[AP]Congressman: 9/11 Hijackers Were Monitored

this needs to get bumped...and at the risk of sounding like batman, "if this is true..." clinton got off way too easy with impeachment...

http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_cr/h052102.html

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kleiman Congressional Record: May 21, 2002 (House)
Page H2820-H2834

Curt Weldon speaking:

...Mr. Speaker, here is the chart, the unclassified chart of what special forces command had 1 year before 9-11. Interesting. The entire al Qaeda network is identified in a graphic chart with all the linkages to all the terrorist groups around the world.

In fact, Mr. Speaker, I was told by the folks who developed the capability for special forces command that this chart and the briefing that was supposed to be given to General Shelton, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, had a recommendation to take out 5 cells of bin Laden's network. Mr. Speaker, this was 1 year before 9-11. This was not during President Bush's administration. This occurred in the fall of the remaining term of President Bill Clinton.

The key question I have been trying to get at is why was this 3-hour briefing, which I also got, I got General Holland to bring his briefers up from Florida with special forces, I went in the Pentagon, went in the tank, and they gave me the briefing, as much as they could give me, because part of it is being used for our operational plan, why was that 3-hour briefing with the recommendations to take out 5 cells of bin Laden's network condensed down to a 1-hour brief when it was given to General Hugh Shelton in January of 2001? And why were the recommendations to take out 5 cells not followed up on? That is the question we should get answered, Mr. Speaker.

Because 1 year before 9-11, the capability that special forces built actually identified to us the network of al Qaeda. And they went beyond that and gave us recommendations where we could take out cells to eliminate their capability. So for those pundits out there sitting in their armchairs criticizing President Bush, they have it all wrong.

Facts are a tough thing to refute, and the fact is that back in 1997, we told the administration at that time what to do. In 1998, we briefed the agencies. In 1999, we put language in a defense bill. In 2000, we
put language in a defense bill. In 2000, special forces command built another mini version of that capability. And in 2000 they briefed General Shelton telling him to take out 5 cells of bin Laden's network.

All of that activity could have prevented or helped to prevent 9-11 from ever occurring. I challenge my colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to review the facts. I challenge the media to report the truth.

August 10, 2005 | P

 

and btw, the reponses in this thread should go a long ways toward identifying who really is a partisan tool.

 

Maybe they already have.

 

oh! snap!



I guess the impeachment didn't have anything to do with cutting the legs out from under anything Clinton could have done. Or the Clinton administration passing off any intelligence to Bush after he took office and ignored it?

nah.....

Easier to blame Clinton. He's the devil you know.

[edit] What was the name of that briefing again in August of 2001? Oh yeah! "Bin Laden determined to attack inside the US."

 

i'm not prejudging the evidence here, just suggesting that if the story pans out, and we knew about atta, et al, a year before 9/11 and a recommendation was made to take them out and it wasn't acted upon...i'd like to know why. it a pretty spectacular charge.

one wonders btw, was "able danger" one of the things sandy berger wrote in the margins of the docs he pilferred?

 

ClutchFans.Net, I'd like to introduce basso, partisan tool extraordinaire.

 

Complete 911 Timeline: Mohamed Atta
link
Project: Complete 911 Timeline
Open-Content project managed by Paul Thompson

November 1, 1998-February 2001: Atta and Other Islamic Militants Are Monitored by US and Germany in Hamburg Apartment
Mohamed Atta and al-Qaeda operatives Said Bahaji and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh move into a four bedroom apartment at 54 Marienstrasse, in Hamburg, Germany, and stay there until February 2001 (Atta is already living primarily in the US well before this time). Investigators believe this move marks the formation of their Hamburg al-Qaeda cell [Los Angeles Times, 1/27/02; New York Times, 9/10/02] Up to six men at a time live at the apartment, including other al-Qaeda agents such as hijacker Marwan Alshehhi and cell member Zakariya Essabar. [New York Times, 9/15/01 (F)] During the 28 months Atta's name is on the apartment lease, 29 Middle Eastern or North African men register the apartment as their home address. From the very beginning, the apartment was officially under surveillance by German intelligence, because of investigations into businessman Mamoun Darkazanli that connect to Said Bahaji. [Washington Post, 10/23/01] The Germans also suspect connections between Bahaji and al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Haydar Zammar. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02] German intelligence monitors the apartment off and on for months, and wiretaps Mounir El Motassadeq, an associate of the apartment-mates who is later put on trial in August 2002 for assisting the 9/11 plot, but apparently do not find any indication of suspicious activity. [Chicago Tribune, 9/5/02] Bahaji is directly monitored at least for part of 1998, but German officials have not disclosed when the probe began or ended. That investigation is dropped for lack of evidence. [Associated Press, 6/22/02; Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02] It is now clear that investigators would have found evidence if they looked more thoroughly. For instance, Zammar, a talkative man who has trouble keeping secrets, is a frequent visitor to the many late night meetings there. [Chicago Tribune, 9/5/02; Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02; Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp 259-60] Another visitor later recalls Atta and others discussing attacking the US. [Knight Ridder, 9/9/02] 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed is in Hamburg several times in 1999, and comes to the apartment. However, although there was a $2 million reward for Mohammed since 1998, the US apparently fails to tell Germany what it knows about him (see 1999). [New York Times, 11/4/02; Newsweek, 9/4/02] Hijacker Waleed Alshehri also apparently stays at the apartment “at times.” [Washington Post, 9/14/01; Washington Post, 9/16/01 (B)] The CIA also starts monitoring Atta while he is living at this apartment, and does not tell Germany of the surveillance. Remarkably, the German government will claim it knew little about the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell before 9/11, and nothing directed them towards the Marienstrasse apartment. [Daily Telegraph, 11/24/01]
People and organizations involved: Mohamed Atta, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Zakariya Essabar, al-Qaeda, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Germany, Mounir El Motassadeq, Said Bahaji, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Central Intelligence Agency, Marwan Alshehhi, Mamoun Darkazanli

