said Abbas Maleki, director of the Caspian Institute, a Tehran research organization. But today, China with its one-party political system appears to feel fewer restraints than do Western nations in dealing with the world's only theocracy. "For China, issues like human rights don't affect your relations with Iran," Namazi said. link
wait...what??? i thought europe had this whole Iran nuke thing solved??? i'm just being a pain in the ass, glynch
Not surprising. The PRC is not happy with the unipolar world that we are now in and is seeking to assert its place in the World. Working with Iran provides energy but also is a step in asserting itself as a counterweight to the US in Geo-politics. The one area though I'm not too concerned about is whether the PRC will aid Iran towards going nuclear. They already have three nuclear powers on their borders with a potential fourth one in NK. No matter how good their relations are I don't expect the PRC to feel comfortable about a nuclear Muslim theocracy only a short distance from them.
The PRC has been arming Iran for two decades. Nothing newsworthy here. Anything the PRC won't give the Russians will, so....
<a HREF="http://www.nti.org/db/china/niranpos.htm">China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Iran</a> <a HREF="http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/iran.htm">Iran</a> <hr color=red> glynch <a HREF="http://www.nti.org/db/china/mmepos.htm">China's Missile Exports and Assistance to the Middle East</a>
I took a look at the nuclear article you posted and it states repeatedly that China cancelled many nuclear assistance programs to Iran in the 90's. The sense I get from it is that while they did aid them initially have balked at aiding their nuclear program fully. The article states difficulty making payment but considering Iran's oil reserves and the PRC's need for oil I don't think this would be the only consideration.
Just to follow up on my last posts its nothing new that the PRC has been selling missiles to Iran and other Middle Eastern countries but that's not the same as selling nukes.
The PRC has been arming Iran for two decades. Nothing newsworthy here. Anything the PRC won't give the Russians will, so.... Hayes, Iraq is not good enough for the neocon in you? Long for the days of us against the Ruskies and the Red Chinese? Oh for the days.
China is seeking oil partners to feed it's enormous economy that won't suffer should the US and China get into a "disagreement" about Taiwan. This is one example of why Kyoto is flawed. Under it, China would be exempt and China is now the second largest consumer of energy behind the US (overtaking Japan). The US economy would suffer under Kyoto compliance but China's wouldn't. As a cyclist I'm all for cutting emissions regardless of the Global Warming implications but countries like China (imo) shouldn't be exempt. So, what do you people suggest? Let China have Taiwan so that we can work with it regarding oil and how China deals with rougue nations? Or do we keep our stance with regard to Taiwan but deal with China's alliances with countries like the Sudan and Iran?
<hr> <i> The one area though I'm not too concerned about is whether the PRC will aid Iran towards going nuclear. <hr> but that's not the same as selling nukes.</i> <hr> What do you define as <b>aid</b> Iran towards going nuclear? If it is selling actual weapons, then it is extremely doubtful that China would do that. If it is to have various tech transfer programs and sales of material in the nuclear development area that has dual uasage, then China has done that. Other considerations in regards to China slowing nuclear projects with Iran in the late 90's 1) Competition from Russia for the <i>civilian</i> business 2) China starting to follow the NPT that it signed in 1992 3) The pledge in October 1997 to Pres Clinton that it wouldn't sign any new deals with Iran. 4) Competition from AQ Khan & Co in the area of clandestine sales and tech transfers (knowledge etc) for the items that have questionable <i>civilian usage</i>. A nice read here: <a HREF="http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=395&issue_id=2939&article_id=236639"> A.Q. KHAN'S CHINA CONNECTION</a>
Glynch, do you know what a neocon is? I am not one by definition since I did things like work on Al Haig's campaign when I was younger. A neocon was famously described by Kristol as 'a liberal that got mugged.' Its pathetic that you've got a little media catchword that you think is something bad and just spit out whenever you want to try and discredit someone. I know you've got a swell of love for the old soviets and red chinese, what with the communist party weekly going out of business and all.
