This thing pulls no punches; the summary: SUMMARY In the wake of the September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. Government declared a global war on terrorism (GWOT). The nature and parameters of that war, however, remain frustratingly unclear. The administration has postulated a multiplicity of enemies, including rogue states; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators; terrorist organizations of global, regional, and national scope; and terrorism itself. It also seems to have confl ated them into a monolithic threat, and in so doing has subordinated strategic clarity to the moral clarity it strives for in foreign policy and may have set the United States on a course of open-ended and gratuitous confl ict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat to the United States. Of particular concern has been the confl ation of al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a single, undifferentiated terrorist threat. This was a strategic error of the fi rst order because it ignored critical differences between the two in character, threat level, and susceptibility to U.S. deterrence and military action. The result has been an unnecessary preventive war of choice against a deterred Iraq that has created a new front in the Middle East for Islamic terrorism and diverted attention and resources away from securing the American homeland against further assault by an undeterrable al-Qaeda. The war against Iraq was not integral to the GWOT, but rather a detour from it. Additionally, most of the GWOT’s declared objectives, which include the destruction of al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations, the transformation of Iraq into a prosperous, stable democracy, the democratization of the rest of the autocratic Middle East, the eradication of terrorism as a means of irregular warfare, and the (forcible, if necessary) termination of WMD proliferation to real and potential enemies worldwide, are unrealistic and condemn the United States to a hopeless quest for absolute security. As such, the GWOT’s goals are also politically, fi scally, and militarily unsustainable. Accordingly, the GWOT must be recalibrated to conform to concrete U.S. security interests and the limits of American power. The specifi c measures required include deconflation of the threat; substitution of credible deterrence for preventive war as the primary vehicle for dealing with rogue states seeking WMD; refocus of the GWOT fi rst and foremost on al-Qaeda, its allies, and homeland security; preparation to settle in Iraq for stability over democracy (if the choice is forced upon us) and for international rather than U.S. responsibility for Iraq’s future; and fi nally, a reassessment of U.S. military force levels, especially ground force levels. The GWOT as it has so far been defined and conducted is strategically unfocused, promises much more than it can deliver, and threatens to dissipate scarce U.S. military and other means over too many ends. It violates the fundamental strategic principles of discrimination and concentration.
To be clear, this report is written by a professor and does not speak for the whole Army college. Although it is certainly arguable that the current war on terror should have a more narrow focus, it's not clear right now that that is correct.
I'm not saying that the report is gospel, however, I think its telling that the professionals are saying the same thing that "unpatriotic" sorts like Howard Dean, Wesley Clark, SamFisher, rimrocker, No Worries, and the rest have said for the past year and a half or so...even before the fact.
Okay, two. Like I said, it's an arguable position. However, what exactly does it mean to make our strategy more narrow (other than not invading Iraq). Would we invade other countries? Would we use more diplomatic pressure? How would this "narrow" policy differ from the status quo of the '80's and '90's which appeared to make the problem worse? We were trying to deter regimes like the Taliban, and it didn't work. I do agree with this however: "The potential policy payoff of a democratic and prosperous Middle East, if there is one, almost certainly lies in the very distant future," he writes. "The basis on which this democratic domino theory rests has never been explicated."
As far as Narrowing, see page 41-45, summed up briefly as : (1) Deconflate the threat. (2) Substitute credible deterrence for preventive war as the primary policy for dealing with rogue states seeking to acquire WMD. (3) Refocus the GWOT first and foremost on al-Qaeda, its allies, and homeland security. (4) Seek rogue-state regime change via measures short of war. (5) Be prepared to settle for stability rather than democracy in Iraq, and international rather than U.S. responsibility for Iraq. 6) Reassess U.S. force levels, especially ground force levels. Regarding the second query I think he (or at least I) would argue that deterrence for dealing with rogue states did work. In the Iraq case, it appears that Iraq had in fact been effectively contained... they appear to have had no WMD program. Afghnistan and the Taliban wasn't so much a functioning state (a la Iraq) as a realm of anarchy with various gangsters in charge. Guys like Osama and Mullah Omar are not traditional state actors, and hence can't be dterred in the traditional fashion, which is why the course of action we took there was justified and effective, as well as popular at home and abroad, in my opinion. Similarly, I believe he/I would argue that a program of invading/rebuilding (preempting) all rogue states is just militarily, economically, and politically impossible... so we're left with deterrence as a remedy.