1999: Mohammed Repeatedly Visits Atta, Others in al-Qaeda's Hamburg Cell
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed “repeatedly” visits Mohamed Atta and others in the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell. [Associated Press, 8/24/02] US and German officials say a number of sources place Mohammed at Atta's Hamburg apartment, although when he visits, or who he visits while he is there, is unclear. [Los Angeles Times, 6/6/02; New York Times, 11/4/02] However, it would be logical to conclude that he visits Atta's housemate Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, since investigators believe he is the “key contact between the pilots” and Mohammed. [Los Angeles Times, 1/27/03] Mohammed is living elsewhere in Germany at the time. [New York Times, 9/22/02] German intelligence monitors the apartment in 1999 but apparently does not notice Mohammed. US investigators have been searching for Mohammed since 1996, but apparently never tell the Germans what they know about him. [New York Times, 11/4/02] Even after 9/11, German investigators complain that US investigators do not tell them what they know about Mohammed living in Germany until they read it in the newspapers in June 2002. [New York Times, 6/11/02]
People and organizations involved: Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Mohamed Atta, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed


February 17, 1999: Germans Intercept al-Qaeda Calls, One Mentions Atta's Name
German intelligence is periodically tapping suspected al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Haydar Zammar's telephone. On this day, investigators hear a caller being told Zammar is at a meeting with “Mohamed, Ramzi, and Said,” and can be reached at the phone number of the Marienstrasse apartment where all three of them live. This refers to Mohamed Atta, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, and Said Bahaji, all members of the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell. However, apparently the German police fail to grasp the importance of these names, even though Said Bahaji is also under investigation. [Associated Press, 6/22/02; New York Times, 1/18/03] Atta's last name is given as well. Agents check the phone number and confirm the street address, but it is not known what they make of the information. [Der Spiegel, 2/3/03]
People and organizations involved: Said Bahaji, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Mohamed Atta, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh

April 1, 1999: Hijacker Jarrah Photographs Wedding Party
Ziad Jarrah has an unofficial wedding with his girlfriend, Aisel Senguen. Interestingly, a photo apparently taken by Jarrah at the wedding is found by German intelligence several days after 9/11. An undercover agent is able immediately to identify ten of the 18 men in the photo, as well as where it was taken: the prayer room of Hamburg's Al-Quds mosque. He is also able to identify which of them attended Mohamed Atta's study group. He knows even “seemingly trivial details” of some of the men, showing that “probably almost all members of the Hamburg terror cell” has been watched by German state intelligence since this time, if not before. The head of the state intelligence had previously maintained that they knew nothing of any of these men. [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2/2/03]
People and organizations involved: Mohamed Atta, Ziad Jarrah

September 21, 1999: German Intelligence Records Calls Between Hijacker and Others Linked to al-Qaeda
German intelligence is periodically tapping suspected al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Haydar Zammar's telephone, and on this day investigators hear Zammar call hijacker Marwan Alshehhi. Officials initially claim that the call also mentions hijacker Mohamed Atta, but only his first name. [Daily Telegraph, 11/24/01; New York Times, 1/18/03] However, his full name, “Mohamed Atta Al Amir,” is mentioned in this call and in another recorded call. [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2/2/03] Alshehhi makes veiled references to plans to travel to Afghanistan. He also hands the phone over to Said Bahaji (another member of the Hamburg cell under investigation at the time), so he can talk to Zammar. [Stern, 8/13/03] German investigators still do not know Alshehhi's full name, but they recognize this “Marwan” also called Zammar in January, and they told the CIA about that call. Alshehhi, living in the United Arab Emirates at the time, calls Zammar frequently. German intelligence asks the United Arab Emirates to identify the number and the caller, but the request is not answered. [Der Spiegel, 2/3/03]
People and organizations involved: Central Intelligence Agency, Mohammed Haydar Zammar, Said Bahaji, Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, United Arab Emirates

