Here's a relatively unknown history of the final days leading up to Gulf War I. It is very interesting to see how Bush I's great fear was that Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait before the ground war could begin. Here Bush II's great problem is that the UN weapons inspectors will convince the world that Sadam Hussein's wmd are disarmed before the ground war can begin. I also found the history important as this is how I remember it. I followed the buildup to that war just as obsessively as the buildup to this one. ********************************************* ********************************************* Powell & the Persian Gulf War An enduring image from the Persian Gulf War is the picture of the two generals -- Colin Powell and Norman Schwarzkopf -- celebrating the 1991 military victory in ticker-tape parades. They seemed the perfect teammates, a politically smooth chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Powell) and the gruff field commander (Schwarzkopf). But the behind-the-scenes reality often was different. Time and again in the march toward a ground war in Kuwait and Iraq, Powell wavered between siding with Schwarzkopf, who was willing to accept a peaceful Iraqi withdrawal, and lining up with President Bush, who hungered for a clear military victory. The tension peaked in the days before the ground war was scheduled to begin. Iraqi forces already had been pummeled by weeks of devastating allied air attacks both against targets in Iraq and Kuwait. As the clock ticked toward a decision on launching a ground offensive, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev tried to hammer out a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. President Bush and his political leadership desperately wanted a ground war to crown the American victory. Schwarzkopf and some of his generals in the field felt U.S. goals could be achieved through a negotiated Iraqi withdrawal that would end the slaughter and spare the lives of U.S. troops. With a deadline for a decision looming, Powell briefly joined the Schwarzkopf camp. On Feb. 21, 1991, the two generals hammered out a cease-fire proposal for presentation to the National Security Council. That last-minute peace deal would have given Iraqi forces one week to march out of Kuwait while leaving their armor and heavy equipment behind. Schwarzkopf thought he had Powell’s commitment to pitch the plan at the White House. But Bush was fixated on a ground war. According to insiders, he saw the war as advancing two goals: to inflict severe damage on Saddam Hussein’s army and to erase the painful memories of America’s defeat in Vietnam. At the NSC meeting, Powell reportedly did reiterate his and Schwarzkopf’s support for a peaceful settlement, if possible. But sensing Bush’s mood, Powell substituted a different plan, shortening the one-week timetable to an unrealistic two days and, thus, making the ground war inevitable. Set on a Ground War Though secret from the American people at that time, Bush had long determined that a peaceful Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait would not be tolerated. Indeed, U.S. peace initiatives in early 1991 had amounted to window-dressing, with Bush privately fearful that the Iraqis might capitulate before the United States could attack. To Bush, exorcising the "Vietnam Syndrome" demons had become an important priority of the Persian Gulf War, almost as central to his thinking as ousting Saddam's army from Kuwait. Conservative columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak were among the few who described Bush's obsession publicly at the time. On Feb. 25, 1991, they wrote that the Gorbachev initiative brokering Iraq's surrender of Kuwait "stirred fears" among Bush's advisers that the Vietnam Syndrome might survive the Gulf War. "There was considerable relief, therefore, when the President ... made clear he was having nothing to do with the deal that would enable Saddam Hussein to bring his troops out of Kuwait with flags flying," Evans and Novak wrote. "Fear of a peace deal at the Bush White House had less to do with oil, Israel or Iraqi expansionism than with the bitter legacy of a lost war. 'This is the chance to get rid of the Vietnam Syndrome,' one senior aide told us." In the book, Shadow, author Bob Woodward confirmed that Bush was adamant about fighting a war, even as the White House pretended that it would be satisfied with an unconditional Iraqi withdrawal. “We have to have a war,” Bush told his inner circle of Secretary of State James Baker, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Powell, according to Woodward. “Scowcroft was aware that this understanding could never be stated publicly or be permitted to leak out. An American president who declared the necessity of war would probably be thrown out of office. Americans were peacemakers, not warmongers,” Woodward wrote. On Jan. 9, 1991, when Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz rebuffed an ultimatum from Baker in Geneva, “Bush was jubilant because it was the best news possible, although he would have to conceal it publicly,” Woodward wrote. Powell and Gulf War I
It was a gamble, and it payed off. In subsequent interviews with Aziz about the Gulf War, he restated Iraq's position of totally refusing any terms of a peaceful withdrawal at that time. So just how is Iraq the victim at that time? To what lengths did Iraq search for a peaceful resolution that had to include the withdrawal of the Kuwaiti territory they forcibly annexed? If it wasn't about the oil, is it now? I seem to recall that Iraqi leadership tried to bribe us with cheap oil if we should decide to turn a blind eye before the first war. If this is a parallel as you portray it, then it would seem that despite our leader's intentions, Saddam would cause enough instability in his region to neccesitate a regime change or even war.