I already posted this here: http://bbs.clutchcity.net/php3/showthread.php?s=&threadid=70498 because of his recommendation that we leave quickly with a *friendly* dictator in power. I agreed with most of the other things he said. At this point it seems like the best option is to go the full multiple generation commitment we gave to rebuilding Germany and Japan, as the adminstration first promised, instead of cutting and running, even if the whole invasion was a trumped up neocon wet dream.
Fair enough. However if you see totalitarianism in the Middle East as the source of the problem, then simply deterring these regimes and letting them continue in existence is a worse alternative to toppling them. And how is deterrence short of war different from what we were already doing the past 2 decades? We tried using the CIA, sanctions, etc. and things did not get any better. Options (2) and (4) above would have been unpersuasive alternatives if my job was to protect the American people. As far as a program of invading and rebuilding rogue states being impossible- yeah for most countries like North Korea it is, but in the case of Iraq it was very possible.
While, as usual, this will be dismissed, marginalized,or qualified by those unwilling to accept what are increasingly becoming evident facts regarding this war, an important distinction should be noted here. This report was not critical of the war based on pre-established ideological differences, nor was it coming from a source noted for public criticism of current military actions, quite the reverse, in fact. Like the plethora of diplomats, intel officers, and the like who resigned pre-war citing unprecedented administrative interference and selective use of intel to confirm already made judgements, this is notable for beign unique. The reasons why yet another unique occurence ( such as the President's father criticizing the WH pre-war diplomatic actions, etc.) can be, as likely many will choose, merely overlooked or chalked up to a weird weather pattern...or maybe people might begin to notice that virtually no one outside the administration feels that this war was necessary, handled properly, or intrinsic to the war on terror. This report is from the academic arm of the military itself. This kind of criticism, not to mention the degree to which it extends, is grounded on military/practical assesments, much along the lines of several pre-war debates I had with treeman, as I recall. It is not centred on a desire to bash Bush, nor is it politically motivated...and it's complaints are not idealistic. It merely points out apects of what is and should be obvious to anyone looking at the situation with open eyes: 1) Unless Iraq represented an immediate threat to the US, or evidence was in hand linking Iraq to 9-11, to try and address the issues with Hussein by military means when the priority should and was on the war on terror was a deviation from the responsible and necessary course. That the rest of the globe said likewise, thus limiting practical support reaffirms this point. 2) The reasons given pre-war to state that Iraq was a threat have all proven false. 3) The evidence said to be in hand linking 9-11 to Iraq has proven false. 4) Since the war in Iraq, the war on terror has been backtracked, lost focus, funding and personel, and has stalled. Note the complete lack of idealistic, political, or partisan basis for the conclusions reached by those who would normally be remiss to voice criticism of current military actions. Note that they have chosen to break precedent. Note their expertise. Then, as is inevitible if you support the war, ignore, marginalize or dismiss it.
What were you protecting the American people from, exactly, with regards to Iraq? 1) Our intelligence was telling us Iraq represented no threat to the US, directly or indirectly. 2) The sanctions and UN inspections did, in fact, make things better from a threat perspective, as he could not develop WMDs...which, again, our intel said were no threat to us even if he did develop them. Those we agreed ( and signed a treaty to same) who were to determine this said so pre-war. It's easier and sexier on television to strike at a hard target than continue flailing away at the smoke screen that is international terrorism, but to do so doesn't mean that you're making the smoke go away.
