I think the US has made several mistakes in Isreal. Until Isreal provide equal rights to its people (Jew, palestinians, Christians, etc.), the US should cut them free. From a lot of the posts I've read since 9-11, there seems to be a lot of disgust with them. I really don't think they're the type of nation the US should ally itself with.
Cutting ties to Israel would be the dumbest possible move we could make in the region, and would likely lead to a general regional war that could go nuclear. Once the US leash disappears, Sharpon will start acting like... well, Sharon. It would mean another large-scale Arab-Israeli conflict, one in which "allied" Arab governments (Egypt and Jordan in particular) would likely fall to Islamic extremists. Somehow I don't think this would improve the situation there... We are the only nation on the planet that has enough leverage over the Israelis to actually influence their behavior. Cutting aid/ties would simply remove that leverage, and remove the leash they are currently on. Why should they obey our requests at restraint if we're not going to support them? They will have no incentive to maintain restraint without our support. It is not as simplistic a situation as some here seem to think. BTW, they are the only democracy in the ME. What kind of nations should we be dealing with there? I'm more inclined to support a pro-US democracy than an anti-US dictatorship. As for what everyone here thinks, that is irrelevant. For some odd reason, opinion here does not match national opinion... For starters, there seems to be a total absence of disgust with the Arab terrorists. For some odd reason the suicide bombings are thought to be OK here... BTW, your poll answers are a bit leading, to say the least. They're either "friends", or we just walk away? Just a tad bit simplistic.
How many millions of Palestinians live inside Israel and Israeli territory? Out of this how many of them are allowed to vote?
No I mean Arabs. They live inside Israel forcibly yet aren't allowed to vote or create their own state. United States was also a GREAT democracy back when poor people, women, and black people weren't allowed to vote right?
boy: Are you talking about the Palestinians? Or are you talking about Israeli Arabs? Israeli Arabs are Israeli citizens and can vote like everyone else. The Palestinians are not Israeli citizens, and therefore cannot vote. Unless and until the Israelis annex the occupied territories, they will never be Israeli citizens. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html Go to 'Israel' and look at the 'Government' section. Arabs can and do vote in Israeli Knesset and PM elections. Perhaps the Palestinians will get to vote in Palestinian elections if they'll ever agree to a deal that gives them a state?
Boy, How many people that are in the USA that are NOT citizens get to vote? How many women get to vote in Saudi Arabia, or Iran, or Iraq? At least we cleaned up our house a bit, what about the Dark Ages....errr....I mean the Middle East? DaDakota
Do you not see the inherent problems in these arguments? Palestinians weren't illegal aliens who came nor where they offered citizenship. They were kicked out or forced to live in refugee camps. Women in Iran do get to vote last I heard. Saudi Arabia is a brutal dictatorship and no one gets to vote there. Iraq is the creation of American support for the Ba'athist regime. Tree I wasn't referring to the Israeli Arabs. I was referring to the million + Palestinians who live in refugee camps. They aren't allowed to vote or create their own state though they live inside the territory of Israel. That seems to me as though Israel isn't a real democracy. I also recall how it was said numerous times on this board that a democratic theocracy is an oxymoron. If so how is Israel a democracy when it lauds itself on the fact that it is a Jewish nation? Of course if its not an oxymoron, Iran is democratic.
boy: For the most part the Palestinians left what is modern-day Israel in '47-'48 in anticipation of a multinational Arab invasion in order to avoid the fighting. They fully expected to return as soon as Israel was destroyed... Didn't work out too well for them, did it? If you're talking about the Palestinians in the occupied territories, keep in mind that A) they've been there since the 1948 war, and B) the occupied territories are not a part of Israel. As I said, unless and until Israel decides to formally annex the territories, the Palestinians will not get Israeli citizenship and cannot vote. Do you want them to vote in Israeli elections, or do you want them to have their own state? Make up your mind. There you go again. The US did not put the Baathist regime in power in Iraq - that is a baseless lie (which makes sense coming from you). The US has always opposed the Baathist movement in the ME; we simply gave Saddam limited support during the Iran-Iraq conflict to counter Iranian ambitions in the Gulf. Now, I'm sure you'd be tickled pink if the mullahs took over the Persian Gulf, but the rest of the world wouldn't look kindly upon that development... We've known Saddam was a bad guy from day one. We simply used him against the Iranians. We did not put him there, as you so often try to claim. Again, make up your mind: Do you want them to have a state, or do you want them to become Israeli citizens? Can't have both. If they'd stop attacking the Israelis then they'd have their own state by now. The Israelis have repeatedly offered statehood to them, but Arafat calls off talks whenever they get too close to success. Why do you think that is? Why do you think they keep calling for "right of return", when they know that there is absolutely no way that the Israelis can ever accept that? Because they will settle for nothing less than the destruction of Israel. Excuse, me, but do you even know what "democracy" means? It means that the people select their leaders. Who elects Knesset members in Israel? The people. Who elects the Prime Minister? The people. Is it a theocratic government? Only in the sense that the vast majority of the people there are Jews, and support religious law. Who elects the Supreme Leader in Iran? No one. Who elects the mullahs? No one. The elected officials there have no real power. I don't know how many times I will have to explain this to you... But the Khamenei controls the military, the press, the secret police, Iranian intelligence services, and regularly nullifies elections that threaten the mullahs' rule. Khatami is powerless, and everyone in Iran knows it. Israel is run by democratically elected officials. Iran is run by a Supreme Leader and numerous councils of unelected mullahs. One is a democracy with theocratic tendencies, the other is a dictatorship with democratic window-dressing. I will never understand how you can confuse the two. Of course, you have already been brainwashed, so it's probably too late for you...
