1. Welcome! Please take a few seconds to create your free account to post threads, make some friends, remove a few ads while surfing and much more. ClutchFans has been bringing fans together to talk Houston Sports since 1996. Join us!

FT: Intelligence backs claim Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger

Discussion in 'BBS Hangout: Debate & Discussion' started by basso, Jun 28, 2004.

  1. basso

    basso Member
    Supporting Member

    Joined:
    May 20, 2002
    Messages:
    33,394
    Likes Received:
    9,309
    This has got to be inconvenient for Joe Wilson...

    http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentS...y&c=StoryFT&cid=1087373295002&p=1012571727085

    --
    Intelligence backs claim Iraq tried to buy uranium
    By Mark Huband in Rome
    Published: June 27 2004

    Illicit sales of uranium from Niger were being negotiated with five states including Iraq at least three years before the US-led invasion, senior European intelligence officials have told the Financial Times.

    Intelligence officers learned between 1999 and 2001 that uranium smugglers planned to sell illicitly mined Nigerien uranium ore, or refined ore called yellow cake, to Iran, Libya, China, North Korea and Iraq.

    These claims support the assertion made in the British government dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programme in September 2002 that Iraq had sought to buy uranium from an African country, confirmed later as Niger. George W. Bush, US president, referred to the issue in his State of the Union address in January 2003.

    The claim that the illicit export of uranium was under discussion was widely dismissed when letters referring to the sales - apparently sent by a Nigerien official to a senior official in Saddam Hussein's regime - were proved by the International Atomic Energy Agency to be forgeries. This embarrassed the US and led the administration to reverse its earlier claim.

    But European intelligence officials have for the first time confirmed that information provided by human intelligence sources during an operation mounted in Europe and Africa produced sufficient evidence for them to believe that Niger was the centre of a clandestine international trade in uranium.

    Officials said the fake documents, which emerged in October 2002 and have been traced to an Italian with a record for extortion and deception, added little to the picture gathered from human intelligence and were only given weight by the Bush administration.

    According to a senior counter-proliferation official, meetings between Niger officials and would-be buyers from the five countries were held in several European countries, including Italy. Intelligence officers were convinced that the uranium would be smuggled from abandoned mines in Niger, thereby circumventing official export controls. "The sources were trustworthy. There were several sources, and they were reliable sources," an official involved in the European intelligence gathering operation said.

    The UK government used the details in its Iraq weapons dossier, which it used to justify war with Iraq after concluding that it corresponded with other information it possessed, including evidence gathered by GCHQ, the UK eavesdropping centre, of a visit to Niger by an Iraqi official.

    However, the European investigation suggested that it was the smugglers who were actively looking for markets, though it was unclear how far the deals had progressed and whether deliveries of uranium were made.
     
  2. basso

    basso Member
    Supporting Member

    Joined:
    May 20, 2002
    Messages:
    33,394
    Likes Received:
    9,309
    a more detailed article, also from FT. how long until the unseemly rush to debunk begins? perhaps Josh will argue the iraq was merely interested in importing goats?

    http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentS...y&c=StoryFT&cid=1087373295039&p=1012571727085

    --
    Evidence of Niger uranium trade 'years before war'
    By Mark Huband
    Published: June 27 2004


    When thieves stole a steel watch and two bottles of perfume from Niger's embassy on Via Antonio Baiamonti in Rome at the end of December 2000, they left behind many questions about their intentions.

    The identity of the thieves has not been established. But one theory is that they planned to steal headed notepaper and official stamps that would allow the forging of documents for the illicit sale of uranium from Niger's vast mines.

    The break-in is one of the murkier elements surrounding the claim - made by the US and UK governments in the lead-up to the Iraq war - that Iraq sought to buy uranium illicitly from Niger.

    The British government has said repeatedly it stands by intelligence it gathered and used in its controversial September 2002 dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes. It still claims that Iraq had sought uranium from Niger.

    But the US intelligence community, officials and politicians, are publicly sceptical, and the public differences between the two allies on the issue have obscured the evidence that lies behind the UK claim.

    Until now, the only evidence of Iraq's alleged attempts to buy uranium from Niger had turned out to be a forgery. In October 2002, documents were handed to the US embassy in Rome that appeared to be correspondence between Niger and Iraqi officials.