Hayes, I'm sorry I do think that you are a neocon. I don't think you say that all neocons as now used were once strong liberals. Please explain how your foreign policiy differs from theirs? As far as liberal goes, ignoring your penchant for miltarism instead of diplomacy, I think you practically qualify as a liberal. This is based on the Ashcroft- Bush wing of the Republican Party. You don't seem to be racist, homophobic, against the environment due to fundie econonomics, opposed to public education, or a reasonable level of taxation or social spending or overly invloved with fundamentalist Christianity.
what with the communist party weekly going out of business and all. lol I missed that, I haven't been there lately.. Do you mean you can't buy the "Daily Worker" in NYC anymore? How about the communist nursing homes? Where am I going to stay in my old age? Has the Party been lying to me out here in the belly of the beast in Houston? I'm going to have to surface and contact my handler to find out if this is all true. PS I'm not sure Al, "I'm in charge" Hague would run from the neocon label. Where is old Al? Is he still around? Haven't seen him on the tube since (if my fading memory serves me right) he was pushing Gulf War I. Although part of me thinks in his old age Al might have became one of those retired rogue generals who the chicikenhawks might say has started to overly identify with the troops and has developed some concerns about wasting their lives unnecessarily for harebrained foreign policy schemes such as installing moderate Republicans types as Arab rulers.
Hate to break it to you but (a) you blew your cover a long time ago and (b) your handler is broke. You're up a shiite creek. I love it. Glynch you are truly a funny guy and I regret getting to harsh on you sometimes because I know you're well meaning . Giving props to Al Haig. That's awesome. Don't know what he's up to these days, but he was more of a Kissinger style 'realist' so you could be right about what he'd think about Iraq.
I'll post Kristol's article about defining neocnservatism below, but to answer your question: I'm not a Republican. I'm not for tax cuts. I'm am, in many areas as you point out, a liberal - especially domestically. I'm not against a world government. I am not against multilateralism, when possible. Each of these makes it impossible to define me as a neocon. If you are to be believed, then anyone in favor of the war in Iraq, like almost all of Congress - would be a neocon. The Neoconservative Persuasion From the August 25, 2003 issue: What it was, and what it is. by Irving Kristol 08/25/2003, Volume 008, Issue 47 WHAT EXACTLY IS NEOCONSERVATISM? Journalists, and now even presidential candidates, speak with an enviable confidence on who or what is "neoconservative," and seem to assume the meaning is fully revealed in the name. Those of us who are designated as "neocons" are amused, flattered, or dismissive, depending on the context. It is reasonable to wonder: Is there any "there" there? Even I, frequently referred to as the "godfather" of all those neocons, have had my moments of wonderment. A few years ago I said (and, alas, wrote) that neoconservatism had had its own distinctive qualities in its early years, but by now had been absorbed into the mainstream of American conservatism. I was wrong, and the reason I was wrong is that, ever since its origin among disillusioned liberal intellectuals in the 1970s, what we call neoconservatism has been one of those intellectual undercurrents that surface only intermittently. It is not a "movement," as the conspiratorial critics would have it. Neoconservatism is what the late historian of Jacksonian America, Marvin Meyers, called a "persuasion," one that manifests itself over time, but erratically, and one whose meaning we clearly glimpse only in retrospect. Viewed in this way, one can say that the historical task and political purpose of neoconservatism would seem to be this: to convert the Republican party, and American conservatism in general, against their respective wills, into a new kind of conservative politics suitable to governing a modern democracy. That this new conservative politics is distinctly American is beyond doubt. There is nothing like neoconservatism in Europe, and most European conservatives are highly skeptical of its legitimacy. The fact that conservatism in the United States is so much healthier than in Europe, so much more politically effective, surely has something to do with the existence of neoconservatism. But Europeans, who think it absurd to look to the United States for lessons in political innovation, resolutely refuse to consider this possibility. Neoconservatism is the first variant of American conservatism in the past century that is in the "American grain." It is hopeful, not lugubrious; forward-looking, not nostalgic; and its general tone is cheerful, not grim or dyspeptic. Its 20th-century heroes tend to be TR, FDR, and Ronald Reagan. Such Republican and conservative worthies as Calvin Coolidge, Herbert Hoover, Dwight Eisenhower, and Barry Goldwater are politely overlooked. Of course, those worthies are in no