Clark gets me giddy...

I'm so excited... the day is almost upon us!!! Banana cheer everybody! I said burrrr! it's cold out there! There must be a Clark in the at-mos-phere! O-E-O-E-O.

MR. RUSSERT: General Wesley Clark, his views on Iraq, after this brief station break.
(Announcements)
MR. RUSSERT: And we are back. Joining us now, the former Supreme Allied commander in Europe, currently a military analyst for CNN and we thank them for sharing you with us this morning.
General Wesley Clark, welcome.
GEN. WESLEY CLARK (Retired, Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander): Thank you.
MR. RUSSERT: Here’s the front page of the Daily News I showed Doctor—”An embarrassing setback for U.S. diplomacy before the United Nations.” How serious of a setback was it?
GEN. CLARK: I don’t think it’s that serious. I think this is part of the changes and the give and the take of diplomacy as you’re moving toward a resolution. I think it’s embarrassing for the United States but it’s not a serious setback.
MR. RUSSERT: There is an article in The Washington Post today, General. It says that part of the reason that France and Russia and Germany and others are giving the United States such a hard time about Iraq is they disagree on the views but also it’s a payback for the heavy-handed and bullying tactics of the last two years of the Bush foreign policy. Do you agree with that?
GEN. CLARK: I do agree with that. I think that’s exactly what they’ve seen and felt in Europe from this administration. It’s an administration which really hasn’t respected our allies. And, frankly, there are a lot of differences and perspectives with our allies in Europe.
One thing I learned in the Kosovo campaign is that if you’re going to have allies, the unfortunate thing is they have their own opinions. And if you really want allies, you got to listen to their opinions, you’ve got to take them seriously, you’ve got to work with their issues. Every one of our allied leaders is an elected leader, at least in Europe. And that means they have domestic politics and political factors at home and economic factors at home that influence their opinions. And those have to be respected just like we would expect them to respect us for our political system in the United States.
If we deal with our allies on a basis of respect, if we give them the opportunity and the evidence and the arguments and the analysis that’s needed to help shape their public opinions, then we can expect them to go along with us.
MR. RUSSERT: You have written extensively about Iraq: an article in Time, Let’s Wait to Attack; an interview with The Washington Post, A General’s Doubts. I want to go through some of your points. This is how The Post characterized it: “Clark fears that the new dangers generated by a war in Iraq might outweigh any gains from disarming Saddam Hussein. Clark cites three tests that the administration must meet before going to war. ...Are you sure you won’t destroy the international institutions you say you are supporting, and thereby undermine the war against terror?”
Are we destroying the institutions we are supporting?
GEN. CLARK: Well, we’re shaking really strongly right now. We’ve put both NATO and the U.N. on the block here and demanded they support us. So as we’re moving ahead here, we’ve got to be careful and not just use brute force against these institutions. We’ve got to provide the arguments, the analysis, the evidence, the time, the sense of responsibility. We’ve got to allow opinion to come along to our side on this.
MR. RUSSERT: Test two, according to the general, and we will show it here. “Can you win the war quickly and smoothly, avoiding the collateral damage that would make you lose while winning?”
Your answer?
GEN. CLARK: Well, I’ve got tremendous confidence in the men and women in the U.S. armed forces.
We are the best in the world. We are incomparably better than Saddam’s forces. But war is inherently uncertain. One of the things that’s uncertain about this war is the involvement of the Shiah and the Kurdish opposition. We know they’re going to be involved. We know the administration has sent Special Forces troops over there, and I was in Davos, Switzerland, a couple, three weeks ago and one of the Iraqi opposition leaders stood up and he said, “Ha!” He said, “You Americans will have no
problem getting to Baghdad.” He said, “We’ll have taken care of all of Saddam’s forces. By then, you’ll simply have to drive up the road.” Well, I hope it’s true, but it also envisions a heck of a fight, and we saw a preview of that fight in 1991 in Basra. The Shiahs revolted, Saddam ruthlessly crushed them, the United States stood by. If this comes out of sync and we have civil war before we’re quite ready to go and don’t have the diplomacy lined up, we’ll face some hard choices.