    When the US State Department later passed the documents to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN nuclear watchdog, they were found to be fake. US officials have subsequently distanced themselves from the entire notion that Iraq was seeking buy uranium from Niger.

    However, European intelligence officers have now revealed that three years before the fake documents became public, human and electronic intelligence sources from a number of countries picked up repeated discussion of an illicit trade in uranium from Niger. One of the customers discussed by the traders was Iraq.

    These intelligence officials now say the forged documents appear to have been part of a "scam", and the actual intelligence showing discussion of uranium supply has been ignored.

    The fake documents were handed to an Italian journalist working for the Italian magazine Panorama by a businessman in October 2002. According to a senior official with detailed knowledge of the case, this businessman had been dismissed from the Italian armed forces for dishonourable conduct 25 years earlier.

    The journalist - Elisabetta Burba - reported in a Panorama article that she suspected the documents were forgeries and handed them to officials at the US embassy in Rome.

    The businessman, referred to by a pseudonym in the Panorama article, had previously tried to sell the documents to several intelligence services, according to a western intelligence officer.

    It was later established that he had a record of extortion and deception and had been convicted by a Rome court in 1985 and later arrested at least twice. The suspected forger's real name is known to the FT, but cannot be used because of legal constraints. He did not return telephone calls yesterday, and is understood to be planning to reveal selected aspects of his story to a US television channel.

    The FT has now learnt that three European intelligence services were aware of possible illicit trade in uranium from Niger between 1999 and 2001. Human intelligence gathered in Italy and Africa more than three years before the Iraq war had shown Niger officials referring to possible illicit uranium deals with at least five countries, including Iraq.

    This intelligence provided clues about plans by Libya and Iran to develop their undeclared nuclear programmes. Niger officials were also discussing sales to North Korea and China of uranium ore or the "yellow cake" refined from it: the raw materials that can be progressively enriched to make nuclear bombs.

    The raw intelligence on the negotiations included indications that Libya was investing in Niger's uranium industry to prop it up at a time when demand had fallen, and that sales to Iraq were just a part of the clandestine export plan. These secret exports would allow countries with undeclared nuclear programmes to build up uranium stockpiles.

    One nuclear counter-proliferation expert told the FT: "If I am going to make a bomb, I am not going to use the uranium that I have declared. I am going to use what I acquire clandestinely, if I am going to keep the programme hidden."

    This may have been the method being used by Libya before it agreed last December to abandon its secret nuclear programme. According to the IAEA, there are 2,600 tonnes of refined uranium ore - "yellow cake" - in Libya. However, less than 1,500 tonnes of it is accounted for in Niger records, even though Niger was Libya's main supplier.

    Information gathered in 1999-2001 suggested that the uranium sold illicitly would be extracted from mines in Niger that had been abandoned as uneconomic by the two French-owned mining companies - Cominak and Somair, both of which are owned by the mining giant Cogema - operating in Niger.

    "Mines can be abandoned by Cogema when they become unproductive. This doesn't mean that people near the mines can't keep on extracting," a senior European counter-proliferation official said.

    He added that there was no evidence the companies were aware of the plans for illicit mining.

    When the intelligence gathered in 1999-2001 was thrown into the diplomatic maelstrom that preceded the US-led invasion of Iraq, it took on new significance. Several services contributed to the picture.

    The Italians, looking for corroboration but lacking the global reach of the CIA or the UK intelligence service MI6, passed information to the US in 2001 and to the UK in 2002.

    The UK eavesdropping centre GCHQ had intercepted communications suggesting Iraq was seeking clandestine uranium supplies, as had the French intelligence service.

    The Italian intelligence was not incorporated in detail into the assessments of the CIA, which seeks to use such information only when it is gathered from its own sources rather than as a result of liaison with foreign intelligence services. But five months after receiving it, the US sent former ambassador Joseph Wilson to Niger to assess the credibility of separate US intelligence information that suggested Iraq had approached Niger.

    Mr Wilson was critical of the Bush administration's use of secret intelligence, and has since charged that the White House sought to intimidate him by leaking the identity of his wife, Valerie Plame, as a CIA agent.

    But Mr Wilson also stated in his account of the visit that Mohamed Sayeed al-Sahaf, Iraq's former information minister, was identified to him by a Niger official as having sought to discuss trade with Niger.