Did it? Al Queda leaders have stated that the attacks on America were inspired directly by the fact that Americans fought on what they consider holy ground in Iraq. Sadaam is still in power and the region is even more unstable than ever. The bombardment of scud missles against Israel led to a harder line against Islamic extremists within Israel destabalizing that region even further. In essense, we are in almost the exact same spot we were nearly 15 years ago, except, this time, we have very few allies supporting us, more rogue states building up WMD's out of growing concern over our forcefulness around the world and it is likely that another war in Iraq would simply increase terrorism against the US, not decrease it. So, how exactly did it pay off?
It payed off in terms of eliminating a proven aggressor that would've threatened the world's economic interests, which was the original intent of the war. We later discovered how Saddam was a year or two away from completing his nuclear program which sparked the passage of the UN inspections. For the aftermath, things couldn't have been handled worse. We didn't depose Saddam for many reasons. An invading foreign army that wiped out a power in the region was an embarassment for many neighbors, whom were our allies. We feared a power vacuum that would exist between our allies and Iran. And the coalition (with countries like Syria, Iran, S. Arabia, Jordan) was disintegrating with every victory. I'm not an apologist for post Gulf War Iraq. We didn't support the CIA incited rebellion that at its height spread across 80% of Iraq. We didn't impose or foster democracy in the region where a dictator ruled for more than 20 years. We relied on our Cold War policy of containment through the UN instead of a radical regime change. To further containment, we stationed troops in Saudi Arabia, which is the top reason Al Qaeda despises us. During the Clinton administration, we have tried to use our influence through diplomatic channels and through the UN. Our forcefulness through unilateralism has been highlighted by the Bush administration. But the contrasts between these two regimes have not prevented rouge states to further their WMD programs. How would the Gulf War accelerate something rogue states are already intent on building? Nuclear programs are already on the highest level of international taboos as it is. I'm not sure if we're in the exact position as we were. The cancer of the Israeli situation has grown, and will continue to pervert whatever interests we have in that region. Moving our troops off Saudi Arabia once and for all might not be enough anymore, but it won't be a grievance for terrorists. And while I suspect, the Administration will use Iraq as a launching grounds for an overhaul in that region, I wouldn't know for sure. I don't need action in that region right now. I actually prefer going through the UN. But there's so many problems in Iraq that do need to be solved. There are some of us who would support Saddam for all the wrong reasons. As for Israel, the Oslo Accords seems so distant doesn't it? Wouldn't you say that the assassination of Rabin produced more destructive consequences? It was through his urging that the Palestian exiles return to Israel for a peaceful settlement. Before, the bulk were stationed in Jordan and Lebanon. Just as Lincoln was assassinated before seeing through reconstruction, we don't know what would've happened if Rabin is still alive today.
It payed off in terms of eliminating a proven aggressor that would've threatened the world's economic interests, which was the original intent of the war. To clear up this myth, Hussein is not a "proven aggressor". He has started two wars in his 30+ years of rule: Iran-Iraq War: Iran was encouraging revolts and rebellions within Iraq at the time and was intent on a religious revolution there. This was just as much a preemptive-defensive war as the current Iraq situation. Kuwait War: Iraq & Kuwait had economic disputes. Iraq first tried diplomacy and failed. Hussein then basically asked our permission before engaging in this war and we quietly said "do whatever you want". He's a lot of things - a tyrant, murderer, terrorism supporter, etc - but he's not a proven aggressor. He values power more than anything else and he does what's necessary to stay in power. He knows attacking Saudi or anyone else would lead to his own death, so he won't do it.
Not true...Otherwise he would have cooperated 100% from the beginning... He hasn't been knocked out of power yet... It will be interesting to see if he does get kicked out. If world & US opinion turns against this war, he could survive yet again. Second on his list behind holding power is mocking & antagonizing the US, so if he can do both, he'll choose that route. He's going to push the limits, no doubt. If the UN would get some guts and actually threaten war, I think he'd cooperate quite quickly. Remember, he invaded another country, got his ass kicked by the world, and possibly attempted to assassinate an ex-President and has held on to power through it all.
