Conditions of victory are often vastly misunderstood and understated

When people talk about "victory" in a conflict or struggle, defining what this means is far more complex and difficult than many realize. Tragically, this lack of understanding and comprehension extends to national leaders. It is for this reason that the US was defeated in Vietnam, the USSR was defeated in Afganistan and the US faces defeat in Iraq.

First, let's look at Vietnam. At first glance, it would seem that "victory" there was a simple matter. Victory meant preserving the existence of an anti-communist South Vietnam from takeover by North Vietnam. However, there were many other implicit conditions of victory which when viewed in totality made defeat in Vietnam inevitable. These conditions were:
1. Prevent S Vietnam from takeover by North
2. Maintain a compliant pro-US regime in South
3. Facilitate finding of guerrillas by burning down villages and homes
and rounding up anyone remotely suspected of being N Vietnamese agents
4. Expect widespread support of US efforts and of S Vietnam regime from
S Vietnamese
5. Achieve said goals without letting war escalate to WWIII
- which meant not invading N Vietnam (otherwise PRC might intervene)
- which meant not invading neighboring N Vietnamese allies (like Cambodia)
- which meant not attacking USSR or PRC even though they were a source
of infinite supply to N Vietnamese troops
6. Achieve said goals with minimal US troops and minimal US casualties and
without the need for indefinite US involvement.

These were probably other "implicit" conditions of victory that I've not mentioned but suffice it say, it should be self-evident that victory in Vietnam was basically impossible because many of these conditions were in clear contradiction. Eventually Ford realized this, pulled-out of S Vietnam and allowed it to be swallowed by N Vietnam.

Now let us look at Iraq today. At first glance, "victory" seemed a simple matter of toppling Saddam's regime. But of course this alone was obviously insufficient. The total conditions of victory are more like this:
1. Topple Saddam regime
2. Establish law and order and maintain basic services througout all of Iraq
3. Prevent break-up and civil war in Iraq
4. Near total de-Baathification of Iraq
5. Prevent establishment of Shiite dominated regime that might be pro-Iran
(In other words, establish a new compliant pro-US regime in Iraq)
6. Facilitate the finding of insurgents and extracting information by ramsaking
homes, repudiating Geneva Convention, and rounding up and treating Iraqis
inhumanely on the flimsiest of suspicions.
7. Expect and maintain widespread and overwhelming support of US effort and
of the new Iraqi regime from most Iraqis
8. Maintain total control of Iraqi reconstruction and nation-building (ie. no UN, etc)
9. Accomplish all this with minimal US forces and minimal US casualties and
in a short period of time

My list is probably not exhaustive but even this list makes clear that defeat
in Iraq could have been forseen as inevitable given all these conditions.

 

Well if you want to simplify it, then Objective 2 should be stated "Nation Building" which would encompass "regime chance, build infrastructure, etc". Perhaps I am oversimplifying but from the onset of war to now, the impression I have always gotten was that the Bush II regime considered it to be "victory" once Objective 1 was accomplished and then everything else would just fall into place. This was obviously a fantasy and extremely naive view but there is every reason for me to think that this is what Bush's neocon advisors believed.

The Bush I regime a decade ago seemed to realize this and set the condition for victory as "liberate Kuwait" and "contain and weaken Saddam regime". He achieved these goals completely and Gulf War I was a near complete victory. Even back then he and his team had the forsight to realize that if the goal had been expanded back then "remove Saddam" and "rebuild Iraq", that if would have resulted in disaster.