    As Niger's other main export is goats, some intelligence officials have surmised uranium was what Mr Sahaf was referring to.
     
  3. mc mark

    mc mark Member

    Joined:
    Aug 31, 1999
    Messages:
    26,195
    Likes Received:
    471
    Well I don't know about goats but...

    By the time you read this post you'll likely already know that today's Financial Times makes stunning new claims about alleged sales of uranium from Niger to Iraq.

    In brief, the main article in the FT makes two points ...

    First, that there is much more information than the forged 'Niger-uranium' documents backing up the claim that Iraq (and other countries) sought to clandestinely purchase 'yellowcake' uranium from Niger.

    (I think point two is the real point of the FT story, not point one. But we'll get to that in another post.)

    The second assertion requires a touch more explanation.

    If you're up on the arcana of the 'Niger-uranium' story you'll remember that they first came to light when a source -- an unnamed Italian businessman and security consultant -- gave copies of them to an Italian journalist named Elisabetta Burba.

    (For more on the tick-tock of what Burba did with them and how they eventually got into US hands, see this piece by Sy Hersh from last year in The New Yorker.)

    There has been endless speculation about who this mystery man was and who actually did the forging. Was he the forger? And if so, what were his motives? If not, who put them into his hands? And what were their motives?

    According to the Financial Times article, that business man is likely himself the forger of the documents and he has a long history of bad acts which, they say, discredit him as a source of information. That last tidbit plays a key part in the FT story because, in their words, the provider of the documents is "understood to be planning to reveal selected aspects of his story to a US television channel."

    That's what the FT says.

    I hear something different.

    In fact, I know something different.

    My colleagues and I have reported on this matter extensively, spoken to key players involved in the drama, and put together a detailed picture of what happened. And that picture looks remarkably different from this account which is out today -- specifically on the matter of the origins of those forged documents and who was involved.

    I cannot begin to describe how much I would like to say more than that. And at some later point in some later post I will do my best to explain the hows and whys of why I can't. But, for the moment, I can't.

    Let me, however, offer a hypothetical that might help make sense of all this.

    Let's say that certain individuals or organizations are responsible for some rather unfortunate misdeeds. And let's further postulate that such hypothetical individuals or organizations find out that some folks are on to them, that a story is in the works -- perhaps more than one -- and that it's coming right at them. Those individuals or organizations -- as shorthand, let's call them 'the bad actors' -- might well start trying to fight back, trying to gin up an alternative storyline to exculpate themselves and inculpate others. If that story made its way into the news, at a minimum, it might help the bad actors muddy the waters for when the real story comes out. You can see how such a regrettable turn of events might come to pass.

    This is of course only a hypothetical. But I thought it might provide a clarifying context.

    So read the FT article. But also keep your ears open. It is, I'm quite confident, not the last word you'll hear on this story.

    -- Josh Marshall
     
  4. SamFisher

    SamFisher Member

    Joined:
    Apr 14, 2003
    Messages:
    61,862
    Likes Received:
    41,378
    Ouch MC, that is quite a response. It will be interesting to see how this develops.
     
  5. basso

    basso Member
    Supporting Member

    Joined:
    May 20, 2002
    Messages:
    33,394
    Likes Received:
    9,309
    hey, if Josh has got a big, airtight scoop, then bully for him, but he essentially ignores the more important point, that forged docs or no, niger sat at the epicenter of an international trade in uranium. did joe wilson just miss this, or was he just dazzeled by the iRaqi info minister's wit when he gave the "all clear?"
     
  6. Woofer

    Woofer Member

    Joined:
    Oct 10, 2000
    Messages:
    3,995
    Likes Received:
    1
    Why have we not invaded Niger? Those guys are proliferating faster than North Korea! Containment is for wussies.
     
  7. mc mark

    mc mark Member

    Joined:
    Aug 31, 1999
    Messages:
    26,195
    Likes Received:
    471
    Indeed! If it's about the war on terror and WMDs. Niger should have been target number one! Go to the source!
     
  8. KingCheetah

    KingCheetah Atomic Playboy
    Supporting Member

    Joined:
    Jun 3, 2002
    Messages:
    59,079
    Likes Received:
    52,748
    Intelligence backs claim Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger

    [​IMG]

    Do the intelligence services of the lesser primates count?
     