And then there’s the problem of the weapons of mass destruction themselves. Where are they? Do we know where they all are, and are they mobile? And what about these labs? What we don’t want to do is go into Iraq, knock the heck out of the forces, get rid of the administration and then find the scientists, the bags of anthrax, the vials of botulinum, have disappeared because al-Qaeda is there. Somebody wants those. Those are like 21st- century gold right now. They may be under the control of Saddam’s special Republican Guards today, but when we destroy those forces we’ve got to make sure we have got the
weapons of mass destruction under control, and that’s going to be a real task.
MR. RUSSERT: If Saddam, in fact, embarks on a scorched-earth strategy where he blows up his own dams, his own electrical grids, sets his oil fields on fire, in fact, flooding and starving his own people, how do we cope with that?
GEN. CLARK: Well, I think the first thing is the military planners have to recognize that this is a potential defensive strategy on the part of Saddam. So we’ve got to have in place the measures to prevent as much of that as possible. That means we’re not going to wait for him to do that. We’re going to take the initiative. We’re going to try to grab those assets, defeat his ability to sabotage and so forth. But after that, we’ve got to be prepared to deal with the humanitarian consequences, the logistics, the infrastructure, I mean, the disease.
The thing that worries me the most about this is if he has bioweapons—and I certainly believe he does, and I certainly believe he has the means to deliver them—and the most easily deliverable and the most dangerous actually is anthrax because it can be spread in advance and it remains active for days, weeks, as spores on the ground. If he does spread this anthrax in the southern Shiia regions before the United States attacks, and we have a million or two million or three million Iraqi civilian casualties in there as we’re moving through it, that’s a nightmare that no U.N. agency, and certainly not the United States, not even the agencies we’ve created under former retired and retired military officers—we’re not going to be able to deal with that easily. So there are real risks here.
MR. RUSSERT: Do you think Saddam will use chemical weapons against U.S. military?
GEN. CLARK: I think he’ll certainly try. I’d be surprised if he’s very successful.
MR. RUSSERT: Should we respond with nuclear, if he does?
GEN. CLARK: No. There’s no reason to do that. We’re going to roll him up so fast.
MR. RUSSERT: As you look at this situation now, should the inspectors be allowed more time? Should we hold back going to war with Saddam Hussein?
GEN. CLARK: Well, I think we should right now, simply because we want to get our allies on board.
I don’t have any confidence that the inspectors are going to find anything. This stuff is extremely well- hidden. Some of it’s probably in Syria, as well. And it’s unlikely the inspectors will ever find the so-called smoking gun on this. But if it makes our allies more able to go to their publics and justify their support of our operation, then I think that’s important. And remember, it’s not just France and Germany. There’s a lot of public opinion all through Europe, even in those states that have already signed up for
the United States, where the publics just aren’t convinced about the need to do this. We shouldn’t allow an artificial deadline of the weather to affect the more significant, more important decisions about when to start the operation.
MR. RUSSERT: Can you keep 200,000 American troops poised at the ready for months in that part of the world?
GEN. CLARK: Well, maybe not for months, but for another month. I mean, they’re not even there yet in most cases. So I think, you know, we need to—and I can understand why Condoleezza Rice is pushing the urgency of the diplomacy because you can’t not push it. But on the other hand, we’ve got to recognize, objectively speaking, another month is probably what we need.
MR. RUSSERT: In your book, “Waging Modern War,” from 2001, you wrote this, “Nations use diplomacy as a means to advance their interests. But when the interests are significant enough, when dialogue, negotiation, and compromise can’t gain traction, and when nations believe their military advantage is sufficient, they will again employ ‘threat’ to provide additional leverage. Once the threat surfaces, however, nations or alliances are committed. Following through to preserve credibility becomes a matter of vital interest.”