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/iltoc.html Israel's Arabs are guaranteed equal religious and civil rights with Jews under the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel. They have voted in national elections and sent members to the Knesset since 1949; following the 1984 elections, seven Arabs sat in the Knesset. Nevertheless, until the end of 1966, Israel's Arabs lived under a military jurisdiction that severely limited their physical mobility and ranges of permissible political expression. They have also lost much land to the Israeli government, a good deal of it expropriated by the army for "security purposes," but much more turned over to Jewish settlements in attempts to increase the Jewish presence in northern and western Galilee, the centers of Arab population. --------------- I'm becoming more and more of an isolationist for day to day events. Go after terrorist. Try not to kill civilians even if they don't like you. Try to prevent wars from starting. I don't see a peaceful solution in ME. I don't see advantages to be allies with anyone in the region on more than a business relationship. I don't see anyone better in the region, but is that a good reason to be so buddy buddy with them. Let the UN protect them. The US military is a big part of any UN forces, but there is a difference in sending any forces at the UN request as "peacekeepers" and sending them in on Israel's request as the cavalry.
What does this mean? You are aware, of course, that we have never sent any troops to aid Israel, even when they were about to be overrun in '73? We have given them weapons, cash, and satintel - the same things we give our Arab "allies". Only we have rushed the cavalry in for their defense before... BTW, I agree that there is probably not a peaceful solution in the ME at this point. There cannot be one as long as one side insists on the other's total destruction...
Only one? I see a wolf and a wolf in sheep's clothes. Its a lose-lose situation in my opinion. I didn't mean to imply the US has defended Israel in the past, but I think we would now if need be.
<A HREF="http://www.mideasti.org/html/full551.html"> RE-THINKING THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC: A ‘CONVERSATION’ WITH AYATOLLAH HOSSEIN ‘ALI MONTAZERI</A> <i> .........Ayatollah Hossein ‘Ali Montazeri, a high-ranking political and religious cleric, lies at the center of the conflict now raging over religious interpretation in Iran. Once named to succeed Ayatollah Khomeini, Montazeri has been under house arrest since 1997 for calling for limits to supreme clerical rule. This article presents a detailed interview with Montazeri on Islam, the clergy and the state – his first ever dialogue with a Western audience – as well as an introduction and brief biographical account. INTRODUCTION The intense factional struggle that has come to characterize virtually all aspects of life in contemporary Iran has its roots in the ambitious proposition put forward at the birth of the Islamic Republic two decades ago – that it be both an Islamic state run by clerics and a republic ruled by popular consent. Failure to resolve this tension in a lasting and profound way has badly weakened the cohesion of the clerical class, undermined the legitimacy of the Islamic system, and left the state increasingly paralyzed in the face of mounting internal pressures. With the election in May 1997 of President Muhammad Khatami, a mid-ranking cleric with a strong modernist bent, these issues have moved out of the obscurity of the seminaries and into the streets. The result has been a revolution turning on itself, with the imprisonment of progressive clerics, the mass closure of the independent media, and a sharp upsurge in political violence as the conservative establishment seeks to reassert itself after repeated electoral defeats. Underpinning Iran's domestic turmoil is a unique philosophical debate. What is the true instrument of God's will in an Islamic republic? Does ultimate political power reside with the senior theologians, qualified to interpret holy law? Or is it the people, as an expression of God's genius, who exercise sovereignty in His name? The way that Iran addresses these questions will provide a road map to the future of the country and to that of the rest of the Islamic world. The death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in June 1989, after a long period of infirmity, exposed the greatest weakness of the Islamic Revolution he had led to victory ten years before. The overthrow of the Shah ended some 2,500 years of centralized despotism. More significantly, it introduced into the modern world the notion of an “Islamic government.” Central to this conception of the state was the controversial doctrine of velayat-e faqih<fn1>, Khomeini's radical reading of Sh‘i Islam. Literally “the guardianship of the jurisconsult,” velayat-e faqih sought to ensure the Islamic nature of the new society by subjecting all key matters to review by a supreme clerical leader, the vali-e faqih, in this case Khomeini himself. In a sharp departure from classical Shi‘ism, it combined both temporal and spiritual authority. Traditionalist clerics, including some of the most senior theologians in the Shi‘i world, were decidedly uneasy at this turn of events. Many abhorred the extension of the notion of velayat, seen historically as guardianship over orphans, widows and others who could not fend for themselves, into the realm of politics. They preferred that the doctors of religion remain outside of politics, while reserving the right to guide the rulers and the ruled in times of