  9. basso

    basso Member
    Supporting Member

    Joined:
    May 20, 2002
    Messages:
    33,394
    Likes Received:
    9,309
    looks like the official UK inquiry will back the niger/iraq connection.

    http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentS...StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1087373567507

    --
    Inquiry will back intelligence that Iraq sought uranium
    By Mark Huband in London

    A UK government inquiry into the intelligence used to justify the war in Iraq is expected to conclude that Britain's spies were correct to say that Saddam Hussein's regime sought to buy uranium from Niger.

    The inquiry by Lord Butler, which was delivered to the printers_on Wednesday_and is expected to be released on July 14, has examined the intelligence that underpinned the UK government's claims about the threat from Iraq.

    The report will say the claim that Mr Hussein could deploy chemical weapons within 45 minutes, seized on by UK prime minister Tony Blair to bolster the case for war with Iraq, was inadequately supported by the available intelligence, people familiar with its contents say .

    But among Lord Butler's other areas of investigation was the issue of whether Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger. People with knowledge of the report said Lord Butler has concluded that this claim was reasonable and consistent with the intelligence.

    President George W. Bush referred to the Niger claim in his state of the union address last year. But officials were forced into a climbdown when it was revealed that the only primary intelligence material the US possessed were documents later shown to be forgeries.

    The Bush administration has since distanced itself from all suggestions that Iraq sought to buy uranium. The UK government has remained adamant that negotiations over sales did take place and that the fake documents were not part of the intelligence material it had gathered to underpin its claim.

    The Financial Times revealed last week that a key part of the UK's intelligence on the uranium came from a European intelligence service that undertook a three-year surveillance of an alleged clandestine uranium-smuggling operation of which Iraq was a part.

    Intelligence officials have now confirmed that the results of this operation formed an important part of the conclusions of British intelligence. The same information was passed to the US but US officials did not incorporate it in their assessment.

    The 45-minute claim appeared four times in a government dossier on Iraq's WMD issued in September 2002, including in the foreword by Mr Blair.

    It became the subject of intense scrutiny when government scientist David Kelly was alleged to have voiced concerns about the claim's accuracy to Andrew Gilligan, then a BBC reporter.

    Mr Gilligan's report of his conversation with Mr Kelly unleashed a fierce dispute between the government and the BBC that culminated in Mr Kelly's suicide, an inquiry into the circumstances of his death, and the resignation of the BBC's two most senior officials.

    Lord Butler is said to have produced a report that criticises the process of intelligence gathering and assessment on Iraq but refrains from criticising individual officials.
     
  10. FranchiseBlade

    Supporting Member

    Joined:
    Jan 14, 2002
    Messages:
    51,810
    Likes Received:
    20,467
    This article is interesting. It doesn't claim that Iraq DID try and buy nuke material from Niger, but only that the it was reasonable to suggest that based on intel at the time.

    Then Lord Butler goes on to criticize the whole process of intel gathering in reference to Iraq.
     
  11. basso

    basso Member
    Supporting Member

    Joined:
    May 20, 2002
    Messages:
    33,394
    Likes Received:
    9,309
    now the Senate intelligence committe's report backs the claim, and contradicts Joe Wilson. moreover, it says specifically that wilson found evidence of such efforts. hmm, that's not what he said in vanity fair! via the AP.

    http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGB62OSSGWD.html

    --
    Jul 9, 2004
    Senate Report Offers Backing for Claim Iraq Sought Uranium in Africa

    WASHINGTON (AP) - A Senate report criticizing false CIA claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction at the same time provides support for an assertion the White House repudiated: that Iraq sought to buy uranium in Africa.

    White House officials said last year it was a mistake for President Bush, in his 2003 State of the Union message, to refer to British reports that Saddam Hussein's government tried to buy uranium. The White House said the evidence for that claim was too shaky to have been included in such an important speech, and CIA Director George Tenet took the blame for failing to have the reference removed.

    A Friday report from the Senate Intelligence Committee offers new details supporting the claim.

    French and British intelligence separately told the United States about possible Iraqi attempts to buy uranium in the African nation of Niger, the report said. The report from France is significant not only because Paris opposed the Iraq war but also because Niger is a former French colony and French companies control uranium production there.

