USSC decisions

Not that different. Biden’s current positions aren’t radically different from Clinton’s. Both are supporting infrastructure bills, maintaining international alliances such as NATO, and continued healthcare reform. Biden is more willing to spend than Clinton but that would put him closer to older Democrats
Like LBJ.

Trump is almost a 180 from both Bushes and Reagan on issues like immigration and US alliances.

 

Useful thread

 

so clever.

Spoiler

clever = facile, trite

 

for all you stare decisis fans out there

What Exactly Do Justices Thomas and Gorsuch Disagree About In Loper Bright
Justice Thomas agrees with the "lion's share" of Justice Gorsuch's concurrence.

https://reason.com/volokh/2024/07/0...s-and-gorsuch-disagree-about-in-loper-bright/

excerpt:

A few other points from Justice Gorsuch's Loper Bright concurrence:

First, Justice Gorsuch accurately describes how Abraham Lincoln responded to Dred Scott:

Abraham Lincoln championed these traditional understandings in his debates with Stephen Douglas. Douglas took the view that a single decision of this Court—no matter how flawed—could definitively resolve a contested issue for everyone and all time. Those who thought otherwise, hesaid, "aim[ed] a deadly blow to our whole Republican system of government." Speech at Springfield, Ill. (June 26,1857), in 2 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 401 (R.Basler ed. 1953) (Lincoln Speech). But Lincoln knew better. While accepting that judicial decisions "absolutely determine" the rights of the parties to a court's judgment, he refused to accept that any single judicial decision could "fullysettl[e]" an issue, particularly when that decision departs from the Constitution. Id., at 400–401. In cases such as these, Lincoln explained, "it is not resistance, it is not factious, it is not even disrespectful, to treat [the decision] as not having yet quite established a settled doctrine for the country." Id., at 401.
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By contrast, Justice Sotomayor inverted this history in her Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson dissent. Her ode to judicial supremacy would have been welcomed by Stephen Douglas and Roger Taney.

Second, Justice Gorsuch echoes a point that co-blogger Jonathan Adler has been making for more than a decade now: the Roberts Court overrules precedent at a much lower rate than the Burger and Warren Courts did:

Recent history illustrates all this. During the tenures of Chief Justices Warren and Burger, it seems this Court overruled an average of around three cases per Term, including roughly 50 statutory precedents between the 1960s and 1980s alone. See W. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L. J. 1361, 1427–1434 (1988) (collecting cases). Many of these decisions came in settings no less consequential than today's. In recent years, we have not approached the pace set by our predecessors, overruling an average of just one or two prior decisions each Term.1

1For relevant databases of decisions, see Congressional Research Service, Table of Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decisions, Constitution Annotated, https://constitution.congress.gov/resources/decisions-overruled/; see also H. Spaeth et al., 2023 Supreme Court Database, http://supremecourtdatabase.org.
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A cite to Adler would have been nice, but such is the Supreme Court.

Third, Justice Gorsuch explains that the Court's progressives love stare decisis unless there are five votes to overrule a conservative precedent.

8 Today's dissenters are no exceptions. They have voted to overrule precedents that they consider "wrong," Hurst v. Florida, 577 U. S. 92, 101 (2016) (opinion for the Court by SOTOMAYOR, J., joined by, inter alios, KAGAN, J.); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 665, 675 (2015) (opinion for the Court, joined by, inter alios, SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ.); that conflict with the Constitution's "original meaning," Alleyne v. United States, 570 U. S. 99, 118 (2013) (SOTOMAYOR, J., joined by, inter alias, KAGAN, J., concurring); and that have proved "unworkable," Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591, 605 (2015) (opinion for the Court, joined by, inter alios, SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ.); see also Erlinger v. United States, 602 U. S. ___, ___ (2024) (JACKSON, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1) (arguing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), and the many cases applying it were all "wrongly decided").
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I cringe whenever Justices Kagan or Sotomayor write about stare decisis after Obergefell. There was every good reason to not overrule a precedent that is older than our society, but they did it because they could. Moreover, it seems the new trend is for the liberal Justices to say they think a precedent is wrong–like Jackson in Erlinger–but not actually call for the decision to be overruled. A distinction without much of a difference.
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more at the link

 

I hate OSHA but dam, do you know what some companies would do if they didnt have that threat looming overhead

 

That’s the whole point, trying to turn this country around 125 years back into the past. Biden had a poor performance to put it mildly, but I have to support him based on the radical Supreme Court, and the shitstain that wants the job back as president.