Has the president drawn the sword where he can no longer back down?
GEN. CLARK: I think that’s right. I can’t quite imagine that he could create a scenario in which it would be OK to just implement an enhanced so-called containment regime with inspectors on the ground; not with all the troops there, not with the determination. Because what you’re really going against here is not the presence of the weapons; it’s the intent of Saddam Hussein and his regime to continue to develop these weapons. So you’re in exactly the situation we were in in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s with UNPROFOR. You would put forces on the ground, they’d be blue-hatted, they’d be doing inspections, but they’d be working against the strategic intent of the power on the ground. Conflict would be inevitable. So I think we can all debate alternative strategies and theories and, yes, maybe containment was possible a year or so ago. Now it’s too late. Saddam Hussein has to understand his day is over.
MR. RUSSERT: War is inevitable.
GEN. CLARK: I think war is inevitable.
MR. RUSSERT: What should the administration have done differently? What other strategy could they have embarked on a year ago where we’d have a different result today?
GEN. CLARK: Well, I think you have to go back really—let’s start with 9/11; 3,000 dead in this country underscore the deadly threat of al-Qaeda. Somehow, we got that tied in with Iraq. From the beginning, people were saying Iraq must have been behind it. Well, they weren’t behind it. Why not? Have focused exclusively on al-Qaeda, said, “Here’s our target, set Iraq aside, strengthen containment. OK. We don’t want them dealing with terrorists. They’re a potential proliferant.” But then so is Iran. They actually have a more active terrorist network. They also have weapons of mass destruction, and then here’s North Korea that even has nuclear weapons, and they do sell.
So you have three potential major proliferants, and then you have al-Qaeda. Why not focus on al-Qaeda and then work that very intensively, work it diplomatically? Go into the United Nations and start with indicting Osama bin Laden as a war criminal. That way, you can use international legitimacy and pressure against some of these so-called coalition partners like Syria and others that are sort of sitting on the fence and playing both sides. And then go to NATO. Take NATO and multifunctionalize it. Say to NATO, “Look, you used to be a military alliance. That was appropriate for the Soviet threat. But now, you know, terrorism’s much more complex. We’ve got to harmonize our laws, got to have a standard definition of what is terrorism, got to know what are the elements of proving terrorism is a crime, got to standardize our rules of evidence. If we give you a wiretap and we say, ‘This guy is guilty of conspiring to blow up the Eiffel Tower,’ we don’t want you to say that’s not admissible in your court.”
And so we could have used NATO that way. We could have brought our allies into it in a much more constructive, powerful way, so that when it comes time for a French election or a German election, the issue isn’t about America. It’s about how that country is doing in its war on terror. This is what we did during the Kosovo campaign by using NATO. As Prime Minister Blair told me during our one-on-one meeting on the 20th of April, ’99, he said, “The future of every government in Western Europe depends on the successful outcome of the campaign that NATO is waging against Slobodan Milosevic.”
But, you know, that’s not what’s happened in Europe today. Somehow, we’ve become divided from Europe. So I would have focused on al-Qaeda. I would have used the United Nations and NATO against al-Qaeda. Then I would have drawn NATO into it. Then when it comes time to work against Iraq, or Iran, or North Korea, you’ve got a strong, committed group of allies. As long as the United States stands with Europe, we can move the world. When we become at odds across the Atlantic, everything becomes more difficult.
MR. RUSSERT: Is this a necessary war?
GEN. CLARK: Probably not. I would say this is an elective operation at this time. This is like elective surgery. And the risks that we’re facing right now is we’ve got North Korea out there. We know they are moving to produce weapons of mass destruction. Brent Scowcroft has an op-ed I saw in the newspaper today. It’s a very important opinion. And he’s certainly in a position to know. But we almost went to war in 1994 against North Korea because we thought they were going to have nuclear weapons. This has been a red line for United States administrations. Now, maybe in this case, this administration has decided, “Well, it’s not that significant. Let them have six nukes or 12 nukes or 14 nukes. I don’t know.” But we don’t seem to have gotten a grip on this.