    Joseph Wilson, a retired U.S. diplomat the CIA sent to investigate the Niger story, also found evidence of Iraqi contacts with Nigerien officials, the report said.

    Wilson told the committee that former Nigerien Prime Minister Ibrahim Mayaki reported meeting with Iraqi officials in 1999. Mayaki said a businessman helped set up the meeting, saying the Iraqis were interested in "expanding commercial relations" with Niger - which Mayaki interpreted as an overture to buy uranium, Wilson said.

    Mayaki told Wilson he met with the Iraqis but steered the discussion away from commercial activity because he did not want to deal with a country under United Nations sanctions.

    All of that information came to Washington long before an Italian journalist gave U.S. officials copies of documents purporting to show an agreement from Niger to sell uranium to Baghdad. Those documents have been determined to be forgeries.

    Even before the forged documents surfaced, U.S. analysts cast doubt on the Niger story, the Senate report said. State Department analysts thought the uranium story was farfetched because such a deal would be detected easily and Iraq already had some 500 tons of lightly processed uranium "yellowcake."

    Some CIA analysts shared that view, the report said.

    The CIA also made only "halfhearted" attempts to investigate a West African businessman's claim that Nigerien uranium bound for Iraq was being stored in a warehouse in the nearby African nation of Benin, the report said. The CIA never contacted the businessman, even though the U.S. Navy gave the CIA his phone number, the report said.
     
  12. basso

    basso Member
    Supporting Member

    Joined:
    May 20, 2002
    Messages:
    33,394
    Likes Received:
    9,309
    ohhh, and his wife helped him get the gig, countrary to what he said publicly. Josh, what are the talking points on this?

    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39834-2004Jul9.html?referrer=emailarticle

    --
    Plame's Input Is Cited on Niger Mission
    Report Disputes Wilson's Claims on Trip, Wife's Role

    By Susan Schmidt
    Washington Post Staff Writer
    Saturday, July 10, 2004
    Former ambassador Joseph C. Wilson IV, dispatched by the CIA in February 2002 to investigate reports that Iraq sought to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program with uranium from Africa, was specifically recommended for the mission by his wife, a CIA employee, contrary to what he has said publicly.

    Wilson last year launched a public firestorm with his accusations that the administration had manipulated intelligence to build a case for war. He has said that his trip to Niger should have laid to rest any notion that Iraq sought uranium there and has said his findings were ignored by the White House.

    Wilson's assertions -- both about what he found in Niger and what the Bush administration did with the information -- were undermined yesterday in a bipartisan Senate intelligence committee report.

    The panel found that Wilson's report, rather than debunking intelligence about purported uranium sales to Iraq, as he has said, bolstered the case for most intelligence analysts. And contrary to Wilson's assertions and even the government's previous statements, the CIA did not tell the White House it had qualms about the reliability of the Africa intelligence that made its way into 16 fateful words in President Bush's January 2003 State of the Union address.

    Yesterday's report said that whether Iraq sought to buy lightly enriched "yellowcake" uranium from Niger is one of the few bits of prewar intelligence that remains an open question. Much of the rest of the intelligence suggesting a buildup of weapons of mass destruction was unfounded, the report said.

    The report turns a harsh spotlight on what Wilson has said about his role in gathering prewar intelligence, most pointedly by asserting that his wife, CIA employee Valerie Plame, recommended him.

    Plame's role could be significant in an ongoing investigation into whether a crime was committed when her name and employment were disclosed to reporters last summer.

    Administration officials told columnist Robert D. Novak then that Wilson, a partisan critic of Bush's foreign policy, was sent to Niger at the suggestion of Plame, who worked in the nonproliferation unit at CIA. The disclosure of Plame's identity, which was classified, led to an investigation into who leaked her name.

    The report may bolster the rationale that administration officials provided the information not to intentionally expose an undercover CIA employee, but to call into question Wilson's bona fides as an investigator into trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. To charge anyone with a crime, prosecutors need evidence that exposure of a covert officer was intentional.

    The report states that a CIA official told the Senate committee that Plame "offered up" Wilson's name for the Niger trip, then on Feb. 12, 2002, sent a memo to a deputy chief in the CIA's Directorate of Operations saying her husband "has good relations with both the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity." The next day, the operations official cabled an overseas officer seeking concurrence with the idea of sending Wilson, the report said.

