http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/149/nation/History_adds_to_doubt_on_arms+.shtml http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/29/international/worldspecial/29LABS.html
(AFP) - U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell was under persistent pressure from the Pentagon and White House to include questionable intelligence in his report on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction he delivered at the United Nations last February, a U.S. weekly US News and World Report magazine said the first draft of the speech was prepared for Powell by Vice President Richard Cheney's chief of staff, Lewis "Scooter" Libby, in late January. http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tm...31/wl_mideast_afp/us_iraq_powell_030531004225
This has nothing to do with bad intelligence or intelligence failures. It looks like the Bush Adminstration wanted a war and manipulated intelligence to support the position, accepted questionable info from questionable sources, and dismissed contrary evidence. The professionals at the intelligence agencies probably did their job well. It was the idealogues who were dishonest, self-serving, and ultimately, have greatly harmed the credibility of our government. It's also not about the liberation of Iraq or how bad a guy Saddam was (is?). The US Government lied to the people of the United States and the world. They were so cynical that instead of making a realistic case for regime change, they pinned it on WMD's which is, in reality, the fear generated by 9-11. They were so determined to take Saddam out that they intentionally subverted the inspection process and presented the world with a fait accompli. As an aside, I think I remember reading in a history book somewhere that there was a time in this country when all we had to fear was fear itself.
Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. Dick Cheney Speech to VFW National Convention August 26, 2002 Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons. George W. Bush Speech to UN General Assembly September 12, 2002 If he declares he has none, then we will know that Saddam Hussein is once again misleading the world. Ari Fleischer Press Briefing December 2, 2002 We know for a fact that there are weapons there. Ari Fleischer Press Briefing January 9, 2003 Our intelligence officials estimate that Saddam Hussein had the materials to produce as much as 500 tons of sarin, mustard and VX nerve agent. George W. Bush State of the Union Address January 28, 2003 We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more. Colin Powell Remarks to UN Security Council February 5, 2003 We have sources that tell us that Saddam Hussein recently authorized Iraqi field commanders to use chemical weapons -- the very weapons the dictator tells us he does not have. George W. Bush Radio Address February 8, 2003 If Iraq had disarmed itself, gotten rid of its weapons of mass destruction over the past 12 years, or over the last several months since (UN Resolution) 1441 was enacted, we would not be facing the crisis that we now have before us . . . But the suggestion that we are doing this because we want to go to every country in the Middle East and rearrange all of its pieces is not correct. Colin Powell Interview with Radio France International February 28, 2003 So has the strategic decision been made to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction by the leadership in Baghdad? . . . I think our judgment has to be clearly not. Colin Powell Remarks to UN Security Council March 7, 2003 Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. George W. Bush Address to the Nation March 17, 2003 Well, there is no question that we have evidence and information that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction, biological and chemical particularly . . . all this will be made clear in the course of the operation, for whatever duration it takes. Ari Fleisher Press Briefing March 21, 2003 There is no doubt that the regime of Saddam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction. And . . . as this operation continues, those weapons will be identified, found, along with the people who have produced them and who guard them. Gen. Tommy Franks Press Conference March 22, 2003 I have no doubt we're going to find big stores of weapons of mass destruction. Defense Policy Board member Kenneth Adelman Washington Post, p. A27 March 23, 2003 One of our top objectives is to find and destroy the WMD. There are a number of sites. Pentagon Spokeswoman Victoria Clark Press Briefing March 22, 2003 We know where they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat. Donald Rumsfeld ABC Interview March 30, 2003 Obviously the administration intends to publicize all the weapons of mass destruction U.S. forces find -- and there will be plenty. Neocon scholar Robert Kagan Washington Post op-ed April 9, 2003 But make no mistake -- as I said earlier -- we have high confidence that they have weapons of mass destruction. That is what this war was about and it is about. And we have high confidence it will be found. Ari Fleischer Press Briefing April 10, 2003
