Stratfor - Iraq: The New Test of Allegiance

Iraq: The New Test of Allegiance
15 February 2002

Summary

It appears the Bush administration has selected Iraq as the next target in its anti-terrorism war. Doing so serves two purposes: It adds a conventional component to a battle that is otherwise murky and difficult for the public to comprehend. It also serves as a litmus test that, for other nations, will define the rules of membership in Washington's anti-terrorism coalition.

Analysis

The fundamental problem with the war on al Qaeda is that it is invisible. It is a covert war against, at most, a few thousand individuals who are both scattered throughout the world and highly mobile. It is also a war of inferences, lies and, ultimately, confusion. It is a war of contemplation rather than a war of action, as intelligence analysts on both sides try to determine what the other side knows and when it knew it. It is a war of sudden, unpredictable actions often undetectable by the other side. And it is a war invisible to the media and, therefore, to the public.

At the same time, it is a war that could suddenly take the lives of thousands of Americans. Indeed, if al Qaeda has secured even minor weapons of mass destruction, it can suddenly take the lives of tens of thousands or even more. This creates tremendous pressures. The war against al Qaeda will be long, invisible and uncertain. Even those prosecuting the war will frequently be uncertain as to what is happening, and the public will have no way to determine progress.

The credibility of the U.S. government -- regardless of who the president might be -- would be sorely tested by such a war. In a democratic society, the foundation of any war is the trust the public is prepared to grant its government. That trust will be hard to sustain in the war against an invisible enemy, without geographic or temporal definition. No one can tell if victory is at hand or beyond reach.

By this standard, Afghanistan was very good for the United States. Even if the deep structure of Afghan society was beyond the grasp of the media and most Americans, the campaign in Afghanistan provided a clear arena and some understandable yardsticks against which to measure. Although nothing important was decided there, something was decided about Afghanistan -- and that meant something solid could be seen in the gloom. It was a comfort to the American people. However, the moment of clarity in Afghanistan has passed, and it is now slowly dissolving into the general darkness of the larger "shadow war."

The United States has never fought a war so unconventional as that against al Qaeda, and it is not clear that any society could sustain a war of such scope over an indeterminate time with so little definition. For Washington to retain the public's support and trust, the war must be recast in comprehensible terms. In some sense, it must be given a geographical cast: There must be some signposts along the way. Even if the most important actions take place in the netherworld of covert operations, the war must have some conventional component.

That is why, as the Afghan campaign shifts into a small-unit holding action, the United States must define the next phase of the war in terms of a nation-state. Iraq now appears to have been officially selected, for some obvious reasons.

First, the United States has unfinished business in Iraq. It expected Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to fall of his own accord after his defeat in 1991. Washington wanted an orderly, internal coup d'etat because it did not want to create a vacuum in Iraq that would be filled by Iran, destabilizing the balance of power in the region. Hussein, like Gamal Abdel Nasser before him, knew how to survive unmitigated disaster. His security forces knew how to stop coups. That has left the United States with an unsatisfactory outcome.

Second, no one knows how far Hussein has gone in developing weapons of mass destruction. He might not have any; he might have many. Guessing wrong on this could have catastrophic results around the world. Therefore, even if al Qaeda did not exist, the mere possibility of Hussein possessing WMD would be intolerable. Israel dealt with this issue in 1981 by bombing his nuclear facilities, but Iraq has had a generation to repair those facilities and spawn new ones. So long as Hussein holds power in Baghdad, we can't be sure that he would not use WMD.

Third, while it is true that al Qaeda and Hussein are ideological opponents, it is also true that they are prepared to cooperate where it suits them. If, for example, Hussein had biological weapons and al Qaeda had a sophisticated global network to deliver them, Hussein might determine that it was in his interests to provide those weapons to al Qaeda. Letting Hussein know he will be held responsible for any such action possibly might deter him. Destroying him and his regime would be a more certain path.

Thus, there are good reasons for targeting Iraq under any circumstances. Given the political imperatives of this war, the U.S. decision is even more understandable. But there is another aspect of this as well: Defining the rules of membership in the anti-terrorism coalition.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has won the argument that only a long-term coalition can sustain U.S. operations in the covert war. However, the unilateralist faction within the Bush administration has also scored a critical point: that the coalition is of value only if it enables that war. It is a danger to U.S. security if sustaining the coalition makes effective operations impossible. Therefore, if there is to be a coalition, that coalition must be shaped. Each nation must accept that friendship with the United States means membership in the anti-al Qaeda coalition -- and that membership means enabling the United States to do what it deems necessary, rather than blocking it.

Iraq is an exquisite test. There are sufficient U.N. resolutions pending against it, sufficient real threats emanating from it and sufficient restraint on the part of the United States. If a coalition partner finds action against Iraq undesirable, the Bush administration reasons, then what sort of actions will it tolerate? For example, neither Russia nor France has fundamental interests at stake in Iraq. Granted, a U.S. operation against Iraq would be inconvenient to both, and they might prefer no action, but Washington's view is that those preferences ought not determine French or Russian policy -- unless Paris and Moscow do not view membership in the anti-terrorism coalition as an overriding principle. And if they do not regard membership in the coalition as a fundamental principle in their foreign policy, in what sense can they be regarded as friendly?

German and Australian leaders have tried to state the principle as their right to be consulted and to approve all actions. From the U.S. point of view, consultation within the limits of security is one thing -- but if prior approval by all coalition members is needed before action, then the coalition has become a straitjacket and allies become the problem rather than the solution.

The United States' allies, particularly in Europe, do not understand American thinking at this point. From their point of view, the attacks of Sept. 11, the threat of future attacks and the strange war upon which the United States has embarked are merely one strand in the fabric of international relations. Life goes on, with the normal protocols of a peacetime relationship in place. From the U.S. point of view, an extraordinary and unprecedented state of emergency exists in which the most fundamental American interests are at stake. The normal state of affairs has been suspended. The Europeans say, "Surely you don't expect us to simply rubber-stamp your decisions?" The Americans answer, "Surely you don't expect us to spend our time trying to convince you to stand by us?"

It is not clear what, if anything, can or will be done about Iraq. However, if a coalition partner cannot -- at least in principle -- accept the idea that Hussein must be toppled in the course of this war, then it doesn't belong in the coalition and cannot be counted on as a friend of the United States. If allies can't support a campaign to overthrow Hussein, it is doubtful they will support any other actions the United States will have to take in years to come. Better to know it now, from Washington's point of view. Powell has made the case for coalition, which the allies have cheered. He has now defined the nature of the coalition, for which the allies were unprepared. Powell has made Iraq the litmus test for coalition membership. If someone doesn't have the stomach for that, they won't have the stomach for anything.

So, there are two reasons for Washington's selection of Iraq as the next target. By redefining the war in more conventional terms -- as a confrontation between nation-states -- the administration buys more time for the covert war it must wage. Second, by turning Iraq into a litmus test for the coalition, Washington can shape the vague alliances into a war-fighting coalition instead of a debating society.

Washington expects defections and will live with them. It is inviting the defectors to contemplate the consequences of defection.

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