 

interesting idea, contracting, rather than expanding, the court.

 

Why not have rotating terms? If they want to keep being judges they can bounce back down to a circuit court

 

sure. feel free to propose an amendment that does that.

 

https://reason.com/volokh/2024/07/0...nt-poses-more-risks-than-suing-the-president/

6 hours ago
Trump v. United States Recognizes That Prosecuting The President Poses More Risks Than Suing The President
by Josh Blackman

Nixon v. Fitzgerald established broad presidential immunity for civil lawsuits. Clinton v. Jones permitted the sitting President to be sued for conduct that occurred before his time in office. But neither case addressed presidential immunity from a criminal prosecution.

During the Mueller investigation, I wrote a series of articles contending that a federal criminal prosecution posed a far greater risk to the presidency than a civil lawsuit. Mueller's defenders disagreed. They contended that since anyone could file a civil lawsuit, while only a responsible federal prosecutor could bring an indictment, the former posed a greater risk. I never found this argument persuasive. Now, Trump v. United States squarely rejected this distinction.

Chief Justice Roberts stated the issue plainly:

Criminally prosecuting a President for official conduct undoubtedly poses a far greater threat of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch than simply seeking evidence in his possession, as in Burr and Nixon. The danger is akin to, indeed greater than, what led us to recognize absolute Presidential immunity from civil damages liability—that the President would be chilled from taking the "bold and unhesitating action" required of an independent Executive. Fitzgerald. Although the President might be exposed to fewer criminal prosecutions than the range of civil damages suits that might be brought by various plaintiffs, the threat of trial, judgment, and imprisonment is a far greater deterrent. Potential criminal liability, and the peculiar public opprobrium that attaches to criminal proceedings, are plainly more likely to distort Presidential decisionmaking than the potential payment of civil damages.​

Robert is absolutely correct (not a sentence I write often).

In dissent, Justice Sotomayor articulated the alternate view. First, she wrote that the "threat of criminal liability is much smaller." There are countless potential civil litigants, but only one Department of Justice. Sotomayor wrote, "The majority's bare assertion that the burden of exposure to federal criminal prosecution is more limiting to a President than the burden of exposure to civil suits does not make it true, and it is not persuasive." I'm not so sure. Compare the impact of Jack Smith and Robert Mueller to the impact of Paula Jones and E. Jean Carroll. Not even in the same ballpark.

Second, Justice Sotomayor pointed to "robust procedural safeguards" that federal criminal prosecution have that civil suits lack. She cites the "scrupulous and impartial" standards that DOJ lawyers follow, in addition to procedural protections under the Bill of Rights. I'm not sure this argument sticks. The procedural protections exist because the potential punishment is far more severe. At most, a civil lawsuit can yield a damages award, and maybe some injunctions. Civil suits can also be quietly settled. By contrast, a criminal prosecution is public, and can result in incarceration and forfeiture of various rights.

Third, Sotomayor acknowledges that "a private civil action may be brought based on little more than "'intense feelings.'" By contrast, "a federal criminal prosecution is made of firmer stuff." Historically, she writes, prosecutors have exercised "restraint" to not prosecute a former President. But the "grave" allegations against Trump were different.

A recurring theme in the Trump dissent is an abiding faith in the fairness of a federal prosecutions against the President–especially by a special counsel. Indeed, Justice Sotomayor insisted that the special prosecutor acts on behalf of the United States:

The public's interest in prosecution is transparent: a federal prosecutor herself acts on behalf of the United States​

That is true only in the most technical sense. In reality, Jack Smith works for Jack Smith, and there is no evidence that Attorney General Garland actually exercises any control over this prosecutor. During oral argument in Florida, counsel for the special counsel refused to address whether the Attorney General was even consulted before Trump was indicted. Moreover, Reports suggest that Smith would continue prosecuting Trump even up till inauguration day–something no accountable prosecutor would even countenance.