way overlooked by a large, probably the largest, segment of the Republican party, with the result that most Republican politicians know nothing and could not care less about neoconservatism. Nevertheless, they cannot be blind to the fact that neoconservative policies, reaching out beyond the traditional political and financial base, have helped make the very idea of political conservatism more acceptable to a majority of American voters. Nor has it passed official notice that it is the neoconservative public policies, not the traditional Republican ones, that result in popular Republican presidencies. One of these policies, most visible and controversial, is cutting tax rates in order to stimulate steady economic growth. This policy was not invented by neocons, and it was not the particularities of tax cuts that interested them, but rather the steady focus on economic growth. Neocons are familiar with intellectual history and aware that it is only in the last two centuries that democracy has become a respectable option among political thinkers. In earlier times, democracy meant an inherently turbulent political regime, with the "have-nots" and the "haves" engaged in a perpetual and utterly destructive class struggle. It was only the prospect of economic growth in which everyone prospered, if not equally or simultaneously, that gave modern democracies their legitimacy and durability. The cost of this emphasis on economic growth has been an attitude toward public finance that is far less risk averse than is the case among more traditional conservatives. Neocons would prefer not to have large budget deficits, but it is in the nature of democracy--because it seems to be in the nature of human nature--that political demagogy will frequently result in economic recklessness, so that one sometimes must shoulder budgetary deficits as the cost (temporary, one hopes) of pursuing economic growth. It is a basic assumption of neoconservatism that, as a consequence of the spread of affluence among all classes, a property-owning and tax-paying population will, in time, become less vulnerable to egalitarian illusions and demagogic appeals and more sensible about the fundamentals of economic reckoning. This leads to the issue of the role of the state. Neocons do not like the concentration of services in the welfare state and are happy to study alternative ways of delivering these services. But they are impatient with the Hayekian notion that we are on "the road to serfdom." Neocons do not feel that kind of alarm or anxiety about the growth of the state in the past century, seeing it as natural, indeed inevitable. Because they tend to be more interested in history than economics or sociology, they know that the 19th-century idea, so neatly propounded by Herbert Spencer in his "The Man Versus the State," was a historical eccentricity. People have always preferred strong government to weak government, although they certainly have no liking for anything that smacks of overly intrusive government. Neocons feel at home in today's America to a degree that more traditional conservatives do not. Though they find much to be critical about, they tend to seek intellectual guidance in the democratic wisdom of Tocqueville, rather than in the Tory nostalgia of, say, Russell Kirk. But it is only to a degree that neocons are comfortable in modern America. The steady decline in our democratic culture, sinking to new levels of vulgarity, does unite neocons with traditional conservatives--though not with those libertarian conservatives who are conservative in economics but unmindful of the culture. The upshot is a quite unexpected alliance between neocons, who include a fair proportion of secular intellectuals, and religious traditionalists. They are united on issues concerning the quality of education, the relations of church and state, the regulation of p*rnography, and the like, all of which they regard as proper candidates for the government's attention. And since the Republican party now has a substantial base among the religious, this gives neocons a certain influence and even power. Because religious conservatism is so feeble in Europe, the neoconservative potential there is correspondingly weak. AND THEN, of course, there is foreign policy, the area of American politics where neoconservatism has recently been the focus of media attention. This is surprising since there is no set of neoconservative beliefs concerning foreign policy, only a set of attitudes derived from historical experience. (The favorite neoconservative text on foreign affairs, thanks to professors Leo Strauss of Chicago and Donald Kagan of Yale, is Thucydides on the Peloponnesian War.) These attitudes can be summarized in the following "theses" (as a Marxist would say): First, patriotism is a natural and healthy sentiment and should be encouraged by both private and public institutions. Precisely because we are a nation of immigrants, this is a powerful American sentiment. Second, world government is a terrible idea since it can lead to world tyranny. International institutions that point to an ultimate world government should be regarded