Late November 1999: Hamburg Cell Members Arrive in Afghanistan for Training
Investigators believe hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, and Ziad Jarrah and associates Ramzi Bin al-Shibh and Said Bahaji (all members of the same Hamburg, Germany, cell) arrive separately in Afghanistan around this time. They meet with bin Laden and train for several months. [CBS News, 10/9/02; New York Times, 9/10/02] In a 2002 interview with Al Jazeera, bin al-Shibh says, “We had a meeting attended by all four pilots including Nawaf Alhazmi, Atta's right-hand man.” The Guardian interprets this to mean that Alhazmi flew Flight 77, not Hani Hanjour as popularly believed. [Guardian, 9/9/02]
People and organizations involved: William Safire, Said Bahaji, Mohamed Atta, Osama bin Laden, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Ziad Jarrah, Marwan Alshehhi, Nawaf Alhazmi

Late 1999: Hijackers Clear Their Passport Records
Hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi report their passports missing; Ziad Jarrah reports his missing in February 2000. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01; Der Spiegel, 2002, pp 257-58] Alshehhi receives a replacement passport on December 26, 1999. [Times of London, 9/20/01]
People and organizations involved: Marwan Alshehhi, Ziad Jarrah, Mohamed Atta

January-May 2000: CIA Has Atta Under Surveillance
Hijacker Mohamed Atta is put under surveillance by the CIA while living in Germany. [Agence France-Presse, 9/22/01; Focus, 9/24/01; Berliner Zeitung, 9/24/01] He is “reportedly observed buying large quantities of chemicals in Frankfurt, apparently for the production of explosives [and/or] for biological warfare.” “The US agents reported to have trailed Atta are said to have failed to inform the German authorities about their investigation,” even as the Germans are investigating many of his associates. “The disclosure that Atta was being trailed by police long before 11 September raises the question why the attacks could not have been prevented with the man's arrest.” [Observer, 9/30/01] A German newspaper adds that Atta is able to get a visa into the US on May 18. According to some reports, the surveillance stops when he leaves for the US at the start of June. However, “experts believe that the suspect [remains] under surveillance in the United States.” [Berliner Zeitung, 9/24/01] A German intelligence official also states, “We can no longer exclude the possibility that the Americans wanted to keep an eye on Atta after his entry in the US” [Focus, 9/24/01] This correlates with a Newsweek claim that US officials knew Atta was a “known [associate] of Islamic terrorists well before [9/11].” [Newsweek, 9/20/01] However, a congressional inquiry later reports that the US “intelligence community possessed no intelligence or law enforcement information linking 16 of the 19 hijackers [including Atta] to terrorism or terrorist groups.” [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/20/02]
People and organizations involved: Central Intelligence Agency, Mohamed Atta

January-March 2000: Hijacker Atta Begins E-mailing US Flight Schools, Seeking Pilot Training
Hijacker Mohamed Atta, who is under CIA surveillance at this time, begins sending e-mails to US flight schools, inquiring about their pilot training programs. One e-mail states, “We are a small group (2-3) of young men from different arab [sic] countries.” “Now we are living in Germany since a while for study purposes. We would like to start training for the career of airline professional pilots. In this field we haven't yet any knowledge, but we are ready to undergo an intensive training program.” Apparently, multiple e-mails are sent from the same Hotmail account. Some e-mails are signed “M. Atta,” while others are signed “Mahmoud Ben Hamad.” [Chicago Tribune, 2/25/03]
People and organizations involved: Central Intelligence Agency, Mohamed Atta

Summer 2000: San Diego Hijackers Meet Atta and Al-Bayoumi
Anonymous government sources later claim that Mohamed Atta visits fellow hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Omar al-Bayoumi. These same sources claim al-Bayoumi is identified after September 11 as an “advance man” for al-Qaeda. [Washington Times, 11/26/02] Other reports have suggested Atta visited Alhazmi and Almihdhar in San Diego, but the FBI has not confirmed this. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
People and organizations involved: Omar al-Bayoumi, Mohamed Atta, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi

June 2000: Hijackers Open Many Bank Accounts in Florida; Transactions Not Followed
Mohamed Atta and other hijackers begin to open bank accounts in Florida. At least 35 accounts are opened, 14 of them at SunTrust Bank. All are opened with fake social security numbers (some with randomly made up numbers), yet none of the accounts are checked or questioned by the banks. [New York Times, 7/10/02] One transfer from the United Arab Emirates three months later totaling $69,985 prompts the bank to make a “suspicious transaction report” to the US Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. Apparently, no investigation into this transaction occurs. [Financial Times, 11/29/01]
People and organizations involved: Mohamed Atta, Mohamed Atta, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, SunTrust Bank