Color me (and the Chief Justice) skeptical about Jack Smith faithfully representing the United States. As Justice Scalia explained in his Morrison dissent, a prosecutor focused on one person, and one person alone, will stop at nothing to get his man. These dynamics are all the more troubling when the guy is the former, and (likely) future President.

Roberts responds:

The prosaic tools on which the Government would have courts rely are an inadequate safeguard against the peculiar constitutional concerns implicated in the prosecution of a former President. Although such tools may suffice to protect the constitutional rights of individual criminal defendants, the interests that underlie Presidential immunity seek to protect not thePresident himself, but the institution of the Presidency.​

Roberts used a nearly identical line in Trump v. Hawaii, though he did not dare cite it:

In doing so, we must consider not only the statements of a particular President, but also the authority of the Presidency itself.​

This issue also recurred during oral argument in Trump v. Mazars. In that case, Justice Gorsuch "we have to write a rule that's presumptively of some value going forward and isn't just about one President but it's about the presidency." Gorsuch made a similar comment in the immunity argument, noting they were writing a "rule for the ages." Gorsuch was mocked for this statement, but he is exactly right. With a separation of powers cases, it's not just about Trump.

Throughout the four years of the Trump presidency, I repeated this refrain over and over again: whatever rules are adopted for this President would invariably weaken the presidency in the future.

I suspect lurking in Roberts's mind is a reasonable concern that a Trump administration will try to indict President Biden on a whole range of offenses. This passage speaks to that risk directly:

Virtually every President is criticized for insufficiently enforcing some aspect of federal law (such as drug, gun, immigration, or environmental laws). An enterprising prosecutor in a new administration may assert that a previous President violated that broad statute. Without immunity, such types of prosecutions of ex-Presidents could quickly become routine.​

As much as Roberts was trying to insulate Trump from criminal prosecution, he was also throwing a life-preserve to former-President Biden, and all future former-presidents.

Still, even so, the Trump DOJ may seek to indict Biden for his retention of classified documents. This conduct by the former Vice President occurred before he was President. Special Counsel Robert Hur's argument that Biden is an "elderly man with a poor memory" will be belied with Biden's own insistence that he has the mental acuity to be the leader of the free world. I'm not sure what the statute of limitations is on that offense, but it would probably be tolled while Biden is in office. And given that Biden would no longer pose any sort of political threat to Trump, there is no conflict of interest, so I don't even think a special counsel would be called for. I suppose Biden could pardon himself on the way out the door.

JOSH BLACKMAN is a constitutional law professor at the South Texas College of Law Houston, an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, and the President of the Harlan Institute. Follow him @JoshMBlackman.
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more from Josh Blackman

What Exactly Did Justice Barrett Agree With Chief Justice Roberts On About Presidential Immunity?
We know that she didn't agree on the evidentiary issue. Beyond that, the disjunction is unclear.

https://reason.com/volokh/2024/07/0...stice-roberts-on-about-presidential-immunity/

 

Clarence Thomas should be told to try walking on some scaffolding in a country with no regulations first.

It's just plain reckless and deadly thinking to want to go backwards in time and remove standards put in place to save lives. I smell money dirty money and greed behind this, and some quid pro quo.

This is exactly what I call prioritizing the wishes of greedy billionaires over the lives of hard working people in this country. Let's just save employers money and stop regulating and requiring safety inspections designed to avoid exposure to harmful chemicals and prevent accidents, fatalities, and injuries.

Who needs to make sure workers are provided required personal protective equipment at no cost? Who needs require training workers about job hazards in a language that they can understand? Screw that. We will find people who want the job bad enough, and we'll save money. Let's make the billionaires of the industries into trillionaires. They fund our campaigns. The working people are just collateral damage along the road to riches.