From Yahoo News... WASHINGTON (AFP) - Officials in the administration of President George W. Bush -- particularly in the Pentagon -- may have jumped to conclusions about Iraq's banned weapons from shaky intelligence. Time and Newsweek magazines said the administration's tendency to read what it wanted to hear in the reports may be why little evidence has surfaced of Baghdad's nuclear, chemical or biological weapons programs. Central Intelligence Agency (news - web sites) officials told Time they would soon present evidence Iraq was developing such weapons, but it appeared searchers were running out of leads. "We've been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad," Lieutenant General James Conway, commander of the First Marine Expeditionary Force, said last week. "But they're simply not there." The case against Iraq was based largely on assumptions rather than hard evidence, Newsweek reported, citing unnamed administration and intelligence officials. The newsweekly said Secretary of State Colin Powell (news - web sites) suspected officials had "cherry-picked" information that supported the administration's point of view for his February 5 presentation to the United Nations (news - web sites). The Pentagon also tended to choose the most dire explanation for intelligence where the meaning was not clear, Time said. "There was a predisposition in this administration to assume the worst about Saddam," a senior military officer told the newsweekly. "They were inclined to see and interpret evidence a particular way to support a very deeply held conviction." An unnamed Army intelligence officer blamed Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld for the tendency. "Rumsfeld was deeply, almost pathologically, distorting the intelligence," the officer told Time.
You would think the former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who led the first Gulf War would have a general idea going in with or without intelligence of what the Iraqi weapon capabilities were.
Yes, it's a crime to release classified material. Only someone wishing to pursue immediate prosecution would go on the record.
Interesting article from GB that answers many of the "so what" types... ______________ Weapons: a question of trust The PM must justify the faith that so many had in him Leader Sunday June 1, 2003 The Observer In his speech at a school in Basra, Tony Blair declared the Allied victory in Iraq 'the defining moment of the twenty-first century'. Although this century is in its infancy, the Prime Minister may be right. A war has been swiftly fought and won. A country has been liberated from a dictator's cruel dominion. The hope is that the lives of Iraqi people will ultimately be transformed and that the region, and the world, may benefit. But that is not the end of the matter. The manner in which history judges Mr Blair, and his defining moment, will depend on the answers to some hard questions. Disquiet is increasing on both sides of the Atlantic about one issue in particular. Almost two months after hostilities ended, there is no significant trace of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defence Secretary, has admitted that the elusive weapons may never be found, suggesting that Saddam may have destroyed them before the war. Mr Rumsfeld's deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, asserts that disarming the Iraqi dictator was only 'a bureaucratic reason' for attack. Even more disturbingly for Mr Blair, a senior intelligence official claims that Downing Street wanted the dossier outlining Saddam's threat 'sexed up' and that information was included against security services' advice. Adam Ingram, the Armed Forces Minister, has admitted Mr Blair's key claim, that a chemical or biological attack could be unleashed at 45 minutes' notice, was based on an uncorroborated source. The Prime Minister continues to have 'absolutely no doubt at all about the existence of weapons of mass destruction'. That as yet unsupported certitude that something will turn up is no longer enough. Mr Blair took a Parliament and a country racked by doubt into conflict expressly because Saddam's weapons posed an immediate threat to his neighbours and to the order of the world. The 'whole purpose' of the war, he said, was 'a proper process of disarmament'. Far more reticent than President Bush about regime change, the Prime Minister did, it is true, make clear his belief in an ancillary moral case. On that issue, there is much sympathy and admiration for Mr Blair. Saddam Hussein was a vile dictator whose collapse no advocate of human rights could fail to welcome. The discovery of mass graves underlines the monstrosity of his rule. But equally, Britain could not have pushed through a case for war centred on the fact that Saddam was a tyrant. The legal reassurance the Attorney General offered Mr Blair was based on an analysis of UN resolutions relating to compliance on disarmament. Even so, Lord Goldsmith's view that attack was lawful attracted widespread challenge. It is unimaginable that the US-led removal of a dictator posing a chronic but unvaried threat to his own people could find a basis in international law. So