with the deepest suspicion. Third, statesmen should, above all, have the ability to distinguish friends from enemies. This is not as easy as it sounds, as the history of the Cold War revealed. The number of intelligent men who could not count the Soviet Union as an enemy, even though this was its own self-definition, was absolutely astonishing. Finally, for a great power, the "national interest" is not a geographical term, except for fairly prosaic matters like trade and environmental regulation. A smaller nation might appropriately feel that its national interest begins and ends at its borders, so that its foreign policy is almost always in a defensive mode. A larger nation has more extensive interests. And large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological interests in addition to more material concerns. Barring extraordinary events, the United States will always feel obliged to defend, if possible, a democratic nation under attack from nondemocratic forces, external or internal. That is why it was in our national interest to come to the defense of France and Britain in World War II. That is why we feel it necessary to defend Israel today, when its survival is threatened. No complicated geopolitical calculations of national interest are necessary. Behind all this is a fact: the incredible military superiority of the United States vis-à-vis the nations of the rest of the world, in any imaginable combination. This superiority was planned by no one, and even today there are many Americans who are in denial. To a large extent, it all happened as a result of our bad luck. During the 50 years after World War II, while Europe was at peace and the Soviet Union largely relied on surrogates to do its fighting, the United States was involved in a whole series of wars: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Kosovo conflict, the Afghan War, and the Iraq War. The result was that our military spending expanded more or less in line with our economic growth, while Europe's democracies cut back their military spending in favor of social welfare programs. The Soviet Union spent profusely but wastefully, so that its military collapsed along with its economy. Suddenly, after two decades during which "imperial decline" and "imperial overstretch" were the academic and journalistic watchwords, the United States emerged as uniquely powerful. The "magic" of compound interest over half a century had its effect on our military budget, as did the cumulative scientific and technological research of our armed forces. With power come responsibilities, whether sought or not, whether welcome or not. And it is a fact that if you have the kind of power we now have, either you will find opportunities to use it, or the world will discover them for you. The older, traditional elements in the Republican party have difficulty coming to terms with this new reality in foreign affairs, just as they cannot reconcile economic conservatism with social and cultural conservatism. But by one of those accidents historians ponder, our current president and his administration turn out to be quite at home in this new political environment, although it is clear they did not anticipate this role any more than their party as a whole did. As a result, neoconservatism began enjoying a second life, at a time when its obituaries were still being published.
Mango; When I say the PRC probably won't aid Iran towards going "nuclear" I mean towards having nuclear weapons not just nuclear power. Anyway in your post and the article you posted supports that position. That yes the PRC have helped Iran develop nuclear power but draws the line at helping them develop weapons.
China manufactures just about everything in our country -- there's not a chance in hell we make them mad. Expect Bush to strap on the kneepads and start bobbing. Not that there's anything wrong with that...
If you mean this article, then I reached a different conclusion after reading it than you did. <a HREF="http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=395&issue_id=2939&article_id=236639">A.Q. KHAN'S CHINA CONNECTION</a> There is a <i>gray area</i> in the dual usage items that you view as not aiding and many others view as aiding. <a HREF="http://www.nci.org/i/ib12997.htm">China's Non-Proliferation Words vs. China's Nuclear Proliferation Deeds*</a> <a HREF="http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/EM532.cfm">The Strategic Implications Of China's nuclear Aid To Pakistan</a> <a HREF="http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/irannuclear02072000.PDF">Iran and Nuclear Weapons</a> <a HREF="http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm#iran">Attachment A Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2003</a> <a HREF="http://69.36.186.201/article.php?art_ofn=nd04albright_037">Iran: Countdown to showdown</a> <a HREF="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3809067.stm">US accuses China of weapons trade</a>
Yep. And its not like Taiwan or some other southeast asian 'tiger' can't step in to mass produce plastic action figures whereas even the loss of MFN would tube China's economy.