Summer-December 2000: FBI Asset Withholds Information About 9/11 Hijackers Living in His San Diego house.
Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar move to the house of Abdussattar Shaikh in San Diego. [San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/16/01] Shaikh, a local Muslim leader, is later revealed to be a “tested” undercover “asset” working with the local FBI. [Newsweek, 9/9/02] Shaikh inexplicably fails to tell his FBI handler important details about the hijackers and appears to be lying about many matters concerning them. In early media reports, the two are said to have moved in around September [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01; San Diego Union-Tribune, 9/16/01; Wall Street Journal, 9/17/01] but the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry implies that Shaikh lied about this, and they moved in much earlier. Alhazmi stays until December; Almihdhar appears to be mostly out of the US after June. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] Neighbors claim that Mohamed Atta is a frequent visitor, and Hani Hanjour visits as well. [Chicago Tribune, 9/30/01; Associated Press, 9/29/01; Las Vegas Review Journal, 10/26/01; San Diego Channel 10, 9/27/01; San Diego Channel 10, 10/11/01] However, Shaikh denies Atta's visits, the FBI never mentions them, and the media appears to have forgotten about them. [Associated Press, 9/29/01] Echoing reports from their first apartment, neighbors witness strange late night visits with Alhazmi and Almihdhar. [Associated Press, 9/16/01 (D)] For instance, one neighbor says, “There was always a series of cars driving up to the house late at night. Sometimes they were nice cars. Sometimes they had darkened windows. They'd stay about 10 minutes.” [Time, 9/24/01 (B)]
People and organizations involved: Mohamed Atta, Abdussattar Shaikh, Khalid Almihdhar, William Safire, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Nawaf Alhaz

June 10, 2000: Almihdhar Flies from San Diego to Germany; Return Date Unclear
Hijacker Khalid Almihdhar flies from San Diego to Frankfurt, Germany. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/20/02] Authorities later believe that Almihdhar visits his cousin-in-law Ramzi Bin al-Shibh and bin al-Shibh's roommate Mohamed Atta and other al-Qaeda members in bin al-Shibh's cell. However, since the CIA fails to notify Germany about their suspicions of either Almihdhar or bin al-Shibh, both of whom were seen attending the al-Qaeda summit in Malaysia in January, German police fail to monitor them and another chance to uncover the 9/11 plot is missed. [Die Zeit, 10/1/02; 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] FBI Director Mueller and the congressional inquiry into 9/11 will claim that Almihdhar does not return to the US for over a year [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/20/02; 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/26/02] , despite obvious evidence to the contrary. For instance, an FBI agent is told Khalid Almihdhar is in the room when he calls Almihdhar's landlord in autumn 2000 and there are indications Almihdhar attends a flight school in Arizona in early 2001. [Arizona Republic, 9/28/01]
People and organizations involved: Germany, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Khalid Almihdhar, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Central Intelligence Agency, Robert S. Mueller III, Mohamed Atta, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry

December 2000-April 2001: Israeli Investigators Deported After Identifying Two Hijackers
According to later German reports, “a whole horde of Israeli counter-terror investigators, posing as students, [follow] the trails of Arab terrorists and their cells in the United States. ... In the town of Hollywood, Florida, they [identify] ... Atta and Marwan Alshehhi as possible terrorists. Agents [live] in the vicinity of the apartment of the two seemingly normal flight school students, observing them around the clock.” Supposedly, around April, the Israeli agents are discovered and deported, terminating the investigation. [Der Spiegel, 10/1/02]
People and organizations involved: Marwan Alshehhi, Israel Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks, Mohamed Atta

April 12-September 7, 2001: Hijackers Collect Multiple Drivers' License Copies
The most famous image of Mohamed Atta came from his Florida driver's license.
At least six hijackers get more than one Florida driver's license. They get the second license simply by filling out change of address forms:
Waleed Alshehri—first license May 4, duplicate May 5;
Marwan Alshehhi—first license, April 12, duplicate in June;
Ziad Jarrah—first license May 2, duplicate July 10;
Ahmed Alhaznawi—first license July 10, duplicate September 7;
Hamza Alghamdi—first license June 27, two duplicates, the second in August; and
“A sixth man” with a Florida duplicate is not named. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01] Additionally, some hijackers obtained licenses from multiple states. For instance, Nawaf Alhazmi had licenses from California, New York, and Florida at the same time, apparently all in the same name. [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01; Newsday, 9/21/01; Daily Oklahoman, 1/20/02; South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/28/01]
People and organizations involved: Hamza Alghamdi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Ziad Jarrah, Marwan Alshehhi, Waleed M. Alshehri