And so that’s really the most urgent problem in my view. It doesn’t mean that you can’t deal with Iraq also. But we haven’t come full to grips with North Korea yet in my view, and now, we’ve got homeland security. And now, we’re starting to see really the threat of al-Qaeda, and a lot of people are asking, “Could we have done more against al-Qaeda?” And, you know, I find it hard to believe that we haven’t put the full funding and resources of the United States government into Homeland Security. Early after 9/11, the administration made a decision to pursue offense, rather than defense, I support that decision, in principle. But it’s the balance that’s important. And when you’re contemplating a $100 billion resource expenditure against Iraq, but you can’t put another $5 billion into Homeland Security to protect the American people, you have to ask: Which strategy best protects America?
MR. RUSSERT: Let me show you General Wesley Clark’s schedule. January 7th, lunch with DNC Chairman Terry McAuliffe; October 9th, 2002, New Hampshire; May 19th, 2002, Iowa; October 18th, 2001, New Hampshire. What’s a general like you keeping a schedule like that?
GEN. CLARK: Well, there’s a lot of other stuff that you’re not showing on the schedule. I’ve been traveling all over this country...
MR. RUSSERT: Will...
GEN. CLARK: ...really since I got out of the service, Tim.
MR. RUSSERT: ...will you run for president of the United States?
GEN. CLARK: Well, I haven’t made any decision on that. A lot of people are talking to me on it. I’ve said I’m not a candidate. I haven’t taken any political money. I don’t have any paid political consultants. I’m not even a member of a party, at this stage. But I am a concerned citizen because I’ve seen the policy go progressively away from the focus on what I consider the principal threat to this country...
MR. RUSSERT: Are you thinking about it?
GEN. CLARK: ...and into this...
MR. RUSSERT: You’re thinking about it?
GEN. CLARK: Well, yeah, sure, I’ve thought about it. A lot of people have come to me and asked me to think very seriously about it.
MR. RUSSERT: Would you run as a Democrat?
GEN. CLARK: Well, I haven’t declared a party, but, you know, it would be hard to conceive of running as a Republican, only because the administration’s policy is what’s causing me to have these concerns.
MR. RUSSERT: Would you accept vice presidential nominations?
GEN. CLARK: No, I’m not going to get in—I haven’t even thought about things like this.
MR. RUSSERT: Jerry McAtee, the AFL-CIO, said you may announce within a few weeks?
GEN. CLARK: Well, I don’t know where he came—I don’t have a time line.
MR. RUSSERT: But it’s fair to say you’re thinking about it?
GEN. CLARK: Well, I have thought about it. And a lot of people have asked me to think about it. But, you know, for me, it’s about ideas. It’s not about candidacies. I mean, we’re at a turning point in American history here. We’re about to embark on an operation that’s going to put us in a colonial position in the Middle East following Britain, following the ottomans. It’s a huge change for the American people and for what this country stands for. And this is the 21st century we’re in. We need to have this dialogue, and we’ve been really late getting to it. And that’s really what—having that dialogue is what I’ve been about for the last year, going around the country, talking to people, finding out what they believe about our country’s future, sharing some of my experiences with them.
MR. RUSSERT: Well, we will stay tuned. We hope if you are going to announce, you’ll come back and talk to us about it.
GEN. CLARK: No commitments.
MR. RUSSERT: General Clark, thanks very much.
And we’ll be right back.
(Announcements)
MR. RUSSERT: We ran over today. We’ll not have our MEET THE PRESS Minute, but we will have it for you next week. That’s all for today. If it’s Sunday, it’s MEET THE PRESS.

Hopefully he'll announce soon.... his demeanor is fresh.

 

I thought you had already signed onto John 'sexy boy' Edwards' campaign BBob.

It is exciting how straightforward this guy is. Hopefully he's as straightforward on domestic issues (and this interview isn't just indicative of his mastery of his own domain). I suppose that it could be the case, that even if he doesn't have the most popular ideas, that delivery ala McCain could be popular.

I guess we'll see soon. I don't know why he'd put himself on the backburner (as Russert suggests w/ the VP talk). The democrats, so far, seem like a bunch of powder puffs (then again our president is George W. Bush)... the race is open for the taking.