weapons, and the threat of imminent attack, formed Mr Blair's case for pre-emptive self-defence. The one-and-a-half tonnes of VX nerve agent and the 26,000 litres of anthrax spores, also persuasive, reside so far only in the pages of Mr Blair's dossier. That certainly does not mean they do not exist. But the lack of results from the pinpoint intelligence once boasted by Secretary of State Colin Powell makes it likely that any find will fall short of the expected arsenal. Mr Blair's mandate for war, we repeat, was granted specifically on his assertion that a threat was so immediate that Hans Blix and his inspectors (who should be sent back to Iraq forthwith) could not be given more time. Seven weeks after the conflict finished, war has produced fewer results on weapons than Mr Blix achieved and revealed no vestige of urgent danger. The growing worry is that Mr Blair's dossier was, in part at least, a testament to wishful thinking. Long before the war, the Prime Minister was privately sure of a linkage, never proven, between al-Qaeda and Iraq. Subsequent events have aroused suspicions of dubious evidence in which intelligence, some from biased or ill-informed sources, was tailored to political whim. Both the dossier set before Parliament and the later factfile that turned out to be plagiarised from an old PhD thesis raise anxieties over shoddy work. Although Mr Blair has denied fabrication, no one has actually accused him of lying. The suspicion, rather, is that he has mistaken his own conviction for unassailable fact and shaped slim evidence accordingly. The consequences of war are yet to be determined. The fall of Saddam is good news for the Iraqi people and may prove to be so for the region. There is a glimmer of optimism over the Middle East peace process. But the postwar rash of international terrorism means the world does not yet feel a safer place. Mr Rumsfeld's sabre-rattling on Iran grows ever more alarming. And there are, as yet, no weapons of mass destruction. In their absence, Mr Blair implies that a free Iraq makes everything worthwhile. However welcome that result, the post-hoc justification will not suffice. Genocide is a reason for intervention, but this war was prosecuted on other grounds. Justifying means by ends is not a sound basis on which to reshape the world. Nor, it should be noted, has the Alliance invested enough thought in humanitarian strategies for peace. Iraq's culture has been looted, security is bad, and basic services are still not restored. On one estimate, 7,000 civilians may have died. Others are still being blown up by Western cluster bombs. These, it is true, are very early days. The situation will certainly improve and Mr Blair is rightly determined on a better life for all Iraqis. Even so, the fragile state of Afghanistan offers a reminder of the fickleness of Western commitment and the difficulties in sponsoring liberal democracies. Mr Blair faces other problems at home. His strengths and weaknesses have been exploited in equal measure by the events following 11 September 2001. Unpredictable and harrowing times demand fast reactions, and none is a more skilled improviser than he. But perennial values, such as trust, become more important in eras of uncertainty. Its absence can only intensify the current climate of fear, in which citizens do not know whether it is really necessary to lose civil liberties or dot the capital with lumps of concrete to stave off terrorist attack. Hectoring Ministers behaving as if they had some monopoly on truth and wisdom do not inspire confidence. Neither do reports, denied by Downing Street, that Colin Powell and Jack Straw shared doubts about the quality of their WMD intelligence. And nor does the fact that the Government is challenged by unaccountable and unelected members of the security services. Wars cannot be un-fought. History has no rewind button. But it is imperative that the Prime Minister takes immediate steps to secure, or redeem, his reputation as a liberal interventionist. He must better explain his continuing certainty that WMDs exist. He must distance himself from Pentagon threats to Iran and dispel any notion that he is in hock to Mr Bush. Most crucially, he should set up a full, judge-led public inquiry into the build-up to the war. Intelligence officers, up to the highest levels and behind screens if necessary, should be called upon to account for their actions, as should members of the Government and civil servants. If the arms-to-Iraq débcle was of sufficient import to demand such attention, then so should the issue of arms in Iraq. For now, Mr Blair's credibility is on the line. He risks creating an irreconcilable gulf with a constituency far beyond a left-wing rump of the Labour Party. Concern about missing weapons is sincere and widespread, not, as he suggests, merely the carping of disaffected pacifists. This newspaper backed the Prime Minister in his decision to go to war. Those in Parliament and the wider public who supported him did so because they believed he had sound reasons for committing the country to conflict. Now he must justify the faith that we and others placed in him. Only the full truth can do that.