    Wilson has asserted that his wife was not involved in the decision to send him to Niger.

    "Valerie had nothing to do with the matter," Wilson wrote in a memoir published this year. "She definitely had not proposed that I make the trip."

    Wilson stood by his assertion in an interview yesterday, saying Plame was not the person who made the decision to send him. Of her memo, he said: "I don't see it as a recommendation to send me."

    The report said Plame told committee staffers that she relayed the CIA's request to her husband, saying, "there's this crazy report" about a purported deal for Niger to sell uranium to Iraq. The committee found Wilson had made an earlier trip to Niger in 1999 for the CIA, also at his wife's suggestion.

    The report also said Wilson provided misleading information to The Washington Post last June. He said then that he concluded the Niger intelligence was based on documents that had clearly been forged because "the dates were wrong and the names were wrong."

    "Committee staff asked how the former ambassador could have come to the conclusion that the 'dates were wrong and the names were wrong' when he had never seen the CIA reports and had no knowledge of what names and dates were in the reports," the Senate panel said. Wilson told the panel he may have been confused and may have "misspoken" to reporters. The documents -- purported sales agreements between Niger and Iraq -- were not in U.S. hands until eight months after Wilson made his trip to Niger.

    Wilson's reports to the CIA added to the evidence that Iraq may have tried to buy uranium in Niger, although officials at the State Department remained highly skeptical, the report said.

    Wilson said that a former prime minister of Niger, Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, was unaware of any sales contract with Iraq, but said that in June 1999 a businessman approached him, insisting that he meet with an Iraqi delegation to discuss "expanding commercial relations" between Niger and Iraq -- which Mayaki interpreted to mean they wanted to discuss yellowcake sales. A report CIA officials drafted after debriefing Wilson said that "although the meeting took place, Mayaki let the matter drop due to UN sanctions on Iraq."

    According to the former Niger mining minister, Wilson told his CIA contacts, Iraq tried to buy 400 tons of uranium in 1998.

    Still, it was the CIA that bore the brunt of the criticism of the Niger intelligence. The panel found that the CIA has not fully investigated possible efforts by Iraq to buy uranium in Niger to this day, citing reports from a foreign service and the U.S. Navy about uranium from Niger destined for Iraq and stored in a warehouse in Benin.

    The agency did not examine forged documents that have been widely cited as a reason to dismiss the purported effort by Iraq until months after it obtained them. The panel said it still has "not published an assessment to clarify or correct its position on whether or not Iraq was trying to purchase uranium from Africa."
     
  13. FranchiseBlade

    Supporting Member

    Joined:
    Jan 14, 2002
    Messages:
    51,810
    Likes Received:
    20,467
    Those contacts have already been discussed by you and others on this very website. Wilson himself said talked about the contacts, and evidence that he found. He then found them to not be credible.

    Still trying to use that as evidence only hurts the case.
     
  14. rimrocker

    rimrocker Member

    Joined:
    Dec 22, 1999
    Messages:
    23,128
    Likes Received:
    10,171
    Response via Josh...
    _____________________

    I'll dispense with the literary prologue and get right to the point.

    Susan Schmidt is known, happily among DC Republicans and not so happily among DC Democrats, as what you might call the "Mikey" (a la Life Cereal fame) of the DC press corps, especially when the cereal is coming from Republican staffers.

    This morning she has an article on the Senate intel report and Joe Wilson, specifically focusing on the relevance of Wilson's reporting on Niger (the report says analysts did not see Wilson's findings as weakening claims that Iraq had sought to purchase uranium from Niger) and his wife's role in recommending him for the assignment.

    We'll discuss the broader issues of Plame's role in Wilson's assignment and the underlying question of the alleged Iraq-Niger negotiations. A clearer-eyed take on Wilson and report can be found here in this story by Knight Ridder. But for now a few points on Schmidt's treatment.

    In her fourth paragraph Schmidt writes that "contrary to Wilson's assertions and even the government's previous statements, the CIA did not tell the White House it had qualms about the reliability of the Africa intelligence that made its way into 16 fateful words in President Bush's January 2003 State of the Union address."

