The US and the West need a swift reversal on policies and decisions over the past decade that has allowed dark money (from Russia, China in particular) to infiltrate western Democracies and corrupt them. Defending the United States against Russian dark money - Atlantic Council Russia-Dark-Money-Printable-PDF.pdf (atlanticcouncil.org) According to the most reliable estimates, Russia has the world’s largest volume of dark money hidden abroad—about $1 trillion—both in absolute terms and as a percentage of its national GDP.3 An estimated one-quarter of this amount is controlled by Russian President Vladimir Putin and his close associates, and the Kremlin appears to be able to persuade dependent oligarchs to assist financially in its foreign policy undertakings.4 These oligarchs hire the best lawyers, auditors, bankers, and lobbyists in the world to develop legal means to conceal and launder their funds. They thus often have greater resources than the regulators tasked with maintaining the integrity of national financial systems. And while governments generally operate in their own single country, a serious Russian oligarch lives (with eminent security) in half a dozen countries, has layers of anonymous shell companies in a score of offshore jurisdictions, and his funds move at lightning speed between them. We argue that these funds pose a serious national security threat to the United States because this money can be exploited and steered by the Kremlin for espionage, terrorism, industrial espionage, bribery, political manipulation, disinformation, and many other nefarious purposes. For Russia, prominent analysts have observed, corruption has been transformed into an instrument of national strategy.5 Russia, and not China, played a major role in the US elections in 2016, according to both the Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, popularly known as the Mueller report, and the Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election.6 In Part I of this paper, we examine the pervasiveness of Russian money laundering practices globally, why the money is laundered, methods, and jurisdictions used, and how these exploit weaknesses in the US system. We provide concrete examples, drawing on recent investigations, of how opaque financial structures allow known Russian actors who have worked against the interests of the United States to operate well within its borders. Part II of the paper discusses how to reframe anti-money laundering and counterterrorism finance (AML/CFT) strategy to focus not only on foreign policy threats emanating from abroad, but on domestic preventive measures and combating risks at home. Using Russia as a case in point, we provide recommendations tailored to the money laundering typologies used by its illicit actors and their financial intermediaries. The United States and likeminded partners should apply four basic principles: Transparency. Timely and efficient access to beneficial ownership information is long overdue in the United States; regulation must cover ultimate beneficiaries of a wide range of obliged entities, from formal financial institutions to intermediaries such as lawyers and brokers to purveyors of valuable assets such as real estate brokers and art dealers. The European Union (EU) has imposed a legal requirement to submit information on ultimate beneficial ownership. Regulators must use this information not only as a preventive measure but for rigorous investigation and enforcement. Swift reporting of relevant transactions. Financial reporting can be slow and spam financial intelligence units with irrelevant and minor transactions, while cooperation between financial intelligence units is cumbersome and falls far behind the speed of commerce. Likeminded financial authorities should develop a greater joint understanding of the typologies of illicit financial movements and develop swift and more selective reporting keyed to criteria to uncover corruption. Likeminded countries with close intelligence relationships should incorporate financial threats into the security dialogue. International cooperation among stronger regulators. Despite having different vulnerabilities within their respective systems, the United States and the EU face similar threats. The EU’s AML/CFT reform proposal to establish an EU-wide regulator to supervise national competent authorities in the member states and have credible enforcement capabilities should receive widespread support from the United States. Conversely, the United States needs to revamp and strengthen the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in the Department of the Treasury. Credible fines. In recent years, US fines for money laundering have dwindled to the point that, unlike penalties for sanctions evaders, they no longer serve as a credible threat for money launderers. And only in rare circumstances have European authorities charged significant fines for money laundering. European Banks should establish proper compliance departments, as exist in the United States, and boost the fines they impose.
You can't pull a trillion bucks out of the system. That's like 10 trillion a sucker bank would lend out. 30 trillion for a bank worth its salt. Anyone remember right after 08, the feds busted Wells Fargo for handling/laundering roughly a third of a trillion in drug money? I think their fine was a measly 50 million. The ****ers know what they're doing.