From the author of "Black Hawk Down" and a supporter of the war... ____________ The Point | U.S. has gained little if Bush lied about reason for war By Mark Bowden For The Philadelphia Inquirer It has been two months since the United States and Britain went to war against Saddam Hussein, and coalition forces have yet to discover convincing evidence of the weapons programs that President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair said were its primary cause. Some of those who supported the war beforehand did so solely on the basis of ending tyranny. The mass graves found throughout Iraq, and widespread stories of torture and atrocity, come as no surprise to those who had studied or endured the Baathist dictator's regime. Those who opposed the war for any reason ought to be doing some soul-searching about the kind of horrors they were prepared to leave in place. But it is true that Hussein represented only one of many thuggish regimes, and that the United States is not about to go to war against them all. I supported this war because I believed Bush and Blair when they said Iraq was manufacturing and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons in the hands of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations that shared Hussein's hostile designs made such a threat a defense priority - or so the argument went. Early this month, the U.S. military announced that it had found three mobile laboratories that were most likely designed to manufacture chemical or biological weapons, the types of labs that Secretary of State Colin L. Powell referred to in making his argument for war before the U.N. Security Council. The discoveries were suggestive but hardly convincing evidence of the specific, tangible threat repeatedly outlined by the President. With the authors of Iraq's illicit-weapons program now in custody, we should expect to see soon, or to have seen already, the facilities and stockpiles we and most of the rest of the world believed Hussein possessed. They may yet be found, but it is beginning to look as though the skeptics in this case were right. If so, I was taken in by this administration, and America and Great Britain were led to war under false pretenses. Events have moved so swiftly, and Hussein's toppling has posed so many new pressing problems, that it would be easy to lose sight of this issue, but it is critically important. I can imagine no greater breach of public trust than to mislead a country into war. A strong case might have been made to go after Hussein just because he posed a potential threat to us and the region, because of his support for suicide bombers, and because of his ruthless oppression of his own people. But this is not the case our President chose to make. Truth in public life has always been a slippery commodity. We expect campaigning politicians or debating journalists to pitch and spin. Facts are marshaled to support arguments and causes; convenient ones are trumpeted and inconvenient ones played down or ignored. This is the political game. But when the President of the United States addresses the nation and the world, I expect the spinning to stop. He represents not just a party or a cause, but the American people. When President Bush argued that Hussein possessed stockpiles of illicit and deadly poisons, he was presumably doing so on the basis of intelligence briefings and evidence that the public could not see. He was asking us to trust him, to trust his office, to trust that he was acting legitimately in our self-defense. That's something very different from engaging in a bold policy of attempting to remake the Middle East, or undertaking a humanitarian mission to end oppression. Neither of these two justifications would have been likely to garner widespread public support. But national defense? That's an argument the President can always win. I trusted Bush, and unless something big develops on the weapons front in Iraq soon, it appears as though I was fooled by him. Perhaps he himself was taken in by his intelligence and military advisers. If so, he ought to be angry as hell, because ultimately he bears the responsibility. It suggests a strain of zealotry in this White House that regards the question of war as just another political debate. It isn't. More than 100 fine Americans were killed in this conflict, dozens of British soldiers, and many thousands of Iraqis. Nobody gets killed or maimed in Capitol Hill maneuvers over spending plans, or battles over federal court appointments. War is a special case. It is the most serious step a nation can take, and it deserves the highest measure of seriousness and integrity. When a president lies or exaggerates in making an argument for war, when he spins the facts to sell his case, he betrays his public trust, and he diminishes the credibility of his office and our country. We are at war. What we lost in this may yet end up being far more important than what we gained.