    This is one of those cases in which it's helpful to actually read the report rather than just run with what you've got from the majority committee staffer who gave you the spin.

    The claim with regards to the back-and-forth was always that the CIA struggled to get the uranium references out of the October 2002 Cincinnati speech and then failed to do so -- though why presicely is less clear -- when the same folks at the White House tried again to get it into the 2003 State of the Union address. And indeed on page 56 the report states that ...

    Based on the analyst's comments, the ADDI drafted a memo for the NSC outlining the facts that the CIA believed needed to be changed, and faxed it to the Deputy National Security Advisor and the speech writers. Referring to the sentence on uranium from Africa the CIA said, "remove the sentence because the amount is in dispute and it is debatable whether it can be acquired from the source. We told Congress that the Brits have exaggerated this issue. Finally, the Iraqis already have 550 metric tons of uranium oxide in their inventory."

    ... Later that day, the NSC staff prepared draft seven of the Cincinnati speech which contained the line, "and the regime has been caught attempting to purchase substantial amounts of uranium oxide from sources in Africa." Draft seven was sent to CIA for coordination.

    ... The ADDI told Committee staff he received the new draft on October 6, 2002 and noticed that the uranium information had "not been addressed," so he alerted the DCI. The DCI called the Deputy National Security Advisor directly to outline the CIA's concerns. On July 16, 2003, the DCI testified before the SSCI that he told the Deputy National Security Advisor that the "President should not be a fact witness on this issue," because his analysts had told him the "reporting was weak." The NSC then removed the uranium reference from the draft of the speech.

    Although the NSC had already removed the uranium reference from the speech, later on October 6th, 2002 the CIA sent a second fax to the White House which said, "more on why we recommend removing the sentence about procuring uranium oxide from Africa: Three points (1) The evidence is weak. One of the two mines cited by the source as the location of the uranium oxide is flooded. The other mine city by the source is under the control of the French authorities. (2) The procurement is not particularly significant to Iraq's nuclear ambitions because the Iraqis already have a large stock of uranium oxide in their inventory. And (3) we have shared points one and two with Congress, telling them that the Africa story is overblown and telling them this is one of the two issues where we differed with the British."


    I find it difficult to square that with Schmidt's claim that the report states that the CIA "did not tell the White House it had qualms about the reliability of the Africa intelligence."

    Then there's a point with regards to Plame's role in selecting Wilson for the mission. The report includes testimony from those involved saying that Plame did suggest Wilson for the mission -- a point we'll return to. Based on this Schmidt says ...

    Plame's role could be significant in an ongoing investigation into whether a crime was committed when her name and employment were disclosed to reporters last summer.
    ...

    The report may bolster the rationale that administration officials provided the information not to intentionally expose an undercover CIA employee, but to call into question Wilson's bona fides as an investigator into trafficking of weapons of mass destruction. To charge anyone with a crime, prosecutors need evidence that exposure of a covert officer was intentional.


    Again, a conversation with a lawyer may have been more helpful than one with a staffer.

    There's no 'challenging the bona fides of a political opponent' exception to the law in question. While Plame's alleged role may have some political traction, it's legally irrelevant. Government officials are not allowed to disclose the identity of covert intelligence agents, whether they feel like they have a good reason or not.

    Finally, down toward the end of Schmidt's article she writes that: "According to the former Niger mining minister, Wilson told his CIA contacts, Iraq tried to buy 400 tons of uranium in 1998."

    I read the report's discussion of the whole Niger business. And I didn't see that reference. However, on page 44 there is a reference to Wilson reporting to the CIA that "an Iranian delegation was interested in purchasing 400 tons of yellowcake from Niger in 1998 [but that] no contract was ever signed with Iran." (emphasis added).

    Perhaps I missed the reference that Schmidt is noting. But it seems awfully similar to the one the report notes about Iran -- same date, same tonnage. Presumably in this case, Schmidt innocently confused the two neighboring and similar-sounding countries, though it's a goof you'd think an editor would have caught.

    -- Josh Marshall

    ____________

    and more...
    ____________

    Several points about the SSCI report on the Niger matter that may not get a lot of attention but are nonetheless important for understanding the larger story ...

