Analysis of the Pending War with Iraq

The second chapter of War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives, Gambling on War: Force, Order, and the Implications of Attacking Iraq, contains a detailed analysis of the pros and cons of the War with Iraq.

This is a very long read, but worth it for those who do not understand either the pro-war or the anti-war side of the argument.

Here is the conclusion of the second chapter:

The Bush administration has embraced a set of expectations about the costs and consequences
of a preventive war with Iraq that incline it to act. Those who do not share
those optimistic expectations are much more fearful about the price that may be paid,
about the problems that may arise, and about the consequences that may ensue.
Where proponents of the war tend to see opportunity, opponents see risks and dangers.
Where proponents of this war see it as a fulfillment of Washington’s global leadership
role, opponents worry that it may undermine the ability of the United States to
play a constructive role in shaping the international order. Where proponents of the
war believe that it will buttress respect for American power and shore up Washington’s
global standing, opponents fear that it will damage America’s reputation and subvert
its international influence. Many of these differences, in truth, have their origins in
very different attitudes about the value of American predominance, about the international
order to be desired, and about the likely effects of the use of force.

In effect, this debate involves a competing set of predictions about the impact of a
preventive war against Iraq. If the Bush administration’s predictions are correct, then a
desirable end will have been achieved at modest cost with few, if any, adverse consequences.
But what if some of those predictions are incorrect? What if all does not go
well? How far does the course of events have to diverge from the rosy scenario painted
by the Bush administration before this war ends up looking like a costly, counterproductive
mess, or even a disaster? These are the questions that haunt worried skeptics
about the war. They see many ways that costs could mount, many scenarios in which
the interests of the United States and its partners are adversely affected. To be sure, it
is not likely that all the negative predictions about the war will come true. But if the
critics are even partially correct – if Saddam does succeed in implementing some of his
options for making the war painful and messy, if the conflict does produce some of the
undesired counterproductive effects feared by opponents of the war – then the costbenefit
calculus associated with this war will be very different from the one offered by
the Bush administration. That is what makes this war such a gamble.

 

I thought the US was going to use the Iraqi oil to pay for the rebuilding of Iraq.

Is your question refering to some passage in the document?