May-August 2001: Hijackers Take Practice Flights and Enjoy Las Vegas Diversions A number of the hijackers make at least six trips to Las Vegas. It is probable they met here after doing practice runs on cross-country flights. At least Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ziad Jarrah, Khalid Almihdhar and Hani Hanjour were involved. All of these “fundamentalist” Muslims drink alcohol, gamble, and frequent strip clubs. They even have strippers perform lap dances for them. [San Francisco Chronicle, 10/4/01; Newsweek, 10/15/01]
People and organizations involved: Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, William Safire, Ziad Jarrah, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta

May 6-September 6, 2001: Some Hijackers Work Out at Gyms, Some Merely Hang Out
The hijackers work out at various gyms, presumably getting in shape for the hijacking. Ziad Jarrah appears to train intensively from May to August, and Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi also take exercising very seriously. [New York Times, 9/23/01; Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01] However, these three are presumably pilots who would need the training the least. For instance, Jarrah's trainer says, “If he wasn't one of the pilots, he would have done quite well in thwarting the passengers from attacking.” [Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01] For instance, Hani Hanjour, Majed Moqed, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, and Salem Alhazmi work out for only four days in early September. [Associated Press, 9/21/01] Three others—Waleed Alshehri, Wail Alshehri and Satam al-Suqami— “simply clustered around a small circuit of machines, never asking for help and, according to a trainer, never pushing any weights. ‘You know, I don't actually remember them ever doing anything... They would just stand around and watch people.’ ” [New York Times, 9/23/01] Those three also had a one month membership in Florida—whether they ever actually worked out there is unknown. [Los Angeles Times, 9/20/01]
People and organizations involved: Satam Al Suqami, Waleed M. Alshehri, Ziad Jarrah, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Majed Moqed, Salem Alhazmi, Marwan Alshehhi, Central Intelligence Agency, Wail Alshehri, Mohamed Atta, William Safire

June or July 2001: Hijackers Plan Attacks from German University
Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, and an unknown third person are seen in the ground-floor workshops of the architecture department at this time, according to at least two witnesses from the Hamburg university where Atta had studied. They are seen on at least two occasions with a white, three-foot scale model of the Pentagon. Between 60 and 80 slides of the Sears building in Chicago and the WTC are found to be missing from the technical library after 9/11. [Sunday Times, 2/3/02]
People and organizations involved: Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, World Trade Center, Pentagon

July 8-19, 2001: Atta, Bin Al-Shibh, Alshehhi, and Others Meet in Spain to Finalize Attack Plans
Mohamed Atta travels to Spain again (his first trip was in January). Three others cross the Atlantic with him but their names are not known, as they apparently use false identities. [El Mundo, 9/30/01] Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, a member of his Hamburg terrorist cell, arrives in Spain on July 9, and stays until July 16. [New York Times, 5/1/02] Hijacker Marwan Alshehhi also comes to Spain at about the same time and leaves on July 17. [Associated Press, 6/30/02] Alshehhi must have traveled under another name, because US immigration has no records of his departure or return. [Department of Justice, 5/20/02] Investigators believe Atta, Alshehhi, and bin al-Shibh meet with at least three Unknown others in a secret safe house near Tarragona. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02; Associated Press, 6/30/02] It is theorized that the final details of the 9/11 attacks are set at this meeting. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02] Atta probably meets with, and is hosted by, Barakat Yarkas and other Spanish al-Qaeda members. [International Herald Tribune, 11/21/01] One of the unknowns at the meeting could be Yarkas's friend Mamoun Darkazanli, a German with connections to the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell. Darkazanli travels to Spain and meets with Yarkas during the time Atta is there. He travels with an unnamed Syrian Spanish suspect, who lived in Afghanistan and had access there to al-Qaeda leaders. [Los Angeles Times, 1/14/03] The Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia later reports that Atta also meets with fellow hijackers Waleed Alshehri and Wail Alshehri on July 16. [Associated Press, 9/27/01] Strangely enough, on July 16, Atta stayed in the same hotel in the town of Salou that had hosted FBI counterterrorist expert John O'Neill a few days earlier, when he made a speech to other counterterrorism experts on the need for greater international cooperation by police agencies to combat terrorism. Bin al-Shibh arrived in Salou on July 9, which means he would have been there when the counter-terrorist meeting took place. [Miller, Stone, and Mitchell, 2002, pp 135]
People and organizations involved: Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, International Herald Tribune, Mamoun Darkazanli, John O'Neill, Barakat Yarkas, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Wail Alshehri

August 4, 2001: Possible 20th Hijacker Denied Entry to US
A Saudi named Mohammed Al-Qahtani is stopped at the Orlando, Florida, airport and denied entry to the US. Jose Melendez-Perez, the customs official who stops him, later says he was suspicious of Al-Qahtani because he had arrived with no return ticket, no hotel reservations, spoke little English, behaved menacingly, and offered conflicting information on the purpose of his travel. At one point, Al-Qahtani said that someone was waiting for him elsewhere at the airport. After 9/11, surveillance cameras show that Mohamed Atta was at the Orlando airport that day. 9/11 Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste says: “It is extremely possible and perhaps probable that [Al-Qahtani] was to be the 20th hijacker.” Al-Qahtani boards a return flight to Saudi Arabia. He is later captured in Afghanistan and sent to a US military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Melendez-Perez says that before 9/11, customs officials were discouraged by their superiors from hassling Saudi travelers, who were seen as big spenders. [Los Angeles Times, 1/27/04]
People and organizations involved: Richard Ben-Veniste, Mohammed Al-Qahtani, Mohamed Atta