    You'll note that the footnote at the bottom of page 57 says that in March 2003 Sen. Rockefeller asked the FBI to investigate the source of the forged uranium documents and the motivation of those responsible for them. Because of that investigation, the Committee chose not to examine any questions about the documents themselves, who forged them, where they came from, etc. In fact, the Committee walled its investigation off so that it looked only at what happened with the documents after they appeared in the US Embassy in Rome in October 2002.

    Second, in many accounts of this story we hear that multiple intelligence agencies had reports of Iraq's attempts to procure uranium from Niger. But many of those reports or judgments were the fruit of the same poison tree.

    On page 69, for instance, the report states that on "March 4, 2003, the U.S. Government learned that the French had based their initial assessment that Iraq had attempted to procure uranium from Niger on the same documents that the U.S. had provided to the INVO" (i.e., the IAEA).

    Now, it's a premise of much reporting and in fact a subtext of the committee report that there were these various reports about Niger and that only much later did these documents surface.

    That's true with respect to the US, but also misleading.

    The French were basing their judgments on documents in question or perhaps a report based on them, as we've seen.

    The US, in turn, was basing most, though not all, of its suspicions on these reports it got from this unnamed foreign intelligence agency that provided an initial report to the US shortly after 9/11 and then another with more detail in February 2002, as the SSCI report states. That foreign government was Italy. And the information they provided also stemmed from the same documents.

    So France, Italy and the United States each had reports about the alleged Iraq-Niger sales. And each stemmed from the same source -- the forged documents, the origins of which the SSCI chose not to investigate.

    The documents weren't peripheral. They were central, though precisely how and why only emerged over time.

    Britain is a more complicated case that we'll address later.

    -- Josh Marshall
     
  15. FranchiseBlade

    Supporting Member

    Joined:
    Jan 14, 2002
    Messages:
    51,810
    Likes Received:
    20,467
    Josh - 1 Susan - 0
     
  16. basso

    basso Member
    Supporting Member

    Joined:
    May 20, 2002
    Messages:
    33,394
    Likes Received:
    9,309
    and the brits and the AP, neither of which relied on spin by susan? ...and i find it incredibley hard to believe that andWaPo[/i] reporter is in the pocket of the RNC.
     
  17. Sishir Chang

    Sishir Chang Member

    Joined:
    Nov 12, 2000
    Messages:
    11,064
    Likes Received:
    8
    Basso;

    I've been coming to this forum for about six months and you've done a good job pouring out a lot of smoke but almost no fire. While I'll agree that yes there is some interesting stuff out there but I can't think of anything you've posted that has yet to be absolutely proven true or is even very clear. You've posted tons of conjecture, speculation that depending on how the dots are connected could lead to something but not much stuff that would lead most people to an automtic acceptance. These are interesting debate fodder but I'm not sure how well you could win a highschool debate with it let alone justify a war.

    Take this as you well but I find your efforts to justify every single argument the Admin laid out to justify the invasion of Iraq, even when many in the Admin itself has now recanted several of those arguments, is begining to remind me of the efforts of the Flat Earth Society.
     
  18. basso

    basso Member
    Supporting Member

    Joined:
    May 20, 2002
    Messages:
    33,394
    Likes Received:
    9,309
    well, this is one case where the "Bush Lied" arguement has turned out to be, well, a lie! you can say the CIA got it wrong, and clearly they've got some 'splainin' to do, but if Bush lied, then so did congress, the clinton admin, tony blair, jacques chirac, and most of the world's intelligence agencies.
     
  19. GladiatoRowdy

    GladiatoRowdy Member

    Joined:
    Oct 15, 2002
    Messages:
    16,596
    Likes Received:
    496
    I can't recall crowing about Bush lying (on this issue), but as I have been claiming, this still shows that Bush used exaggerated, misleading, and faulty intel to make his case for war. Only some of that blame goes to Tenet.
     
  20. basso

    basso Member
    Supporting Member

    Joined:
    May 20, 2002
    Messages:
    33,394
    Likes Received:
    9,309
    you, and many, some, etc, others here have been accusing bush of lying for the past three years, as has kerry, dean, clark, et al., not to mention mm. has a single instance been proven? it's all innuendo and partisan kant disguised as principled debate. this entire forum is nothing but a venue for posters like yourself to accuse bush of mendacity.
     

Share This Page