moral or religious crisis. For the most part, this traditionalist opposition has been effectively muzzled. Nonetheless, there remains a potentially powerful reservoir of clerical resistance to Iran's system of Islamic government. But another, more immediate threat lies just below the surface. Opposition to the status quo has also been building steadily among Iran's “political mullahs” and their lay allies. Foremost among such critics is Ayatollah Hossein ‘Ali Montazeri, once the designated heir to Khomeini and now Iran's most influential dissident. Since 1997, Montazeri has been under house arrest in the holy city of Qom for challenging the theological credentials of Khomeini's successor, Ayatollah ‘Ali Khamene'i. He is barred from teaching and his financial resources – donations from the faithful used in part to finance young seminary students – are frozen. Guests are forbidden, except for immediate relatives; his grandchildren are monitored by the secret police as they shop for the family's groceries. The author sought to break the information blockade that surrounded this veteran revolutionary and senior cleric. The result was an extensive interview conducted by fax in December 1999 and January 2000 that lays out Montazeri's challenge to the present system of supreme clerical rule. Word of the interview, Montazeri's first ever, electrified the Iranian press and foreign radio services broadcasting in Farsi.<fn2> Until then, Montazeri had been able to smuggle out the odd tract denouncing the clerical establishment, but he had been cut off from the large, if discreet, following he enjoys both within the power structure and society at large. His initial house arrest sparked rare public protest from scores of parliamentarians. Residents of his native Najafabad, near Isfahan, took to the streets at the time and the area remains defiant. Key political figures, including the mayor of Tehran, many members of the new parliament, and leading progressive clerics all look to Montazeri for moral and political leadership. And he remains immensely popular among young seminary students. At the core of Montazeri's critique lies a profound opposition to the absolute nature of clerical rule as practiced in post-Khomeini Iran. Along the way, Montazeri deplores what he sees as deviations from the intent of the drafters of the 1979 Constitution, a document he was instrumental in creating. He also acknowledges the need for serious structural reform. He and other framers of the 1979 Islamic Constitution never intended to accord the institution of velayat-e faqih with absolute powers. “He can never be above the law, and he cannot interfere in all the affairs, particularly the affairs that fall outside his area of expertise, such as complex economic issues, or issues of foreign policy and international relations,” explains Montazeri. “The most important point to be highlighted is that Islam is for the separation of powers and does not recognize the concentration of power in the hand of a fallible human being.” “According to the Constitution, the election of the vali-e faqih is performed by the Experts, who are in turn elected by the people. However, the experience of the last twenty years has made it clear that this procedure has not been successful, creating doubts, confusion and problems in the minds of the majority of the nation, which is supposed to be the very foundation of the government.” He blames these shortcomings on the political inexperience of the clerics, saying they have led to “the weakening of the spiritual status of the clergy among the public.” In the first decade of the revolution, the extensive powers wielded by Ayatollah Khomeini were of little concern to clerics like Montazeri. After all, Khomeini was a revolutionary figure who had proven his ability on the political stage. Furthermore, he had been recognized as a marja‘-e taqlid [Ar. marja‘ al-taqlid, literally, a source of tradition or emulation], a senior religious expert empowered to provide spiritual authority to his followers, long before the revolution. In the face of his undoubted charisma, the tensions between clerical rule and republicanism were simply set aside. All this changed with the sharp decline in Khomeini's health, accelerated by the bitter 1988 truce that ended the eight-year war with Iraq. To shore up the institution of supreme leader in the anticipated absence of Khomeini and to ease the succession, his loyalists forced through revisions in the Constitution to make the powers of the faqih “absolute.” At the same time, the religious requirements for the post were reduced. The supreme leader no longer had to be drawn from among the recognized maraje‘ taqlid; political expertise was judged sufficient. In Iranian year 1374 (1995-1996), parliament further strengthened the hands of the ruling clerics, giving the Guardian Council, dominated by theologians, the right to vet candidates for elected office. Montazeri's transformation from revolutionary mullah to revolutionary dissident began toward the end of the Khomeini era. Described by the leader of the revolution as “the fruit of my life,” he was initially designated as heir and successor. Montazeri was the first post-revolutionary Friday prayer leader in Tehran. He had been at the forefront of the dissident movement against the Shah inside Iran for many years, and he had attracted a big popular following as an antidote to the traditional mullah, perceived for centuries as self-indulgent, corrupt, and self-important. By contrast, Montazeri was born into a poor family in 192 2. He endeared himself to his growing number of followers by shopping