August 24-29, 2001: Hijackers Buy 9/11 Plane Tickets Using Their Apparent Real Names
All of the hijackers book their flights for 9/11, using their apparent real names. Most pay using credit cards on the Internet. [Miami Herald, 9/22/01] At least five tickets are one way only. [Los Angeles Times, 9/18/01]

September 8-11, 2001: Last-Minute Money Transfers Between Hijackers and United Arab Emirates
The 9/11 hijackers send money to and receive money from a man in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) who uses the aliases “Mustafa Ahmed,” “Mustafa Ahmad,” and “Ahamad Mustafa.” [MSNBC, 12/11/01] This “Mustafa” transfers money to Mohamed Atta in Florida on September 8 and 9 from a branch of the Al Ansari Exchange in Sharjah, UAE, a center of al-Qaeda financial dealings. [Financial Times, 11/30/01] On September 9, three hijackers, Atta, Waleed Alshehri, and Marwan Alshehhi, transfer about $15,000 back to “Mustafa's” account. [Time, 10/1/01; Los Angeles Times, 10/20/01] Apparently the hijackers are returning money meant for the 9/11 attacks that they have not needed. “Mustafa” then transfers $40,000 to his Visa card and then, using a Saudi passport, flies from the UAE to Karachi, Pakistan, on 9/11. He makes six ATM withdrawals there two days later, and then disappears into Pakistan. [MSNBC, 12/11/01] In early October 2001, it is reported that the financier “Mustafa Ahmed” is an alias used by Saeed Sheikh. [CNN, 10/6/01] It will later be reported that Saeed wired money to Atta the month before. These last-minute transfers are touted as the “smoking gun” proving al-Qaeda involvement in the 9/11 attacks, since Saeed is a known financial manager for bin Laden. [Guardian, 10/1/01]
People and organizations involved: Ahamad Mustafa, Saeed Sheikh, Mohamed Atta, al-Qaeda, United Arab Emirates, Waleed M. Alshehri, Marwan Alshehhi

Before September 11, 2001: Hijackers Drink, Watch Strip Shows on Eve of Attacks
A number of the hijackers apparently drink alcohol heavily in bars and watch strip shows. On September 10, three of them spend $200 to $300 apiece on lap dances and drinks in the Pink Pony, a Daytona Beach, Florida strip club. While the hijackers had left Florida by this time, Mohamed Atta is reported to have visited the same strip club, and these men appear to have had foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. [Boston Herald, 10/10/01] Marwan Alshehhi and Mohamed Atta are seen entering the Hollywood, Florida, sports bar Shuckums already drunk. They proceed to drink even more hard alcohol there . Atta and Alshehhi are seen at Sunrise 251, a bar in Palm Beach, Florida. They spend $1,000 in 45 minutes on Krug and Perrier-Jouet champagne. Atta is with a tall busty brunette in her late twenties; Alshehhi is with a shortish blonde. Both women are known locally as regular companions of high-rollers. [Daily Mail, 9/16/01] A stripper at the Olympic Garden Topless Cabaret in Las Vegas, Nevada, recalls Marwan Alshehhi being “cheap,” paying only $20 for a lap dance. [Cox News, 10/16//01] Several hijackers reportedly patronize the Nardone's Go-Go Bar in Elizabeth, New Jersey. They are even seen there on the weekend before 9/11. [Boston Herald, 10/10/01; Wall Street Journal, 10/16/01] Majed Moqed visits a p*rn shop and rents a p*rn video. The mayor of Paterson, New Jersey, says of the six hijackers who stayed there: “Nobody ever saw them at mosques, but they liked the go-go clubs.” [Newsweek, 10/15/01] Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar often frequented Cheetah's, a nude bar in San Diego. [Los Angeles Times, 9/1/02] Hamza Alghamdi watched a p*rn video on September 10. [Wall Street Journal, 10/16/01] University of Florida religion professor Richard Foltz states, “It is incomprehensible that a person could drink and go to a strip bar one night, then kill themselves the next day in the name of Islam ... People who would kill themselves for their faith would come from very strict Islamic ideology. Something here does not add up.” [South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 9/16/01]
People and organizations involved: Mohamed Atta, Khalid Almihdhar, Hamza Alghamdi, Nawaf Alhazmi, Majed Moqed, Marwan Alshehhi

 

I actually have no problem with people placing some blame on Clinton for what happened on 9/11. While I'm not sure there is clear evidence that he was directly responsible for ignoring important warning signs, at the very least he was the man in charge and should bear some responsibility.