The truth is the truth no matter what kind of ad hominem attack one comes up with against the bearer of that truth. For every administration there will be people with different agendas leaking information for whatever purpose. If this guy revealed sources and how we obtained data that would be really bad. If he revealed that someone higher up distorted the raw data as a means of deceiving the public, the greater good is served IMHO.
Well treeman, et al. may not care to discuss it anymore, but some hawks still care about this issue: The Point | U.S. has gained little if Bush lied about reason for war By Mark Bowden For The Inquirer It has been two months since the United States and Britain went to war against Saddam Hussein, and coalition forces have yet to discover convincing evidence of the weapons programs that President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair said were its primary cause. Some of those who supported the war beforehand did so solely on the basis of ending tyranny. The mass graves found throughout Iraq, and widespread stories of torture and atrocity, come as no surprise to those who had studied or endured the Baathist dictator's regime. Those who opposed the war for any reason ought to be doing some soul-searching about the kind of horrors they were prepared to leave in place. But it is true that Hussein represented only one of many thuggish regimes, and that the United States is not about to go to war against them all. I supported this war because I believed Bush and Blair when they said Iraq was manufacturing and stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons in the hands of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations that shared Hussein's hostile designs made such a threat a defense priority - or so the argument went. Early this month, the U.S. military announced that it had found three mobile laboratories that were most likely designed to manufacture chemical or biological weapons, the types of labs that Secretary of State Colin L. Powell referred to in making his argument for war before the U.N. Security Council. The discoveries were suggestive but hardly convincing evidence of the specific, tangible threat repeatedly outlined by the President. With the authors of Iraq's illicit-weapons program now in custody, we should expect to see soon, or to have seen already, the facilities and stockpiles we and most of the rest of the world believed Hussein possessed. They may yet be found, but it is beginning to look as though the skeptics in this case were right. If so, I was taken in by this administration, and America and Great Britain were led to war under false pretenses. Events have moved so swiftly, and Hussein's toppling has posed so many new pressing problems, that it would be easy to lose sight of this issue, but it is critically important. I can imagine no greater breach of public trust than to mislead a country into war. A strong case might have been made to go after Hussein just because he posed a potential threat to us and the region, because of his support for suicide bombers, and because of his ruthless oppression of his own people. But this is not the case our President chose to make. Truth in public life has always been a slippery commodity. We expect campaigning politicians or debating journalists to pitch and spin. Facts are marshaled to support arguments and causes; convenient ones are trumpeted and inconvenient ones played down or ignored. This is the political game. But when the President of the United States addresses the nation and the world, I expect the spinning to stop. He represents not just a party or a cause, but the American people. When President Bush argued that Hussein possessed stockpiles of illicit and deadly poisons, he was presumably doing so on the basis of intelligence briefings and evidence that the public could not see. He was asking us to trust him, to trust his office, to trust that he was acting legitimately in our self-defense. That's something very different from engaging in a bold policy of attempting to remake the Middle East, or undertaking a humanitarian mission to end oppression. Neither of these two justifications would have been likely to garner widespread public support. But national defense? That's an argument the President can always win. I trusted Bush, and unless something big develops on the weapons front in Iraq soon, it appears as though I was fooled by him. Perhaps he himself was taken in by his intelligence and military advisers. If so, he ought to be angry as hell, because ultimately he bears the responsibility. It suggests a strain of zealotry in this White House that regards the question of war as just another political debate. It isn't. More than 100 fine Americans were killed in this conflict, dozens of British soldiers, and many thousands of Iraqis. Nobody gets killed or maimed in Capitol Hill maneuvers over spending plans, or battles over federal court appointments. War is a special case. It is the most serious step a nation can take, and it deserves the highest measure of seriousness and integrity. When a president lies or exaggerates in making an argument for war, when he spins the facts to sell his case, he betrays his public trust, and he diminishes the credibility of his office and our country. We are at war. What we lost in this may yet end up being far more important than what we gained. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seems to work for the Pentagon. Didn't Chalabi provide them with intelligence? 'His reputation is far from unblemished' Opinion is split over proposed leader of Iraq Toby Manhire Thursday May 8, 2003 The Guardian In the search for leadership in postwar Iraq, Ahmad Chalabi's name crops up again and again. The 58-year-old leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) returned to his homeland last month after 45 years in exile. This week he was named by the US admin-istration in Iraq as part of the likely "nucleus of leadership" for the country. Mr Chalabi's repeated denials of any ambition to gain political office in Iraq have been met with widespread scepticism. At Slate.com, Chris Sullentrop raised an eyebrow at statements that "sound suspiciously like the carefully crafted formulations that American presidential candidates use when they're pretending not to be presidential candidates". Newsweek set out the central uncertainty: "To his American friends, Mr Chalabi is a democrat and a paragon of Iraqi patriotism. To his enemies, he's a crook." To others, he is little more than an American tool. In the London-based pan-Arab daily al-Hayat, Kanan Mikiya dubbed him "the Pentagon's favourite puppet"; the Independent called him "the Pentagon's place-man". Though Mr Chalabi is favoured by key figures in the US administration, including the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, as well as by Pentagon adviser Richard Perle, his popularity knows bounds. "The prospect of Mr Chalabi heading anything appals British and US diplomats, including the entire [US] state department," said Simon Jenkins in the Times. Nor is Mr Chalabi's profile in Iraq especially high. The Asia Times noted that his "Pentagon patrons" were this week "being forced to admit that their hero appeared to have less of a following in Iraq than they had been led to believe". Mr Chalabi's reputation is one of his main problems. In the early 90s, he was convicted, in absentia, by a Jordanian military court for embezzling more than £40bn. He disputes the legitimacy of the charges, but members of the Jordanian financial community talked to by the Village Voice said that "at best ... he was grossly negligent, at a tremendous cost not only to the Jordanian economy, but to thousands of shareholders ... and at worst, in the words of [the former head of Jordan's Central Bank] Mohammed Said Nabulsi, he 'was a crook who absolutely cooked the books to hide his crimes'". The New York Times's Maureen Dowd was in no doubt about his character. Mr Chalabi was "the Richard Perle pal, Pentagon candidate and convicted embezzler". Conservatives in the Bush administration, argued Dowd, were "protecting their interests by backing a shady expat puppet". This was too much for Jay Nordinger, at National Review Online. "That Mr Chalabi, Iraq's great democratic hope, should be a hatefigure for liberals is extra- ordinarily revealing," he railed. Dowd was delivering "the sort of vitriol Saddam's 'information minister' would have used against opponents of the regime". In the Iraqi Crisis Report of the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Julie Flint agreed that criticism of Mr Chalabi, a friend of hers, had gone overboard. "His critics say his long struggle against Saddam's cruel regime boils down to personal ambition. But many of those who know him well believe that nothing could be further from the truth. [He] has been seeking democracy for Iraq single-mindedly, without regard for his comfort or safety, for much of his life." American Prospect Online, meanwhile, recoiled at reports that Mr Chalabi's INC was sniffing out Saddam Hussein. "On the face of it, this is ridiculous. What is the INC doing running a freelance Saddam-tracking operation in Iraq? ... If the INC did have information about Saddam's whereabouts, you'd think the US would have it, too." But maybe there was something more sinister at work: "It wouldn't surprise us if in the coming weeks the Pentagon handed over a couple of Iraqi leaders - maybe even Saddam himself, if he's found - to Mr Chalabi's gang to 'catch'; that is, US troops do the hard work, but Mr Chalabi and his goof-offs get to make the collar. What else will the Pentagon hawks do to promote Mr Chalabi?" http://www.guardian.co.uk/editor/story/0,12900,951195,00.html