in the local markets of his native Najafabad with ordinary people. This was unprecedented for a cleric of such authority. The image of Montazeri as a genuine man of religion served him well among the people but weakened his hand in the high-stakes power politics of the ruling clerical circles. Even after his appointment as designated successor, Montazeri appeared to ignore the sensitive nature of his new position. He continued to campaign aggressively against injustice toward political prisoners, corruption in government, and duplicity within the clerical establishment. Khomeini had assigned Montazeri to monitor post-revolutionary violence and prisoner releases. But his principles set him at odds with a number of powerful figures and institutions, including the judiciary, still ruled by revolutionary fervor rather than traditional Shi‘i notions of justice. Toward the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, Montazeri openly criticized the intelligence and security forces for mistreating citizens and political prisoners. He warned that the principles of the revolution were being undermined by counter-revolutionaries, bent on creating a new dictatorship. The breaking point came in the autumn of 1988, when thousands of opposition prisoners were executed in a move against the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, the armed opposition seeking to overthrow the Islamic Republic. Montazeri turned to Khomeini to voice his criticism, but by then the leader of the revolution was gravely ill and had lost most of his critical faculties. Instead, the circle around Khomeini took advantage of the situation to turn him against Montazeri, largely to improve their own political prospects in the upcoming struggle for succession. In the end, Khomeini renounced his one-time protege, freeing Montazeri from his official duties but unleashing a powerful voice of dissent that reverberates to this day. ..... </i> The interview follows at the link above, but its length precludes posting it in this thread. A link to an English translation of the Iranian Constitution. <A HREF="http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ir00t___.html">Constitution of Iran</A> I have read the interview with Ayatollah Montazeri and looked at the Constitution to understand the points that he makes. If you can refute the issues that he raises, please do. Mango
Joe Joe: Oh come on... If Israel wanted to actually destroy the Arabs, then there would be no Arabs right now. Unlike the Arabs, the Israelis actually do have the military capability to totally and utterly destroy their enemies. They have not done so because they have no desire to do so. They are just tired of being continuously attacked. How would we feel if a 9/11-scale attack happened here every week? When the Israelis lose 20 people in a suicide bombing, that's about the relative equivalent of a 9/11 attack to them... They have been under attack for over 50 years. If it happened to us on a weekly basis, then there really wouldn't be any Arabs left. As for sending troops to defend them, there's no need to. They can defend themselves from another Arab offensive; it's just impossible to defend against suicide bombers. Incidentally, we've sent them a bunch of improved Patriot batteries, so I guess you could say that we are going to help them some in the anti-missile category... Seems like they're expecting a few SCUDs from the east sometime in the near future.
I don't like to choose between only two choices-- unquestioning support or cutting Israel totally loose. We need to quote the conservatives "regime change" in Israel. Fortunately this is easy for us to do. Just quit subsidizing their military occupation of the post 1967 borders and let them know that Sharon has overstepped his boundaries. Sharon is on his way out anyway and this will speed it up. Once they figure they can't count on our unlimited backing for continual war against their neighbors, the Sharonists will give up on their dream of hanging on to their 1967 conquest , they will start following UN resolutions and things will actually get better for them. Unfortuantely many Israelis are still otionally distraught at this time to realize what is best for them. This does seem to be changing with the reservistsbegiining to refuse to serve in the occupied terriories and the intelligence types questioning the wisdom of expending such great resources to defend isolated settlements of religious settler extremists.
I'm backing down from completely cutting off Israel which was a decision I made after a bad day at work yesterday, but I don't see them as nice guys (maybe a product of the area, but we won't know till peace happens) and wouldn't give them a blank check. But, if they did this, they'd be like the Nazis. I think the Israeli's are testing how much latitude the US and UN will give them and your scenario, complete ethnic cleansing, would be beyond those limits. Why did you choose Arab instead of Palestinian? Why are there Israeli settlements outside of Israel in occupied territory? Why was land expropriated from Arabs for Jewish settlements despite the Arabs being citizens (I think the Arabs were granted citizenship before this but could be wrong). I can see bases from a military point of view in occupied territory, but why put civilians in a warzone unless you mean to expand into conquered (through defending themselves) territory. I have no problem installing Patriots in Israel. I have no problem selling them offensive weapons. I would watch their actions and make sure they only defend themselves and hold them to standards we hold ourselves to.