I just hope that people like Basso will keep a few extra pitchforks and torches around when we start examining Bush's Iraq war records.

I find it ironic that this thread is used as a litmus test for partisanship. Even if the claims in the first posts were true, what are we going to do to Clinton that has not already been taken cared of by the 22nd Amendment?

Oh well. At least it is a large step up from examining the man's sexual preferences.

 

So the 9/11 hijackers liked boozing it up and hanging out at strip clubs, eh?

Time to order a background check on Trader_Jorge!!!

Paging homeland security!!!!!

 

here's where Gorelick comes in...

isn't this at least as relevant to national security as the Plame Kerfluffle? where's the independent counsel, the senate investigation?

http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/16/p...=1124251200&partner=homepage&pagewanted=print

--
Officer Says Pentagon Barred Sharing Pre-9/11 Qaeda Data With F.B.I.
By PHILIP SHENON

WASHINGTON, Aug. 16 - A military intelligence team repeatedly contacted the F.B.I. in 2000 to warn about the existence of an American-based terrorist cell that included the ringleader of the Sept. 11 attacks, according to a veteran Army intelligence officer who said he had now decided to risk his career by discussing the information publicly. The officer, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, said military lawyers later blocked the team from sharing any of its information with the F.B.I.

Colonel Shaffer said in an interview that the small, highly classified intelligence program known as Able Danger had identified by name the terrorist ringleader, Mohammed Atta, as well three of the other future hijackers by mid-2000, and had tried to arrange a meeting that summer with agents of the F.B.I.'s Washington field office to share the information.

But he said military lawyers forced members of the intelligence program to cancel three scheduled meetings with the F.B.I. at the last minute, which left the bureau without information that Colonel Shaffer said might have led to Mr. Atta and the other terrorists while the Sept. 11 plot was still being planned.

"I was at the point of near insubordination over the fact that this was something important, that this was something that should have been pursued," Colonel Shaffer said of his efforts to get the evidence from the intelligence program to the F.B.I. in 2000 and early 2001.

He said he learned later that lawyers associated with the Defense Department's Special Operations Command had canceled the F.B.I. meetings because they feared controversy if Able Danger was portrayed as a military operation that had violated the privacy of civilians who were legally in the United States. "It was because of the chain of command saying we're not going to pass on information - if something goes wrong, we'll get blamed," he said.

The Defense Department did not dispute the account from Colonel Shaffer, a 42-year-old native of Kansas City, Mo., who is the first military officer associated with the so-called data-mining program to come forward and acknowledge his role.

At the same time, the department said in a statement that it was "working to gain more clarity on this issue" and that "it's too early to comment on findings related to the program identified as Able Danger." The F.B.I. referred calls about Colonel Shaffer to the Pentagon.

The account from Colonel Shaffer, a reservist who is also working part-time for the Pentagon, corroborates much of the information that the Sept. 11 commission has acknowledged that it received about Able Danger last July from a Navy captain who was also involved with the program but whose name has not been made public.

In a statement issued last week, the leaders of the Sept. 11 commission said the panel had concluded that the intelligence program "did not turn out to be historically significant." The statement said that while the commission did learn about Able Danger in 2003 and immediately requested Pentagon files about the program, none of the documents turned over by the Defense Department referred to Mr. Atta or any of the other hijackers.

Colonel Shaffer said that his role in Able Danger was as the program's liaison with the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, and that he was not an intelligence analyst. The interview with Colonel Shaffer on Monday night was arranged for The New York Times and Fox News by Representative Curt Weldon, the Pennsylvania Republican who is vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and a champion of data-mining programs like Able Danger.

Colonel Shaffer's lawyer, Mark Zaid, said in an interview that he was concerned that Colonel Shaffer was facing retaliation from the Defense Department - first for having talked to the Sept. 11 commission staff in October 2003 and now for talking with news organizations.

Mr. Zaid said that Colonel Shaffer's security clearance had been suspended last year because of what the lawyer said were a series of "petty allegations" involving $67 in personal charges on a military cellphone. He noted that despite the disciplinary action, Colonel Shaffer had been promoted this year from the rank of major.

Colonel Shaffer said he had decided to allow his name to be used in news accounts in part because of his frustration with the statement issued last week by the commission leaders, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton.

The commission said in its final report last year that American intelligence agencies had not identified Mr. Atta as a terrorist before Sept. 11, 2001, when he flew an American Airlines jet into one of towers of the World Trade Center in New York.

A commission spokesman did not return repeated phone calls for comment. A Democratic member of the commission, Richard Ben Veniste, the former Watergate prosecutor, said in an interview today that while he could not judge the credibility of the information from Colonel Shaffer and others, the Pentagon needed to "provide a clear and comprehensive explanation regarding what information it had in its possession regarding Mr. Atta."

"And if these assertions are credible," he continued, "the Pentagon would need to explain why it was that the 9/11 commissioners were not provided this information despite request for all information regarding to Able Danger."

Colonel Shaffer said that he had provided information about Able Danger and its identification of Mr. Atta in a private meeting in October 2003 with members of the Sept. 11 commission staff when they visited Afghanistan, where he was then serving. Commission members have disputed that, saying they do not recall hearing Mr. Atta's name during the briefing and that the terrorist's name did not appear in documents about Able Danger that were later turned over by the Pentagon.

"I would implore the 9/11 commission to support a follow-on investigation to ascertain what the real truth is," Colonel Shaffer said in the interview this week. "I do believe the 9/11 commission should have done that job: figuring out what went wrong with Able Danger."

"This was a good news story because, before 9/11, you had an element of the military - our unit - which was actually out looking for Al Qaeda," he continued. "I can't believe the 9/11 commission would somehow believe that the historical value was not relevant."

Colonel Shaffer said that because he was not an intelligence analyst, he was not involved in the details of the procedures used in Able Danger to glean information from terrorist databases. Nor was he aware, he said, which databases had supplied the information that might have led to the name of Mr. Atta or other terrorists so long before the Sept. 11 attacks.

But he said he did know that Able Danger had made use of publicly available information from government immigration agencies, from internet sites and from paid search engines such as Lexis Nexis.

"We didn't that Atta's name was significant" at the time, he said, adding that "we just knew there were these linkages between him and these other individuals who were in this loose configuration" of people who appeared to be tied to an American-based cell of Al Qaeda.

Colonel Shaffer said he assumed that by speaking out publicly this week about Able Danger, he might effectively be ending his military career and limiting his ability to participate in intelligence work in the government. "I'm proud of my operational record and I love what I do," he said. "But there comes a time - and I believe the time for me is now -- to stand for something, to stand for what is right."

 

No, because the 9/11 commission was supposed to have dug into all of this to recommend changes that would improve intelligence sharing. That is what the Department of Homeland Security was created for, to have a central place to gather said intelligence so that this lack of communication doesn't allow another 9/11 to happen.

The Plame "kerfluffle" is over the leaking of an active intelligence operative's identity and the possible involvement of government officials.

You are comparing apples and hammers.

 

Andymoon keyword= "supposed"

 

Even assuming they didn't accomplish that goal, you are talking about communications issues between governmental agencies and are comparing that to a government official leaking the identity of an undercover CIA operative.

Apples and hammers.

 

so in your view, the idea that the defense department knew atta's name and tried to pass this info to the fbi, but were blocked from doing so by the infamous "wall of separation" institutued by a member of the 9/11 commision is not worthy of further investigation?

 

9/11 panel denies Atta's ID blocked

BY RICHARD SISK
DAILY NEWS WASHINGTON BUREAU

WASHINGTON - The Sept. 11 commission hit back yesterday at charges that one of its members had enforced policies that blocked the FBI from tracking 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta to Brooklyn before the attacks.

"We went back to the archives, reviewed every one of the contemporary memos, and we did not find a reference to Atta," said commission spokesman Al Felzenberg.

Felzenberg also denied that commission member Jamie Gorelick, a deputy attorney general under former President Bill Clinton, had enforced an intelligence "wall" that stopped the military from sharing the Atta information with law enforcement.

The allegations arose from recent claims by Army Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, who has said the military's "Able Danger" intelligence operation had used data-mining techniques to track Atta to Brooklyn in 2000 and also locate two terror cells in the U.S. But because of the alleged intelligence wall, military lawyers blocked the Able Danger team from telling the FBI, Shaffer has charged in several published interviews.

Shaffer also claimed he told the 9/11 commission's staff in 2003 about Atta and Able Danger, but former Sen. Slade Gorton (R-Wash.), another commission member, rejected charges of a coverup.

"The assertion that the commission failed to report on this program to protect Ms. Gorelick is ridiculous," Gorton said in a letter to the Washington Times. "She had nothing to do with any wall between law enforcement and our intelligence agencies."

Gorton said former Attorney General John Ashcroft had "reissued and reaffirmed" the same guidelines on intelligence that Gorelick had worked under before the 9/11 attacks.

Shaffer has claimed he cannot produce documentation for his allegations since his security clearance was lifted.

A spokesman for the Defense Intelligence Agency said Shaffer lost his clearance after he allegedly padded his travel and phone expenses. Shaffer was on administrative leave, the spokesman said, and he was appealing the lifting of his clearance.

Shaffer's allegations were brought to light last week by Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), who has called for congressional hearings on Able Danger and the military's knowledge of the Atta cell in Brooklyn.

"Obviously, if we had taken out that cell, 9/11 would not have occurred," Weldon said last week.

http://www.nydailynews.com/08-19-2005/news/wn_report/story/338626p-289136c.html